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Abstract 
The momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty—
evidence from the Chinese stock market 
by Yuan Wu 
From this study, we find that the momentum premia are universally positive and 
statistically significant across 16 different momentum trading strategies in the 
Chinese Class A share market. By defining the time periods following UP and 
DOWN market states according to prior 12 or 24-month average Chinese Class A 
share market returns, we show that the momentum premia of different momentum 
strategies over time periods following UP market state eclipse those found over time 
periods following DOWN market state in the Chinese Class A share market for the 
whole sample period from January 1996 to December 2008. Furthermore, by 
employing 7 different factors—firm size, firm age, analysts’ coverage, return volatility, 
dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecast, trading volume, the quality/strength of 
corporate governance (free float ratio)—to gauge the degree of firm-level information 
uncertainty, we evidence that the information uncertainty has an amplifying effect 
over the momentum premium, and the amplifying effect is more pronounced over 
time periods following DOWN market state. The results from the sub-period analysis 
revolving the inception of two Chinese financial market regulatory reforms—1) July 
1
st, 1999 the implementation of the new P.R.C. security law; 2) July 3
rd, 2003 the 
opening of the Chinese Class A share market to qualified foreign institutional 
investors (QFII) dismiss the doubt that our findings could be sample time period-
specific. Compared with the tradition FF3F model, the Wang & Xu (2004)’s version of 
the FF3F model, with the value effect factor of the traditional FF3F model supplanted 
by residual free float ratio (proxy for the quality/strength of firm-specific corporate 
governance), exhibits more explanatory power over the momentum premia yet still 
fails to fully rationalize the momentum premia found in this study.  
This research fills the gap in the literature and expands the understanding of the 
momentum premium by offering empirical evidence of the dynamics of the 
momentum premia amid market swings, the impact of information uncertainty over 
momentum premia as well as the impact of information uncertainty over momentum 
premia amid market swings in the context of the Chinese stock market. The results 
from this study can potentially provide an important reference point for international 
and domestic investors in adjusting investment strategies and portfolio positions, or 
fishing for investment diversification opportunities in a financial market with volatile 
market condition such as the Chinese stock market. VI 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Research motivation and goals 
Ever since the existence of the momentum effect was firstly documented by 
Jegadeesh and Titman(1993) in their seminal work, it has been one of the most hotly 
discussed financial market anomalous effects on the stage of academic debating 
forum and adopted by many professionals in the financial market in their stock 
picking process or the formation of their portfolio strategy, manifesting the 
importance of the momentum effect in both academia and financial industry. Over 
decades, the resilience of the anomalous effect has spawned voluminous research. 
Some found solid empirical evidence showing the existence of the momentum effect 
around the globe, while others, especially those efficient market proponents, devoted 
a great deal of effort in rationalizing the anomalous effect or in finding empirical 
evidence that fundamentally dismisses the existence of the effect, directly 
challenging the validity of the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) (Fama, 1965). 
Collectively, the above-mentioned bewildingly complex debates lift the profile of the 
momentum effect as an intellectual idea. Among all the discussants, one of the 
group attempts to interpret the anomalous effect on the premise of various 
experimental evidence in the field of psychology, also well-known as the behavioural 
finance or neuroeconomics—a major inspiration of this research. Despite the warm 
reception it has received among academics and professionals in the field of finance, 
the bedrock of the momentum trading mechanism is not that glamorous at all. Simply 
put, the mechanism can be spelled out as “buying past winners and (short) selling 
past losers”. In some sense, the contrast between the simplity of the momentum 
mechanism and the high profile of the momentum phenomenon as an intellectual Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty                   Chapter 1 Introduction 
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idea kindles the motivation of carrying out this research. 
The Chinese economy has established itself as the engine of world economic growth 
in recent years. Given that the Chinese stock market has become an increasingly 
large part of the Chinese economy (40.37% of GDP in 2008
1), the activities taking 
place in the Chinese stock market has unequivocally attracted mounting attention 
from the academic community. What’s more, despite being a nascent financial 
market, the Chinese stock market is largely agreed to be lacking of interrelations with 
other developed financial markets such as the U.S. and the U.K, offering a good 
source for international investors fishing for diversification opportunities. Additionally, 
some of the unique characteristics of the Chinese stock market, such as different 
market segments (Class A and Class B shares; Shanghai Stock Exchange and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange), the split between tradable and non-tradable shares, 
offer plenty of room for academic discussions. 
In the wake of the uncertainty over global stock market we face today, assessment 
of the impact of information uncertainty on different investment opportunities is 
paramount to avoid adversity in the financial investing activities, making it an 
essential element to address amidst volatile market condition. With this in mind, the 
consideration of the impact of information uncertainty over the momentum premium 
in this study therefore bears substantial practical value. 
This study is not just reinventing the wheels by offering empirical evidence of the 
existence of the momentum effect in the Chinese stock market. Instead, it explores 
the dynamics of the momentum premium in the Chinese Class A share market by 
first providing a comprehensive view of the momentum premia of 16 different 
                                            
1 Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China 
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momentum strategies with different combinations of ranking and holding periods 
(R=3, 6, 9, 12; H=3, 6, 9, 12) over the entire sample period from January 1996 to 
December 2008, and then looking into the dynamics of the momentum premia of 
different momentum trading strategies amid market swings, followed by an 
investigation on the impact of information uncertainty over the momentum premium 
in the Chinese Class A share market. The study of the impact of information 
uncertainty over the momentum premia is further extended by an examination of the 
impact of information uncertainty over the momentum premia amid market swings. 
The robustness of the empirical findings is tested through the implementation of a 
sub-period analysis revolving the inception of two Chinese stock market regulatory 
reforms—July 1
st, 1999 implementation of the new P.R.C. security law and July 9
th, 
2003 the opening of Chinese Class A share market to qualified foreign institutional 
investors (QFII) and a risk adjustment process based on both of the traditional FF3F 
model and Wang & Xu (2004)’s version of the FF3F model, where the value effect 
factor is supplanted with a strength of corporate governance factor (proxied by the 
residual free float ratio).  
The sample dataset entails monthly stock returns, market capitalization, firm age, 
return volatility, dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecast, trading volume and free 
float ratio in the Chinese Class A share market over sample time period spanning 
from January 1996 to December 2008.  
From this study, we find that the momentum premia are universally positive and 
statistically significant across 16 different momentum trading strategies in the 
Chinese Class A share market. By defining the time periods following UP and 
DOWN market states according to prior 12 or 24-month average Chinese Class A Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty                   Chapter 1 Introduction 
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share market returns, we show that the momentum premia of different momentum 
strategies over time periods following UP market state eclipse those found over time 
periods following DOWN market state in the Chinese Class A share market for the 
whole sample period from January 1996 to December 2008. Furthermore, by 
employing 7 factors—firm size, firm age, analysts’ coverage, return volatility, 
dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecast, trading volume, the strength of corporate 
governance (free float ratio)—to gauge the degree of information uncertainty, we 
evidence that the information uncertainty has an amplifying effect over momentum 
premium and the amplifying effect is more pronounced over time periods following 
DOWN market state. The results from the sub-period analysis dismiss the doubt that 
our findings could be sample time period specific. Comparing to the tradition FF3F 
model, the Wang & Xu (2004)’s version of the FF3F model, with the value effect 
factor of the traditional FF3F model supplanted by residual free float ratio (proxy for 
the strength of firm-specific corporate governance), exhibits more explanatory power 
over the momentum premium yet still fails to fully justify the momentum premium.  
Succinctly, the research is aimed at expanding the understanding of the momentum 
phenomenon in the setting of the Chinese stock market through clinching the 
existence of the momentum phenomenon in the Chinese stock market, examining 
the dynamics of momentum premia amid market swings, and investigating the 
impact of information uncertainty over the momentum premia amidst market swings. 
 
1.2 Research questions and thesis outline 
During our endeavour in developing this research revolving the main theme—the 
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Class A share market, the questions that keep us intrigued and push us thinking 
forward are: 
1. Are the momentum premia of 16 momentum trading strategies with different 
combinations of ranking and holding periods (R=3, 6, 9, 12; H=3, 6, 9, 12) (short-to-
intermediate time horizon) evident in the Chinese Class A share market over the 
time period spanning from January 1996 to December 2008? 
2. What is the dynamics of the momentum premia of different momentum trading 
strategies amidst market swings in the Chinese Class A share market? 
3. What is the role information uncertainty, proxied by seven different factors (firm 
size, firm age, analysts’ coverage, return volatility, dispersions in analysts’ earnings 
forecast, trading volume as well as the strength of corporate governance), plays in 
impacting the momentum premia of different momentum trading strategies in the 
Chinese Class A share market? 
4. How does information uncertainty influence the momentum premia of different 
momentum trading strategies amid market swings in the Chinese Class A share 
market? 
5. In the light of prior studies showing the strength of firm-level corporate governance 
is capable of either gauging the degree of information uncertainty (Zhang, 2006) or 
justifying cross-sectional stock returns in the setting of the Chinese stock market 
(Wang and Xu, 2004), we conjecture whether the dual roles the quality/strength of 
firm-level corporate governance play can be substantiated with respect to influencing 
the momentum premia of momentum trading strategies and holding explanatory 
power over the momentum premia of momentum trading strategies in the Chinese 
Class A share market context. Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty                   Chapter 1 Introduction 
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To set out details in addressing the questions listed above, the remainder of the 
thesis is organized as follows: 
Chapter 2 Theoretical framework 
The bedrock of theoretical framework of this study is laid down in Chapter 2. First 
and foremost, the momentum phenomenon is explained in great detail in conjunction 
with the one of the milestones of modern finance—the Efficient Market Hypothesis 
(EMH)—theoretical basis of some relevant asset pricing models, deployed to 
rationalize the momentum phenomenon. On top of that, behavioural finance is 
portrayed as a path to interpret the phenomenon. Subsequently, the building blocks 
of the testing hypothesis—information uncertainty and corporate governance—are 
described. In the end, the testing hypotheses are summarized to complete the 
building of the underlying theoretical foundation of this research. 
Chapter 3 A review of current literature 
This chapter reviews the literature directly relevant to this research in the order of: 1) 
the evidence of the momentum phenomenon in developed and nascent financial 
markets around the globe; 2) the debates revolving the impetus behind the 
momentum premium; 3) the dynamics of momentum profits under different market 
states; 4) information uncertainty and the momentum premium; 5) the role of 
corporate governance.  
Chapter 4 Data and methodology 
The sample dataset and methodological approaches employed in this study are 
described in this chapter. With regard to the sample dataset, first a concise overview 
is given to different aspects of the Chinese stock market including the 4 salient 
financial market regulatory refroms over its history, the description of the two Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty                   Chapter 1 Introduction 
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bourses, twin-share system and the unique ownership structure. Then, the 
characteristics of market participants in the Chinese stock market will be portrayed. 
Finally, the specifications of the sample dataset will be summarized. 
The methodology section of the chapter starts off with a detailed description of the 
momentum trading mechanism, and then introduces the procedure to measure the 
momentum premium over the time periods following UP and DOWN market states. 
Subsequently, the measurement of firm-specific information uncertainty and the 
method implemented to quantify the impact of firm-specific information 
uncertaintyover the momentum phenomenon –two-way sorting momentum 
strategy—will be discussed in great detail. At the end of this chapter, the risk 
adjustment analysis and sub-period analysis, devised to test the resilience of 
momentum premia against risk factors and different types (pre- or post-event) of 
sample time period, will be described. 
Chapter 5-8 Results: 
Chapter 5 reports the evidence found on the overall momentum premia of different 
momentum investing strategies over the whole sample period (Jan. 1996- Dec. 2008) 
in the Chinese Class A share market and the behaviour of the momentum premia 
over time periods following UP and DOWN market states in the Chinese Class A 
share market.  
Chapter 6 documents the momentum premium under the influence of information 
uncertainty in the Chinese Class A share market. The empirical findings of the 
momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty over time periods 
following UP and DOWN market states in the Chinese Class A share market are 
summarized in chapter 7. Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty                   Chapter 1 Introduction 
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Chapter 8 reports the results from two robustness tests: 1) the momentum premium 
over sub-periods revolving the inception of two financial market regulatory reforms in 
the Chinese Class A share market; 2) risk-adjusted momentum premia of momentum 
trading strategies in the Chinese Class A share market based on the traditional FF3F 
model and Wang and Xu (2004)’s version of the FF3F model. 
Chapter 9 Conclusion 
This chapter concludes the whole study by first briefly summarizing the findings of 
the research, then discussing over the practical implications and theoretical 
contributions to the literature, and eventually rounding out with a brief view of the 
limitations of this research and future research avenues. 
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Chapter 2 Theoretical framework 
2.1 Introduction 
During the course of modern finance theory development in the past three decades, 
the argument of whether the financial markets are efficient has been arguably one of 
the most debatable topics in the literature. The market efficiency proponents, 
represented by Fama (1970) who first proposed the efficiency market hypothesis in 
his 1970 seminal work, argue that, on average, investors in the financial markets 
cannot make superior returns over the market portfolio. Subsequently, this school of 
thought is empirically tested and supported by a spate of asset pricing models such 
as the CAPM first proposed by Lintner (1965), Treynor(1961, 1962) and Sharpe 
(1964) and the FF3F model, firstly introduced by Fama and French (1996) etc. 
Propped by all these efforts to empirically prove the validity of the efficient market 
hypothesis, the EMH theory became one of the most solid theoretical propositions of 
the empirical finance research for well over a decade. Yet, in late 1980s, the 
emerging of a group of financial market anomalies—the value effect (Basu, 1977, 
Basu, 1983, Ball, 1978), size effect (Banz, 1981, Reinganum, 1981), prior return 
effect (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993), calendar effect (Keim, 1983, Reinganum, 1983, 
Roll, 1983, French, 1980) etc.—cast doubt on the validity of the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis empirically.   
Over the past two decades, scholars have endeavoured to find theoretical or 
empirical foundation suitable to rationalize the anomalous returns from profiting on 
the above-mentioned financial market anomalies. So far, their efforts have paid off 
as to explain a few of these anomalies. For instance, the myth of the value effect Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty   Chapter 2 Theoretical framework 
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was successfully uncovered as Fama and French(1996) claim that their FF3F model 
can fully explain the extra amount of risk carried by high book-to-market ratio 
portfolios. Whilst others such as the momentum effect is proved to be very resilient 
on theoretical level, behavioural finance proponents extended the effort in explaining 
the anomaly by challenging the theoretical limitions of the EMH. Specifically, they 
argue that all financial market investors are subject to different levels of cognitive 
biases, contradicting one of the most important EMH assumptions—all investors in 
the capital market are homogeneously rational. Consequently, the behavioural 
finance scholars contend that the momentum effect could be attributed to various 
forms of human cognitive biases such as overconfidence(Daniel et al., 1998), 
conservativeness/underreaction to earnings information (Barberis et al., 1998) and 
investors’ overreaction and underreaction(Hong and Stein, 1999). 
By and large, information uncertainty can be defined as the inaccuracy associated 
with the information flows in different contexts. In which case, the inaccuracy can be 
further decomposed into error if it is known and uncertainty otherwise(Hunter and 
Goodchild, 1993). In other words, information uncertainty represents ambiguity, 
doubt and inconsistency embedded in a variety of information, existing in everyday 
life, capital market and academic research analysis. Neverthless, in this research, 
information uncertainty is strictly defined as “ambiguity with respect to the 
implications of new information for a firm’s value, which potentially stems from two 
sources: the volatility of a firm’s underlying fundamentals and poor information” 
(Zhang, 2006: page 105). 
Another important concept in firm valuation is corporate governance. Typically, it can 
be defined as “the way in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty   Chapter 2 Theoretical framework 
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themselves of getting a return on their investment” (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997: Page 
737). This research puts corporate governance on the centre stage in part because 
of its potential importance in the portfolio strategy formation process of investing 
professionals, the likes of portfolio strategists and fund managers. Implicit in that is 
global fund managers’ demand for better quality of corporate governance and more 
accountable listed-firms in the setting of the Chinese stock market (Zweig, 2010a). 
Moreover, thanks to the availability of the free float ratios, we are able to quantify the 
quality/strength of corporate governance of the listed firms in the Chinese stocks 
market, signifying the practical value of the study.  
In this study, the hypotheses are developed on the belief that the Chinese stock 
market, being the most important emerging market in the world of capital market, is 
exceedingly rich in behavioural phenomena due to its unique characteristics—the 
market is policy-driven, packed with retail investors, swung by speculative trading 
and retail investors’ sentiment. Moreover, the role of corporate governance, being 
the focal point for most international investors nowadays, is deserved to be 
rigorously analyzed from the perspective of its relation to the momentum effect under 
different market conditions. The theoretical building blocks of the hypotheses are 
buttressed by previous solid theoretical and empirical evidence on the momentum 
phenomenon in the Chinese stock market (Kang et al., 2002, Naughton et al., 2008), 
the intricate relationship between information uncertainty and stock returns(Zhang, 
2006, Jiang et al., 2005), and relationship between the quality of corporate 
governance and stock returns in the setting of the Chinese stock market (Wang and 
Xu, 2004). Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty   Chapter 2 Theoretical framework 
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The remainder of the chapter is organized around the building blocks of our testing 
hypotheses. Section 2.2 explores the understanding of the momentum phenomenon 
and explains the mechanism of the momentum trading strategies. The concepts of 
behaviour finance, information uncertainty and corporate governance are explained 
in section 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5 respectively. Section 2.6 wraps out the chapter by listing 
out all the testing hypotheses. 
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2.2 The momentum phenomenon 
2.2.1 The momentum phenomenon 
The momentum phenomenon is a form of the prior return effects, with the other well 
known as the contrarian phenomenon. Simply put, the superior performance of 
stocks/portfolios during the prior periods (J months) can be expected to prolong 
during the subsequent periods; the stocks/portfolios with weak performance in the 
previous periods are inclined to extend their loss in the subsequent periods. The 
existence of the momentum phenomenon can be tested by comparing the return of 
the momentum effect-based trading strategy against that of “buy-and-hold” investing 
strategy. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) pioneered to document the effect in their 
1993 study. In the study, they ranked all the stocks listed on the NYSE and AMEX 
over the time horizon from 1965 to 1989 based on their prior i-month (i= 3, 6, 9, 12) 
average returns. The stocks were subsequently grouped into 10 portfolios based on 
their ranking. The group consists of stocks with the best past returns is named the 
“winner” portfolio; the group consists of stocks with the worst past returns is named 
the “loser” portfolio. The “winner” and “loser” portfolios, being rebalanced monthly, 
are held for j month (j= 3, 6, 9, 12). To mitigate the issue of biased test statistics 
caused by overlapping returns, Jegadeesh and Titman design the momentum 
mechanism in the way that one strategy (j, k) actually represents a combination of 
different ranking strategies. Further, they adjusted the raw returns of winner and 
loser portfolios for the market risk factor using the CAPM model, which can be 
expressed mathematically as, 
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“Where  pt r represents the return on “winner/loser” portfolio,  mt r denotes the return on 
the value-weighted index (proxy for the return of the market portfolio), and  ft r is the 
interest rate on 1-month Treasury Bill” (page 77). The results showed that “the 
portfolio of past winner achieves significant positive abnormal return when the value-
weighted index is used as the benchmark, while the abnormal return of the portfolio 
of past loser is not statistically significant with this benchmark” (Page 77). The 
findings from Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)’s work has inspired many researchers in 
the literature. Over the past couple of decades, swamping amount of empirical 
evidence was present, confirming the existence of the momentum phenomenon 
around the globe (their studies are detailed in the literature review chapter). 
Theoretically, the existence of the momentum phenomenon was challenged by 
Fama and French (1996), yet they failed to explain the abnormal returns attributed to 
the momentum effect by using the FF3F model. Moreover, Carhart (1997) examined 
the returns of mutual funds in the US market over the time horizon of Jan. 1962 to 
Dec. 1993. In the risk-adjustment process, he extended the FF3F model by adding a 
Prior-one-year factor
2 (PR1YR) (momentum factor) and claimed that the improved 
asset pricing model could justify most anomalous effects in the financial market but 
the persistent underperformance of momentum “loser” portfolios. In addition, the 
findings from the study clinched the postulate that the momentum effect per se is 
totally independent of the size and value effect. In other words, the results from his 
analysis, armed with the momentum-inspired asset pricing model, manifested the 
                                            
2 The Prior-one-year factor was constructed by taking the average returns of “the equal-weight 
average of firms with the highest 30 percent eleven-month returns lagged one month minus the 
equal-weight average firms with the lowest 30 percent eleven-month returns lagged one month” 
(Carhart, 1997: 61). “The portfolios include all NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq stocks and are re-formed 
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enormous debacle in attempt to rationalize the momentum phenomeon using known 
risk factors from a unique perspective. While hitting the wall on the risk-based 
explanations, researchers turned to behaviour-based theories/models, motivated by 
psychological evidence, for help to reconcile the anomalous effect (will be detailed in 
section 2.3 behavioural finance/investors’ sentiment).  
2.2.2 The momentum trading strategies 
The price momentum mechanism we employ will be consistent with the approach 
documented in Jegadeesh and Titman(1993)’s seminal work. The details of the 
momentum investing mechanism will be described in chapter 4—the data and 
methodology chapter. 
2.3 Behavioural finance/ investors’ sentiment 
Behavioural finance is the study of the influence of psychology on the behaviour of 
financial practitioners and the subsequent effect on markets. Behavioural finance is 
of interest because it helps explain why and how markets might be inefficient. 
(Sewell, 2007: page 1) 
In plain language, the framework of behavioural finance is reliant on the common 
sense, supported by experimental evidences in the field of psychology, that human 
beings are fallible in judging reality. This sort of imperfection in people’s judgment is 
also well known as human cognitive biases. The first ever scholarly research on 
behavioural finance dates back to 1912 and was documented by Selden (1912). He 
argued that the price movements on the stock exchanges could be greatly attributed 
to investors’ psychological behaviours, yet the modern behavioural finance research 
has not really flourished until the publication of the articles “Availability: A heuristic 
for judging frequency and probability” and “Judgement under uncertainty: Heuristics Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty   Chapter 2 Theoretical framework 
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and Biases” by two psychologists—Tversky and Kahneman (1973, 1974). The duo 
pioneered to introduce three most important psychological evidences—
Representativeness, availability and anchoring effect, which later evolved to become 
the theoretical foundation of numerous behavioural finance theories.  
In their 1979 work, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) firstly proposed the prospect 
theory, standing in contrast with the expected utility theory (Bernoulli, 1954, Von 
Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944). In the very same article, they experimentally 
confirmed the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes under the prospect theory: “risk 
aversion for gains of moderate to high probability and losses of low probability, and 
risk seeking for gains of low probability and losses of moderate to high probability” 
(Sewell, 2007: page 2).  
The seminal work on using behavioural finance theories to interpret the momentum 
phenomenon was substantiated by Daniel et al.(1998), Barberis et al.(1998) and 
Hong and Stein (1999).  
Daniel, Hirshileifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) proposed a behavioural model where 
investors are assumed to be quasi-rational and overconfident. They argued that 
because the overconfident investors in the financial market routinely overestimate 
their forecasting or judging ability coupled with inherent human confirmation bias
3, 
they tend to emphasize public information signals that confirm their own judgment 
yet downplay public information signals that contradict their judgment on different 
securities. Their irrational behaviour gives rise to the overreaction upon different 
                                            
3 “Confirmation bias is a cognitive bias whereby one tends to notice and look for information that 
confirms one’s existing beliefs, whilst ignoring anything that contradicts those bliefs. It is type of 
selective thinking” April 16, 2010 <http://confirmation-bias.behaviouralfinance.net/>. Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty   Chapter 2 Theoretical framework 
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public information signals, which eventually leads to the momentum phenomenon we 
observe in the financial market. In other words, Daniel et al. (1998) suggested that it 
is the investors’ overreaction driven by human cognitive biases—overconfidence, 
self-attribution bias and confirmation bias—that leads to the momentum 
phenomenon observed in the financial market.  
In a contemporary study, inspired by psychological evidence such as 
representativeness bias (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) and confirmation 
bias(Gilovich, 1993), Barberis et al.(1998) constructed a model consists of one 
representative market investor and one security, where the representative investor’s 
sentiment directly affects the security’s price in the fictional market. Furthermore, 
they assumed that the earnings of the security follow a random walk, which is not 
revealed to the representative market investor. Instead, he/she believes the 
dynamics of the asset earnings can be categorized into two types of regimes: 1) the 
earnings tend to reverse its trend in the prior period (mean-reverting); 2) the earnings 
tend to maintain its trend in the previous period (trending). The representative 
investor as human being is subject to cognitive bias. Specifically, when the investor 
witnesses a mean-reverting earning regime in the previous period, he/she will 
believe that the earnings will follow suit in the coming period, which is what 
psychologist/behavioural finance researchers call “confirmation bias”. Sometimes, 
buoyed by the confirmation bias formed in the previous period, the representative 
investor erroneously believes the dynamics of earnings are in a regime whilst in fact 
the earnings are following the other alternative regime. These erroneously beliefs in 
turn give rise to the investor’s underreaction to the information about the earnings. Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty   Chapter 2 Theoretical framework 
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Consequently, Barberis et al.(1998) argued that the momentum phenomenon stems 
from the investors’ underreaction to earnings information in the financial market. 
In another one of the most important subsequent studies at the early stage of the 
literature, Hong and Stein(1999) made their work distinct from two prior seminal 
work(Daniel et al., 1998, Barberis et al., 1998) mentioned above by building a 
behavioural theory on the behavioural interaction between two different type of 
agents as opposed to the behaviour of one single representative agent employed by 
Daniel et al.(1998) and Barberis et al.(1998).  In Hong and Stein(1999)’s theory, all 
market investors are assumed to be “boundedly rational” (Hong and Stein, 1999: 
page 2144), yet can be divided into two distinctive groups—“newswatcher” and 
“momentum trader”. Of them, “newswatcher” investor tends to forecast based purely 
on the private information coming in, on the contrary, “momentum trader” make their 
trading decision based solely on the historic stock price trends regardless of any 
current and upcoming in-play information signals in the market. Moreover, they also 
assume that private information signals spread out among all the “newswatchers” 
over time. Hong and Stein(1999) postulated that it is underreaction by 
“newswatchers” toward private information signals that drives and lies at the heart of 
the momentum phenomenon in the stock market. In another influential study, Du 
(2002) proposed a behavioural model on the premise of heterogeneity in investors’ 
self-confidence. The momentum phenomenon is largely believed to be driven by 
investors’ underreaction to public information signalling a permanent change in the 
fundamental value of assets (Hong and Stein, 1999). Drawing on the theoretical 
framework of the underreaction theory proposed by Hong and Stein (1999) and 
gradual-information-diffusion theory developed by Hong, Lim and Stein (2000), Du Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty   Chapter 2 Theoretical framework 
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argued that the economic agents with lower confidence underreact to the public 
information signals, which in turn leads to the lagged incorporation of information to 
asset prices and eventually results in the momentum phenomenon observed. In 
other words, he nominates the underconfidence/hesitation of some investors toward 
decision making as the driving force behind the momentum effect. 
In our research, the above-mentioned behavioural finance theories will be employed, 
by constantly referring back to, to interpret the empirical evidence found on the 
influence of information uncertainty over the momentum premium from the 
perspective of human cognitive heuristics such as underreaction, 
optimism/overconfidence, overreaction etc., inherent with Chinese investors’ 
behaviours. 
As to the Chinese stock market or Chinese stocks, many finance practitioners argue 
that the hotly discussed stock market or stocks share a few similarities with the tech 
sector/stocks in the “Dot Com bubble” era in the late 1990s. They witnessed that 
some listed firms outperformed the overall market by solely adding “China” to their 
trade tickers in the stock market (Zweig, 2010b, Bae and Wang, 2009). Indeed, 
being one of the biggest and most important emerging markets, the Chinese stock 
market looks promising to offer rich evidence of financial market anomalous effects 
triggered by individual investors’ cognitive biases—overconfidence, disposition effect 
etc. (Chuang, 2010, Xu and Lu, 2008). The cognitive biases in the Chinese stock 
markets can take different forms and “on a different level than people of other culture” 
(Kim and Nofsinger, 2008: page 1). Against this backdrop, empirical evidence found 
in the setting of the Chinese stock market bear significant theoretical and practical 
significance in behavioural finance-related research.  Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty   Chapter 2 Theoretical framework 
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To close out this section, I’d like to re-emphasize the crucial role behavioural finance 
plays in forming the theoretical basis of our empirical hypotheses by quoting an 
appraisement on behavioural finance by Shefrin(2000): 
Behavioural finance is everywhere that people make financial decisions. Psychology 
is hard to escape; it touches every corner of the financial landscape, and it’s 
important. Financial practitioners need to understand the impact that psychology has 
on them and on those around them. Practitioners ignore psychology at their peril. 
(page 309) 
2.4 Information uncertainty 
The importance of information has been emphasized in various studies across 
different disciplines such as clinical nursing (Mills and Sullivan, 1999), 
neuroscience(Abeles et al., 1994), information management(Li, 1997), supply chain 
management(Singh, 1996) etc. Needless to say, the role of information in finance 
market has been widely documented in numerous studies in the finance literature. 
Among them, Mitchell and Mulherin(1994) proxied the public information using “the 
number of news announcements reported daily by Dow Jones & Company” (923) 
and found a direct relationship between public information and market activities 
(trading volumes and stock returns). Booth and Chua (1996) empirically 
substantiated the role of investor-borne information costs as an explanation to the 
tendency of IPO underpricing provoked by ownership dispersion. Furthermore, other 
researchers (Fleming and Remolona, 1999) showed that the announcements of 
important public information trigger a “two-stage adjustment process” (1901) in the 
price formation in the US Treasury market. From a firm-specific perspective, Sjoo 
and Zhang(2000)  postulated that investors normally have more faith in firms with Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty   Chapter 2 Theoretical framework 
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large capitalization in that large-cap firms tend to carry better quality of information. 
With so many evidences being reported in this line of the literature, it is no wonder 
that one of the most prolific wall-street finance semi-professionals, Zweig (2010c), 
suggests that “information is power in the financial market” (page 1).  
The vast majority of previous studies have been concentrating on the information 
flows or information asymmetry(Sjöö and Zhang, 2000) (Hong et al., 2000, Doukas 
and McKnight, 2005). Differing from the above-mentioned scholarly studies, we 
choose to focus on the uncertainty character of information. In the context of our 
research, information uncertainty can be defined as “the ambiguity with respect to 
the implications of new information for a firm’s value, which potentially stems from 
two sources: the volatility of a firm’s underlying fundamentals and poor information” 
(Zhang, 2006: page 105), to be consistent with the seminal work by Jiang et al. 
(2005) and Zhang (2006)—the main inspiration of this research. Even though the 
empirical finding of the interaction between the momentum premia and information 
uncertainty is scant in the literature, a fair amount of articles have substantiated the 
intricate relationship between information uncertainty and stock returns. The positive 
relationship between cross-sectional stock returns and information uncertainty in the 
stock market was postulated by Wall Street practitioners as well as researchers in 
the academia(Stivers and Sun, 2009). Hirshleifer (2001) set out a theoretical 
framework of investors’ psychology and asset pricing, under which, information 
uncertainty factors accentuate investors’ cognitive biases, triggering them to down 
play the fundamentals of stocks in the stock market. Further, Hirshleifer (2001)’s 
theoretical framework is empirically validated by Daniel et al.(1998, 2001). They 
showed that the presence of anomalous effects in the financial market was boosted Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty   Chapter 2 Theoretical framework 
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by higher level of information uncertainty. Additionally, Daniel et al. (1998, 2001) 
argued that their finding can be attributed to the fact that the difficulty of business 
valuation, imposed by information uncertainty, tends to amplify stock investors’ 
heuristic bias (overconfidence).  From other perspective, information uncertainty also 
was found to encourage risk-taking behaviours in the stock markets, which leads to 
more frequent trading activities (Brereton, 2009). Besides the positive relationship 
between information uncertainty and stock returns, a pair of studies (Jiang et al., 
2005, Zhang, 2006) first documented the relationship between information 
uncertainty and the momentum premia. In these two studies, they used different sets 
of proxies
4 to measure the degree of information uncertainty and show that the 
degree of information was positively associated with the momentum premia. In other 
words, greater degree of information uncertainty amplifies the yields from momentum 
trading. Following Zhang (2006)’s method of proxying information uncertainty levels 
based on different firms’ characteristic variables (firm size, firm age, analyst 
coverage, volatility, analyst earnings forecasts, cash flow volatility), Kelsey et 
al.(2010) studied the dynamic of positive and negative momentum effect under 
Knightian uncertainty in the U.S. stock market and confirmed Zhang (2006)’s finding 
that the momentum premia tend to be evidently larger under the influence of greater 
information uncertainty. Further, negative momentum effect (measured by the 
returns of loser portfolios) was found to play a more dominant and persistent role 
compared to positive momentum effect (measured by the returns of winner portfolios) 
                                            
4 Jiang et al.(2005) use firm age, return volatility, average daily turnover, and the duration of firms’ 
future cash flows to proxy IU. Zhang (2006) employs firm size, firm age, analyst coverage, dispersion 
in analyst earning forecasts, stock volatility and cash flow volatility to gauge stocks’ information 
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in determining and amplifying the momentum premium under the influence of 
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2.5 Corporate governance 
The origin of corporate governance dates back to over 200 years ago, when Adam 
Smith (1961) succinctly described the prime issue sitting at the heart of corporate 
governance—“when ownership and control of corporations are not fully coincident, 
there is potential for conflicts of interest between owners and controllers” (qtd. in 
Denis and McConnell, 2003: page 1). In view of the theoretical and practical 
developments revolving the concept, corporate governance has had increasingly 
entrenched influence over research in different fields such as law, finance etc. as a 
qualitative factor, associated with board administration, chief executive officer 
compensation, ownership and firm performance. A good corporate governance 
practice can be defined as “a culture and a climate of Consistency, Responsibility, 
Accountability, Fairness, Transparency, and Effectiveness that is Deployed 
throughout the organization (the ‘CRAFTED’ principles of governance)”
5. The quality 
of the corporate governance is closely related to the success of a corporation as 
good corporate governance practice enables the corporation to more efficiently yield 
profits, aligning with the interests of its stakeholders, which is probably the reason 
why increasingly more portfolio strategiests/fund managers start taking corporate 
governance into consideration in their stock picking/portfolio selection process. In the 
corporate governance-finance literature, by constructing an index based on 
corporate governance quality measurements, scholars found prevailing empirical 
evidences showing “lower quality of corporate governance practice is associated 
with consistent lacklustre performance of corporations in the stock market (Gompers 
et al., 2003, O'Donovan, 2003, Drobetz et al., 2004). Yet most of the studies focused 
                                            
5 Arguden, Yilamz. “Measuring the effectiveness of corporate governance.” INSEAD: Knowledge: 2 
Par. Online. Internet. 01/22/2010. Available: http://knowledge.insead.edu/corporate-governance-
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on very mature, developed financial markets, only limited attention was paid on 
emerging Asian markets in this line of the literature. Of them, Mitton (2002) showed 
that there is a strong positive relationship between the quality of corporate 
governance practice and firm’s stock price in the stock market in six east Asian 
countries—Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand. His finding was 
confirmed by Black et al.(2006), who postulated that more stringent corporate 
practice presages high share returns in emerging markets. In one of the most 
influential studies to the development of my testing hypotheses, Wang and Xu (2004) 
took into account the special share ownership structure
6  of the firms listed in the 
Chinese stock market and used free float ratio (“the ratio of shares in a public 
company that are freely available to the investing public to total company 
shares”(page 65)), to proxy for the corporate governance factor, reflecing the 
quality/strength of corporate governance.  
Wang and Xu (2004) witnessed that the residual free float ratio as a risk factor 
improves the explanatory power of the FF3F model over the cross-sectional stock 
returns in the Chinese stock market. Extending Wang and Xu (2004)’s study, we 
employ their calibrated version of the FF3F asset pricing model to rationalize the 
risks borne by momentum winner and loser portfolios. Yet the role of corporate 
governance in our research is not limited to be merely one of the risk factors in the 
risk-adjustment process, it will also be examined as one of information uncertainty 
proxy variables. On this front, we are particularly inspired by the seminal work on 
corporate governance and company’s share performance in the stock market by 
                                            
6 The special share ownership structure refers to the fact that “about two-thirds of total market 
capitalization is owned by the state” (66), and the majority of the remaining shares are in the hands 
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Gompers et al. (2003). Specifically, high free flow also means that shareholders 
have more incentive to exercise their rights, which will in turn give rise to higher 
quality of corporate governance. In the context of the Chinese stock market, 
characterised by frequent government intervention, a high free float implies less 
uncertainty induced by government policies through the government owned non-
tradable shares (Gompers et al., 2003, Wang and Xu, 2004). Elsewhere in the 
literature, researchers found a slew of evidences unanimously showing that firm-
level information uncertainty can be reflected by the quality/strength of firm’s 
corporate governance practice. To be specific, more stringent corporate governance 
practice tends to signal lower level of information uncertainty (Bushman and Smith, 
2001, Cai et al., 2006, Gillan et al., 2006, Raheja, 2009, Das, 2008, Magnan and Xu, 
2008). All the above-mentioned empirical and theoretical evidence collectively 
corroborate my conjecture that corporate governance is a suitable proxy for firm-
level information uncertainty.  
2.6 Summary/testing hypotheses 
To sum up, we list out the testing hypotheses, reflecting the essence of our 
conjectures, in this section as follow: 
Hypothesis 1: overall the momentum premia of different momentum trading 
strategies in the Chinese Class A share market are positive and statistically 
significant over the sample time period from January 1996 to December 2008. 
Hypothesis 2: the momentum premia of different momentum trading strategies in 
the Chinese Class A share market are expected to be positive and significant over 
time periods following UP market state and much weaker and statistically 
insignificant during time periods following DOWN market state over entire sample Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty   Chapter 2 Theoretical framework 
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period (Jan. 1996 to Dec. 2008). 
Hypothesis 3: information uncertainty, proxied by 7 different factors including firm 
size, firm age, analysts’ coverage, return volatility, dispersion in analysts’ earnings 
forecast (DISP), trading volume, the quality/strength of corporate governance (free 
float ratio), amplifies the momentum premium of the (R=6, H=6) momentum strategy, 
a representative of all the momentum trading strategies, in the Chinese Class A 
share market. Additionally, the amplifying effect of information uncertainty over 
momentum premium of the (R=6, H=6) momentum trading strategy is most 
pronounced over time periods following DOWN market state.  
Hypothesis 4: In the light of Wang & Xu(2004) ‘s finding that a factor proxying the 
quality/strength of corporate governance helps elucidate cross-sectional stock 
returns, we expect the inclusion of the corporate governance factor, proxied by 
residual free float ratio, to ameliorate explanatory power of the traditional FF3F asset 
pricing model. Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty   Chapter 2 Theoretical framework 
 
- 28 - 
 
   Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty   Chapter 3 A review of current 
literature 
 
- 29 - 
 
Chapter 3 A review of current literature 
3.1 Introduction 
Momentum phenomenon grabbed researchers and analysts’ attention thanks to the 
detrimental role it plays against the validity of the well-grounded Market Efficiency 
Hypothesis. Doubtless, the curiosity and vigour of researchers towards the 
phenomenon have been translated into numerous of academic studies, from which 
they either proved the significance and resilience of the momentum phenomenon or 
argued that the phenomenon does not exist in certain financial market in the world or 
global financial market as a whole. This chapter will cover the relevant and 
noteworthy evidence from previous studies in the extant literature. 
3.2 A panorama of the evidence of the existence of the momentum 
phenomenon globally 
3.2.1 Evidence of the momentum phenomenon in the U.S. and U.K. markets 
The phenomenon of short-to-medium horizon return continuation has been 
extensively documented in the finance literature for years. The earliest evidence of 
the existence of the effect was reported in Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)’s seminal 
work, where they studied the performance of stocks trading on the NYSE and AMEX 
over the period 1965 to 1989. Specifically, they first ranked all the listed-stocks 
based on their past 3, 6, 9, 12-month returns, then put them into 10 portfolios (the 
portfolio consists of stocks with highest past returns is labelled as “winner” portfolio; 
the portfolio consists of stocks with lowest past returns is labelled as “loser” portfolio) 
based on their past-return ranking, and subsequently held these 10 portfolios for 3, 6, 
9, 12 months by going long on “winner” portfolios and going short on “loser” 
portfolios.  Consequently, they find that abnormal returns can be produced by buying Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty   Chapter 3 A review of current 
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“winner” portfolios and selling “loser” portfolios in various formation periods (3, 6, 9, 
12 months) and holding the portfolios for various lengths of time (3, 6, 9, 12 months). 
Not surprisingly, Jegadeesh and Titman(1993)’s finding became the impetus behind 
ensuing endeavours to capture the evidence of the existence of the momentum 
phenomenon in different markets and the cause of the financial market anomaly.  
Recent studies reported promising evidence on the existence of the momentum 
effect in two of the world’s most developed financial markets—the U.S. and U.K 
markets. Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1995) analyzed a sample dataset 
consists of all stocks listed on the NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq over the time period 
from January 1973 through December 1993 and show that the price momentum
7 
profit—returns from past winner portfolios minus the returns from past “loser” 
portfolios—is around 8.8 percentage points on average for the US stock market. Yet, 
the earnings momentum
8 effect is proved to be slightly less significant over six-
month holding period. Intriguingly, the “loser” portfolio consists of stocks with the 
lowest past earnings exhibit the strongest momentum returns over various holding 
periods (6-12 months), which is consistent with the information diffusion theory firstly 
proposed by Hong, Lim and Stein (2000). The theory states that because of lacking 
of attention from most analysts, information tends to travel slower among stocks with 
lacklustre earnings performance. Consequently, Chan et al. (1999), contend that the 
(price and earnings) momentum phenomenon can be attributed to the sluggish 
response of share prices to share price and company earnings information available 
                                            
7 A type of momentum strategy that selects stocks based on their past share price performance(Bird 
and Whitaker, 2003). 
8 A type of momentum strategy that selects stocks based on their past reported earnings 
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in the financial market.  
On the UK market front within the literature, employing a comprehensive UK market 
share price data taken from the London Share Price Database (LSPD) over the time 
period January 1977 to December 1996, Liu at al. (1999) document that the 
momentum effect is positive and significant in the UK financial market. Their results 
are robust against different methodologies (Lehmann, 1990; Jegadeesh and Titman, 
1993), seasonal effects, and data-snooping such as sub-period analysis and 
bootstrap test etc.  
3.2.2 Evidence of the momentum phenomenon in the rest of markets around the 
globe 
Among studies with a focus on the momentum effect across a group of countries, 
Rouwenhorst(1998) implements the Jegadeesh and Titman(1993)’s approach and 
performed the test on a sample dataset of a diversified portfolio among 12 European 
countries
9 over the period 1978 to 1995. The empirical results from his study show 
that the short-to-medium time horizon momentum returns are consistently positive 
and significant. Further, Rouwenhorst (1998) confirms the robustness of the results 
through testing against country and size factors.  
Among works pertaining the evidence of the momentum phenomenon in Asian 
markets, Ramiah et al.(2009) investigate the impact of the special dual-board 
structure of the Singapore Stock Exchange on the momentum effect for the sample 
time period 1990 through 2004. They report that the momentum trading generates 
positive and economically significant abnormal returns for the main board, the 
                                            
9 The 12 European countries include Austria (60 firms), Belgium(127), Denmark(60), France(427), 
Germany(228), Italy(223),the Netherlands(101),Norway(71),Spain(111),Sweden(134), 
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second board, or the combined board in the stock exchange. Yet, the results from a 
split-board study reveal that the momentum effect is markedly more significant 
among the smaller companies, which are normally concentrated on the second 
board of the stock exchange. By studying a dataset includes the returns of all 
common stocks listed in Hong Kong, Indonesian, Japanese, Korean, Malaysian, 
Singaporean, Taiwanese, and Thai stock markets over the period January 1996 
through February 2000, Chui et al. (2000) report that the momentum returns for a 
portfolio with stocks diversified among the Asian countries mentioned above except 
Japan are positive and statistically significant. However, the existence of the 
momentum effect within individual countries is time frame-dependent for pre- and 
post-1997 Asian financial crisis.  
Nonetheless, the empirical results from other studies in the literature with focus on 
Asian financial markets cast doubt on the resilience of the momentum effect. Among 
them, Hameed and Kusnadi (2002) conduct analysis on the stock-listed on six Asian 
financial markets (Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and 
Thailand) over the time window spanning from 1979 to 1994
10. The empirical 
evidence from their study shows that momentum effect is weak and mostly 
statistically insignificant among the sample markets. Differing from prior studies on 
momentum phenomenon in different Asian markets, such as Hameed and 
Kusnadi(2002) and Chui et al.(2000) who focused on 3-12 months portfolio formation 
periods, McInish et al. (2008) examine momentum portfolios with formation periods 
ranging from 1 to 4 weeks and show that the momentum phenomenon in major 
                                            
10 The data are collected from the Pacific-Basin Capital Markets (PACAP) Database(Hameed and 
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literature 
 
- 33 - 
 
Asian stock markets
11 is not significant for the time period spanning from 1999 to 
2000.  
3.2.3 Evidence of the momentum phenomenon in the Chinese stock market 
Compared to the comprehensive focuses on other relatively more developed 
financial markets, the momentum phenomenon in the Chinese stock market only 
started receiving fair amount of attention in early 2000. The empirical results from 
these studies have been mixed and confusing mainly because different methods 
have been implemented on different stock exchanges (Shanghai Stock Exchange 
and Shenzhen Stock Exchange) over different ranking and holding periods (from 
very short up to 2 years). Naturally, the results do not normally concur with each 
other. Yet, the divergence of the findings distracts scholars from further exploring the 
main driver behind the momentum phenomenon and other factors that might impact 
the momentum profitability. 
By examining a dataset that includes weekly share A
12 stock prices for the period 
January 1993 to January 2000 taken from Datastream, Kang et al.(2002) document 
that the momentum returns are positive and statistically significant for intermediate-
ranking and holding periods (12, 16, 20 and 26 weeks). Yet, they contemplate that 
the momentum profits will die off as the Chinese financial market “becomes mature 
and more transparent in the future” (Kang et al., 2002: 264). Extending the sample 
time horizon to the period 1995 to 2005, Naughton et al. (2008) focus on the A 
shares that are listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and report that the 
momentum trading strategies can produce positive and significant abnormal returns. 
                                            
11 The major Asian stock markets studied in this research include Japan, Taiwan, Korea, Hong Kong, 
Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore. 
12 Share A stocks were only allowed to be traded among local Chinese investors(Kang et al., 2002). Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty   Chapter 3 A review of current 
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Their empirical results firmly support Kang et al.(2002)’s findings that the momentum 
effect is prevalent in the Chinese Class A share market. Furthermore, Wang and 
Chin(2004) employ a sample dataset pertains all share A stocks listed on both the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) and 
investigate the interaction between volume-based and past return-based momentum 
approaches. They document that low-volume stocks exhibit considerably positive 
and robust momentum effect, which is largely in line with theoretical behavioural 
framework (Barberis et al., 1998, Hong and Stein, 1999, Baker and Stein, 2004), 
implying that investors’ underreaction and slow incorporation of information attribute 
to the momentum phenomenon.  
Yet, other studies with a focus on the Chinese market could not provide compelling 
evidences to show the existence of the effect. By examining return data
13 of all 
Share A stocks listed on both of Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange over period January, 1994 through December, 2004, He and Tan (2006) 
follow the methodology outlined in Jegadeesh and Titman(1993)’s seminal work and 
show that only small number of short-to-intermediate time horizon momentum 
strategies can produce positive momentum profits and most of them are not 
statistically significant. Similarly, in Wang (2004) employs the Jegadeesh and 
Titman(1993)’s approach and finds negative momentum returns over 6-month to 2-
year holding and ranking periods, which is expected as numerous previous studies 
report that the momentum effect exists only in short to intermediate time window.  
                                            
13 Data are collected from Chinese Stock Market price and return database (CCER) and Chinese 
Stock Market exchange database (CSMAR) (He and Tan, 2006). Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty   Chapter 3 A review of current 
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3.3 Extant explanations to the momentum phenomenon 
Whilst some very compelling evidences of the existence of the momentum 
phenomenon have been documented in numerous of previous studies mentioned 
above, there is an on-going debate about what is the driving force behind the 
momentum phenomenon. Researchers have been developing different theories in 
attempt to explain the cause of the momentum effect without concurrence over years. 
Overall, the explanations can be divided into two main strands—risk factor-based 
explanations built on the belief of the validity of weak-form market efficiency and 
behavioural models-based explanations supported by modern behavioural finance 
theory.  
3.3.1 Risk-based explanations to evidence of the momentum profits  
For a quite long period of time in the past decades before the behavioural finance 
research loomed in the late 1980s, mostly market efficiency proponents in the field 
believe that the momentum effect is the resultant of some hidden risk factors. 
Specifically, the risk factors cannot be captured by existing asset pricing models 
such as the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) proposed by Sharpe (1964) and 
Lintner (1965) and the Fama and French Three Factor model (FF3F) and alike. 
However, the hypothesis that risk factors alone can fully explain the returns from 
momentum investing keeps being rejected by empirical results from most of 
momentum effect-focused studies. Of which, in their 1993 seminal work on the 
momentum phenomenon in the US stock markets, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) 
test the resilience of the momentum returns against market risk factor (CAPM), size 
factor, lead-lag effects, transaction costs, seasonal effect, and sample time horizon. 
They show that the excess returns from momentum trading cannot be justified by Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty   Chapter 3 A review of current 
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any of the above-mentioned risk factors. To further stretch asset pricing model’s 
capability of capturing risk, Fama and French (1996) propose a multi-risk factor asset 
pricing model augmented by market risk factor, size factor and book-to-market factor 
and report that their model is proved to be capable of  explaining most of the 
financial market phenomena, yet fails to rationalize the abnormal momentum returns 
which is attributed to the lack of fitness of various CAPM model in describing 
average returns. In regards to the FF3F model’s inability to explain the momentum 
returns, Fama and French (1996) offer three possible explanations: Firstly, they 
bitterly question if the momentum effect is a resultant of data mining. Secondly, they 
point out that behavioural-based model, describing human heuristic biases of market 
participants, might be capable of spelling out the existence of the momentum 
phenomenon. Finally, they call for a richer asset pricing model in order to capture 
any hidden risk factors which might drive the momentum effect. It is worth noting that 
Fama and French (1996)’s suggestions have enormously influenced the direction of 
subsequent studies in the literature.  
Overseeing the literature, the empirical evidence that reject the asset pricing model 
approach in explaining the momentum effect overwhelm those evidence that support. 
Specifically, Hon and Tonks (2003) show that the returns yielded from momentum 
investing cannot be justified by either beta-risk factor or size factor in their extensive 
study of the momentum effect in the UK stock market. In particular, Kang et al.(2002) 
follow the methodology proposed by Chan(1988) in constructing time-varying risk 
models and show that the momentum returns in Chinese market cannot be attributed 
to the time-varying market risk factor. On the contrary, Wang(2004) find significant Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty   Chapter 3 A review of current 
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evidence to support the argument that the Fama French factors are capable of 
explaining the momentum phenomenon in Chinese stock market. 
3.3.2 Behavioural model-based explanations to the momentum phenomenon 
While many market efficiency proponents still believe that the momentum payoffs 
reflect a compensation for risk, academics in the behavioural finance field make 
attempts to unveil the perplexing momentum phenomenon in the financial markets 
by developing different theories based on various forms of behavioural models and 
human heuristic biases such as overreaction, underreaction, overconfidence, frame-
dependence etc. The behavioural finance
14’s influence upon the explanation to the 
momentum phenomenon is rooted in Jegadeesh and Titman(1993)’s seminal work, 
where they conjecture that the momentum effect might be attributed to market 
investors’ underreaction to firm-specific information. Yet they call for “a more 
sophisticated model of investor behaviour”(Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993: page 90) 
to advance their conjecture on the driving force of the momentum phenomenon.  
Responding to Jegadeesh and Titman(1993)’s research, researchers in the field 
develop various behavioural-model based theories to justify the excess returns from 
momentum investing. Among them, three major studies have been strikingly 
convincing:  
Intrigued by the psychological evidence on representativeness, availability and 
anchoring biases along with the prospect theory as documented in a series of 
Tversky and Kahneman (1973, 1974, 1979)’s scholarly work, Daniel et al.(1998) 
develop a behavioural model based on investors’ overconfidence, self-attribution and 
argue that investors’ overconfidence, triggered by cognitive confirmation bias, 
                                            
14 “Behavioural finance is the application of psychology to financial behaviour—the behaviour of 
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contributes to the momentum phenomenon. In a contemporary study, Barberis et 
al.(1998) construct a one-agent behavioural model based on representativeness and 
find that the momentum effect can be largely attributed to investors’ underreaction 
towards earnings information in the financial market. Elsewhere in the literature, De 
Long et al.(1990) and Hong and Stein(1999) set up a behavioural model consists of 
two types of “boundedly rational” (Hong and Stein, 1999: 2144)—newswatcher and 
momentum trader and suggest that the underreaction(triggered by availability and 
anchoring) of newswatcher toward private information signals contributes to the 
momentum phenomenon.  
Furthermore, there are a couple of studies worth mentioning as they empirically 
support the explanation to the momentum phenomenon firstly proposed by Hong and 
Stein(1999), which based on the assumption that private information gradually 
travels across among stock market investors. Employing firm size and residual 
analyst coverage to proxy for the rate at which private information travels in the 
financial market, Hong, Lim and Stein (2000) find that: 1) small firms (measured by 
market capitalization) tend to exhibit markedly more significant momentum 
phenomenon; 2) momentum investing is significantly profitably among firms are 
scarcely covered by stock analysts. Taken together, the results from their study are 
in line with Hong and Stein(1999)’s gradual-information-diffusion hypothesis.  
3.4 The dynamics of the momentum premia under different market states  
Cooper et al. (2004) categorize the market states by the sign of the average market 
returns for the preceding 12, 24, or 36 months and apply Jegadeesh and 
Titman(1993)’s approach on the monthly stock returns data for the US stock market Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty   Chapter 3 A review of current 
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over the period from January 1926 through December 1995. They find empirical 
evidence supporting the theory proposed by Johnson(2002)—“The momentum 
premium is procyclical” (Stivers and Sun, 2009) (page 3). In one of the most recent 
empirical studies on the topic, Stivers and Sun (2009) proxy the market states using 
cross-sectional stock return dispersion and show that DOWN market state reflected 
by a high cross-sectional stock return dispersion presages low momentum returns in 
the subsequent period and UP market state reflected by a low cross-sectional stock 
return dispersion indicates significantly higher momentum returns in the following 
period, consistent with the findings by Cooper et al.(2004).  
In another contemporary study, using a dataset pertain all stocks listed on Centre for 
Research in Security Price (CRSP) for the time period spanning from January, 1927 
to December, 2005, Asem and Tian (2009) document that the economic and 
statistical significance of momentum profits change drastically as the market 
condition
15 swings. Specifically, the momentum profits tend to be more significant 
when an UP market is followed by a UP market or when a past DOWN market 
resumes its course for current period compare to the switching-regime market 
states—past DOWN market followed by an UP market state or vice versa. 
Comparing to the two mainstream explanations—rational asset pricing models and 
behavioural theory models—on the momentum phenomenon in the extant literature, 
the authors find that the results is remarkably consistent with overreaction 
behavioural theory—stems from investors’ overconfidence—firstly proposed by 
Daniel et al.(1998). Yet, rational asset pricing models—changes in stock returns 
                                            
15 In the study, Asem and Tian (2009) define up (down) market based on the sign of the past 12-
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autocorrelations—fail to explain the reason why the momentum profits are larger 
when a past DOWN market is followed by a DOWN market than when a past DOWN 
market is followed by an UP market instead.  
Elsewhere in the literature, analyzing on a share return dataset including all-listed 
companies in the Taiwan Stock Exchange over January 1981-July 2006 period, Du 
et al.(2009) implement Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)’s approach yet only focus on 
the strategy with 6-month ranking and 6-month holding periods and follow the market 
states categorization approach developed by Cooper et al.(2004). They find dismal 
momentum payoffs in the Taiwan financial market. Mulling over their failure of finding 
the existence of the momentum phenomenon, they postulate that the lack of 
momentum effect in Taiwan financial market is because the positive momentum 
profits exhibited following UP markets are counterbalanced by the negative 
momentum returns exhibited following DOWN market state. Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty   Chapter 3 A review of current 
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3.5 Information uncertainty and the momentum premium 
Albeit there are abundant studies focusing on the information uncertainty proxies and 
empirical evidence of the momentum effect separately in the extant literature, the 
research debate on confronting the relationship between information uncertainty and 
the momentum effect in either direct or indirect way is virtually muted.  
One of the seminal work on this front is carried out by Jiang et al. (2005). Differing 
from the previous information uncertainty (IU)-related studies where researchers 
traditionally interpret information uncertainty as an indication of information 
asymmetry, Jiang et al. (2005) hypothesize that information uncertainty represents 
the difficulty of estimating firms’ value and thereby employ four variables—Firm Age, 
Return Volatility, Average Daily Turnover, and  the Duration of its future cash flows—
to proxy for the degree of IU. In their research, Jiang et al.(2005) reason that greater 
degree of firm-level information uncertainty associated with stocks can potentially 
accentuate the magnitude of momentum premia under the information uncertainty-
investor’s overconfidence-arbitrage costs paradigm
16. Through analyzing the 
interaction between the IU factor with price momentum, with earnings momentum, 
and with industry distribution respectively, they find the empirical evidence 
supporting their hypothesis---the implementation of momentum trading strategies 
within stocks associated with high IU level significantly improved the momentum 
premia. From an empirical perspective, Jiang et al. (2005) contend that the trading 
strategy of emphasizing the impact of the momentum-related signals on high-IU 
firms and impact of value-related signals on low-IU firms could strengthen the 
                                            
16 “The level of information uncertainty is positively correlated with a pervasive form of decision bias 
(investor overconfidence), and that it is also positively correlated with arbitrage costs (in particular, 
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profitability of portfolio investment. Yet the testing of such strategies is beyond the 
scope of our research and is a notable future research avenue. Extending Jiang et al. 
(2005)’s work,  Zhang (2006) takes a slightly different approach to gauge the degree 
of information uncertainty factor. Building the foundation of his research hypothesis 
on the heuristic bias—specifically, overconfidence—as suggested by evidence found 
in previous behavioural finance studies(Daniel et al., 1998), Zhang (2006) selects a 
set of factors including firm size, firm age, analyst coverage, dispersion in analyst 
earning forecasts, stock volatility, and cash flow volatility attempting to best proxy for 
the level of information uncertainty
17 associated with companies listed in the U.S. 
stock market using the monthly data over the period from January 1983 to December 
2001. Forming portfolios based on different information uncertainty proxies, Zhang 
(2006) finds all the empirical evidence unanimously suggest that higher IU level 
associated with stocks following good/bad news magnifies the profitability of 
momentum trading strategies, which indirectly indicates that the momentum effect 
can be largely attributed to how quick share prices adjust to news to reflect the 
company’s fundamental value. Specifically, the momentum premia are noticeably 
larger among stocks/portfolios associated with high level of information uncertainty. 
Moreover, he points out that firm size is a reasonable factor to proxy for information 
uncertainty according to the results, which suggests that the investors’ underreaction 
is more prevalent among small-cap companies.  
 
 
                                            
17 Zhang (2006) defines information uncertainty as “ambiguity with respect to the implications of new 
information for a firm’s value…”. (page 105) Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty   Chapter 3 A review of current 
literature 
 
- 43 - 
 
3.6 The role of corporate governance in the research 
During the last couple of centuries, as the operation of both public and private 
corporations grows increasingly transparent, investors have learnt how to play the 
right card to protect their own rights and in turn optimize their chance of sharing a 
slice of the success of the corporations. Under this backdrop, corporate governance 
comes to the spotlight. Shleifer and Vishny define corporate governance as “the 
ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a 
return on their investment” (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997: page 737). From business 
practitioner’s perspective, O’Donovan(2003) describes corporate governance as “an 
internal system encompassing policies, processes and people, which serves the 
needs of shareholders and other stakeholders, by directing and controlling 
management activities with good business savvy, objectivity, accountability and 
integrity”. Specifically, she points out that corporate governance can precipitate 
changes in the share price of corporations in the financial market. O’Donovan’s 
argument is well supported by the evidence found in different capital markets in the 
literature. Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) take relevant corporate governance 
data from the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) and construct a 
“Governance Index” to gauge the level of corporate governance practice associated 
with corporations listed on New York Stock Exchange(NYSE), American Stock 
Exchange (AMEX), and NASDAQ markets. Consequently, they find that “corporate 
governance is strongly correlated with stock returns during the 1990s” (Gompers et 
al., 2003: 144). In support of their argument, Gompers et al. (2003) show that longing 
stocks of firms with stringent corporate governance and shorting stocks of firms with 
weak corporate governance can outperform market portfolio by 8.5 percent per year. Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty   Chapter 3 A review of current 
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Among studies in the European financial markets, Drobertz et al. (2004) test Gomper 
et al. (2003)’s hypothesis on the German financial market by taking a distinct 
approach. Specifically, in Drobertz et al. (2004)’s research, a broad corporate 
governance rating (CGR) is constructed by conducting a corporate governance 
proxies
18 survey among 253 firms listed on NEXMAX 50 (index of growth firms) and 
SMAX (small-cap stocks). Using the CGR to measure corporate quality for the firms, 
Drobertz et al. (2004) find that “better corporate governance is highly correlated with 
better operating performance, higher stocks returns and higher market valuation” 
(Drobertz et al., 2004: page 270), largely in line with results found in Gomper et al 
(2003)’s empirical work. Furthermore, they show that the corporate governance 
index-based investment strategy can yield 12% excess returns over the market 
portfolio. In a subsequent study, Bauer et al. (2004) test the argument hypothesized 
by Gomper et al. (2003) on two separate datasets (the U.K. and the European 
Monetary Union (EMU) ) taken from Deminor. They find that in the UK market, the 
corporate governance index-based investment strategy employed by Gomper et al. 
(2003) can yield economically significant risk-adjusted return. Nevertheless, in the 
EMU the returns from the corporate governance index-based investment strategy is 
much smaller. In line with the difference in the realized investment returns, Bauer et 
al. (2004) show that the EMU exhibits stronger positive relationship between 
corporate governance and firm value compared to the UK market. Their finding is 
consistent with a cross-country corporate governance study conducted by LaPorta et 
al. (2002), where they compared the relationship between corporate governance 
                                            
18 “The 30 corporate governance proxies are divided into five categories: (1) corporate governance 
commitment, (2) shareholder rights, (3) transparency, (4) management and supervisory board 
matters, and (5) auditing.” (Drobertz et al., 2004: 271) Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty   Chapter 3 A review of current 
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standards and firm valuation among 27 countries
19. By analyzing a sample dataset 
consists of 539 firms from the 27 countries taken from WorldScope database, they 
show that the quality of corporate governance standards of firm (country) is positively 
related to the valuation of firms (within the country).  
Even though the research effort on the relationship between firm-level corporate 
governance and share performance of firms in the settting of the Asian markets has 
been very limited, there are a few good examples. Among them, Mitton(2002) 
studies the impact of firm-level corporate governance on the firm performance in the 
financial markets of six countries—Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines and 
Thailand—whom are worst hit by the 1997 Asian financial crisis. From the 
perspective of stock price movements, Morck et al. (2000) examine a sample dataset 
consists of GDP and stock price of 40 emerging and developed countries
20 over 
1995 to 1997. The results from cross-sectional regression analysis suggest that 
more firm-specific information tends to be factored in the stock prices in the financial 
markets equipped with more stringent rules on legal protection of investors’ rights. 
Taking the research topic to a more specific level, Wang and Xu (2004) look into the 
inherent relationship between quality/strength of corporate governance and share 
price by employing corporate governance—measured by residual free float ratio 
(from regression free float ratio against the logarithm market capitalization of 
corresponding firms)—supplanting the value effect factor of the traditional FF3F 
                                            
19 The 27 countries include Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Australia, 
Canada, Hong Kong, Ireland, Israel, New Zealand, Singapore, United Kingdom, United States. 
20 The 40 emerging and developed countries include Japan, Denmark, Norway, Germany, United 
States, Austria, Sweden, France, Belgium, Holland, Singapore, Hong Kong, Canada, Finland, Italy, 
Australia, UK, Ireland, New Zealand, Spain, Taiwan, Portugal, Korea, Greece, Mexico, Chile, 
Malaysia, Brazil, Czech, South Africa, Turkey, Poland, Thailand, Peru, Columbia, Philippines, 
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model as one of the risk factors in a modified version of Fama and French three 
factor model. In their study, Wang and Xu (2004) collect returns (Share A stocks 
listed on Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange) and free float ratio data 
spanning from July 1996 to June 2002 from the China Stock Market and Accounting 
Research Database. Specifically, they run different time-series regression analysis 
by replacing price-to-earnings ratio (the value effect factor) with residual free float 
ratio within the FF3F model in the risk justification (against portfolio returns) process. 
Based on the results, they document that corporate governance factor (free float 
ratio) “significantly increased the explanatory power of the market model—from 81 
percent to 90 percent” (Wang and Xu, 2004: page 65).  
Besides, the quality/strength of firm-level corporate governance is also arguably a 
suitable proxy for the degree of information uncertainty associated with listed firms, 
supported by considerable empirical evidences in the literature. Bushman and 
Smith(2001) empirically explore the interrelation between information uncertainty and 
corporate governance practices and show that the quality of corporate governance 
can reflect the level of information uncertainty associated with firms in the corporate 
markets. Magnan and Xu (2008) examine the topic from a completely different point 
of view. They study a sample of 197 US listed biotech firms in the healthcare sector 
over the time period from 1998 to 2004. The results from univariate and multivariate 
analysis show that poor quality of corporate governance practice (no or less 
information disclosure) can trigger a higher level of firm-specific information 
uncertainty. 
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Chapter 4 Data and methodology 
4.1 Data  
4.1.1 Introduction 
In this section, the specifications of the data used in our research will be described in 
great detail. Considering the importance of the data is utterly pertinent in 
understanding the methodological procedures and results of this research, we will 
lay out this section as follows: first, the history of the emergent Chinese stock market 
will be briefly reviewed, entailing the four major regulatory reforms from 1996 through 
2008, the unique twin-share systems—Class A share and Class B share, as well as 
the two stock exchanges (Shanghai and Shenzhen). Subsequently, the major 
characteristics of the market participants in the Chinese stock market will be outlined. 
Finally, the statistical properties of the data will be presented based on different 
types of shares, different stock exchanges and different IU proxy variables employed 
to gauge the degree of firm-specific information uncertainty.  
4.1.2 An overview of the Chinese stock market 
4.1.2.1 Four major regulatory reforms in the history of the Chinese stock market 
Over the relatively brief post-1949 history of Chinese stock market, there has been 
four notable regulatory reforms to the stock market infrastructure imposed by the 
central government. The financial market regulatory reforms can be listed as follows:  
(1) “Daily price limit regulation which took place in December 16, 1996 
(2) Implementation of new People’s Republic of China (P.R.C.) security law on July 
1, 1999 
(3) Removal of trading restrictions allowing domestic residents to trade B-share 
stocks on Feb. 20, 2001 Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty   Chapter 4 Data and methodology 
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(4) Opening A-share markets to foreign investors on July 9, 2003” (Lin and Swanson, 
2008: page 50-51) 
Overall, the aims of the financial market regulatory reforms are threefold: “(1) to 
develop new financial institutions and clarify the responsibilities of existing financial 
institutions; (2) to replace direct administrative economic controls with 
macroeconomic levers; and (3) to develop efficient financial markets” (Bei et al., 
1993: page 149). In addition, the four regulatory reforms each have their own 
specific purposes. The 1996 regulatory reform that imposed limit on daily trading 
price is aiming at assuaging the retail investors’ speculating behaviours and to 
maintain the stability of the stock market. The implementation of new People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) securities law that took place in 1999 intends to effectively 
protect investors’ rights associated with their investment decisions and consolidate 
the architecture of corporate governance for the listed firms. By allowing domestic 
retail investors to own B shares in 2001 and allowing qualified foreign institutional 
investors (QFII) to own A shares in 2003, the Chinese central government attempts 
to liberate Chinese financial market in stride and to mitigate market inefficiency 
provoked by market segmentation(will be further discussed in section 4.1.2.2 and 
4.1.2.3).  
4.1.2.2 The Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
The Shanghai Stock Exchange 
The city of Shanghai, located by the Yangze River, hosts one of the two stock 
exchanges in mainland China. As a non-profit membership institution and legal 
person, the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) was official established on 
November 26, 1990 (Han, 2007). Subsequently, the full operation of trading activity 
started on December 1990. Directly governed by the China Securities Regulatory Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty   Chapter 4 Data and methodology 
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Commission (CSRC), the SHSE had grown into an exchange that provides a 
powerful trading platform for a variety of financial instruments such as Class A 
shares, Class B shares, investment fund shares, treasury bonds, futures and 
derivatives etc. By the end of 2009, the SHSE had 1,351 listed securities, 870 listed 
companies with a total market capitalization of over 18 trillion yuan. Also, it’s 
noteworthy that the over its operation of more than two decades, the SHSE has 
made a significant effort in developing a set of principles (“legislation, supervision, 
self-regulation and standardization”
21) to facilitate numerous Chinese corporations to 
successfully raise capitals.  
The Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
Trailing the establishment of the Shanghai stock exchange chronologically, the 
opening of the stock exchange in Shenzhen on December 1, 1990 was subtly in line 
with the main open-market economic policies advocated by the Chinese central 
government in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Similar to the Shanghai stock 
exchange, the Shenzhen stock Exchange (SZSE) is a self-regulated legal entity 
under the supervision of China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC)
22. 
Geographically, the stock exchange is convinently located in the special economic 
zone—the city of Shenzhen, which is only 30 miles north of Hong Kong. Function-
wise, the exchange was initially designed to specialize in stock trading, yet after 20 
years in full operation it has become a stock trading platform with fully fledged 
functions including “providing venue and facility for securities trading, formulating 
operational rules, arranging securities listing, organizing and supervising securities 
                                            
21 The Shanghai Stock Exchange. February 11, 2011 
http://www.sse.com.cn/sseportal/en/c01/c01/c01/p996/c15010101_p996.shtml  
22 The Shenzhen Stock Exchange “SZSE Overview” February 20, 2011 < 
http://www.szse.cn/main/en/aboutsse/sseoverview/ >  Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty   Chapter 4 Data and methodology 
 
- 50 - 
 
trading, offerings membership supervision and oversight of listed companies, 
managing and publicizing market information and other capacities permitted by 
CSRC”
23.  
For a corporation to get listed on the Shenzhen stock exchange, the issuance of its 
shares must have been completed, being authorized by the CSRS. Then, the 
company is required to prepare for a listing announcement based on relevant 
provisions of the CSRC.  
Comparing the two stock exchanges of the Chinese stock market, the difference in 
terms of geographical location will surely stand out as the most obvious distinction---
the Shanghai Stock Exchange is housed in one of the most affluent coastal cities in 
eastern China, Shanghai, well-known for its economic importance in mainland China, 
whereas the city of Shenzhen, a Special Economic Zone tailor-designed to facilitate 
the development of Chinese open-market economic policy and neighbour of Hong 
Kong, offers home to the Shenzhen Stock Exchange.  More importantly, the two 
stock exchanges follow different paths in expanding over the last decade in terms of 
the number of listed firms and the value of total market capitalizations as shown in 
the Table 4.1. 
                                            
23 The Shenzhen Stock Exchange “SZSE overview” February 20, 2011 < 
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Table 4.1 Number of listed stocks and market capitalization (1996-2008) 
                            Year   1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
Panel A. Number of listed stocks 
                  SHSE                                        
Total  329  422  479  526  614  700  769  834  891  888  896  914  918 
SZSE                                        
Total  270  399  454  504  557  550  551  548  578  586  621  712  782 
                            Panel B. Market capitalization (in 
billion yuan Renminbi) 
                  SHSE                                        
Total  550  931  1071  1475  2709  2828  2582  3052  2632  2334  7211  27118  9763 
SZSE                                        
Total  439  832  890  1192  2124  1590  1300  1268  1107  935  1780  5732  2412 
 
Source: Fact Book the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
4.1.2.3 The categorization of shares in the Chinese stock market  
4.1.2.3.1 The tradable and non-tradable shares 
Prior to the year 2000, for a firm’s intention of going public to come to fruition, 
permission must be obtained from “the local government or/and its affiliated central 
government ministries” (Han, 2007: page 10), who receive an IPO quota every year 
from the CSRC. Nevertheless, this government-controlled IPO system considerably 
undermined the efficiency of the IPO issuance in the Chinese stock market. In 
response to call for leaner IPO issuance system, starting from the year 2000, the 
CSRC revamped the IPO issuance procedure into a more market-driven system 
based on the competitiveness of the firms and the macroeconomic conditions.  
In terms of tradability, the shares of listed companies can be put into two major 
categories: tradable shares and non-tradable shares. Of them, non-tradable shares 
can be further partitioned into two groups: state shares and legal person shares. The 
state shares, exactly as its name suggests, are at the hands of central or local Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty   Chapter 4 Data and methodology 
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governments or by state-designated institutions including SOEs. Legal person
24 
shares are the shares that are assigned to “domestic government-controlled 
financial institutions, or by the foreign partners of a corporatized foreign joint venture” 
(Han, 2007: page 10-11). Legally, individual investors are not permitted to hold legal 
person shares. The issuance of non-tradable shares is aiming at tightening the grip 
over the State-owned enterprises (SOE’s) and helping firms finance financial 
difficulties or projects through reaping the maximum financial benefit from the IPO 
issuance. Albeit the issuance of the non-tradable shares might sound very organized, 
it brings in inefficiency to the operational architecture of the Chinese stock market. 
For instance, less tradable shares can induce a decrease in liquidity and an increase 
in volatility, opening the door for the potential market unregulated trades such as 
insider information trading. Besides, large amount of non-tradable shares blunts the 
power of individual shareholders over the firms’ managerial decisions, which to 
some extent, triggers the surge in volatility as individual investors are less likely to 
commit to have long investment time horizon.   
The other type of shares is tradable shares, which can be freely traded by retail 
investors and institutional investors subject to the CSRC’s trading rules. The amount 
of tradable and non-tradable shares issued each year on the SHSE and SZSE is 
shown on Panel A and Panel B of the Table 4.2 respectively. By charting the 
number of tradable shares as a percentage of the total shares outstanding in both 
SHSE and SZSE, we witness a steady, consistent upward trend, in terms of 
percentage of tradable shares, has been running its course over the past decade, 
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while the percentage of tradable shares basically maintained its 1999 level, having 
experienced some mild fluctuations over time.   
 
Table 4.2 The SHSE and SZSE tradable and non-tradable comparison 
Panel A 
SHSE tradable and non-tradable comparison (all in 100 million shares) 
 
1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
Tradable  494.41  648.99  837.53  992.53  1157.1  1366.58  1561.21  2254.5  3399.3  4916.04 
Non-
tradable   1085.7  1383.4  2326.9  2735.3  3013.3  3333.97  3461.84  8025.1  10774  10494.4 
Total 
shares  1580.2  2032.4  3164.4  3727.8  4170.4  4700.55  5023.05  10280  14173  15410.4 
% of 
tradable 
shares  31.29%  31.93%  26.47%  26.62%  27.75%  29.07%  31.08%  21.93%  23.98%  31.90% 
 
Panel B 
SZSE tradable and non-tradable comparison (all in 100 millions shares) 
 
1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
Trdable  457.93  584.32  643.35  687.4  740.22  822.8  934.29  117.69  1511.2  2023.75 
Non-
tradable  870.77  996.65  1030.6  1047.8  1087.3  1181.67  1199.36  2258.1  1270.5  1418.11 
Total 
shares  1328.7  1581  1673.9  1735.2  1827.5  2004.47  2133.65  2375.8  2781.7  3441.86 
% of 
tradable 
shares  34.46%  36.96%  38.43%  39.62%  40.50%  41.05%  43.79%  49.54%  54.33%  58.80% 
Source: Fact Book the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, 
China Statistical YearBook of The Securities and Futures 1996-2009 
Based on the nature of the tradable shares, the tradable shares can be further 
divided into Class A shares, Class B shares, overseas listing shares (such as Class 
H shares) and red chip listing shares. 
4.1.2.3.2 Twin-share system: Class A and Class B shares 
Under the law and regulations specified in the Administration of the Issuing and 
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Securities Law, a firm could choose to list their Class A shares or Class B shares or 
both on either the Shanghai Stock Exchange or the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. 
Initially, Class A shares’ trading activities were confined to domestic investors—
Chinese citizens living in mainland China. However, since July 2003, the restriction 
has been lifted to the extent that thanks to China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(SRC)’s 2003 reform, qualified foreign institutional investors (QFII) are allowed to 
engage in Class A shares trading activities. Specifically, “[t]he QFII are defined as 
overseas fund management firms, insurance companies, securities companies, and 
other asset management institutions that must be approved by SRC to invest in 
China’s securities market and are granted investment quotas by the State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange.” (Lin and Swanson, 2008: Page 56)  
As opposed to Class A shares, prior to February 2001, Class B shares could only be 
subscribed by foreign investors
25. Yet, starting from February 2001, domestic 
investors are allowed to purchase Class B shares on both the SHSE and SZSE 
using foreign currencies. Specifically, Class B shares are traded on the SHSE in U.S. 
dollar and are traded on the SZSE in Hong Kong dollar. It is worth noting that despite 
the 2001 regulatory reform, the domestic ownership of Class B shares is still subject 
to stringent government control. Besides, the issuance of Class B shares is also 
controlled by the State council, who decides the allocations of the amount of Class-B 
share issuing and listing quota.  
To summarize the twin-share system in the Chinese stock market, the similarities 
and differences between Class A and Class B shares will be detailed from vantage 
                                            
25 Foreign investors can be defined as “foreign legal and natural persons and other entities, legal and 
natural persons from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan, and Chinese citizens who are residents 
abroad” (Han, 2007: page 13) Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty   Chapter 4 Data and methodology 
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point of trading mechanism, the historical trend of main Class A and B shares indices 
and fundamental statistics. On the trading mechanism front, the buy and sell orders 
stay valid for 1 day while “the smallest trading unit is 100 shares” (Xu, 2000: page 
83). There are only two types of orders legally allowed in the Chinese stock market: 
Market orders and limit orders.  
4.1.2.4 Summary of listing and trading costs for Class A shares and Class B shares 
on the SHSE and the SZSE  
See Appendix 12. 
4.1.2.5 Chinese stock market share ownership structure (2001 Share ownership 
reform) 
Share ownership has intricate relationship with the quality/strength of corporate 
governance, exhibited as a positive correlation with the performance of a company’s 
shares in the stock market (as discussed in great detail in section 2.5 corporate 
governance of the theorerical framework chapter). A general picture of the share 
ownership on the SHSE and SZSE will be portrayed in this section. By and large, 
there are five types of shares categorized by different types of owners within Class A 
shares: State shares, Legal person shares, Individual shares, Employee shares and 
Foreign institutions shares. Among them, the shares owned by the central 
government, local governments, or solely state-owned enterprises are called the 
state shares. “The ultimate owner of state shares is the State Council” (Xu and Wang, 
1999: page 79). Even though the state shares are not tradable, the transfer of the 
state shares among domestic institutions is legal upon CSRC’s approval. The line 
drawn between the state shares and the legal person shares is the requirement that 
at least one of the legal person shareholders is non-state owner. Other owners of the 
legal person shares could be domestic institutions such as non-bank financial Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty   Chapter 4 Data and methodology 
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institutions
26 as majority of shareholders or SOEs. Deemed capable of hinting the 
quality/strength of corporate governance, the portion of legal person shares within a 
listed corporation is found to be positively related to its profitability (Xu and Wang, 
1999). Within a listed firm in the Chinese stock market, the right of buying a certain 
numbers of shares at a considerable discount off their market value is allocated to 
some of its internal stakeholders such as workers and managers as part of employee 
benefits package. The shares allocated to employees through the employee benefit 
scheme are known as employee shares, the flow of which to the secondary market 
“are registered under the title of the labour union of the company” (Xu, 1999: page 
79). Besides, it is worth-noting that upon the exercise their right of buying shares, the 
employees are only entitled to trade the shares on the secondary market after a 
holding period (normally ranging from 6 to 12 months) and the successful filing of the 
listed company with the CSRC. Individual and foreign institutions shares, suggested 
by their names, are owned by individual investors and foreign institutions 
respectively. Table 4.3 depicts the changes in share ownership structure over 2001 
to 2008 on the SHSE and the SZSE. For the case of share ownership in the SHSE, 
shown in Panel A, since the 2001 when the domestic investors are allowed to tap 
into a restricted portion of Class B shares and foreign companies can choose to be 
listed on the SHSE and SZSE
27, the proportions of state shares, legal person shares 
and employee shares have shrunk in a consistent pattern apart from a modest surge 
in the proportion of state shares from 2007 to 2008. On the other hand, the individual 
shares have been making up increasingly bigger proportion of the total shares. 
Having experienced some fluctuations, the proportion of shares held by foreign 
                                            
26 The non-bank financial institutions include “securities firms, trust and investment companies, 
finance companies, mutual funds, and insurance companies” (Xu and Wang, 1999: page 79) 
27 The BBC news editorial team. March 14, 2011. < http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/1433474.stm >  Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty   Chapter 4 Data and methodology 
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institutions declined from 0.739% in 2001 to 0.404% in 2008. With regard to 
ownership picture of the SZSE (shown in Panel B of Table 4), similar general pattern 
of changes in the proportions of state shares, legal person shares, individual shares, 
employee shares and foreign institution shares over years is observed. Nonetheless, 
a characteristic difference in the proportions of state shares, legal personal shares 
and individual shares between the two stock exchanges is that in 2001, the 
proportion of state-owned shares (38.41%) was significantly smaller (by 14 
percentage points) in the SZSE compared with that in the SHSE (52.99%). Yet, over 
years, the proportions of state share on the two stock exchanges converge to 45 
percentage points at the end of 2008. Sharing the rough changing pattern of the 
proportions of legal person share in the SHSE and SZSE, at the end of year 2001, 
the proportion of legal person share on the SZSE (24.20%) was twice as much as 
that on the SHSE (12.6%). however, it dropped precipitously over the eight year 
period (2001-2008) to 6.9% in 2008, still more than twice of the proportion of legal 
person share in the SZSE (2.74%) for the same year. During the same time period 
(2001-2008), the proportion of individual share on the SZSE surged from 36.7% in 
2001 to 45.1% at the end of year 2008 in a steady manner. Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty   Chapter 4 Data and methodology 
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Table 4.3 The ownership structure in the SHSE and SZSE (2001-2008) 
 
The ownership structure in the SHSE and SZSE from 2001-2008 (in 
percentage) 
    Panel A  SHSE 
                   
Year     State shares  Legal person  Individuals  Employees 
Foreign 
institutions 
2001 
 
52.99 
 
12.6 
 
33.156 
 
0.515 
 
0.739 
  2002 
 
53.75 
 
11.94 
 
33.277 
 
0.281 
 
0.752 
  2003 
 
53.77 
 
11.33 
 
33.972 
 
0.155 
 
0.773 
  2004 
 
52.81 
 
11.36 
 
34.865 
 
0.1 
 
0.865 
  2005 
 
50.85 
 
11.69 
 
36.565 
 
0.035 
 
0.86 
  2006 
 
36.12 
 
4.74 
 
58.637 
 
0.017 
 
0.486 
  2007 
 
37.85 
 
3.36 
 
58.349 
 
0 
 
0.441 
  2008 
 
45.29 
 
2.74 
 
51.566 
 
0 
 
0.404 
 
                       
                        Panel B  SZSE 
                   
Year     State shares  Legal person  Individuals  Employees 
Foreign 
institutions 
2001 
 
38.41 
 
24.196 
 
36.07 
 
0.372 
 
0.952 
  2002 
 
39.6 
 
22.282 
 
36.9 
 
0.255 
 
0.963 
  2003 
 
40.48 
 
20.537 
 
37.84 
 
0.16 
 
0.983 
  2004 
 
41.07 
 
20.06 
 
37.76 
 
0.09 
 
1.02 
  2005 
 
43.77 
 
15.324 
 
39.69 
 
0.13 
 
1.086 
  2006 
 
49.54 
 
8.774 
 
40.64 
 
0.004 
 
1.042 
  2007 
 
54.31 
 
4.453 
 
40.2 
 
0 
 
1.037 
  2008 
 
46.96 
 
6.912 
 
45.1 
 
0 
 
1.028 
 
                         
Source: The Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange Fact Book 2001- 
2008 
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4.1.3 The Characteristics of the market participants in the Chinese stock market 
This section is dedicated to provide an account of the composition of investors in the 
Chinese stock market and the behavioural characteristics of each different type of 
investors. Table 4.4 portrays the historical view of changes in the composition of 
three main types of investors in the Chinese stock market in percentage term. The 
proportion of each type of investors is estimated by charting the market value of total 
shares owned by investors in each category every year as a percentage of market 
value of total tradable shares outstanding in corresponding year.  
Table 4.4 Changes in the composition of three main types of investors in the Chinese 
stock market 
 
Changes in the composition of three main types of investors in the Chinese stock 
market 
Panel A. the SHSE                   
 
Domestic individual  Domestic institutional  Foreign investors 
  2001  71.63% 
 
26.80% 
 
1.57% 
    2002  72.56% 
 
25.82% 
 
1.63% 
    2003  73.82% 
 
24.51% 
 
1.67% 
    2004  74.09% 
 
24.07% 
 
1.83% 
    2005  74.47% 
 
23.78% 
 
1.75% 
    2006  91.82% 
 
7.42% 
 
0.76% 
    2007  93.88% 
 
5.41% 
 
0.71% 
    2008  94.25% 
 
5.01% 
 
0.74% 
   
                Panel B. the SZSE                   
 
Domestic individual  Domestic institutional  Foreign investors 
  2001  59.17% 
 
39.29% 
 
1.55% 
    2002  61.51% 
 
36.89% 
 
1.59% 
    2003  63.84% 
 
34.50% 
 
1.65% 
    2004  64.23% 
 
34.04% 
 
1.73% 
    2005  70.82% 
 
27.25% 
 
1.93% 
    2006  80.55% 
 
17.39% 
 
2.07% 
    2007  87.98% 
 
9.75% 
 
2.27% 
    2008  85.03% 
 
13.03% 
 
1.94% 
   
                Source: The Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange Fact Book 2001-
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As shown in the above table, the proportion of domestic individual investors has 
been trending up consistently over the time period from 2001 to 2008 in the SHSE 
and the SZSE, although historically the proportion of individual investors on the 
SZSE outweighed that in the SHSE. Reverse to the general trend of the proportions 
of domestic individual investors in both stock exchanges, the proportion of domestic 
institutional investors has been lurching lower thanks in large part to the regulatory 
reforms of share ownership took place in 2001 with the proportions of domestic 
institutional investors in the SHSE trailing those in the SZSE in each corresponding 
year in general. On one hand, the proportion of foreign investors in the SHSE 
crawled up from 1.57% in 2001 to 1.75% in 2005, and then dropped to 0.76% in 
2006, having been held steady since. On the other, the proportion of foreign 
investors in the SZSE increased at a steady pace from 1.55% in 2001 to 2.27% in 
2007 while dropping a little in the year 2008 to 1.94%.  
A detailed description portraying domestic individual investors, domestic foreign 
investors, and foreign (institutional) investors can be found in Appendix 13. Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty   Chapter 4 Data and methodology 
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4.1.4 Sample data specification 
4.1.4.1 Data source, time horizon and categories 
The data used in this research are kindly provided by Guotai Junan Securities Co. 
Ltd.
28 (GTJA) through their database provider Shanghai Wind Information Co. Ltd
29. 
The sample period adopted for the research is from January 1996 to December 2008, 
entailing 156 months in total. Given consideration to uniquely segmented Chinese 
stock market (the SHSE and the SZSE; Class A shares and Class B shares), the 
sample period is chosen to provide the most comprehensive examination to date of 
the momentum phenomenon and the impact of information uncertainty on the 
momentum effect, yet preclude the potential distortions caused by “the fierce 
volatility and the low quantity”  in the first few years of full operation of the stock 
market (1991-1995) (He and Tan, 2006: page 1810). Specifically, the types of data 
we use for the analysis in this study can be listed out as follows: (1) The monthly 
price data
30 of the Chinese Class A shares in the SHSE and the SZSE (excluding 
dividends and interest); (2) Trading volumes of Chinese Class A shares listed in the 
SHSE and the SZSE; (3) Turnover ratios of the Chinese Class A shares in the SHSE 
and the SZSE; (4) the number of tradable shares of the Chinese Class A shares in 
the SHSE and the SZSE; (5) Monthly market capitalization of the Chinese Class A 
shares listed in the SHSE and the SZSE; (6) Annual data of the number of days 
stocks have been listed in the Chinese Class A share market; (7) Annual data on the 
number of financial analysts following and issuing earnings estimates for Share A 
stocks in the Chinese Class A share market; (8) Semi-annual data of the difference 
                                            
28 GTJA. April 6
th, 2011. < http://www.gtja.com/ygygtja/gygtja.html > 
29 Wind Financial Database. April 6
th, 2011. < http://www.wind.com.cn/en/product/windDB.htm > 
30 Dividends were reinvested automatically. Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty   Chapter 4 Data and methodology 
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in opinions between analysts’ earnings forecasts (EPS)
31 of the Chinese Class A 
share market; (9) Monthly China one-year-time deposit rate; (10) Monthly index price 
data for Shanghai composite, A, B index; (11) Monthly index price data for Shenzhen 
component, A, B index. The basic statistical characteristics of above-listed data will 
be detailed in the following section. 
4.1.4.2 Basic statistics summary 
4.1.4.2.1 The SHSE and SZSE as categorizing criterion 
This section illustrates the statistical attributes of monthly share price in the Chinese 
stock market, further categorized based on the two stock exchanges--- namely, the 
SHSE and the SZSE. There are currently 1520 and 1288 stocks trading on the 
SHSE and the SZSE respectively. As stock market indices, in general, reflect the 
trend of changes in stock prices as a whole
32, we therefore adopt the composite 
index and component index to portray the statistical characteristics of the monthly 
share price for stocks trading on two segments of the Chinese stock market--- the 
SHSE and SZSE. “Constituent stocks in [SHSE] SSE Composite Index include all 
the Class A shares and Class B shares listed on the SSE. Constituent stocks in 
[SHSE] SSE New Composite Index consist of all the [SHSE] SSE-listed stocks that 
have completed the non-tradable share reform.” The indices on both the SHSE and 
SZSE are calculated by: 
Today’s index= (total stock market value of all today’s index/the total market value of 
the base day index shares)*base day index 
The “Divisor Adjustment Methodology” is adopted to calibrate both indices. 
                                            
31 The data of the difference in analysts’ earnings forecasts (EPS) is only available from January, 
2000. 
32 How fair the indices as a representation of the changes in prices for all stocks rests on how each 
constituent of the indices is weighted. For instance, the weights of the index constituents could be 
determined by trading volume, market capitalization, stock issuance etc. Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty   Chapter 4 Data and methodology 
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Specifically, “when changes occur to constituent list or the share structure, or 
constituents’ market value changes due to non-trading factors, the divisor is adjusted 
to keep the index comparable over time. The formula is:  
        	      	   	      	          
   	        =
        	      	   	     	          
   	                              (4.1) 
Adjusted market cap after adjustment=adjusted market cap before adjustment + 
adjusted market cap increased or decreased. The new divisor derived from this 
formula is used for later index calculation.”
33 
Table 4.5 Basic information summary for main indices 
Indices  Price level  Base day  Base value  Sample 
period 
# of 
constituents 
  2008        2008 
The SHSE 
Composite 
1820.80  19/12/1990  100  01/1996-
12/2008 
1184 
The SZSE 
Composite 
553.3016  03/04/1991  100  01/1996-
12/2008 
964 
 
Table 4.6 Statistical attributes of the returns of the SHSE Composite and SZSE 
Composite indices 
Indices  Mean   Variance  Skewness  Kurtosis  Jarque-
Bera 
SHSE 
Composite  
0.00331  0.00138  -0.066475 
(a)  
1.467871(b)  251.834(a) 
SZSE 
Composite 
0.00524  0.002018  0.51331 (a)   1.76877(a)  228.426(a) 
a---statistically significant at 1% level. 
b---statistically significant at 5% level 
c---statistically significant at 10% level 
As shown in the Table 4.5, the SHSE new Composite was firmly priced at 1,820.80 
standardized on the price level reached at the end of year 1990 (100) and included 
                                            
33 Shanghai Stock Exchange Factbook 2009. “SSE indices Calculation & Maintenance”. April 7, 2011. 
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1184 securities, regardless of type of shares (Class A or B), listed on the SHSE. 
Whereas, the SZSE Composite entailed 964 securities (both Class A and B shares) 
and hit 553.3016 points, using the price level reached in April 3
rd, 1991 as the base 
value (100). Table 4.6 illustrates the statistical characteristics of the returns
34 of the 
SHSE new Composite and SZSE Composite indices. The stocks listed on the SZSE 
yielded better average return overall at 0.00524 compared to the stocks listed on the 
SHSE (0.00331). Yet, the portfolio consists of all the securities listed on the SZSE 
(0.002018) carries virtually twice as much as the risk associated with the 
corresponding portfolio in the SHSE (0.0138). The numeric values of the skewness  
for returns of the SHSE Composite and the SZSE Composite indicate that both of  
the returns are significantly asymmetrically distributed, with the return of the SHSE 
Composite skewed to the right (-0.066475) and the return of the SZSE Composite 
skewed to the left (0.51331). Both of the returns have statistically significant positive 
kurtosis, demonstrating that comparing to a standard normal distribution, the 
distributions of the two returns have fatter tails and higher summit levels. Moreover, 
the Jarque-Bera statistics show that the distributions of the returns of the two 
composite indices are statistically significantly deviating from the normal distribution. 
4.1.4.2.2 Information uncertainty proxy factors 
Apart from the monthly share prices for stocks listed in the SHSE and SZSE, we also 
employ seven different factors (firm size, firm age, return volatility, trading volume, 
analyst coverage, corporate governance, dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecast), 
reflecting firms’ attributes, to gauge the degree of information uncertainty and 
subsequently examine the impact of information uncertainty over the momentum 
                                            
34 The monthly returns of the SHSE and SZSE indices are calculated by taking the logarithm of 
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phenomenon on the grounds that firm attributes provide insight information, guiding 
investors to make shrewd prediction and in turn to realize above-average amount of 
capital gains(Lakonishok et al., 1994). Yet, the test is only carried out within the 
Chinese Class A share market due to liquidity concerns. This section is dedicated to 
give an overview of the statistical characteristics of the seven information proxy 
factors for the Chinese Class A shares listed in the SHSE and the SZSE.  
Table 4.7 Descriptive statistics of the information uncertainty proxy factors 
 
Firm size is the market capitalization (in million yuan) for each listed stock at the end of 
month t. Firm age is number of days since a stock gets listed or first appears in the database. 
Return volatility is the standard deviation of monthly returns of each listed stock over 6 
months prior to the beginning of the ranking period. Trading volume is estimated by the 
turnover ratio of each listed stock at the end of month t. Analysts’ coverage is measured by 
the number of analysts covering the firm in the year prior to the ranking period. Corporate 
governance is proxied by the free float ratios
35 of listed firms prior to the beginning of the 
ranking period. Dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecast (DISP) is measured by the standard 
deviation of analysts’ earnings forecasts scaled by prior year-end stock price. The sample 
period is from January 1996 to December 2008. 
Proxy factors  Mean  Variance  Skewness  Kurtosis  Jarque-Bera 
Firm size (A 
Shares) 
4,622(billion 
yuan)  5.536E+25  2.80656(a)  7.80869(a)  519.3667(a) 
Firm size (B 
Shares) 
54 (billion 
yuan)  4.23168E+20  0.14505(a)  -1.31164(a)  851.489(a) 
Firm age (A 
Shares)  1158 days  182591  0.39771(a)  -0.598758(a)  1251.284(a) 
Firm age (B 
Shares)  1236 days  333768  0.08215(a)  -1.64572(a)  852.119(a) 
Return 
volatility (A 
Shares) 
0.38176  2.4187  0.13274(a)  -0.94715(a)  102.813(a) 
Return 
volatility(B 
Shares) 
0.123684  3.7613  0.3618(a)  -1.2791(a)  150.782(a) 
Trading 
volume (A 
Shares) 
31481  1238356812  1.85833(a)  4.284965(a)  1283.159(a) 
Trading 
volume (B 
Shares) 
892  2497969  5.5022(a)  42.61267(a)  982.184(a) 
Analyst 
coverage (A 
Shares) 
4.6591  4.9488  0.4611(a)  -1.65291(a)  232.619(a) 
                                            
35 Free float ratio is computed by taking the ratio between the number of shares in a listed firm that is 
free to trade among investors and total number of share a company issued. Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty   Chapter 4 Data and methodology 
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Corporate 
governance 
(A Shares) 
0.31157  0.001884  6.0123(a)  36.4105(a)  260.51(a) 
Corporate 
governance 
(B Shares) 
0.31698  0.0003983  -0.25934(a)  6.07530(a)  190.782(a) 
Difference in 
analysts’ 
opinion (A 
Shares) 
0.071514  0.000834  -0.33781(a)  0.8258  155.386(a) 
Source: Wind financial database 
As described in Table 4.7, the Chinese Class A shares overwhelm the Class B 
shares in terms of firm size, measured by firm’s market capitalization (4,622 billion 
yuan Vs. 54 billion yuan), yet there is markedly more variations in firm size among 
the Chinese Class A shares than the Class B shares (variance: 5.536E+25 Vs. 
4.23168E+20). The distributions of the firm size of both Class A shares and Class B 
shares are significantly skewed to the left compared to the normal distribution. 
Deviating from the shape of the normal distribution, the firm size of the Class A share 
firms in the SHSE and the SZSE exhibits a distribution with a fatter tail and higher 
global maximum point; yet on the other hand, the firm size of the Class B shares 
exhibits a distribution with a lower peak and a thinner tail. Additionally, there is 
statistically significant evidence at 1% significance level that the distributions of firm 
size of both Class A and Class B shares do not take the shape of a normal 
distribution.  
In term of firm age (measured by the number of days the stocks have been listed on 
the SHSE), Share A stocks share a lot of statistical attributes with Share B stocks. 
For example, they have similar number of average days listed in the SHSE and the 
SZSE (1158 days Vs. 1236 days); both of them are significantly skewed to the left; 
they exhibit distributions with fatter tails and higher summit points compared to a 
normal distribution; the distributions do not follow the shape of a normal distribution. Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty   Chapter 4 Data and methodology 
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The only characteristic that sets them apart is that the Chinese Class B shares, on 
average, have a wider variation in terms of the number of days listed on the SHSE.  
Turning now to return volatility (measured by the standard deviation of monthly 
market excess returns over the year ending at the end of month t), the Share A 
stocks exhibit, on average, more than three times much volatility, compared with the 
volatility of the Class B shares (0.38176 Vs. 0.123683). The distributions of the 
return volatility of both Share A stocks and Share B stocks are significantly skewed 
to the left and are with fatter tails and higher peaks, meaning neither of those two 
distributions take the shape of a normal distribution(evidenced by highly statistically 
significant Jarque-Bera statistics).  
On the trading volume (measured by turnover ratio) front, Share A stocks, on 
average, traded 35 times as frequently as Share B stocks (31481 Vs. 892). The 
distributions of the trading volume of both Share A and B stocks are characterized by 
fatter tails and higher maximum points compared to a normal distribution and are 
significantly skewed to the left. 
For analyst coverage (estimated by the number of analysts following the firm in the 
previous year), data are only available for Share A stocks listed in the SHSE and the 
SZSE. The average number of analysts covering a specific Share A stock is 4, falling 
in the range between 1 and 6 for the sample data. The statistical distribution of the 
analyst coverage factor is skew to the left and exhibit lower peak and thinner tail 
compared to a normal distribution. 
In terms of corporate governance factor (estimated by free float ratio), the difference 
between the Share A and B stocks is that the statistical distribution is significantly 
skewed to the left for Share A stocks whereas it is significantly skewed to the right Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty   Chapter 4 Data and methodology 
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for Share B stocks. The free float ratios of both Classes of stocks exhibit distributions 
with fatter tails and higher peaks.  
The data for difference in analysts’ earnings forecasts, gauged by the standard 
deviation of analyst forecasts (semi-annually) scaled by the prior half-year end stock 
price, is also only available for the Chinese Class A shares listed in the SHSE and 
the SZSE. On average, the difference between financial analysts’ earnings forecasts 
is 0.071514, which tends to stay in a very narrow range. The statistical distribution of 
the difference in analysts’ earnings forecasts factor is skewed to the right and exhibit 
a fatter tail and high peak, which surely doesn’t resemble a normal distribution 
(Jarque-Bera statistic: 155.386). Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty   Chapter 4 Data and methodology 
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4.2 Methodology 
4.2.1 Introduction 
Following the detailed account of the sample dataset used in this research, we 
intend to describe the econometrics procedures along with closely associated 
economic logic and theories employed to test the hypotheses in this study in this 
section. As described in the literature review chapter (chapter 3), the studies on the 
momentum phenomenon methodologically have been closely stuck to the procedure 
of momentum portfolio formation and calculation of momentum returns suggested by 
the Jegadeesh and Titman(1993) in their seminal work of the field.  Consistent with 
previous research on the topic and most importantly with the logic behind this 
research, the Jegadeesh and Titman’s momentum approach, arguably be the best 
starting point to unfold this section, will be described in sub-section 4.2.2. To further 
explore the topic of the momentum premia of different momentum trading strategies, 
the subsequent section (sub-section 4.2.3) will be devoted to offer a detailed account 
of the method that allows us to quantify the difference between the momentum 
premia found over time periods following UP market state and DOWN market state. 
Furthermore, sub-section 4.2.4 will illustrate how the firm-specific information 
uncertainty is measured by different proxy factors. Extending the idea put forth in 
sub-section 4.2.4, a two-way sorting momentum strategy mechanism based on 
historical share returns and different information uncertainty proxy factors will be 
introduced to examine the dynamics of the momentum premium under the influence 
of information uncertainty in sub-section 4.2.5. Subsequently, the robustness test 
procedure—sub-period analysis—will be explained in sub-section 4.2.6. In attempt to 
rationalize the momentum premia by justifying them against risk factors, we will Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty   Chapter 4 Data and methodology 
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describe the theoretical framework of the tradtional FF3F model (Fama and French, 
1996) as well as that of the Wang & Xu’s version of the FF3F model, first developed 
by Wang and Xu(2004), in the last sub-section (4.2.7) of the methodology section.  
4.2.2 Momentum trading strategy 
Albeit a more complex two-way momentum trading strategy is employed for this 
research, with different information uncertainty proxy factors being incorporated as 
additional sorting factors, the theoretical backbone of the more sophisticated 
methodological approach is fundamentally derived from the original momentum 
trading strategy, which hinges on the belief of the existence of the momentum 
phenomenon and first used by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) in discovering and 
establishing the momentum phenomenon as one of the landmark financial market 
anomalies. As the research intends to explore the in-depth dynamics of the 
momentum phenomenon in the Chinese stock market, Jegadeesh and Titman’s 
procedure is succinct to be implemented as the basic momentum trading strategy to 
quantify the momentum premiums over the different sample periods, and also for 
ease of comparison. Consistent with Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)’s approach, 
zero-cost
36 momentum portfolios will be formed based on different ranking periods 
(R= 3, 6, 9, 12), and different holding periods (H= 3, 6, 9, 12). Hence, for general 
momentum trading strategy, there are 16 specific trading strategies in total to be 
implemented. Namely, (R=3, H=3); (R=3, H=6); (R=3, H=9); (R=3, H=12); (R=6, 
H=3); (R=6, H=6); (R=6, H=9); (R=6, H=12); (R=9, H=3); (R=9, H=6); (R=9, H=9); 
(R=9, H=12); (R=12, H=3); (R=12, H=6); (R=12, H=9); (R=12, H=12). The length of 
ranking period and the length of holding period are chosen in a way rested on the 
                                            
36 Zero-cost strategy is employed for brevity and ease of comparison, whilst the estimated trading 
costs and its implication on the momentum premiums found in this research will be accordingly 
discussed at the end of this chapter and in results chapter. Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty   Chapter 4 Data and methodology 
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methodological procedure employed in a slew of previous prominent studies on the 
significance of the momentum phenomenon (Rouwenhorst, 1998, McKnight and Hou, 
2006, Chou et al., 2007, Huang, 2006) including the seminal work by Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993). Furthermore, as described in the literature review chapter, the 
majority of previous research in the literature finds that the momentum effect, 
quantified by the momentum premium, is proved to be most pronounced when both 
of the ranking and holding periods are within short-to-medium time horizon 
(specifically from 3 to 12 months).  Moreover, almost as a convention to this line of 
research, to mitigate the potential issues induced by “bid-ask bounce” bias
37  and 
return serial correlation(Arena et al., 2008) and to avoid “test statistics based on 
overlapping returns” (Moskowitz and Grinblatt, 1999: page 1258), a month is skipped 
between the end of ranking period and the start of holding period(Jegadeesh and 
Titman, 1993, Galariotis et al., 2007, McKnight and Hou, 2006, Lehmann, 1990). In 
other words, the one-month skipping approach is able to minimize the risk of 
attenuating the momentum phenomenon, also espoused by one of major inspirations 
of this research(Zhang, 2006) in exploring the interaction between the momentum 
effect and information uncertainty. Concisely, the mechanism of the momentum 
procedure can be described as follows:  
First of all, all the stocks listed within in the Chinese Class A share market are 
ranked based on their J-month average returns in ascending order. Based on which, 
the ranked stocks, being equally weighted, will be put into five portfolios to form five 
quintile momentum portfolios. What’s worth noting is that the equally-weighted 
approach is found to not only result in robust results of momentum premia by 
                                            
37 The “big-ask bounce” bias is induced by the difference between the bid and ask price for one trade 
and either of bid or ask price could be chosen for no particular reason as the transaction price during 
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numerous studies such as Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and Lee and Swaminathan 
(2000) but also enable the study to vividly imitate lay people’s investing behaviours, 
normally biased due to the “1/n heuristic” postulated by Benartzi and Thaler(2001). 
The plausibility of the postulate is supported by many empirical studies in psychology 
(Allison and Messick, 1990; Rabin, 1997; Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1998; 
Frederick, 2003)
38. The quintile momentum portfolio consists of 20% of the stocks 
with highest ranking, which is titled “winner” portfolio, whereas, the 20% of the stocks 
with lowest ranking are gathered to form the so-called “loser” portfolio. The following 
month after the end of ranking period is skipped before taking out a long position on 
the “winner” portfolio and a short position on the “loser” portfolio. There are two 
options of the way we maintain the long and short positions during the holding period: 
Option 1: closely following the procedure suggested by Jegadeesh and Titman by 
rebalancing the holding of long position on “winner” portfolio and short position on 
“loser” portfolio on a monthly basis, which will incur higher than expected trading 
costs
39 and in turn run the risk of deteriorating the significance of the momentum 
phenomenon in the Chinese stock market. Based on this monthly rebalancing 
mechanism, for a (R=6, H=6) momentum trading strategy, the momentum premium 
on January 2000 is determined equally by six different sets of portfolios: (1) “winner” 
and “loser” portfolios formed based on the ranking for the period from July 1999 to 
December 1999; (2) “winner” and “loser” portfolios formed based on the ranking for 
                                            
38 Gilovich, Griffin and Kahneman, Heuristics and biases: The psychology of intuitive judgment 
(Cambridge Univ Press, 2002) page 556-557. 
39 For a Class A share transaction, an investors is obliged to pay 0.3% of trading value as commission 
to securities firms and 0.1% of trading value as transfer fee to the Depository & Clearing Company. 
In addition, a sell-side investor is also required to pay 0.1% of trading value as stamp duty to the tax 
authorities. On the other hand, for a Class B share transaction, an investor is subject 0.3% of trading 
value as commission to securities firms, 0.05% of trading value as settlement fee to the depository & 
Clearing Company and 0.1% of trading value (sell side only)  as stamp duty to tax authorities (the 
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the period from May 1999 to November 1999; (3) “winner” and “loser” portfolios 
formed based on the ranking for the period from April 1999 to October 1999; (4) 
“winner” and “loser” portfolios formed based on the ranking for the period from March 
1999 to September 1999;  (5) “winner” and “loser” portfolios formed based on the 
ranking for the period from February 1999 to August 1999; (6) “winner” and “loser” 
portfolios formed based on the ranking for the period from January 1999 to July 1999. 
More specifically, at the end of the month t=6=R, the long position of the portion of 
the “winner” portfolio, held through since time t-6, will be closed by selling the portion 
of the portfolio and a long position will be taken on based on the “winner” portfolio 
formed on the ranking on stocks’ past 6 months performance since t-5 to fill the 1/6 
of the overall “winner” portfolio. The same procedure can be applied to “loser” 
portfolio. Option 2: implementing a buy-and-hold strategy throughout the holding 
period, which gives a more practical version of momentum trading strategy as it 
intends to eschew the potentially costly trading costs in the Chinese stock market. At 
the end of the holding period, the returns from the “winner” and “loser” portfolios will 
be converted into equivalent average monthly returns to calculate the momentum 
premium (Galariotis et al., 2007). In this research, we choose to use the more 
practical approach—buy-and-hold strategy during the holding period in face of the 
expensive trading costs in the Chinese stock market.  
The momentum premium	(    ) can be calculated by taking the difference of the 
average monthly return from the “winner” portfolio (  ) and that from “loser” portfolio 
(  ). Mathematically, it can be expressed as follows: 
 
     =    −                                                      (4.2) Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty   Chapter 4 Data and methodology 
 
- 74 - 
 
The statistical significance of the momentum premium can be tested by using a t-test 
statistics: 
     
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
                                                              (4.3) 
Where    is the mean monthly return from “winner” portfolio,   
   is the variance of 
“winner” portfolio,    is the number of stocks in the “winner” portfolio and    
represents the mean monthly return on “loser” portfolio,   
  is the variance of “loser” 
portfolio, and    denotes the number of stocks in the “loser” portfolio(Hon and Tonks, 
2003). A significant t statistic at either 5% or 10% significance level reflects whether 
the momentum premium is statistically different from zero and the strength of the 
momentum effect for different momentum trading strategies. 
4.2.3 Test on the dynamics of momentum premium over time periods following 
UP and DOWN market states 
A fair amount of attention has been paid on exploring the interaction between 
different market states, i.e. post-UP and DOWN market states, and the momentum 
phenomenon such as Cooper et al.(2004), Du et al. (2009), Huang (2006) and 
Siganos and Chelly-Steeley (2006), just to name a few. Despite being a relatively 
emergent financial market, the Chinese stock market experienced booms and busts 
over its twenty years of development. Naturally, the impact of market swings, 
triggered by different salient events in the financial market, over the momentum 
effect deserves to be focused on and examined. In order to do so, a method similar 
to the one firstly proposed in Cooper et al. (2004) and later on adopted by Du et 
al.(2009),Siagnos and Chelley-Steeley (2006) and Huang (2006) will be employed.  
Basically, the methodological procedure is designed in the way to address the 
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significance between the momentum premia over time periods following UP market 
state and those found over time periods following DOWN market state; (2) whether 
the difference between the momentum premia found over time periods following UP 
market state and DOWN market state is statistically significant; (3) whether the 
momentum premia found over time periods following different market states maintain 
the similar relative pattern across different momentum trading strategies as what was 
found over the overall sample period (Jan. 1996 – Dec. 2008). In terms of which 
metric to use in defining post-UP and DOWN market states, the results from 
previous studies in the literature have shown neither macroeconomic factors such as 
lagged industrial production growth(Huang, 2006) nor a combination of macro 
variables (Cooper et al., 2004, Du et al., 2009) nor previous 36-month average 
market return(Cooper et al., 2004, Huang, 2006) is deemed effective in 
differentiating market states. Therefore, in this research, 12-month average market 
return is chosen as the main barometer to identify the state of the stock market. 
Moreover, 24-month average market return is used as an additional market state 
definition, reassuring the robustness of the results. The returns of a self-constructed 
share A composite index entails all the Class A shares listed on the SHSE and SZSE, 
weighted by their market capitalization, will be used to proxy for the average market 
return of all Class A shares. The Chinese Class B share market is precluded from 
the analysis on the dynamics of the momentum premia over time periods following 
UP and DOWN market states due to liquidity and microstructure concerns (Naughton 
et al., 2008, Wang and Chin, 2004). Methodologically, two main steps are 
implemented for the analysis in studying the dynamics of the momentum premia over 
time periods following UP and DOWN market states in aforementioned three Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty   Chapter 4 Data and methodology 
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different segments:  
Step 1: the momentum premia over time periods following UP and DOWN market 
states will be quantified by regressing the raw momentum returns against an UP 
state dummy and a DOWN state dummy. Mathematically, it can be expressed as 
    ,  =     ,      +     ,          +                           (4.4) 
Where     ,  denotes the momentum premium from different momentum trading 
strategies (for instance, for a trading strategy with 6-month holding period, t 
represents the time spot at the end of t+6 and     ,  represents the monthly average 
momentum returns for the holding period from t+1 to t+6);     is equal to 1 if it is a 
UP market state (average market return for the previous 12 or 24 months is positive: 
       ,   ,    > 0 , where k=12 or 24) and is 0 otherwise; based on the same logic, 
      is equal to 1 if it is a DOWN market state (average market return for the 
previous 12 or 24 months is negative:        ,   ,    < 0 , where k=12 or 24) and is 
zero otherwise. The average momentum return following the UP market state is 
denoted by     ,  , and the average momentum return following the DOWN market 
state is symbolized by     ,    .  
Step 2: The difference of momentum premia over time periods following UP and 
DOWN market states will be quantified and the statistical significance of the 
difference will be tested by regress the raw momentum returns against a UP market 
state dummy factor. Mathematically, it can be shown as: 
    ,  =   +     ,           +                                       (4.5) 
Where     ,        represents the difference of momentum premia following two 
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4.2.4. Measurement of firm-specific information uncertainty levels 
Within the domain of empirical finance, the impact of information uncertainty over 
cross-sectional stock returns and other anomalous phenomena in the financial 
market has been one of the hotly discussed topics. A few researchers (Zhang, 2006, 
Jiang et al., 2005) have studied the impact of information uncertainty over the 
momentum phenomenon yet could not reach a consensus on which is the most 
appropriate variable/set of variables to proxy for the degree of information 
uncertainty (Schultz, 2005). The selection of information uncertainty proxy factors is 
difficult as some of the most obvious options, such as firm size (measured market 
capitalization) and firm age, are highly susceptible to be confounded with other 
factors. Inspired by the two seminal work revolving this topic(Zhang, 2006, Jiang et 
al., 2005) and prior empirical evidence concerning the intricate relationship between 
the quality/strength of corporate governance, firm value, and information uncertainty 
(Wang and Xu, 2004, Gompers et al., 2003, Cai et al., 2006, Magnan and Xu, 2008), 
we employ a group of seven proxy factors to gauge the degree of firm-level 
information uncertainty associated with different stocks. Specifically, the seven proxy 
factors are: firm size, measured by the stock’s market capitalization right before the 
ranking period; firm age, measured by the number of days prior to the ranking period 
since a stock gets listed or firstly appears in the database; analysts’ coverage, 
measured by the residual from regressing the number of analysts covering the firm in 
the year before the ranking period against the market capitalization of the 
corresponding firm (firm size) to stave off the cofounding effect of the firm size and Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty   Chapter 4 Data and methodology 
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analysts’ coverage
40 documented by Bhushan (1989), analogous to the procedure 
employed by Hong, Lin and Stein (2000) and McKnight and Hou (2006); return 
volatility, measured by the standard deviation of the monthly returns of a stock over 6 
months prior to the ranking period; dispersion of analysts’ opinion on earnings 
forecast, which is believed to be able to “reflect the information uncertainty each 
security bears” (Graham, Zweig, 2003: page 238) and is measured by “standard 
deviation of analysts’ earnings forecasts scaled by prior year-end stock price to 
mitigate heteroskedasticity” (Zhang, 2006: page 110); trading volume, estimated by 
the turnover ratio
41 of a stock prior to the ranking period; the quality/strength of 
corporate governance, measured by free float ratio
42, consistent with Wang and 
Xu(2004)’s method. More explicitly, free float ratio is calculated by taking the ratio 
between the number of shares in a listed firm that is free to trade among investors 
and total number of share a company issued. Collectively, all the plausible proxy 
factors are employed in a way that the the results from using all the IU proxy factors 
offer a comparative view of how information uncertainty, proxied by 7 different 
variables, impacts the momentum premia. The reasons why each individual 
information uncertainty proxy factor is chosen are explained in rich detail at the 
beginning of each section of chapter 6. 
                                            
40 The rationale of the cofounding effect is rather trivial: large cap-firms tend to draw more attention 
from the analysts, thus resulting in a positive correlation between the firm size factor and analysts’ 
coverage factor (Bhushan, 1989). 
41 The turnover ratio is calculated by taking the ratio between the number of share changed hands 
each day and the number of total shares outstanding for the stock at the end of the day (estimated 
based on quarterly data due to data availability). 
42 Free float ratio is defined as “the ratio of shares in a public company that are freely available to the 
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4.2.5 Two-way sorting momentum strategy 
To detect the impact of information uncertainty, gauged by seven different factors as 
mentioned in the previous section, over the momentum premia, we employ an 
independent two-way sorting method to form information uncertainty and momentum 
quintiles. In this study, we only examine the impact of information uncertainty over 
the momentum premia in the Chinese Class A share market, as opposed to the 
Chinese Class B share market, generally ignored due to liquidity concerns (Wang, 
2004, Kang et al., 2002). For brevity and simplicity to replicate in future research, 
with respect to the investigation on the impact of information uncertainty on 
momentum premia, we only focus on the momentum trading strategy with ranking 
period of 6 months and holding period with ranking period of 6 months. Based on the 
results of momentum premia of different momentum trading strategies in different 
segments of the Chinese stock market, the (R=6, H=6) momentum strategy exhibits 
most resilient and significant momentum phenomenon
43. 
The mechanism of the independent two-way sorting procedure was firstly proposed 
by Lee and Swaminathan (2000), who studied the linkage between past trading 
volume and momentum premia, and is further popularised by Wang and Chin (2004) 
and Naughton et al. (2008) in their investigation on the profitability of the momentum 
investment strategies, sorting based on past trading volumes and past returns, in the 
Chinese stock market and Jiang et al.(2005) in exploring the interrelationship 
between information uncertainty and cross-sectional stock returns in the U.S. stock 
market. Specifically, at the beginning of every month over the entire sample period 
                                            
43 Other momentum strategies with different ranking and holding period combinations have also been 
examined for testing purpose and results found are largely in line with those found by using (R=6, 
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from January 1996 to December 2008, all the eligible Class A share stocks (stocks 
with a price less than $1 (about 7 yuan) at the portfolio formation date are excluded 
from the sample), listed on the SHSE and the SZSE, will be ranked independently 
based on two criteria—information uncertainty proxy factor and past returns over 6-
month ranking period in ascending order. Based on each ranking, the stocks, 
bearing equal weights, are put into five different portfolios to form five quintile 
momentum portfolios. The quintile portfolio consists of 20% highest-ranked stocks 
based on their past 6-month average returns is titled “winner” portfolio, whereas the 
quintile portfolio consists of 20% lowest-ranked stocks based on their past 6-month 
average returns is named “loser” portfolio. Additionally, the quintile portfolio, 
comprising 20% highest-ranked stocks according to one of seven information 
uncertainty proxy factors, is labelled as “high IU portfolio”; the bottom quintile 
portfolio, consisting of 20% lowest ranked stocks is labelled as “low IU” portfolio. To 
factor in the interplay of the information proxy factors and return momentum premia, 
we form the “winner-high IU” portfolio by taking the intersection of the “winner” 
portfolio and “high IU” portfolio. Analogously, the intersection of the “loser” portfolio 
and “low IU” portfolio forms the “loser-low IU” portfolio; the intersection of the “winner” 
portfolio and “low IU” portfolio forms the “winner-low IU” portfolio; the intersection of 
the “loser” portfolio and “high IU” portfolio forms the “loser-high IU” portfolio. To 
simplify the notations, the five quintile portfolios partitioned based on stocks’ past-
return ranking will be denoted by Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4, Q5 respectively in ascending 
order. In other words, Q1 is the so-called “loser” portfolio and Q5 is the so-called 
“winner” portfolio. Echoing the way of labelling the past-return quintile portfolios, the 
quintile portfolios grouped based on the level of information uncertainty ranking are Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty   Chapter 4 Data and methodology 
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represented by IU1, IU2, IU3, IU4, IU5 respectively in ascending order. IU1 is known 
as the “low IU” portfolio, consisting of 20% lowest-ranked stocks, whereas IU5 is the 
same as above-mentioned “high IU” portfolio, entailing top 20% of stocks based on 
information uncertainty level ranking. Therefore, the “winner-high IU” portfolio can be 
denoted by Q5-IU5, the “loser-low IU” portfolio by Q1-IU1, the “winner-low IU” 
portfolio by Q5-IU1 and the “loser-high IU” portfolio by Q1-IU5. Collectively, there are 
25 different portfolios being drawn up based on stocks’ past 6-month return and 
information uncertainty level ranking. All these 25 portfolios will be held for six 
months after skipping the month subsequent to the end of the 6-month ranking 
period to avoid provoking microstructure issues (Lehmann, 1990, Jegadeesh, 1990, 
Galariotis et al., 2007). To realistically minimize transaction costs incurred, a buy-
and-hold strategy will be employed during the holding period. The discussion on this 
front has been detailed in section 4.2.2. Consistent with momentum trading strategy 
adopted in this research to calculate momentum premia in different segments of the 
Chinese stock market and following UP and DOWN market states, the momentum 
return 	(    ) on different information uncertainty levels will be determined by taking 
the difference of the average monthly return from relevant “winner-IU portfolio” 
(  )	and that from corresponding “loser-IU” portfolio (  ). Mathematically, it can be 
written as  
     =    −                                                  (4.6) 
 And the statistical significance of each momentum return can be verified through a t-
test statistics:  
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Where    is the mean monthly return from “winner” portfolio,   
   is the variance of 
“winner” portfolio,    is the number of stocks in the “winner” portfolio and    
represents the mean monthly return on “loser” portfolio,   
  is the variance of “loser” 
portfolio, and    denotes the number of stocks in the “loser” portfolio(Hon and Tonks, 
2003). A significant t statistic at either 5% or 10% significance level reflects whether 
the momentum premium is statistically different from zero and in turn the strength of 
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4.2.6 Sub-period analysis (robustness test) 
Given the relatively short history of the Chinese stock market as described in data 
section, a conventional back-testing strategy of running the same tests over a period 
of equivalent length preceding to the whole sample period (01/1996-12/2008 in this 
case) (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993) is implausible to establish the robustness of the 
results of momentum premia in the Chinese Class A share market and the interplay 
of momentum premia and information uncertainty over time periods following UP and 
DOWN market states. Instead, we apply a sub-period analysis, equally popular as 
back-testing strategy among other time-series analysis-oriented studies in the field 
(Schiereck et al., 1999, Conrad and Kaul, 1998, Lin and Swanson, 2008, Zhang, 
2006, Kelsey et al., 2010), by zeroing in on two financial market regulatory reforms of 
great salience in the development of the Chinese stock market over the last couple 
of decades—1) the implementation of the new P.R.C. security law on July 1
st, 1999; 
2) the opening of the Chinese Class A share market to qualified foreign institutional 
investors (QFII) on July 9
th, 2003. In light of the study by Lin and Swanson(2008) 
whom employed similar procedure to investigate the effect of China’s four major 
reform policies on stock market information transmission, we study how financial 
market regulatory reforms as such play out in impacting the momentum premia 
found in different segments of the Chinese stock market and during time periods 
following UP and DOWN market states. Over the entire sample period (Jan. 1996- 
Dec. 2008), there were four major financial policy reforms taking place in the 
Chinese stock market: “(1) daily price-limit regulation—December 16, 1996, (2) 
implementation of new People’s Republic of China (P.R.C.) securities law—July 1, 
1999, (3) removal of trading restrictions allowing domestic residents to trade B-share Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty   Chapter 4 Data and methodology 
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stocks—February 20, 2001, and (4) opening A-share markets to foreign investors—
July 9, 2003.” (Lin and Swanson, 2008: page 50-51) The detailed descriptions of 
these policy reforms and their purposes have been detailed in section 4.1.2.1 of the 
data chapter. Of these aforementioned policy reforms, to the extent that whether the 
launch of them have a real impact on the operational efficiency and microstructure of 
the Chinese stock market, only two of the policies—July 1
st, 1999: implementation of 
the new P.R.C. securities law and July 9
th, 2003: opening of Class A share market to 
qualified foreign institutional investors (QFII) –can be deemed as salient events, in 
the sense that both ameliorate the operational efficiency of the stock market, 
according to empirical evidence found in Lin and Swanson (2008)’s work. To 
implement the sub-period analysis, the time period revolving each of two salient 
events will be split into pre-event period and post-event period. In more detail, for the 
implementation of the new P.R.C. security law which took place in July 1
st, 1999, the 
pre-event period is defined as the time period from January 1998 to June 1999 and 
the post-event period is from August 1999 to January 2001. As for the other salient 
event—the opening of the Chinese Clas A share market to QFII which took place in 
July 9
th, 2003, the pre-event period refers to the period from January 2002 to June 
2003, and the post-event period is from August 2003 to January 2005. In brief, the 
tests of investigation on the dynamics of the momentum premia in different market 
segments of the Chinese stock market as well as on the influence of information 
uncertainty over the momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) momentum trading 
strategy in the Chinese Class A share market
44 will be run over pre-event periods 
                                            
44 The market state-dependent momentum strategies and momentum strategies under the influence 
of information uncertainty are not performed in sub-period analysis as the shortened testing periods 
(pre-event, post-event periods) could have drastic impact on the definition of market states (UP and 
DOWN) (12 or 24 months), distorting the picture of results found earlier on in this study. Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty   Chapter 4 Data and methodology 
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and post-event periods of the two salient events to determine the resilience of the 
results found in chapter 5-7. 
4.2.7 Risk adjustment using two versions of the FF3F model (robustness test) 
Having explained in the theory chapter that any consistent and significant evidence 
of any form of financial market anomalies poses immense challenge to the efficient 
market paradigm first proposed by Fama (1965),  we are unequivocally to test the 
hypothesis that whether the momentum premia, calculated for different research 
purposes (e.g. testing the existence of the momentum phenomenon in the Chinese 
Class A share market; examining the dynamics of the momentum premia over time 
periods following UP and DOWN market states; or investigating the impact of 
information uncertainty over the momentum premium) amid maket swings, can be 
fully rationalized by risk factors embedded in existing asset pricing models. Despite 
that numerous forms of different asset pricing models have been spawned over the 
last couple of decades in attempt to rationalize different kinds of anomalous financial 
market phenomena in the empirical finance literature, the Fama and French three 
factor model (FF3F) and one of its calibrations—Wang & Xu(2004)’s version of the 
FF3F model—will be implemented in this research for the following reasons: 1) 
previous studies in the field of the momentum effect unanimously agree that neither 
the static nor conditional CAPM model is rich enough to explain the risk associated 
with momentum portfolios;  2) the underlying rationale of some slightly more 
complicated model, such as the version of the FF3F model developed by 
Carhart(1997) through including a momentum effect risk factor, bluntly goes against 
the existence of the momentum effect, designed to intentionally capture the 
momentum premium as a risk factor; 3) as outlined in the theory chapter, focusing on Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty   Chapter 4 Data and methodology 
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the Chinese stock market, Wang and Xu(2004) replace the value effect factor of the 
original Fama and French three factors with the corporate governance factor in 
justifying cross-sectional stock returns. Partially inspired by Wang and Xu(2004)’s 
work, this study is aimed at extending the application of Wang and Xu’s version of 
the FF3F model, tempted to unique characteristics of the Chinese stock market, by 
employing the FF3F model calibrated by the duo to rationalize the momentum 
premia found in this study. The traditional FF3F model can be expressed 
mathematically as: 
 (   ),  −   ,  =   +     ,  −   ,   +  (    ) + ℎ(    ) +              (4.8) 
Where  (   ),  is the average monthly momentum returns calculated by taking the 
difference between the average monthly returns of “winner” portfolios and those of 
“loser” portfolios;   ,  is the risk-free rate, proxied by the monthly yield of China one-
year deposit rate
45. (As “interest rate is strictly controlled by the central bank (the 
People’s Bank of China), and banks are almost state-owned,… deposit interest rate 
is virtually risk free.” (Wang and Chin, 2004: page 171));   ,  denotes the average 
monthly returns of the market portfolio, which is proxied by a self-constructed Class 
A share Index consisting of all eligible Class A shares listed in the SHSE and SZSE. 
     is the difference between the average monthly returns of portfolios consisting 
of 20% of all eligible stocks with the smallest capitalization and those of portfolios 
comprising 20% of all eligible stocks with the largest capitalization ranked in June of 
each year (Fama and French, 1993), to be consistent with approach devised in the 
majority of the studies in the field, known as the size effect factor.      represents 
                                            
45 The China one-year deposit rate is found on Bank of China’s official website: July 11, 2011 < 
http://www.boc.cn/en/bocinfo/ >. Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty   Chapter 4 Data and methodology 
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the difference between the average monthly returns of portfolios consisting of 20% of 
all eligible stocks with the highest book-to-market ratios and those of portfolios 
comprising 20% of all eligible stocks with the lowest book-to-market ratios, also 
known as the value effect factor
46. The calculation of the size effect factor and the 
value effect factor, which is analogous to the procedure used by Fama and 
French(1993) can be described as follows: at the end of every June each year, all 
non-financial stocks in the Chinese Class A share market are ranked based on their 
past year’s market capitalization in descending order. Based on which, the stocks 
will be grouped into five quintile portfolios. The quintile portfolio consists of 20% 
highest-ranked stocks with smallest market capitalizations is labelled as “small cap” 
portfolio, whereas the quintile portfolio consists of 20% lowest ranked stocks is 
named “large cap” portfolio. The      is yielded by taking the difference between 
the average monthly return of equal-weighted “small cap” portfolio and those of 
equal-weighted “large cap” portfolio at the end of month t. Similar to the computation 
of the size effect factor (      ), the value effect factor (      ) is computed by 
ranking all the non-financial stocks based on their past year’s book-to-market ratios 
in ascending order and subsequently forming “high book-to-market” portfolio, 
entailing the 20% highest-ranked stocks, and “low book-to-market” portfolio, 
comprising the 20% lowest ranked stocks. The      factor is computed by taking 
the difference between the average monthly return of equal-weighted “high book-to-
market” portfolio and those of equal-weighted “low book-to-market” portfolio at the 
                                            
46 The author is aware that question of whether the size effect factor and value effect, rooted from the 
two financial market anomalous effects (Zarowin, 1990; Banz, 1981), are risk factors in the sense 
of rationality remains ever controversial (Ferson and Harvey, 1999), yet an in-depth debate 
revolving the matter is beyond the scope of this study. Consequently, consistent with Fama and 
French (1993)’s theoretical framework, size effect factor and value effect factor are deemed as 
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end of month t.   represents the portion of the raw momentum premium that cannot 
be explained by the three risk factors embedded in the FF3F model. i.e. the risk-
adjusted momentum returns.  ,  , ℎ are the loadings resulted from regressing 
estimation procedure on the market risk factor, size effect factor and value effect 
factor respectively.    is an error factor, which is independently and identically 
distributed.  
Another version of the FF3F model employed in examining the momentum premia 
found in this research is Wang and Xu’s version of the FF3F model. Their version of 
the FF3F model supplants the value effect factor      of the traditional FF3F model 
with the residual free float ratio factor (   _     ) thanks to some of the unique 
characteristics of the Chinese stock market—the split between tradable and non-
tradable shares enables them to gauge the quality/strength of corporate governance 
using free float ratio. Mathematically, the model can be written as, 
 (   ),  −   ,  =   +     ,  −   ,   +  (    ) +  (   _    ) +       (4.9) 
Where all the symbols denote the same elements except the newly-calibrated 
residual free float ratio factor(   _    )	, also known as corporate governance 
factor, which is constructed by ranking all the non-financial stocks at the end of June 
every year according to their residual free float ratios, estimated from regressing free 
float ratios against logarithm market capitalization of corresponding firms, in 
ascending order and forming the “high    _    ” portfolio, consisting of 20% 
highest-ranked stocks, as well as the “low    _    ” portfolio, comprising 20% of 
lowest-ranked stocks. The corporate governance (   _    ) factor can be 
subsequently computed by taking the difference between the monthly average return 
of the “high    _    ” portfolio and those of the “low    _    ” portfolio at the Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty   Chapter 4 Data and methodology 
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end of month t.   is the loading from the regression estimation procedure on the 
corporate governance factor (   _    ). Wang and Xu’s FF3F model is aimed at 
testing the role of corporate governance in explaining cross-sectional stock returns in 
the Chinese stock market. In this research, we apply their version of FF3F model to 
rationalize the momentum premia of different momentum trading strategies found in 
different market segments and during time periods following UP and DOWN market 
states in the Chinese stock market. Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty   Chapter 4 Data and methodology 
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Chapter 5 Momentum premia and momentum premia under 
post-UP and post-DOWN market states in the Chinese Class A 
share market 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the evidence of the momentum phenomenon in the Chinese 
Class A share market in section 5.2 and the dynamics of the momentum 
phenomenon amid market swings in the Chinese Class A share market in section 
5.3. The findings portrayed in this chapter well complement the extant evidence of 
the momentum phenomenon in the Chinese Class A share market by extending the 
sample horizon and focusing the momentum investing strategies with short-to-
intermediate ranking and holding periods, and further documenting the dynamic 
behaviour of the momentum phenomenon amid market swings, which has yet to be 
rigorously examined in the setting of the Chinese Class A share market in this line of 
the literature. 
 
5.2 Overall momentum premia in the Chinese Class A share market 
In this section, the momentum premia
47 calculated in Class A share market are 
presented. Table 5.1, as shown below, reports the findings from the investigation on 
the overall momentum premia of various momentum trading strategies in the Class A 
share market for the sample period from January 1996 to December 2008. In total, 
there are 16 different momentum trading strategies, differed based on different 
combinations of ranking (R= 3, 6, 9, 12) and holding (H= 3, 6, 9, 12) periods, being 
                                            
47 The calculations of the momentum premia follow zero-cost portfolio approach, adopted by most of 
the studies (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993; Lee and Swamnathan, 1998; Liu et al, 1999; Wang, 2004 
etc.) for consistency unless otherwise stated. An in-depth discussion of momentum premia net 
trading costs is beyond the scope of this study yet the issue is briefly discussed in the end of the 
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examined. For each momentum trading strategy, the monthly average returns of the 
“loser” portfolio (Q1), “winner” portfolio (Q5) and the momentum premium (monthly 
average return of “winner” portfolio minus that of “loser” portfolio (Q5-Q1)) are listed 
out in Table 5.1. In addition, the significance of the momentum premia is shown by 
the sign of asterisk. Every three rows represent the results for a ranking period of 
certain length R (R=3, 6, 9, 12), and every column represent the results for a holding 
period of certain length H (H=3, 6, 9, 12). At first glance, as shown in Table 5.1, all 
momentum premia are positive and statistically significant at at least 10% confidence 
level. Despite being consistently larger across different momentum trading strategies 
in magnitude, this result echoes the findings of one of the most recent studies with 
focus on the Chinese stock market carried out by Naughton et al. (2008), who 
studied the momentum effect in the Chinese Class A share market for the sample 
period from 1995 to 2005 and found solid evidence of the momentum premia in the 
Chinese Class A share market. However, the results found in other major studies on 
the Chinese Class A share market have been a mixed bag. Of them, Wang (2004) 
documents much smaller and even negative momentum premia for matching 
momentum trading strategy over the sample time horizon from July 1994 to 
December 2000. Analysing stock return data for the sample period from January 
1993 to January 2000, Kang et al.(2002) report evidence of significant and positive 
momentum premia over intermediate lengths of holding and ranking periods (roughly 
from 4 to 8 months). Taken together, the only possible reason why the results of 
momentum premia in the same testing ground—Chinese Class A share market—is 
the different sample time periods over which the studies are carried out, 
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immersed with speculative retail investors, the Chinese stock market has been 
comparatively volatile over its relatively short history. With this in mind, it is more 
plausible that studies with focus on shorter sample time horizon, for instance, 
Wang(2004)’s and Kang et al.(2002), could produce disparate results. Comparing to 
the results found in some of the mature financial markets in the world, the 
momentum premia found in this study, in terms of both significance level and 
magnitude, trail behind those found in Chan et al. (1995) from their study on the U.S. 
stock market over Jan. 1973 to Dec. 1993 (8.8 percentage points on average) and in 
Liu et al. (1999)’s empirical work on the UK stock market (9 percentage points on 
average), which is consistent with the empirical evidence found by Koutmos (1997) 
and Van der Hart (2003) supporting the postulate that the presence of the 
momentum effect tends to be weaker in emerging financial markets in comparison to 
mature financial markets. To expands the understanding of the pattern, Chui et 
al.(2000) nominates more fraudulent asset pricing activities, more likely to take place 
in less developed financial market due to immature law system to protect investors’ 
rights, as the impetus behind the asymmetry of the momentum effect in emergent 
and developed stock markets (Koutmos, 1997, van der Hart et al., 2003).  
Conversely, casting doubt on the pattern—the momentum premia tend to be weaker 
in the emergent stock markets compared with those found in developed financial 
markets—described above, evidence found in Jegadeesh and Titman(1993)’s 
seminal work are falling short slightly, in terms of magnitude, of the momentum 
premia found here. In addition, even though the momentum premia found in the UK 
stock market in Hon and Tonks (2003)’s research over an extensive 40-year sample 
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tend to be much smaller in terms of magnitude than the results in the Chinese Class 
A share market found in this study. To properly interpret the observation, one would 
be hard-pressed not to reach back to some characteristics of the Chinese stock 
market, resembling an emergent market. Namely, the marked volatility(Selcuk, 2005)  
and a comparatively high percentage of individual investors (retail investors) as 
described in data and methodology chapter. Amid more than frequent market swings, 
the behaviours of the vast amount of retail investors are inevitably subject to different 
heuristic biases especially so during judgmental process as the judgments and 
decision of most individuals are fraught with cognitive illusions and distortions 
(Nisbett et al., 1983) as documented in psychology. Specifically, Asian investors 
were found to be more over-confident in general compared with Western 
counterparts (Yates et al., 1998), resulting in the excessive momentum premia 
observed here in the Chinese stock market under the framework of investors’ 
overconfidence theory developed by Daniel et al. (2001). From a different 
perspective, one could argue that the difference of momentum premia found in 
Chinese stock market and other more developed stock markets stems from the 
persuasive evidence from experimental study showing that on average the Chinese 
investors, having received considerably less statistics-related education, are less 
capable of statistics heuristics of cognitive System two (Kahneman and Tversky, 
2002) in judgment process(Fong et al., 1986, Nisbett et al., 1983). Consequently, the 
behaviours of Chinese investors are prone to the influence of overconfidence/over-
optimism and underreaction towards firm-specific information, susceptible to take 
significant part in contributing to the momentum premia documented in the literature 
(Daniel et al., 1998, Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993, Hong and Stein, 1999). Taken Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty                        Chapter 5 Results I 
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together, one should not be surprised to observe the evidence of momentum premia 
found here in the Chinese stock market outstrip some of those found more advanced 
financial markets.   
Turning glare back to the Table 5.1, for strategies with 3 months as length of the 
ranking period, with all the corresponding momentum premia being positive and 
statistically significant, the momentum premia gradually increase as the holding 
periods get longer from 3 months to 12 months. On the premise of the 
overconfidence/overoptimism theory (Daniel et al., 1998), this pattern can be 
explained by psychology experimental evidence showing that economic agents tend 
to get less optimistic as the time to reveal their prediction outcomes draws closer 
(Armor and Taylor, 1998), consequently resulting in the dwindling momentum premia 
as holding period shortens as observed. Moreover, the pattern holds with 
approximate uniformity for the momentum trading strategies with 6, 9, 12 months as 
holding periods (with the exception of the return of the (R=6, H=12) strategy( 2.09) 
slightly trailing that of the (R=6, H=9) strategy (2.17)), closely in line with the pattern 
of the results reported by Naughton et al.(2008) and echoing voluminous scholarly 
findings in that field manifesting that the momentum effect is more prevalent for 
short-to-intermediate time horizons (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993, Hon and Tonks, 
2003, Liu et al., 1999, Naughton et al., 2008).  
Table 5.1 Monthly momentum premia in Class A share market over sample period 
from January 1996 to December 2008 
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Overall momentum premia (monthly returns) Share A (Jan. 1996 – Dec. 2008) 
R months ranking 
period 
H months ranking 
period 
   H=3     H=6     H=9     H=12    
R=3  Q1  -0.64  -0.72  -0.83  -0.79 
   Q5  1.21  1.46  1.42  1.52 
   Q5-Q1  1.85  *  2.18  **  2.25  **  2.31  * 
R=6  Q1  -0.77  -0.89  -0.95  -0.82 
   Q5  0.54  0.75  1.22  1.27 
   Q5-Q1  1.31  **  1.64  **  2.17  *  2.09  ** 
R=9  Q1  -0.95  -0.72  -0.88  -0.79 
   Q5  0.62  1.08  1.11  1.31 
   Q5-Q1  1.57  **  1.8  **  1.99  **  2.1  ** 
R=12  Q1  -0.79  -0.74  -0.88  -0.92 
   Q5  0.7  1.06  1.06  1.16 
   Q5-Q1  1.49  *  1.8  **  1.94  **  2.08  ** 
This table presents the momentum premia (the difference between average monthly returns of 
“winner” portfolios and those of “loser” portfolios) as well as the average monthly returns of “winner” 
and “loser” portfolios respectively in the Class A share market for the sample period from Jan. 1996 to 
Dec. 2008. The momentum portfolio formation procedure is akin to the methodology used by 
Jegadeesh and Titman(1993). Over the sample period, at the end of each month, all the eligible 
stocks are ranked in ascending order based on their past R-month (the value of R denotes the 
number of months used as ranking period for a specific momentum trading strategy. For this study, 
R= 3, 6, 9, 12) performance. The 20% highest ranked stocks, being equally weighted, form the 
“winner” portfolio (Q5) and 20% lowest ranked stocks form the “loser” portfolio (Q1). One month is 
skipped to avoid microstructure issues. The portfolios are then held for H months (H=3, 6, 9, 12) using 
buy-and-hold strategy to avoid excessive trading costs(Galariotis et al., 2007). Q5-Q1 represents the 
momentum premium for each momentum trading strategy. The significance of the momentum premia 
is determined by t statistics for the difference between the returns of “winner” portfolio and those of 
“loser” portfolio. * symbolizes statistical significance at 10% level. ** symbolizes statistical significance 
at 5% level. All the numbers are in percentage term. 
The pattern of the momentum premia across the mix of 16 momentum strategies is 
graphed in Figure 5.1, where the holding periods (3, 6, 9, 12) and ranking periods (3, 
6, 9, 12) are labelled on the x axis and y axis respectively and z axis measures the 
momentum premia. Most notably, the momentum trading strategies with 3-month 
ranking period, represented by the line in burgundy, appear to be most profitable 
groups among strategies with 4 possible ranking periods (R=3, 6, 9, 12). Moreover, 
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period produces the global maxium momentum premium of 2.31 per cent among all 
16 momentum trading strategies with different combinations of holding and rnaking 
periods. From a different angle, all momentum trading strategies can be grouped in 
terms of 4 possible holding periods. Apart from the momentum premia of (R=6, H=9) 
trading strategy, by and large, the momentum premia, with the lengths of holding 
period fixed, tend to deteriorate as the ranking periods gets longer from 3 months to 
12 months. Based on psychology evidence, as ranking period lengthens, investors 
generally have access to more historic data upon which they are able to draw a 
clearer picture to make their bets, translated into more confidence in their predictions 
(Armor and Taylor, 1998). Riding the wave of overall higher confidence, investors 
have less traction in disbelieving themselves towards making investment decision, 
deterring the influence of invesotrs’ underconfidence, theorised as the cause of the 
momentum effect according to Du(2002)’s investors’ hesitation model. In summary, 
in the Chinese Class A share market, the momentum premia are maximized by 
shortening the ranking period (down to 3 months) and lengthening the holding period 
(up to 12 months).  
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Figure 5.1 Overall monthly momentum premia in Class A share market (Jan. 1996 - 
Dec. 2008) 
 
Notes: The holding periods (3, 6, 9, 12 months) are scaled on the X axis; the ranking periods (3, 6, 9, 
12 months) are plotted on the Y axis; the momentum premia are measured on the Z axis. The line in 
burgundy color represents the changes of momentum premia yielded by the group of momentum 
trading strategies with 3-month ranking period; the line in apple green reflects the changes of 
momentum premia yielded by the group of momentum trading strategies with 6-month ranking period; 
the line in royal blue represents the changes of momentum premia yielded by the group of momentum 
trading strategies with 9-month ranking period; the line in purple represents the changes of 
momentum premia yielded by the group of momentum trading strategies with 12-month ranking 
period. 
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5.3 Momentum premia under post-UP and DOWN market states 
In this section, the momentum premia over time periods following UP and DOWN 
market states in the Chinese Class A share market
48 will be documented. The 
market states are initially defined using past 12-month average market return, with 
market portfolios proxied by relevant market indices (a consolidated Class A share 
index entails all the Class A shares listed on the SHSE and SZSE), and the past 24-
month average market return is employed to define the market states in the back-
testing procedure.  
To re-stress the definition of market states and have a clearer picture of the market 
dynamics over the sample period from January 1996 to December 2008, we reiterate 
the way we define market states—a UP market state is when the prior 12(24)-month 
average market return is positive, otherwise a DOWN market state and depict the 
number of UP and DOWN-market months for the Chinese Class A share market 
(Figure 5.2). The mini-statistics box describes the number of UP and DOWN market 
months quantitatively. The green-coloured columns represent the number of UP-
market months for each calendar year and the red-coloured columns represent the 
number of DOWN-market months for each calendar year. 
The Chinese Class A share market 
Figure 5.2 The number of UP and DOWN-market months over sample period (Jan. 
1996- Dec. 2008) 
Class A share  
UP  DOWN  Total 
N  85  71  156 
%  54.49%  45.51% 
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Notes: this figure illustrates the number of UP-market months and DOWN-market months in each 
calendar year of the sample period (1996- 2008). For Class A share market, a self-constructed value-
weighted Share A Index is used to proxy market portfolio. UP market state is defined as when the 
prior 12-month average market return is positive, while DOWN market state is defined as when the 
prior 12-month is negative. The number of UP-market months is represented by green columns, and 
the number of DOWN-market months is represented by red columns. 
In the largest market segment (measured by volumes) of the Chinese stock 
market—the Class A share market (entailing all the Class A shares listed on the 
SHSE and the SZSE), the momentum premia of 16 different momentum trading 
strategies over time peirods following UP and DOWN market states, defined by past 
12-month average market return
49, over the whole sample period from January 1996 
to December 2008 are summarized in the Table 5.2. Panel A shows the empirical 
evidence of the momentum premia over time periods following UP market state, and 
Panel B the empirical evidence of the momentum premia over time periods following 
DOWN market state. With regard to the momentum premia of 16 different 
momentum trading strategies over time periods following UP market state in the 
Chinese Class A share market, all of them are positive and statistically significant at 
least at 10% significance level. Compared with the evidence of the overall 
                                            
49 For this case, the value-weighted average return of SSE (SHSE) A Share Index and SZSE 
Component A Share Index is used to proxy for the average market return. 
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momentum premia in the Class A share market as shown in the previous section, the 
momentum premia realized over time periods following UP market state are all 
positive and  mostly moderately larger in magnitude, paralleling the empirical 
evidences found by Huang (2006) in an international context, Du et al. (2009) in the 
scenario of the Taiwanese stock market and Asem and Tian (2009) in the U.S. stock 
markets. The preceding observation of more pronounced momentum premia over 
time periods following UP market state can be elucidated by different behavioural 
theories outlined in the fields of empirical finance and psychology. Specifically, given 
that the Chinese/Asian investors are found to be more overconfident/ overoptimistic 
than their Western counterparts(Yates et al., 1998), subsequent to market run-ups, 
investors’ euphoric sentiment stoke their confidence/optimism levels,  proved to 
evoke(Daniel et al., 1998) and amplify the momentum premia (Antoniou et al., 2010) 
in empirical finance.  Furthermore, the pattern can be interpreted using experimental 
evidence from psychology—investors’ confidence got boosted as they emphasize 
the outcomes confirm their optimistic prediction following positive market swing 
thanks to confirmatory bias (Block and Harper, 1991, Griffin and Tversky, 1992, 
Chapman and Johnson, 1999), further fuelling the overreaction of the share prices 
and in turn resulting in the larger momentum premia observed. This plausibility of 
this explanation is clinched by the findings by Patel and Bohl (1998) (Du et al., 2009: 
page 144) showing that the investors in emergent financial markets are predisposed 
to make investment decisions based on some heuristic biases such 
representativeness, overconfidence and conservatism. At the other end of the 
spectrum, investors in buoyant mood are more inclined to rely on the simple intuitive 
heuristics of System 1 of two cognitive systems (Bless and Schwarz, 1999) and Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty                        Chapter 6 Results I 
 
- 102 - 
 
feelings (Schwarz, 1990), reining in the more significant momentum premia through 
pushing the market price of stocks well over their fundamental values (Daniel et al., 
1998) or underreact to firm-specific information (Barberis et al., 1998, Hong and 
Stein, 1999). 
Additionally, the larger momentum premia following UP market state found here also 
provide direct empirical evidence to challenge the claim theorised by Chui et 
al.(2000)
50 suggesting that among Asian investors, less heuristic biases, mediated 
by repressed individualism due to Asian culture, are present in investment decision 
making, which undermines the significance of the momentum premia in Asian 
financial markets.  
In stark contrast to the momentum premia found over time periods following UP 
market state described above, a completely different picture is observed for the 
evidence of the momentum premia over time periods found following DOWN market 
state, shown in panel B, which are all negative and statistically insignificant. It is 
unsurprising as this observation is largely in line with the empirical finding by (He and 
Chen, 2006) in a study on the momentum effect in bear and bull markets in the 
Chinese stock market. Furthermore, the asymmetry of the momentum premia for the 
periods following UP market state and those following DOWN market state found in 
this research qualitatively concur with what was found in other major research on the 
behaviour of the momentum premia under state dependence in the literature. 
Namely, Cooper et al. (2004) on the U.S. stock markets, Huang (2006) on a group of 
international stock markets and Du et al. (2009) on the Taiwan stock market. The 
virtually muted momentum premia over time periods following DOWN market state 
                                            
50 Chui et al. (2000) study financial markets in a group of eight Asian countries including Hong Kong, 
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can be interpreted by behavioural theories from different perspectives. First, as a by-
product of the market downdraft, the gloomy mood of investors tends to prompt 
systematic processing procedure in the judgemental process(Tiedens and Linton, 
2001, Schwarz, 1990), during which the reflective heuristics such as neutral, 
statistics and abstract heuristics of System 2 of two cognitive system (Kahneman 
and Frederick, 2002) are employed. The aforementioned systematic processing 
procedure puts a lid on the occurrence of overreaction of share prices or 
underreaction toward firm-specific news, triggered by investors’ 
overconfidence/overoptimism(Daniel et al., 1998), underconfidence(Du, 2002) and 
conservatism (Barberis et al., 1998) and consequently deteriorates the momentum 
premia over time periods following DOWN market state observed. From a different 
vantage point, following a market skid, investors grow slightly more confident in 
expecting the occurrence of a reversal—market run-up—by convincing themselves 
that the market has found its technical bottom(Shefrin, 2000), therefore undermining 
the momentum premia based on Du(2002)’s investors’ hesitation behavioural model.   
The asymmetry of the behaviour of the momentum premia over time periods 
following UP market state and those over time periods following DOWN market state 
is quantitatively illustrated in Table 5.3. The t statistics are listed below 
corresponding differences.  As shown in the table, all the differences between the 
momentum premia over time periods following UP market state and those over time 
periods following DOWN market state are positive and markedly statistically 
significant. This empirical evidence strengthens the validity of behavioural theories—
overconfidence/overoptimism theory (Daniel et al., 1998, Daniel et al., 2001), 
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theory (Hong and Stein, 1999, Hong et al., 2000) and investor’s underconfident 
behaviour(Du, 2002)—in explaining the market state-dependent attribute of the 
momentum premium. As noted in rich detail earlier, following market run-ups, 
spurred by the surrounding euphoria and inherent tendency of being overconfident 
evidenced in experimental research of psychology(Yates et al., 1998), Chinese 
investors are inclined to embrace more optimistic sentiment, eliciting the use of 
intuitive heuristics of System 1 of two cognitive system in judgmental process. More 
explicitly, the cognitive heuristics behind the aforementioned behavioural theories—
overconfidence/overoptimism theory (Daniel et al., 1998, Daniel et al., 2001), 
conservatism (Barberis et al., 1998), underreaction/gradual-information-diffusion 
theory (Hong and Stein, 1999, Hong et al., 2000) and investor’s underconfident 
behaviour(Du, 2002)—all belong to the System 1(intuitive), separately or jointly 
stoking the noticeably more evident momentum premia observed. The plausibility of 
which can also explained by intensified herding behaviour of Chinese investors 
following upside market movements (Tan et al., 2008), cemented by psychology 
evidence showing that behavioural imitation is most pronounced when economic 
agents are in buoyant mood state(Hertel et al., 2000), leading to more significant 
momentum premia of different momentum trading strategies following market run-
ups (Grinblatt et al., 1995, Nofsinger and Sias, 1999).  
On the other hand, the markedly attenuated momentum premia observed during time 
periods following market downdraft can be elucidated within the framework of 
feelings as information (Schwarz, 1990). More explicitly, the investors’ sentiment 
turns more pessimistic following market slumps, prompting “detailed-oriented 
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extensive practice of cognitive heuristics of System 2 of two cognitive 
systems(Kahneman and Frederick, 2002) such as statistics heuristics, abstract 
heuristics (Tiedens and Linton, 2001). The systematic processing procedure crimps 
the influence of overconfidence, conservatism and underreaction overs investors, 
evoked by intuitive heuristics and in turn deteriorates the momentum premia 
following market down-side movements. 
Collectively, the result is consistent with the prediction of our proposition—the 
momentum premia of different momentum strategies tend to be larger and more 
significant over time periods following UP market state yet turn dismal over time 
periods following DOWN market state.  
Table 5.2 Monthly momentum premia following UP and DOWN market states in 
Class A share market over sample period (Jan. 1996- Dec. 2008) 
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Panel A 
Monthly momentum premia Share A 
Following UP market 
(12 months) 
Jan. 1996- Dec. 
2008 
Ranking periods 
Holding 
periods 
   H=3     H=6     H=9     H=12    
R=3  Q1  -0.73  -0.83  -0.79  -0.88 
Q5  1.13  1.44  1.34  1.48 
   Q5-Q1  1.86  *  2.27  **  2.13  **  2.36  ** 
R=6  Q1  -0.58  -0.64  -0.93  -0.87 
Q5  0.82  0.91  1.25  1.23 
   Q5-Q1  1.4  *  1.55  *  2.18  **  2.1  * 
R=9  Q1  -0.83  -0.71  -0.82  -0.71 
   Q5  1.05  1.27  1.07  1.5 
   Q5-Q1  1.88  *  1.98  **  1.89  *  2.21  ** 
R=12  Q1  -0.83  -0.74  -0.69  -0.92 
   Q5  0.79  1.16  1.15  1.23 
   Q5-Q1  1.62  *  1.9  **  1.84  *  2.15   ** 
 
Panel B 
Monthly momentum premia Share A following DOWN market (12 months) 
Jan. 1996- Dec. 
2008 
Ranking periods 
Holding 
periods 
   H=3     H=6     H=9     H=12    
R=3  Q1  1.29  1.65  1.51  1.56 
   Q5  0.71  0.84  0.62  0.63 
   Q5-Q1  -0.58     -0.81     -0.89  *  -0.93    
R=6  Q1  1.16  1.37  1.61  1.87 
   Q5  0.54  0.62  0.75  0.93 
   Q5-Q1  -0.62  *  -0.75  *  -0.86  *  -0.94    
R=9  Q1  1.41  1.1  1.53  1.46 
   Q5  0.63  0.48  0.74  0.86 
   Q5-Q1  -0.78     -0.62  *  -0.79     -0.6    
R=12  Q1  0.81  0.8  1.22  1.25 
   Q5  0.46  0.38  0.73  0.58 
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This table presents the momentum premia (the difference between average monthly returns of 
“winner” portfolios and those of “loser” portfolios) following UP market state and DOWN market state 
as well as the average monthly returns of “winner” and “loser” portfolios respectively in the Class A 
share market for the sample period from Jan. 1996 to Dec. 2008. The momentum portfolio formation 
procedure is akin to the methodology used by Jegadeesh and Titman(1993). Over the sample period, 
at the end of each month, all the eligible stocks are ranked in ascending order based on their past R-
month (the value of R denotes the number of months used as ranking period for a specific momentum 
trading strategy. For this study, R= 3, 6, 9, 12) performance. The 20% highest ranked stocks, being 
equally weighted, form the “winner” portfolio (Q5) and 20% lowest ranked stocks form the “loser” 
portfolio (Q1). One month is skipped to avoid microstructure issues. The portfolios are then held for H 
months (H=3, 6, 9, 12) using buy-and-hold strategy to avoid excessive trading costs(Galariotis et al., 
2007). Q5-Q1 represents the momentum premium for each momentum trading strategy. The 
calculation of the momentum premia following UP and DOWN market states is analogous to the one 
used by Cooper et al. (2004), Huang (2006), Siagnos and Chelley-Steeley(2006) and Du et al.(2009). 
Mathematically, the procedure can be expressed as 
    ,  =     ,      +     ,          +    for ease of comparison. * symbolizes 
statistical significance at 10% level. ** symbolizes statistical significance at 5% level. All the numbers 
are in percentage term. 
 
Table 5.3 Equality test results of state-dependent monthly momentum premia 
(following UP and DOWN market states) in the Class A share market 
Class A share 
market  (12 months) 
Equality test for UP-
DOWN=0 
MOM  (3,3)  (3,6)  (3,9)  (3,12)  (6,3)   (6,6)  (6,9)  (6,12) 
UP  1.86  2.27  2.13  2.36  1.4  1.55  2.18  2.1 
DOWN 
-
0.58  -0.81  -0.89  -0.93  -0.62  -0.75  -0.86  -0.94 
Difference  2.44  3.08  3.02  3.29  2.02  2.3  3.04  3.04 
t stats  2.78  3.51  1.96  4.83  3.71  3.44  5.1  3.19 
MOM  (9,3)  (9,6)  (9,9)  (9,12)  (12,3)  (12,6)  (12,9)  (12,12) 
UP  1.88  1.98  1.89  2.21  1.62  1.9  1.84  2.15 
DOWN 
-
0.78  -0.62  -0.79  -0.6  -0.35  -0.42  -0.49  -0.67 
Difference  2.66  2.6  2.68  2.81  1.97  2.32  2.33  2.82 
t stats  3.45  2.76  3.88  4.05  1.93  1.55  1.37  1.63 
This table reports the difference between the momentum premia following UP and DOWN market 
states in the Class A share market for 16 different momentum trading strategies. The difference is 
estimated by regressing the raw momentum premia against an UP dummy variable (    ) and an 
intercept (  ) , following the same methodology for equality test used by Cooper et al. (2004) and Du 
et al. (2009). Mathematically, it can be written as     ,  =   +     ,           +    . The t statistics 
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In order to better visualize the asymmetry of the momentum premia over time 
periods following UP and DOWN market states, we plot the momentum premia over 
the time periods following UP market state and corresponding momentum premia 
during the time periods following DOWN market state for each momentum trading 
strategy side by side, presented in the Figure 5.3. In the figure, the vertical axis 
measures momentum premia in percentage form and the horizontal axis indicates 16 
momentum trading strategies with different combinations of ranking and holding 
periods. The blue columns represent the momentum premia realized during periods 
following UP market state; the red columns represent the momentum premia over 
time periods following DOWN market state. As noted earlier, the momentum trading 
strategies, on the whole, appear to produce superior returns over the time periods 
following UP market state than over the time periods following DOWN market state. 
The observation is portrayed by the uneven distribution of lengths of the blue 
columns and the red columns above and below zero horizontal axis, with the lengths 
of blue columns above the zero axis overwhelming those of corresponding red ones 
below the zero axis. Turning into each individual momentum trading strategy, the 
momentum trading strategy with 3-month ranking period and 12-month holding 
period is exhibiting most noticeable asymmetry between momentum premia of 
momentum trading strategies conditional on post-UP market state and post-DOWN 
market state. Intriguingly, the slimmest difference between momentum premia 
following UP and DOWN market states is observed when employing the strategy 
with 12-month ranking period and 3-month holding period. To explore the plausibility 
of the preceding observation, we reach back to how the momentum premia of 
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and holding periods summarized in section 5.1, where we find that the momentum 
premia decline as ranking period lengthens and as holding period shortens. 
Following the logic, the (R=12, H=3) momentum trading strategy is expected to 
produce weak or even the weakest momentum premium, which turns out to be the 
most resilient amid market swings. This find sheds light on the implementation of the 
momentum strategies in the financial industry under different market states by 
indicating the most appropriate strategy to employ to insure one’s investment interest 
against adverse development brought by market gyrations. 
Compared with the finding of asymmetric momentum premia over time periods 
following UP and DOWN market states by Huang(2006) using a portfolio entailing 17 
developed markets
51 (see Appendix 7), the momentum premia following UP and 
DOWN market states found in this study for the Class A share market exhibit a more 
dramatic asymmetric pattern across different momentum trading strategies in 
general. Quite glaringly, it is intriguing to notice that the difference between 
momentum premia following UP market state and those following DOWN market 
state is also maximized at the momentum trading strategy with 3-month ranking 
period and 6-month holding period. Looking through findings of other studies in this 
line of research, who normally render the spotlight to the performance of the 
momentum trading strategy with 6-month ranking period and 6-month holding period, 
the Taiwan stock market exhibit the most significant asymmetric momentum premia 
following UP and DOWN market states quantitatively of 2.86 per cent (Du et al., 
2009), moderately bettering the evidence of the asymmetry found in the Class A 
                                            
51 The 17 developed stock markets are located in Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
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share market(2.3 per cent). In comparison, the evidence of asymmetric momentum 
premia over time peirods following UP and DOWN market states found in developed 
financial markets, however, quantitatively lag those in aforementioned two studies 
with focus on developing financial markets (the Taiwan and Chinese stock markets). 
Numerically, the differences of the momentum premia (for (R=6, H=6) momentum 
trading strategy) following UP and DOWN market states of 1.25 per cent for the U.S. 
stock market over the period from Jan. 1927 to Dec. 2005, 1.12 per cent for the U.S. 
stock market during the period from 1929 to 1995 and 1.065 per cent in the 
international context are documented by Asem and Tian (2009), Cooper et al. (2004) 
and Huang (2006) respectively (all using past 12-month average market returns to 
defined market states). Of the crop, the only disparate evidence of the asymmetric 
momentum premia following different market states is evidenced by Siganos and 
Chelley-Steeley (2006), who investigate the proposition in the setting of the UK stock 
market and show that the (R=6,H=6) momentum strategy performs better during 
periods following DOWN market state than does during the periods following UP 
market states, with the difference calculated at – 1.03 per cent. In view of the 
evidence of the difference of momentum premia under two different market states 
found in different stock markets in the world as described above, the cause of the 
different patterns observed in the UK stock market and other stock markets in the 
globe seems unlikely to lie within the claim that the inherent cognitive heuristics of 
the U.K. investors are differentiable from those of their counterparts in emergent 
stock markets as the empirical evidence found in other developed markets are 
largely consistent with those obtained in emerging stock markets. In other words, the 
eminent reason behind the reversed pattern of the momentum premia under different Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty                        Chapter 6 Results I 
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market state could stem from the characteristics of market microstructure. 
Additionally, the results from this study offer little support for Du et al.(2009)’s 
conjecture on the reason why the momentum premia fade away—dismal 
performance of the momentum trading strategies following DOWN market and the 
fact that there is higher percentage of DOWN-market months (35%) compared with 
the U.S. markets (16%) (Cooper et al., 2004). There is, as shown in the statistics box 
of Figure 5.2, over 45 per cent of DOWN-market months in the Chinese Class A 
share market through the sample period from Jan. 1996 to Dec. 2008, and to be 
more specific, as Du et al. only focus on the (R=6, H=6) momentum trading strategy, 
the (R=6, H=6) strategy yields statistically significant negative return at -0.75 per 
cent (shown on Table 5.3) over time periods following DOWN market state (smaller 
in magnitude than the negative return (-1.35 per cent) documented in Du et al.’s 
study). Running contrary to the 0.24 per cent return yielded by the (R=6, H=6) 
momentum trading strategy in Du et al.(2009)’s research on the Taiwan stock market, 
the trading strategy manages to eke out a gain of 1.64 per cent over the sample time 
period in the Chinese share A market. Consequently, the evidence found here shed 
light on the proposition that the argument of Du et al. (2009), supported by the 
empirical evidence found in the Taiwan stock market, cannot be applied to other 
settings (other stock markets).  
In order to boost the power of test on the asymmetry between the momentum premia 
over time periods following UP market state and those during time periods following 
DOWN market state, we adopt a different market-state definition. Specifically, 
instead of using prior 12-month average market return to define UP and DOWN 
market states, prior 24-month average market return is employed: UP market state if Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty                        Chapter 6 Results I 
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the prior 24-month average market return is positive; DOWN market state if the prior 
24-month average market return is negative. The testing results, as reported in 
Appendix 11, are rather similar to what we found using prior-12 month average 
market return as the definition of market states, asserting the robustness of the 
empirical evidence reported above. Given that investors’ heuristics are insensitive to 
duration documented in psychology experiments (Kahneman, 2000, Frederick and 
Kahneman, 1993), the resilience of the test result seems plausible. 
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Figure 5.3 Comparison between the momentum premia (monthly) over time periods 
following UP and DOWN market states in the Class A share market 
 
Notes: the column-shaped diagram illustrates the difference of momentum premia during time periods 
following UP market state and those during periods following DOWN market states in the Class A 
share market. The vertical axis measures the momentum premia in percentage form; the horizontal 
axis labels the 16 different momentum trading strategies studied in the form of (R, H), where R 
denotes ranking period (=3, 6, 9, 12) and H represents holding period (=3, 6, 9, 12). For each 
momentum trading strategy, the corresponding momentum premium following UP market state is 
represented by the blue-coloured column, whereas the corresponding momentum premium following 
DOWN market state is represented by the red-coloured column. 
 
 
5.4 Summary 
In sum, chapter 5 reports and interprets the evidence of the existence of the 
momentum phenomenon and the evidence of the dynamics of the performance of 
different momentum trading strategies amid market swings in the Chinese Class A 
share market. Specifically, we document compelling evidence of the existence of the 
momentum phenomenon in the Chinese Class A share market. Additionally, the 
empirical results unanimously indicate that on average, short-to-medium time 
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horizon momentum trading strategies (R=3, 6, 9, 12; H=3, 6, 9, 12) over time periods 
following UP market state tend to outperform the corresponding momentum trading 
strateiges over time periods following DOWN market state. As described in rich 
detail in section 5.2 and 5.3, the overall persuasively more pronounced momentum 
premia found during periods following market run-ups and comparatively depressed 
momentum premia found during periods following market sell-offs can be elucidated 
within the framework of heuristics and bias tradition(Gilovich et al., 2002), prospered 
over years on different fronts such as economics and sociology, along with three 
most entrenched behavioural theories developed in the momentum effect literature—
namely, the overconfidence theory (Daniel et al., 1998, Daniel et al., 2001), investors’ 
conservatism model (Barberis et al., 1998) and investors’ underreaction to firm-
specific news model(Hong and Stein, 1999). Moreover, the results obtained by using 
prior 24-month average market return as market state definition reassure the 
robustness of the empirical findings recorded in this chapter. 
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Chapter 6 Momentum premia under the influence of information 
uncertainty 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter documents the results from our investigation on the role of information 
uncertainty plays in influencing the momentum premium in the context of the 
Chinese Class A share market. As a convention of this line of research, Chinese 
Class B shares are excluded from the test due to liquidity or microstructure 
concerns(Wang, 2004). More specifically, the sample dataset chosen for this part of 
the study encompass all eligible Class A shares listed in the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange (SHSE) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE). For brevity and ease 
of comparison and replication, we only focus on the (R=6, H=6) momentum trading 
strategy
52, consistent with the choice of a couple of seminal work on information 
uncertainty and stock returns by Jiang et al. (2005) and McKnight and Hou (2006), in 
order to zero in on the interplay of the information uncertainty and momentum 
premium in the context of the Chinese Class A share market. As there isn’t a 
consensus and well-established metric to gauge the level of information uncertainty 
in the extant literature, seven different factors—(1) Firm size; (2) firm age; (3) 
analysts’ coverage; (4) return volatility; (5) dispersion of analysts’ opinion on 
earnings forecast; (6) trading volume; (7) the strength/quality of corporate 
governance—are chosen to proxy for the degree of firm-level information uncertainty 
in the Chinese Class A share market. In view of empirical evidence from existing 
studies in the field, the underlying motivation of this part of the study is to test the 
                                            
52 The evidences from this research, shown in section 5.1 of chapter 5, and from majority of studies 
on momentum premia suggest that (R=6, H=6) momentum trading strategy is fair representation of 
the performance of momentum trading strategies with short-to-intermediate term ranking and 
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proposition—whether and how the firm-level information uncertainty, measured by 
the above-listed seven proxy factors, is influencing the momentum premium of the 
(R=6, H=6) momentum trading strategy as detailed in the section 2.3 of the theory 
chapter. 
6.2 Firm size 
First, the result from our investigation on the impact of firm size, measured by the 
market capitalization of the listed firms in the Chinese Class A share market, as an 
information uncertainty (IU thereafter) proxy factor over the momentum premia will 
be discussed. The conjecture that firm size is capable of proxying the degree of firm-
level information uncertainty is blindly obvious in that, compared with listed firms with 
large capitalization, small-cap firms were found to carry more risk due to less 
diversified business model, higher leverage levels, and more importantly more 
obscure information accessibility as suggested by many studies (Chan and Chen, 
1991, Hong et al., 2000). The influence of firm size as an IU proxy factor over the 
momentum premium or simply cross-sectional stock returns have been examined by 
Zhang (2006) and McKnight and Hou (2006) in the U.S. stock market and the U.K. 
stock market respectively, where both of them documented evidence showing firm 
size as an IU proxy is positively correlative with the momentum premium. The results 
from our test therefore not only offer evidence to support the conjecture of firm size 
as an IU factor in influencing the momentum premium but also provide an out-of-
sample test for the above-noted two studies in the largest emerging financial market 
in the world—the Chinese stock market.  
Table 6.1 presents the average monthly returns of different momentum-IU quintiles 
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across different information uncertainty levels, resulted from the independent two-
way sorting procedure, employed by the majority of studies in the domain(Jiang et al., 
2005, Lee and Swaminathan, 2000, Wang and Chin, 2004). From Q1 (“loser” 
momentum quintile (portfolio)) to Q5 (“winner” momentum quintile (portfolio)), each 
column represents the average monthly return of the portfolio drawn up based on 
stocks’ prior 6-month returns in ascending order and corresponding t statistics. The 
column with the title “Q5-Q1” summarizes the returns of momentum portfolios with 
different levels of IU and the last column lists out the corresponding t statistics. 
Horizontally, each row presents the average monthly returns of different momentum 
portfolios associated with the certain degree of firm-level information uncertainty and 
their corresponding t statistics. As IU level varies from low (IU1) to high (IU5), the 
momentum portfolios are associated with higher degree of information uncertainty.  
The momentum premia (Q5-Q1) across five IU levels average out at 1.84 per cent, 
exceeding the momentum premium of the (R=6, H=6) strategy (1.64 per cent) in the 
same Class A share market found earlier (shown on Table 5.1), which implies that 
overall the firm size as an IU proxy factor amplifies the momentum premium of the 
(R=6, H=6) momentum trading strategy. Looking into different momentum quintiles 
(Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4, Q5), the average monthly returns of the momentum quintiles are 
positively correlated with the IU levels. For instance, in the “loser” momentum quintile 
(Q1), the “loser” portfolio with lowest IU level (largest market capitalization) (IU1) 
yields negative momentum return of -0.15 per cent. Within the same momentum 
quintile Q1, it is striking to notice that the “loser” portfolio with highest IU level (firms 
with smallest market capitalization) produces 0.34 per cent premium. The difference 
of the returns between the “loser” portfolio with high IU level and the “loser” portfolio Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty                        Chapter 6 Results II 
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with low IU level is 0.49 (t= 1.99). Therefore, the average monthly returns of “loser” 
portfolio not only tipped steadily forward to the positive territory as the degree of 
information uncertainty heightens but also grow larger in terms of magnitude. Given 
the evidence of the impact of the amplifying effect of IU on the momentum premium 
of the (R=6, H=6) momentum trading strategy described above and the way 
momentum premium is defined (returns of “winner” portfolio minus those of “loser” 
portfolio) (Q5-Q1), one would expect that the average monthly returns of “winner” 
portfolio increase in a more abrupt manner under the influence of increasingly rising 
level of information uncertainty on theoretical grounds. 
As expected, the relationship between the returns of the “winner” momentum quintile 
(Q5) and the IU levels associated with the momentum quintile portfolios resembles 
remarkable uniform pattern as what is observed in the “loser” momentum quintile 
(Q1). More specifically, within the “winner” momentum quintile (Q5), the average 
monthly returns of the “winner” momentum portfolios increase monotonically from 
1.22% to 2.68% as the IU level heightens from IU1 to IU5, resulting in a highly 
statistically significant difference (IU5-IU1) of 1.46% (t=3.07), cementing our 
conjecture. The pattern of the evidence just described is largely consistent with what 
was found by Hong, Lim and Stein (2000) in the U.S. stock markets yet differs from 
others found in developed financial markets. For example, Zhang (2006) found that 
the IU levels are negatively associated with the returns of “loser” momentum quintile 
portfolios yet are positively associated with the returns of “winner” momentum 
quintile portfolios in the U.S. stock markets and McKnight and Hou (2006) observed 
no discernible trend of returns of “winner” and “loser” portfolios associated with 
different levels of information uncertainty in the U.K. stock market. The preceding Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty                        Chapter 6 Results II 
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observation echoes the prediction of an investors underreaction theory/slow 
information diffusion theory developed by Hong, Lim and Stein (2000), postulating 
that firm-specific information tends to diffuse in a more sluggish manner for firms with 
small capitalization, compared with firms with large capitalization, giving rise to more 
swingeing underreaction to firm-specific news (Hong and Stein, 1999) and in turn 
leads to the positive relation between the levels of IU (proxied by firm size, in inverse 
relationship with IU level: e.g. highest IU level is represented by the portfolio 
consisting of firms with smallest capitalization) and the returns of “loser” momentum 
quintiles. In the same vein, the positive relationship between IU levels and both 
“winner” and “loser” portfolios is indicative of prevalent underreaction to private news, 
evoked by gradual information diffusion(Hong et al., 2000), exhibiting in extreme 
momentum quintiles (Q5 and Q1) in the Chinese Class A share market. 
By focusing on the momentum premia (Q5-Q1) of the momentum portfolios 
associated with different IU levels, we observe a positive relationship between the IU 
levels and the momentum premia (Q5-Q1). As shown in the column with title “Q5-Q1” 
in Table 6.1, all the momentum premia are highly statistically significant and positive 
and as the IU level goes up, the momentum premia increase gradually and 
monotonically from 1.37% (t=4.26) at lowest IU level (IU1 firms with largest market 
capitalization) to 2.34%(t=10.25) at highest IU level (IU5) (firms with smallest market 
capitalization), resulting in a statistically significant difference of 0.97% (t=4.53). This 
pattern is tellingly in accord with the finds of studies by Hong, Lim and Stein (2000), 
McKnight and Hou (2006) and Zhang (2006)— “market participants underreact more 
to new information for small firms than for large firms” (page 117), in defiance of 
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of IU described earlier on, supported by a multitude of behavioural theories and 
experimental evidence in psychology. Under the framework of heuristics and biases 
tradition, “people also appear to be more optimistically biased under condition of 
greater uncertainty” (Armor and Taylor, 1998: page 338 Gilovich et al., 2002). In 
buoyant mood, spurred by the optimism/confidence sentiment, investors are more 
inclined to practice a “top-down, heuristics strategy of information processing” on the 
premise of “preexisting general knowledge structure” (Schwarz, 1990: page 542) in 
judgmental process. During the procedure, investors frequently implement intuitive 
heuristics such as affective, and prototypes heuristics of System 1(intuitive) of two 
cognitive systems (Kahneman and Frederick, 2002), subsequently eliciting the 
behavioural biases such as overconfidence, conservatism, underconfidence and 
underreaction that are nominated as the impetus behind momentum premium(Daniel 
et al., 1998, Barberis et al., 1998, Du, 2002, Hong and Stein, 1999) in the literature. 
Following this logic, as the salience of information uncertainty heightens, the 
momentum premia are expected to get propped up gradually, which is line with the 
proposition of our hypotheses. From a different angle, following the spirit of feelings-
as-information theoretical framework, as noted earlier, investors can be rather 
optimistic under the influence of greater information uncertainty (Armor and Taylor, 
1998) and the fact that the vast amount of Chinese domestic retail investors lack of 
statistics knowledge to override the intuitive heuristics such as affective heuristics 
(Nisbett et al., 1983), working jointly to give rise to more frequent practice of 
evaluative judgments (heuristics strategy of information processing) (Schwarz, 1990), 
reflected by the increasingly larger momentum premia as the degree of firm-level 
information uncertainty heightens. Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty                        Chapter 6 Results II 
 
- 121 - 
 
More intriguingly, in comparison to the Hong, Lim and Stein (2000)’s research, the 
results found here differ from their finds in three noteworthy respects: (1) larger 
positive momentum premia are found in momentum portfolios consisting of small-cap 
stocks (as shown in Table 6.1), signifying higher IU levels, as opposed to negative 
momentum returns yielded by momentum portfolios entailing small-cap stocks 
documented in Hong et al. (2003)’s work; (2) by plotting the momentum premia(on 
the vertical axis) against the IU levels (on the horizontal axis), as illustrated in Figure 
6.1, we observe a non-linear yet upward trending relationship, with momentum 
portfolio associated with lowest IU scoring minimum momentum premium of 1.37% 
(t=4.26) and that associated with highest IU yielding maximum momentum premia of 
2.34% (t=10.26), differing from “a pronounced, inverted U-Shape” (Hong et al., 2000: 
page 276) described by Hong, Lim and Stein or “a double inverted U-Shape pattern” 
(page 232) depicted by McKnight and Hou(2006); (3) The numbers in the last 
column of the table, titled “Q3-Q1/Q5-Q1”, measure how much of the momentum 
premia of different momentum portfolios across different levels of IU, in the form of 
percentage, comes from the difference between the returns of the average 
performing portfolios and the “loser” portfolios (Q3-Q1). For instance, for the 
momentum portfolio with highest IU (IU5), only 12.4% of the momentum premia is 
attributable to Q3-Q1. Therefore, it is only evident in the momentum portfolio with the 
lowest IU level (IU1) that large part of the momentum premia is attributable to the 
returns of “loser” portfolio as documented by Hong, Lim and Stein (2000) in the U.S. 
stock markets and McKnight and Hou (2006) in the U.K. stock market, while the 
results from other four momentum quintiles with different levels of IU suggest the 
impact of the returns of “loser” portfolio on the momentum premia is not as significant. Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty                        Chapter 6 Results II 
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In combination, even though the evidence found here does support the 
underreaction theory proposed by Hong and Stein (1999), the asymmetry in stock 
price’s reactions to bad and good news is not observed. In view of the distinction 
from the pattern found in more mature financial markets such as the U.S. and U.K., 
the logical reason to explain it is bound to lie within the difference between the 
markets in terms of the composition of market participants, with Chinese stock 
market boasting a significant proportion of domestic retail investors. They are found 
to be more prone to heuristics and biases in judgmental process, to chase good 
news (Yeh and Lee, 2000) and subject to heavy herding behaviour (Tan et al., 2008), 
which could separately or jointly contribute to the succumbed asymmetry in stocks’ 
underreaction to good and bad news documented here (Nofsinger and Sias, 1999).  
 
Table 6.1 Average monthly returns of momentum ("winner" minus "loser") portfolio 
independently sorted based on past returns and firm size (1/MV) as information 
uncertainty proxy (the (R=6,H=6) momentum trading strategy) 
   Momentum Quintile 
Q3-Q1/Q5-
Q1 
   Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q5  Q5-Q1  t-value 
Information uncertainty proxy: Firm size (1/MV) 
IU1  -0.15  0.23  0.65  0.89  1.22  1.37  4.26 
0.584  t-stats  -1.15  1.87  2.95  1.75  3.99       
IU2  -0.02  0.26  0.53  1.01  1.72  1.74  4.18 
0.316  t-stats  -2.53  2.05  2.46  2.99  4.05       
IU3  0.17  0.31  0.59  0.94  1.96  1.79  3.99 
0.235  t-stats  1.37  4.28  2.41  3.04  4.18       
IU4  0.26  0.41  0.63  1.17  2.23  1.97  5.93 
0.188  t-stats  1.68  2.42  1.52  4.99  5.01       
IU5  0.34  0.51  0.63  1.09  2.68  2.34  10.26 
0.124  t-stats  1.84  4.51  2.64  5.55  3.94       
IU5-
IU1  0.49  0.28  -0.02  0.2  1.46  0.97    
t-value  1.99  3.16  -0.51  2.97  3.07  4.53    Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty                        Chapter 6 Results II 
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This table reports the average monthly returns of momentum portfolio (the difference between the 
average monthly returns of “winner” portfolios and “loser” portfolios at difference information 
uncertainty levels) grouped following the independent two-way sorting approach based on past 6-
month stock returns and firm size as proxy for information uncertainty levels in the consolidated Class 
A share market consisting of all the eligible Class A stocks listed in the Shanghai Stock Exchange and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange over the sample period from January 1996 to December 2008. For the 
purpose of this research and ease of comparison, the (R=6, H=6) momentum trading strategy is 
focused on in the investigation on the influence of information uncertainty on the momentum premia 
(chapter 6) and the influence of information uncertainty on the momentum premia over time periods 
following UP and DOWN market states (chapter 7). At the beginning of every month, all eligible Class 
A stocks are ranked first based on their prior 6-month returns in ascending order and subsequently 
grouped into five quintile momentum portfolios (Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4, Q5) with stocks being equally 
weighted within in each quintile portfolio. In the same vein, all the eligible stocks are independently 
sorted based on information uncertainty (IU) levels associated with them, measured by the reciprocal 
of their market capitalizations (1/MV)
53 at the end of the month proceeding to the ranking period, in 
ascending order and are put into five equal-sized IU portfolio (IU1, IU2, IU3, IU4, IU5). To be more 
specific, IU1 can be dubbed as the “low IU” portfolio entailing stocks associated with the lowest IU 
level, whereas IU5 is named as the “high IU” portfolio consisting of stocks associated with the highest 
IU level. Subsequently, the intersection of the momentum portfolios (Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4, Q5) and the 
information uncertainty (IU) portfolios (IU1, IU2, IU3, IU4, IU5) is taken to construct 25 different 
portfolios as the result of independent two-way sorting approach. Beginning from 1 month (to avoid 
microstructure issues) subsequent to the end of ranking period of 6 months, the portfolios, following 
the buy-and-hold strategy to avoid excessive trading costs (Galariotis et al., 2007), are held for 6 
months. The momentum premia for momentum portfolios associated with different information 
uncertainty levels (IU1, IU2, IU3, IU4 and IU5) are calculated by taking the difference of the equal-
weighted average returns of “winner” portfolios and those of corresponding “loser” portfolios (Q5-Q1). 
The significance of the momentum premia is determined by t statistics, shown below each momentum 
premium, for the difference between the returns of “winner” portfolio and those of “loser” portfolio. All 
the numbers are in percentage term. 
Figure 6.1 Momentum premia and IU levels proxied by the reciprocal of firm size 
(1/MV) 
                                            
53 The reciprocal of the market capitalization is used to be consistent with the seminal work by Zhang 
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Notes: IU level is measured by the reciprocal of firm size. i.e. IU1 represents the portfolio consists of 
stocks with largest market capitalizations, indicating low IU; IU5 represents the portfolio entails stocks 
with smallest market capitalizations, indicating higher IU. 
6.3 Firm age 
The impact of firm age, measured by the reciprocal of the number of days (1/Age) 
preceding to the 6-month ranking period since a stock gets listed or firstly appears in 
the database, as an IU proxy factor over the momentum premium is the issue to 
which we turn next. Firm age is naturally considered a plausible factor to proxy for IU 
levels as firms with little history in the stock market tend to draw less coverage from 
analysts and less attention from investors and in turn suffer from information deficit, 
eliciting information uncertainty associated with their stocks, not to mention that both 
of the seminal work by Jiang et al. (2005) and Zhang (2006) in the volume nominate 
and examine firm age as an information uncertainty proxy factor in influencing the 
momentum premium. Hence, this section provides intriguing comparison between 
the empirical evidence found here in the Chinese Class A share market and those 
found by Jiang et al. (2005) and Zhang (2006) in the U.S. stock markets. 
Table 6.2, as shown below, presents the average monthly returns of the “winner” and 
“loser” portfolios and the resulted momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) momentum 
strategy at different levels of IU (IU1, IU2, IU3, IU4, IU5) in the Chinese Class A 
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share market over the sample period from January 1996 to December 2008. The IU 
levels are gauged by the reciprocal of the number of days a stock gets listed or firstly 
appeared in the database. Hence, when moving from IU1 to IU5, IU levels 
associated with quintile momentum portfolios gradually increase. Similar to Table 6.1, 
the “Q5-Q1” column summarizes the momentum premia under different levels of IU. 
Overall, all the momentum premia are positive and highly statistically significant. 
Compared with the momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) trading strategy (1.64%) 
found earlier in Table 5.1, the momentum premia of the two momentum portfolios 
with the highest IU levels (IU4 and IU5) are larger, at the amount of 1.88% and 2.3% 
respectively. However, the momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) trading strategy 
across five different IU levels average out at 1.42%, trailing the momentum premium 
(1.64%) without IU influence in the same market segment. At this point, the evidence 
suggests that the amplifying effect of the IU over the momentum premia is rather 
obvious among the high IU-momentum portfolios yet it is not a general feature of all 
the momentum premia. Within “loser” momentum quintiles (Q1), there exhibits a 
negative relationship between the IU levels and the average monthly returns of “loser” 
momentum quintile (portfolio).  More illustratively, as the IU level goes up from IU1 
consisting of oldest firms to IU5 encompassing youngest firms, the returns of the 
“loser” portfolio dissipate monotonically from 1.18% to merely 0.12%. Conversely, a 
positive relationship between the IU levels and the returns of “winner” portfolios is 
observed. As IU level goes up from IU1 to IU5, the average monthly return of “winner” 
portfolios climbs from 1.83% up to 2.42%. The above-mentioned finding is very 
similar to the pattern documented by Zhang (2006) in his investigation on firm age as 
an information proxy factor in influencing the momentum premia in the U.S. stock Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty                        Chapter 6 Results II 
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market, indicating that the “loser” stocks of younger firms tend to underperform under 
greater information uncertainty compared with their more mature counterparts, 
evoking negative momentum; on the other hand, the “winner” stocks of younger firms 
tend to keep on yielding gratifying profits, inducing positive momentum. Both 
patterns are consistent with the prediction of the gradual-information diffusion theory 
developed by Hong, Lim and Stein (2000)—information are most prone to travel 
slowly among younger firms, not normally receiving much attention in the stock 
market. With positive momentum and negative momentum exhibiting in “winner” 
stocks and “loser” stocks respectively, on the theoretical grounds, one would expect 
to witness larger momentum premium as the degree of information uncertainty gets 
greater. 
Very much as expected, we find that the amplifying effect of the firm age as an IU 
proxy is more pronounced among momentum portfolios with higher IU levels. To be 
more specific, the momentum portfolio with lowest IU level (IU1 entails the oldest 
firms in the stock market) yielded 0.65% premium when applying the (R=6, H=6) 
momentum strategy, on the other hand, 2.3% of the momentum premium is realized 
for the portfolio with the highest IU level (IU5 consists of youngest firms). The 
difference of the momentum premia between the momentum portfolios with the 
highest IU and the lowest IU is 1.65 (t=4.07). In general, the momentum premium 
gets larger in monotonic manner as the IU levels goes up from IU1 to IU5, echoing 
the pattern found in Zhang (2006)’s study, which is in accord with the gradual 
information diffusion/underreaction theory proposed by Hong, Lim and Stein (2000) 
and the conservatism theory put forward by Barberis et al. (1998) postulating that 
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their prior beliefs (Barberis et al., 1998, Hong and Stein, 1999) and eventually giving 
rise to the momentum premium. From the perspective of behavioural theory, 
investors tend to make judgment through the lens of optimism under greater 
information uncertainty (Armor and Taylor, 1998), stoking the volume of trending 
chasing behaviour among Chinese retail investors (Yeh and Lee, 2000) and 
subsequently resulting in more pervasive momentum premia (Grinblatt et al., 1995, 
Nofsinger and Sias, 1999). The preceding evidence also strike a chord with the 
prediction of Han, Hong and Warachka’s cognitive learning theory, theorising that 
investors learn by updating weights of prior belief, evoking shifting of information 
weights—momentum premium is larger for portfolio consisting of young firms (2008). 
The very last row of the table “IU5-IU1” shows overall which momentum quintile is 
the lynch pin in contributing to the amplified momentum premia. The differential 
return of “loser” portfolio with highest IU and that with lowest IU comes at -1.06%, 
whereas the differential return of “winner” portfolio with highest IU and that with 
lowest IU is 0.59%, suggesting that the lacklustre performance of “loser” momentum 
quintile portfolios is the driving force behind the larger momentum premium observed 
here, which is consistent with the find by Jiang et al.(2005). Additionally, the gloomy 
performance of the stocks of young firms (associated with high IU) is evident in four 
out of total five momentum quintiles, signified by the negative IU5-IU1 values, 
paralleling the prediction of gradual information diffusion theory/ underreaction theory 
by Hong and Stein (1999) as described previously. Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty                        Chapter 6 Results II 
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Table 6.2 Average monthly returns of momentum ("winner" minus "loser") portfolio 
independently sorted based on past returns and firm age (1/age) as information 
uncertainty proxy (the (R=6, H=6) momentum trading strategy) 
   Momentum Quintile 
   Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q5  Q5-Q1  t-value 
Information uncertainty proxy: Firm age (1/Age) 
IU1  1.18  1.17  1.43  1.71  1.83  0.65  3.66 
t-stats  1.99  2.05  3.28  3.81  5.99       
IU2  0.88  1.12  1.41  1.83  1.91  1.03  4.25 
t-stats  1.58  2.62  2.98  1.55  2.81       
IU3  0.73  1.04  1.63  1.84  1.97  1.24  6.03 
t-stats  1.63  1.05  3.27  3.5  5.15       
IU4  0.47  0.73  1.26  1.63  2.35  1.88  8.18 
t-stats  1.51  2.99  3.47  3.16  2.99       
IU5  0.12  0.24  1.02  1.53  2.42  2.3  10.62 
t-stats  2.18  1.07  2.47  4.05  5.09       
IU5-IU1  -1.06  -0.93  -0.41  -0.18  0.59  1.65    
t-value  -1.99  -1.2  -1.03  -0.18  2.99  4.07    
This table reports the average monthly returns of momentum portfolio (the difference between the 
average monthly returns of “winner” portfolios and “loser” portfolios at difference information 
uncertainty levels) grouped following the independent two-way sorting approach based on past 6-
month stock returns and firm age as proxy for information uncertainty levels in the consolidated Class 
A share market consisting of all the eligible Class A stocks listed in the Shanghai Stock Exchange and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange over the sample period from January 1996 to December 2008. The 
methodological approach is described in detail underneath Table 6.1. 
6.4 Analysts’ coverage 
The interplay of analysts’ coverage as an IU proxy factor and the momentum 
premium of the (R=6, H=6) momentum trading strategy will be described in this 
section. More important, it is worth stressing that, to mitigate the cofounding effect 
evoked by two IU proxy factors—the firm size and analysts’ coverage—found by 
Bhushan(1989), we follow the approach adopted by Hong, Lim and Stein(2000) and 
McKnight and Hou (2006), measuring analysts’ coverage in this study by the 
reciprocal (for ease of illustration) of the residual from regressing the number of 
analysts covering the firm (by reporting earnings forecasts) in the year preceding to 
the ranking period against the market capitalization of the corresponding firm(firm Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty                        Chapter 6 Results II 
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size). Analysts’ coverage is suitable to proxy for IU levels associated with listed firms 
in that information, spreading via analysts’ research report, tends to diffuse in a 
substantially slower pace among the listed firms receive less analysts’ 
coverage/attention (Hong and Stein, 1999, Hong et al., 2000), which subsequently 
kindles the uncertainty about the firm’s value (consistent with the definition of IU in 
this study). Also note that the gradual-information-diffusion (investors’ underreaction) 
model theoretically supports the postulate that the momentum premia are 
attributable to investors’ underreaction, triggered by gradual information diffusion 
(Hong and Stein, 1999, Hong et al., 2000). Taken together, one would expect that 
momentum premia are larger for the portfolios consisting of stocks receive low 
analysts’ coverage, indicative of higher degree of information uncertainty, on 
theoretical grounds. 
Table 6.3 reports average monthly returns of momentum quintile portfolios at 
different IU levels of the (R=6, H=6) momentum trading strategy in the Chinese 
Class A share market over the sample period from January 1996 to December 2008. 
Moving from IU1 to IU5, the degree of IU gets more pronounced indicated by 
portfolios consisting of firms receiving significantly less coverage. Overall, regardless 
of types of momentum quintiles (“winner” quintile (Q5) or “loser” quintile (Q1) or the 
momentum portfolio (Q5-Q1)), all of them yield positive and mostly statistically 
significant returns. Moreover, similar to the pattern of returns of “winner” and “loser” 
portfolios across different levels of IU observed when using firm age as an IU proxy 
factor described earlier, on the one hand, the average monthly returns of “loser” 
momentum portfolios are negatively correlative with the level of IU. Numerically, the 
average monthly returns of Q1s, stripping out the return of the Q1 associated with Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty                        Chapter 6 Results II 
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IU2 (0.72%), decline monotonically from 0.68% to 0.24% as the degree of IU goes 
up from IU1 to IU5, suggesting that among “loser” portfolios, the ones consisting of 
firms with scant coverage tend to continue to underperform compared with those 
consisting of firms with extensive coverage. The preceding observation echoes the 
prediction of the information gradual diffusion theory (Hong et al., 2000)—firm-
specific information travels more sluggishly among firms receiving less 
attention/coverage, inducing underreaction of share price and in turn fostering the 
negative momentum among “loser” portfolios. On the other hand, the average 
monthly returns of “winner” portfolios (Q5s) tend to be positively related to the 
degree of IU. More specifically, the average monthly returns of Q5s steadily march 
up from 2.59% to 4.02% as the degree of IU gets greater from IU1 to IU5, indicating 
that among “winner” portfolios, the returns of the ones consisting of firms with 
sporadic coverage triumph the returns of those entailing firms with broad coverage. 
Similar to the pattern of negative relation observed between the returns of “loser” 
portfolios and the degree of IU, the above observation corroborates what the gradual 
information diffusion theory (Hong et al., 2000) suggests, reasoning that “winner” 
portfolios consisting of firms with less coverage have the propensity to outperform 
those encompassing firms with widespread coverage, creating positive momentum, 
which in turn serves as a traction for the emergence of momentum premium. The 
above-noted distinct relationships between the returns of “loser” portfolios and the 
degree of IU and between the returns of “winner” portfolios and the degree of IU are 
largely in line with the patterns found empirically by Zhang (2006) in the U.S. stock 
markets and McKnight and Hou (2006) in the U.K. stock market.  
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different levels of IU. Succinctly, the momentum premia get larger for the momentum 
portfolios associated with higher level of IU. Among the five momentum portfolios, 
the momentum premium maxes out at 3.78 per cent (t=13.07) at the highest IU level 
(IU5), which is highly significant in both statistical and economic sense. The 
preceding find can be interpreted under the framework of heuristics and biases 
tradition, developed by Tversky and Kahneman (1973). As under greater uncertainty, 
investors are more predisposed to be overoptimistic (Armor and Taylor, 1998) in the 
judgmental process. Investors’ over-optimism triggers the practice of intuitive 
heuristics such as affective heuristics of System 1(intuitive) of two cognitive systems 
(Kahneman and Frederick, 2002) in processing information(Schwarz, 1990),  prone 
to the influence of different behavioural biases such as overconfidence, 
conservatism, underconfidence and underreaction. All of which are found to propel 
the formation of the momentum premium (Daniel et al., 1998, Barberis et al., 1998, 
Du, 2002, Hong and Stein, 1999). From a different perspective, the more 
pronounced momentum premium under greater IU could be attributed to the fact that 
the dominant amount of Chinese retail investors lack of sophisticated statistics 
education to hone their intuitive heuristics into reflective heuristics such as statistics 
and abstract heuristics of System 2 (reflective) of two cognitive systems (Kahneman 
and Frederick, 2002) to assist them in the judgmental procedure (Nisbett et al., 
1983). Consequently, their investment decisions are heavily influenced by heuristics 
biases such as overconfidence, conservatism, underconfidence and underreaction. 
Coupled with the evidence showing, amidst greater IU, investors are subject to more 
optimism (Armor and Taylor, 1998), triggering heuristic information processing 
procedure (Schwarz, 1990)—characterised by the frequent use of intuitive heuristics Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty                        Chapter 6 Results II 
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of System 1(intuitive), one would expect more pronounced momentum premium 
under the influence of greater information uncertainty . 
Additionally, the difference between the momentum premium of momentum portfolio 
with highest IU level (IU5) and that of momentum portfolio with lowest IU level (IU1) 
arrives at 1.87% (t=5.03). The differential returns (IU5-IU1) of portfolios with two 
extreme levels of the IU (IU5 and IU1) of different momentum quintiles are mostly 
negative (Q1, Q2, Q3 and Q4), suggesting that the portfolios associated with greater 
degree of IU are driving the larger momentum premia observed here. Across 
different IU levels, the momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) momentum strategy 
average out at 1.91%, exceeding the yield of the same momentum trading strategy 
unconditional on the information uncertainty (1.64%). In sum, the positive 
relationship between the momentum premia and the IU levels (negative relationship 
between the momentum premia and the amount of analysts’ coverage firms receive) 
documented here concurs with the empirical finds by Hong, Lim and Stein (2000) 
and Zhang (2006) in the U.S. stock markets and McKnight and Hou(2006) in the U.K. 
stock market, jointly showing support of Hong and Stein (1999)’s gradual-information 
diffusion (underreaction) theory described in detail earlier. 
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Table 6.3 Average monthly returns of momentum ("winner" minus "loser") portfolio 
independetly sorted based on past returns and analysts' coverage as information 
uncertainty proxy (the (R=6, H=6) momentum trading strategy) 
   Momentum Quintile 
   Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q5   Q5-Q1  t-value 
Information uncertainty proxy: Analyst coverage (1/COV) 
IU1  0.68  1.32  1.71  1.84  2.59  1.91  2.51 
t-stats  1.85  2.13  2.99  1.52  4.27       
IU2  0.72  1.31  1.47  1.85  2.79  2.07  3.18 
t-stats  2.15  2.27  3.05  1.93  6.16       
IU3  0.53  1.24  1.58  1.79  3.1  2.57  3.09 
t-stats  1.62  2.74  3.18  2.16  6.21       
IU4  0.39  1.01  1.35  1.82  3.25  2.86  7.15 
t-stats  1.77  2.84  1.51  3.99  5.81       
IU5  0.24  0.82  1.31  1.68  4.02  3.78  13.07 
t-stats  1.27  2.84  1.53  2.66  9.81       
IU5-IU1  -0.44  -0.5  -0.4  -0.16  1.43  1.87    
t-value  -0.62  -1.68  -0.13  -0.82  2.64  5.03    
This table reports the average monthly returns of momentum portfolio (the difference between the 
average monthly returns of “winner” portfolios and “loser” portfolios at difference information 
uncertainty levels) grouped following the independent two-way sorting approach based on past 6-
month stock returns and analysts’ coverage as proxy for information uncertainty levels in the 
consolidated Class A share market consisting of all the eligible Class A stocks listed in the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange over the sample period from January 1996 to 
December 2008. The methodological approach is described in detail underneath Table 6.1. 
6.5 Return volatility 
In view that the role of standard deviation of equity returns as metric of risk has been 
firmly entrenched in the modern finance research, it comes as no surprise that return 
volatility, measured by the standard deviation of the returns of stocks over six 
months prior to the ranking period, is chosen as a proxy factor for information 
uncertainty. As noted in the theory chapter, consistent with Jiang et al. (2005) and 
Zhang(2006)’s research, information uncertainty is strictly defined as “the ambiguity 
with respect to the implications of new information for a firm’s value” (Zhang, 2006: 
page 105). Simply put, the uncertain characteristic of information, where the 
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study. Hence, this section is dedicated to describe the results from our investigation 
on the impact of return volatility as an IU proxy factor over the momentum premium 
of the (R=6, H=6) momentum trading strategy. Theoretically, high return volatility of a 
firm’s stock in the market can be directly provoked by the high degree of value 
ambiguity associated with the firm (IU) (Magnan and Xu, 2008), which is found 
empirically to enhance the momentum premium as documented by Jiang, Lee and 
Zhang (2005) and subsequently by Zhang (2006) both in the U.S. stock markets. 
Given the empirical findings in the extant literature, we expect to witness a positive 
relationship between the degree of IU (proxied by return volatility) and the 
momentum premium in the Chinese Class A share market. 
Table 6.4 reports the average monthly returns of “loser”, “winner” and momentum 
portfolios, formed by sorting stocks independently based on their prior 6-month 
returns and return volatility, of the (R=6, H=6) momentum trading strategy in the 
Chinese Class A share market over sample period from January 1996 through 
December 2008. Moving from IU1 to IU5, the degree of IU associated with different 
portfolios heightens. At first glance, the average monthly returns of all sorts of 
portfolios turn out to be positive and highly statistically significant, as shown in Table 
6.4. The “Q5-Q1” column summarizes the momentum premia of momentum 
portfolios at different IU levels, averaging out at 1.3%, lagging behind the momentum 
premium of the (R=6, H=6) momentum trading strategy unconditional on the IU 
factor (1.64%). This observation suggests that overall return volatility as an IU proxy 
factor does not boost the momentum premia, implying a differential impact of 
different levels of IU over the momentum premium of different momentum portfolio.  
By looking closely at the average monthly returns of “loser” portfolios and those of Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty                        Chapter 6 Results II 
 
- 135 - 
 
“winner” portfolios reported in column Q1 and column Q5 respectively, we find 
familiar patterns, as noted in the majority of previous sections in chapter 6, that there 
is a negative relationship between the returns of “loser” portfolios and the IU levels. 
As IU level goes up from IU1 to IU5, the average monthly returns of “loser” portfolios 
dissipate from 1.29% to 0.12%. The differential return of “loser” portfolio with highest 
level of IU and that with lowest level of IU comes at -1.17% (t= -1.48), suggesting 
that momentum quintiles with constituents associated with high return volatility levels 
(high IU) tend to underperform those with constituents associated with more 
subdued return volatility (low IU) the “loser” portfolio consisting of more volatile 
stocks (higher IU). The preceding observation, similar to most of the previous 
sections discussed earlier, is consistent with the prediction of the gradual-
information-diffusion theory (Hong et al., 2000). With the help of which, the negative 
relationship between IU level and returns of “loser” portfolios can be elucidated as: 
firm-specific information travels more languishingly among stocks with higher return 
volatility or with higher IU levels, prompting investors to underreact towards firm-
specific news (Hong and Stein, 1999), and consequently resulting in extended losses 
for “loser” portfolio, stoking negative momentum. 
On the “winner” portfolio front, the average monthly returns of “winner” portfolios 
edge up from 1.83% to 2.41% as the IU level heightens from IU1 to IU5. Additionally, 
the differential return of “winner” portfolio with the highest IU (IU5) and that with the 
lowest IU (IU1) is also substantial yet in an opposite direction (0.58 (t=2.99)), 
indicating that “winner” portfolio with higher IU tends to outperform “winner” portfolio 
with lower IU. Similar to the rationale behind the negative relationship between IU 
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average monthly returns of “winner” portfolios is also in congruent with the gradual-
information-diffusion/underreaction theory developed by Hong and Stein (1999) as 
noted earlier. Furthermore, the above-described patterns, exhibited in returns of 
“loser” and “winner” portfolios at different levels of IU, are tellingly consistent with 
those found by Jiang, Lee and Zhang (2005) and Zhang (2006) in the U.S. stocks 
markets.  
Turning back to the “Q5-Q1” column, the momentum premia increase monotonically 
as the IU level goes up from 0.54% for the momentum portfolio with IU1 to 2.29% for 
that with IU5, which is in line with our prediction and is consistent with the evidence 
documented by Jiang et al. (2005) and Zhang (2006). A group of assorted 
psychology evidence could well serve as theoretical ammunition in attempt to 
interpret the above-noted positive statistical association between the momentum 
premia (Q5-Q1) and the degree of information uncertainty. Specifically, under 
greater information uncertainty, investors are more overoptimistic/overconfident 
(Armor and Taylor, 1998), a reflection of the behavioural phenomenon that investors 
tend to underweight the salience of information (Griffin and Tversky, 1992) and in 
turn fail to promptly update their prior beliefs according to Han et al. (2008)’s 
cognitive learning theory, resulting in larger momentum premium (Barberis et al., 
1998, Hong et al., 2000). On the other end of the spectrum, the intensified herding 
behaviour of Chinese retail investors, exacerbated by the influence of optimistic bias 
in judgmental process (Yeh and Lee, 2000), is prone to contribute to more pervasive 
momentum premium (Grinblatt et al., 1995, Nofsinger and Sias, 1999). Collectively, 
the empirical evidence of all three studies supports the prediction of the 
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gradual information diffusion theory developed by Hong and Stein (1999) and Hong, 
Lim and Stein (2000).  
Table 6.4 Average monthly returns of momentum ("winner" minus "loser") portfolio 
independently sorted based on past returns and return volatility as information 
uncertainty proxy (the (R=6, H=6) momentum trading strategy) 
   Momentum Quintile 
   Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q5  Q5-Q1  t-value 
Information uncertainty proxy: Return volatility (VOL) 
IU1  1.29  1.38  1.42  1.69  1.83  0.54  2.04 
t-stats  1.99  2.05  3.15  2.36  2.97       
IU2  1.02  1.31  1.3  1.52  1.86  0.84  2.61 
t-stats  1.61  2.06  3.58  2.35  4.04       
IU3  0.93  1.27  1.35  1.43  1.95  1.02  4.06 
t-stats  1.51  3.15  2.51  3.02  7.15       
IU4  0.42  1.03  1.17  1.35  2.21  1.79  9.17 
t-stats  2.62  1.99  1.25  3.61  9.41       
IU5  0.12  0.7  0.99  1.21  2.41  2.29  11.36 
t-stats  2.83  1.82  3.17  3.99  11.15       
IU5-IU1  -1.17  -0.68  -0.43  -0.48  0.58  1.75    
t-value  -1.48  -1.95  -0.74  -0.55  2.99  4.73    
This table reports the average monthly returns of momentum portfolio (the difference between the 
average monthly returns of “winner” portfolios and “loser” portfolios at difference information 
uncertainty levels) grouped following the independent two-way sorting approach based on past 6-
month stock returns and return volatility as proxy for information uncertainty levels in the consolidated 
Class A share market consisting of all the eligible Class A stocks listed in the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange over the sample period from January 1996 to December 
2008. The methodological approach is described in detail underneath Table 6.1. 
6.6 Dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts (DISP) 
In this section, the role of the dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts (DISP 
hereafter) as an IU proxy factor in impacting the momentum premium of the (R=6, 
H=6) trading strategy will be discussed based on the empirical evidence found in this 
study. Reiterating what has been mentioned in the methodology chapter, for ease of 
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forecasts for each month scaled by the prior year-end stock price
54, consistent with 
the measurement used by Zhang (2006). The DISP, signalling the divergence of 
analysts’ opinion on the stocks’ intrinsic value (Diether et al., 2002, Dische, 2002), as 
an IU proxy factor, is theoretically and empirically supported by a torrent of diverse 
studies through the history of modern finance literature. For instance, back in 1977, 
Miller (1977) established the theoretical linkage between divergence of opinion and 
uncertainty. In the time since, the DISP is widely employed as a proxy for uncertainty 
or divergence of opinion has been empirically studied in conjunction with cross-
sectional stock returns (Diether et al., 2002), earnings momentum premium (Dische, 
2002, Jegadeesh et al., 2004) and price momentum premium (Jegadeesh et al., 
2004, Zhang, 2006). According to underreaction explanation for the momentum 
effect theorised by Daniel et al.(1998) and Hong and Stein (1999) whom proposed 
that the momentum premium is attributable to investors’ sluggish incorporation of 
fundamental news on stocks elicited by their underreaction, the IU factor, proxied by 
DISP, should boost the momentum premium on theoretical grounds. For the time 
being, the existing empirical evidence in attempt to validate the proposition is rather 
puzzling: one line of evidence supporting the validity of the proposition comes from 
Zhang(2006) and Han, Hong and Warachka
55 (2008) for the U.S. stocks markets, yet, 
on the other spectrum, doubt was raised by Dische (2002) armed with empirical 
results found in the German stock market. In short, the result of this study provides 
more insight about the validity of the proposition by testing it empirically in an 
emerging market context. 
                                            
54 The standard deviation of analysts’ earnings forecast for each month is scaled by the prior year-end 
stock price to alleviate the noise evoked by heteroskedasticity (Zhang, 2006). 
55 Note that differing from this study where the dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecast is employed to 
gauge information uncertainty, Han, Hong and Warachka (2008)’s work focuses on the interplay of 
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Table 6.5 presents the average monthly returns of “winner”, “loser” and momentum 
portfolios with different IU levels for the (R=6, H=6) momentum trading strategy in 
setting of the Chinese Class A share market over the sample period from January 
1996 to December 2008. From IU1 to IU5, the DISP associated with “loser”, “winner” 
or momentum portfolios (W-L) widens, indicating the higher degree of IU. Similar to 
what we find in the majority of other IU proxy factors discussed earlier, all the returns 
of “winner”, “loser” and momentum (W-L) portfolios at different IU levels are positive 
and highly statistically significant. As shown in Table 6.5, the “Q5-Q1” column reports 
the momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) momentum trading strategy at different IU 
levels, which average out at 1.73%, well outstripping the momentum premium of the 
same (R=6, H=6) trading strategy unconditional on IU proxy factor (1.64%). Turning 
now to the loser portfolios column, titled “Q1”, we observe that the “loser” portfolio 
returns are negatively related to the degree of IU. More illustratively, as the IU level 
associated with “loser” portfolios goes up from IU1 (narrowest DISP) to IU5 (widest 
DISP), the average monthly returns of “loser” portfolios dwindle from 0.62% to 0.25%, 
indicating that “loser” portfolios entailing stocks with more consensual earnings 
forecasts outperform those with more dispersed earnings forecast. This empirical 
results lends leg of support to the postulate that past loser stocks with high IU is 
bound to suffer from lacklustre performance than those with lower IU theorised and 
empirically validated by Diether, Malloy and Scherbina (2002),  who documented that 
small-cap, “loser” stocks with less dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts tend to 
outperform those with higher dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts, strikingly 
echoing the evidence found here among “loser” momentum quintiles across different 
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Differing from the pattern exhibited by the “loser” portfolio returns and IU levels in a 
déjà vu manner, the returns of “winner” portfolio, summarized in column Q5, are 
found positively related to the IU levels (degree of dispersion in analysts’ earnings 
forecasts) associated with the portfolios, lending direct empirical support to Sadka 
and Scherbina (2007)’s empirical find that stocks with higher dispersion in analysts’ 
earnings forecasts are more inclined to be overpriced. The patterns witnessed within 
“loser” and “winner” portfolios are in accord with the empirical evidence found by 
Jiang et al. (2005) and Zhang(2006), supporting the underreaction/gradual-
information diffusion theory (Hong and Stein, 1999, Hong et al., 2000) as noted in 
earlier sections—the sluggish manner information travels among “winner” stocks with 
widely dispersed earnings forecasts, to a substantial extent, drives the gratifying 
returns of “winner” stocks with greater information uncertainty (Hong et al., 2000), 
indicated by the negative return differentials of three  out of five momentum quintiles 
(Q1, Q2, Q3) with two extreme IU levels (IU1 and IU5), portfolio with lowest IU tend 
to outperform that with highest IU. However, this pattern is reversed for past best-
performing “winner” portfolio (Q4 and Q5), where the portfolio with highest IU level 
yields significantly superior returns compared with that with lowest IU level (Q4: 
0.31%, t=2.99 and Q5: 0.56%, t=4.17).  
With respect to the momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) momentum trading strategy 
across different levels of IU, being reported in column “Q5-Q1”, the pattern of the 
relationship bewteen momentum premia and IU levels can be described as: the 
momentum premium surges monotonically from 1.28% (t=2.51) for the momentum 
portfolio with IU1 to 2.21% (t=15.03) for the momentum portfolio with IU5. The 
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empirically vindicates the validity of the theoretical hypothesis—the momentum 
portfolios with higher IU are predisposed to outperform those with lower IU, 
stemming from the overconfidence theory and underreaction theory for explanation 
to the momentum premia advanced by Daniel et al. (1998, 2001), Hong and Stein 
(1998) and Hong, Lim and Stein (2000) respectively and supported empirically by 
results from Jiang et al. (2005) and Zhang (2006).  
Table 6.5 Average monthly returns of momentum ("winner" minus "loser") portfolio 
independently sorted based on past returns and the dispersion in analysts' earnings 
forecast (DISP) as information uncertainty proxy (the (R=6, H=6) momentum trading 
strategy) 
   Momentum Quintile 
   Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q5  Q5-Q1  t-value 
Information uncertainty proxy: Analysts' forecast dispersion (DISP) 
IU1  0.62  1.04  1.41  1.53  1.9  1.28  2.51 
t-stats  1.99  2.05  3.58  5.05  6.18       
IU2  0.62  1.24  1.41  1.72  2.13  1.51  4.15 
t-stats  1.95  2.51  3.99  4.51  6.02       
IU3  0.62  1.29  1.43  1.84  2.29  1.67  12.05 
t-stats  3.08  2.95  3.47  5.05  4.99       
IU4  0.48  1.21  1.27  1.64  2.45  1.97  4.66 
t-stats  2.01  3.38  5.01  3.08  8.27       
IU5  0.25  0.9  1.35  1.84  2.46  2.21  15.03 
t-stats  1.94  2.05  3.85  4.31  15.08       
IU5-IU1  -0.37  -0.14  -0.06  0.31  0.56  0.93    
t-value  -0.69  -0.51  -0.99  2.99  4.17  1.58    
This table reports the average monthly returns of momentum portfolio (the difference between the 
average monthly returns of “winner” portfolios and “loser” portfolios at difference information 
uncertainty levels) grouped following the independent two-way sorting approach based on past 6-
month stock returns and dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts (DISP) as proxy for information 
uncertainty levels in the consolidated Class A share market consisting of all the eligible Class A 
stocks listed in the Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange over the sample period 
from January 1996 to December 2008. The methodological approach is described in detail 
underneath Table 6.1. 
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6.7 Trading volume 
From the perspective of market microstructure, compared with more heavily traded 
stocks, thinly traded stocks are commonly deemed carrying more risk, signifying 
higher degree of IU. Consequently, according to the risk and return 
relationship(Sharpe, 1964)  well entrenched in modern finance theory, the thinly 
traded stocks are expected to produce higher yield than the heavily traded stocks by 
the virtue of bearing higher risk. The prediction is widely known as liquidity 
hypothesis, first proposed by (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986) and supported by the 
empirical evidence documented by Datar, Naik and Radcliffe (1998). The 
contentious issue revolving the interpretation of the interaction between the trading 
volumes and stock returns, largely believed to be driven by market dynamics (Blume 
et al., 1994), was taken further by Conrad, Hameed and Niden (1994) and Lee and 
Swaminathan (2000). Both of the studies gave the spotlight to the interplay of trading 
volume and momentum premium yet support two competing theories. Specifically, 
Conrad, Hameed and Niden (1994) provided empirical evidence supporting the 
proposition that stocks/portfolios with low trading volume tend to produce larger 
momentum premium. On the contrary, the manifestation that high trading volumes of 
stocks/portfolios presage superior momentum premium is supported by the evidence 
found by Lee and Swaminathan (2000) in the U.S. market context and Chan, 
Hameed and Tong (2000) in an international context. In view of the enigmatic 
existing empirical evidence in the literature, through employing trading volume, 
proxied by the reciprocal of turnover ratio
56, as an IU proxy factor, we intend to 
                                            
56 The reciprocal of turnover ratio is used to proxy for trading volume for ease of illustration in the 
results table. The turnover ratio is the ratio of the number of shares traded each month to the 
number of shares outstanding at the end of the month, to be consistent with Lee and Swaminathan 
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provide an out-of-sample testament to the manifestation of the relationship between 
trading volume and momentum premium spun out by Conrad, Hameed and Niden 
(1994) and Lee and Swaminathan (2000) in the Chinese Class A share market 
context. Reliant on the gradual-information-diffusion theory proposed by Hong and 
Stein (1999) and Hong, Lim and Stein(2000), thinly traded stocks/portfolios, among 
whom information tends to spread in a more sluggish manner, are expected to yield 
higher momentum premium.  
Table 6.6 reports the average monthly returns of the “winner”, “loser” and momentum 
(“W-L”) portfolios across 5 different IU levels (IU1-IU5) in the Chinese Class A share 
market for the sample time horizon from January 1996 to December 2008. Looking 
into all “loser” portfolios (Q1), we observe a familiar negative relationship between 
the returns of “loser” portfolios and the IU levels, indicated by the observation that 
the return of “loser”-high IU portfolio consisting of “loser” stocks with low trading 
volume (high IU level) trails behind that of “loser”-low IU entailing “loser” stocks with 
high trading volume (low IU level). The preceding observation, consistent with 
empirical evidence found by  Zhu, Wu and Wang (2004) and Jiang et al.(2005) in the 
Chinese Class A share market and in the U.S. stock markets respectively, sheds 
light on the plausibility of Hong and Stein(1999) and Hong, Lim and Stein (2000)’s 
underreaction theory/information graduation theory. In other words, firm-specific 
information travels slowly among stocks/portfolios receiving less investor’ attention, 
prompting underreaction of share price to the information and subsequently resulting 
in extended skid in terms of share price of “loser” and relatively infrequently traded 
stocks/portfolios. Nevertheless, the empirical evidence found here differs from the 
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could be largely attributed to the pervasive influence of the vast amount of Chinese 
retail investors, who drive the overall historically higher turnover ratio in the Chinese 
stock market compared with the average turnover ratio of the U.S. market and 
normally have shorter investment horizons (Wang and Chin, 2004). The above-noted 
factors collectively determine that the underreaction of share prices, evoked by 
investors’ overconfidence (Daniel et al., 1998) or gradual information diffusion 
among high IU stocks (Hong et al., 2000), prevails in the Chinese stock market.  
Within column Q5, summarizing the average monthly returns of “winner” portfolio, 
the average monthly returns of “winner” portfolios are positively related to the IU 
levels, akin to the pattern observed in the majority of the previously-discussed results. 
Intriguingly, the positive relationship between the average monthly returns of “winner” 
portfolios and the degree of IU appears to be a general feature across different stock 
markets as documented in four major studies on the trading volume and momentum 
premia noted above—Lee and Swaminathan (2000) and Jiang et al. (2005) in the 
U.S. market; Wang and Chin (2004) and Zhu et al. (2004) in the Chinese Class A 
share market. In more detail, the “winner” portfolios with higher IU, indicated by low 
trading volumes, tend to yield superior momentum premia compared with those 
associated with lower IU, signalled by high trading volumes, which is in accord with 
Hong and Stein (1999)’s underreaction theory and Hong, Lim and Stein (2000)’s 
gradual information diffusion theory—the overshoot of the returns of “winner” stocks 
associated with greater degree of IU, evoked by the underreaction of stock prices, is 
the resultant of the sluggish manner in which firm-specific news travels among 
“winner” stocks that are coincidentally thinly traded.  
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trading strategy across 5 different IU levels. Numerically, the momentum premia 
increase monotonically from 0.91% (t=1.99) for momentum portfolio with IU1 to 2.27% 
(t=11.14) for momentum portfolio with IU5. Moreover, the momentum premia across 
different IU levels average out at 1.36%, lagging behind the momentum premium of 
the (R=6, H=6) momentum strategy unconditional on IU level in the Chinese Class A 
share market (1.64%), suggesting that the amplifying effect of IU on the momentum 
premia is not a general feature across different IU levels, yet the existence of the 
amplifying effect of IU is proved behind doubt as the momentum premium of the 
momentum portfolio with highest IU level (IU5) comes in at 2.27%, well outpacing the 
premium of the (R=6, H=6) momentum strategy unconditional on IU. More pointedly, 
the difference of average monthly returns between momentum portfolios with two 
extreme IU levels (IU5-IU1) comes in at 1.36 (t=6.32), suggesting that the 
momentum effect is more pronounced among stocks with greater information 
uncertainty, paralleling the empirical evidence by Hou, Peng and Xiong (2008) 
manifesting high trading volume stocks exhibit more prevalent momentum effect. In 
view of the empirical evidence in the extant literature, the above-noted evidence 
aligns with empirical evidence found by Wang and Chin (2004), Zhu et al. (2004) and 
Jiang et al. (2005) and echoes the prediction of our proposition and underreaction 
theory (Hong and Stein, 1999) /gradual information diffusion theory (Hong et al., 
2000) as described earlier. The evidence of the amplifying effect of information 
uncertainty over the momentum premium, especially of the momentum portfolios 
associated with greater degree of IU, can be interpreted from different perspectives 
reliant on various behavioural theories and psychology evidence. Given the fact that 
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ratio/liquidity is proved to be a barometer indicating the degree of clustering of 
irrational investors (Baker and Stein, 2004). Therefore, in our case, the high trading 
volume (large turnover ratio) not only signals less information uncertainty but also 
hints the high proportion of irrational investors in the stock market, whose behaviours 
are subject to the influence of overconfidence and optimism bias, blunting the 
momentum premium according to Du (2002)’s traders’ underconfidence behavioural 
model. Based on which, the plausibility of the positive relationship between level of 
information uncertainty and momentum premium is further clinched as empirical 
evidence from Statman, Thorley and Vorkink (2006) shows that high trading volume 
(low 1/turnover ratio; less IU) is indicative of high level of investors’ overconfidence, 
depressing the influence of investors’ underconfidence toward decision making and 
therefore undermining the significance of momentum premium (Du, 2002). 
Table 6.6 Average monthly returns of momentum ("winner" minus "loser" ) portfolio 
independently sorted based on past returns and trading volume as information 
uncertainty proxy (the (R=6, H=6) momentum trading strategy) 
   Momentum Quintile 
   Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q5  Q5-Q1  t-value 
Information uncertainty proxy: Volume(1/Turnover ratio) 
IU1  1.04  1.36  1.68  1.73  1.95  0.91  1.99 
t-stats  3.05  2.99  2.63  3.91  4.15       
IU2  0.85  1.03  1.38  1.62  1.84  0.99  5.39 
t-stats  2.88  3.08  4.99  2.18  7.62       
IU3  0.48  0.63  0.92  1.16  2.16  1.68  4.38 
t-stats  1.99  4.05  3.18  4.08  4.55       
IU4  0.23  0.7  0.85  1.31  2.35  2.12  7.15 
t-stats  2  2.63  3.11  4.82  6.99       
IU5  -0.03  0.41  0.64  0.83  2.24  2.27  11.14 
t-stats  -0.25  2.58  3.05  3.88  10.29       
IU5-IU1  -1.07  -0.95  -1.04  -0.9  0.29  1.36    
t-value  -1.26  -0.83  -1.03  -0.97  2.99  6.32    
This table reports the average monthly returns of momentum portfolio (the difference between the 
average monthly returns of “winner” portfolios and “loser” portfolios at difference information 
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month stock returns and trading volume as proxy for information uncertainty levels in the consolidated 
Class A share market consisting of all the eligible Class A stocks listed in the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange over the sample period from January 1996 to December 
2008. The methodological approach is described in detail underneath Table 6.1. 
 
6.8 Corporate governance 
Since the 1980s, in view of a strong wave of fanatic M&A activities taking place in 
the financial market, academics and practitioners has paid increasingly more 
attention on analyzing the informational value of the strength of corporate 
governance of a listed firm as shareholder rights get restricted to fend off potential 
“proxy fight and hostile takeovers” (Gompers et al., 2003: page 108). Over recent 
years, the line of research revolving corporate governance has been branched out 
into different sub streams such as the concentration of share ownership and equity 
prices (Gompers et al., 2003), corporate governance and information efficiency (Cai 
et al., 2006) and the role of corporate governance in foreign investments (Das, 2008) 
etc. In this study, we employ the strength of corporate governance as a yardstick in 
measuring information uncertainty, which has been hinted in a growing body of 
research recently. Specifically, a slew of studies (Bushman and Smith, 2001, Cai et 
al., 2006, Gillan et al., 2006, Raheja, 2009, Das, 2008, Magnan and Xu, 2008) 
provide empirical evidence supporting the postulate that more stringent corporate 
governance practice is indicative of lower level of information uncertainty. Yet, to our 
knowledge, no one has yet to investigate the interplay of the strength of corporate 
governance, as an IU proxy factor, and the momentum premium, which 
characteristically sets this research apart from other existing studies in the field and 
provides a novel contribution to the literature. Furthermore, the strength of corporate 
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free float ratios (“the ratio of shares in a public company that are freely available to 
the investing public to total company shares” (Wang and Xu, 2004: page 65)) of all 
eligible stocks prior to the end of the ranking period. The underlying logic is that a 
higher free float ratio (higher percentage of tradable shares), reflecting the capability 
of shareholders in flexing their muscles and having their say, indicates less 
uncertainty revolving the stock elicited by government policies imposed through the 
government-owned non-tradable shares (Wang and Xu, 2004). Turning now to the 
linkage between the corporate governance as an IU proxy factor and momentum 
premium, Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) found an investing strategy akin to 
Jegadeesh and Titman(1993)’s momentum mechanism—buying stocks with 
strongest shareholder rights and selling stocks with weakest shareholder rights—
could produce abnormal returns in the U.S. stock markets. In light of the above-
noted empirical evidence, combined with the general proposition of relationship 
between IU and momentum premium in this research, we conjecture that the 
strength of corporate governance as an IU proxy factor has pronounced amplifying 
effect on the momentum premium in the setting of the Chinese Class A share market.  
Table 6.7 reports average monthly returns of momentum quintiles (Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4, 
Q5) and momentum portfolios (Q5-Q1) across different levels of IU (IU1-IU5) in the 
Chinese Class A share market for the sample time period from January 1996 to 
December 2008. Familiarly, the “Q5-Q1” column presents the momentum premia of 
the (R=6, H=6) momentum trading strategy under the impact of different IU levels. 
The momentum premium monotonically increases as the degree of IU gets greater 
from IU1 to IU5, suggesting a positive relationship between the IU and momentum 
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postulates and empirical evidence in the literature. What’s more, the amplifying effect 
of IU is tellingly evident as not only the average momentum premia across all IU 
levels (2.15%) but also the momentum premia under all IU levels, ranging from 1.84% 
for IU1 to 3.99% for IU5, significantly exceed the momentum premium of the (R=6, 
H=6) momentum trading strategy unconditional on IU proxy factor (1.64%). The 
amplifying effect of IU on the momentum premium can be explained with 
experimental evidence from psychology: spurred by greater information uncertainty 
facing, investors are more inclined to be optimistic (Armor and Taylor, 1998), eliciting 
heuristic processing procedure(Schwarz, 1990) involving the use of a series of 
intuitive heuristics such as affective heuristics of System 1 (intuitive) of two cognitive 
systems (Kahneman and Frederick, 2002). The heuristics processing procedure in 
human judgmental process is susceptible to strengthen the influence of various 
behavioural biases such as overconfidence, conservatism, underconfidence and 
underreaction over the momentum premium (Daniel et al., 1998, Barberis et al., 
1998, Du, 2002, Hong and Stein, 1999), exhibiting as the amplified momentum 
premia observed under the influence of IU. 
By focusing on the “Q1” column (“loser” portfolio), we observe a negative relationship 
between the average monthly returns of “loser” portfolios and IU and the differential 
return of “loser” portfolio with high IU (IU5) (weak shareholder rights) and that with 
low IU (IU1) (strong shareholder rights) is recorded at -0.37%, supporting the 
postulate that “weak shareholder rights caused poor performance” (Gompers et al., 
2003: page 145) with out-of-sample empirical evidence found in the Chinese Class A 
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stock returns are positively related to residual free float ratios
57 documented by 
Wang and Xu (2004) also in the Chinese Class A share market. Succinctly, the 
pattern manifests that “loser” portfolios consisting of stocks associated with more 
limited shareholder rights (greatest IU) tend to underperform those consisting of 
stocks of more democratic firms (less IU), echoing the prediction of underreaction/ 
gradual information diffusion theory (Hong and Stein, 1999, Hong et al., 2000). 
Specifically, skimpy communication between firms of high IU “loser” stocks and stock 
market participants, a reflection of limited shareholder rights (weak corporate 
governance), hinders the efficiency of the way share prices react toward the firm-
specific information, triggering a further loss for high IU “loser” stocks (Hong et al., 
2000).  
On the contrary, a positive relationship between IU and average monthly returns of 
“winner” portfolios is found in Column Q5, where the average monthly returns of 
“winner” portfolios climb up from 2.73% for IU1 to 4.51% for IU5. The superior 
performance of “winner” portfolios with higher IU is clinched by the differential return 
of the “winner” portfolio with highest IU and that with lowest IU, recorded at 1.78% 
(t=5.03).  
                                            
57 Residual free float ratios are arrived by regressing free float ratios against logarithm market 
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Table 6.7 Average monthly returns of momentum ("winner" minus "loser") portfolio 
independently sorted based on past returns and the strength of corporate 
governance as information uncertainty proxy (the (R=6, H=6) momentum trading 
strategy) 
   Momentum Quintile 
   Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q5  Q5-Q1  t-value 
Information uncertainty proxy: Corporate governance (proxied by 1/free float 
ratio) 
IU1  0.89  1.35  1.79  2.15  2.73  1.84  3.03 
t-stats  3.81  3.55  4.15  2.99  5.05       
IU2  0.92  1.05  1.53  1.98  3.12  2.2  4.82 
t-stats  3.05  2.95  4.01  5.62  5.05       
IU3  0.73  0.94  1.41  1.93  3.25  2.52  3.55 
t-stats  2.84  2.61  2.99  2.05  7.18       
IU4  0.84  1.06  1.38  1.82  3.35  2.51  6.92 
t-stats  3.59  2.18  2.03  4.28  6.04       
IU5  0.52  0.84  1.32  1.74  4.51  3.99  11.36 
t-stats  1.96  3.18  5.08  3.48  10.04       
IU5-IU1  -0.37  -0.51  -0.47  -0.41  1.78  2.15    
t-value  -0.03  -0.38  -0.17  -0.2  5.03  4.55    
This table reports the average monthly returns of momentum portfolio (the difference between the 
average monthly returns of “winner” portfolios and “loser” portfolios at difference information 
uncertainty levels) grouped following the independent two-way sorting approach based on past 6-
month stock returns and the strength of corporate governance as proxy for information uncertainty 
levels in the consolidated Class A share market consisting of all the eligible Class A stocks listed in 
the Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange over the sample period from January 
1996 to December 2008. The methodological approach is described in detail underneath Table 6.1. 
 
6.9 Summary 
To close out this section, we describe the main findings on the momentum premium 
under the influence of information uncertainty by summarizing the general features 
and differences of the impact of seven different information uncertainty proxy factors 
over the returns of momentum quintiles and momentum portfolios (Q5-Q1). Across 
the seven sections of this chapter categorized by the use of seven different IU proxy 
factors, we generally observe negative relationship between the average monthly 
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but the scenario when firm size is employed to yardstick the strength of information 
uncertainty. As to the average monthly returns of “winner” momentum quintiles, they 
are found to have positive statistical association with the levels of information 
uncertainty unanimously in all seven sections. The general patterns—negative 
relation between IU and the returns of “loser” momentum quintiles and positive 
relation between IU and the returns of “winner” momentum quintiles—are consistent 
with the empirical evidence found by Zhang (2006) in his seminal work in the field, 
corroborating the prediction reliant on investors’ underreaction theory and gradual 
information diffusion theory developed Hong and Stein (1999) and Hong, Lim and 
Stein (2000) respectively. Specifically, both of the above-noted behavioural theories 
nominate investors’ underreaction, evoked by the languish manner firm-specific 
information concerning low IU “loser” stocks and high IU “winner” stocks travels 
among investors, as the impetus behind the momentum premium.Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty                       Chapter 7 Results III 
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Chapter 7 Momentum premia under the influence of information 
uncertainty over time periods following UP and DOWN market states 
 
7.1 Introduction 
In section 5.3 of chapter 5, we document that the momentum premia of different 
momentum trading strategies are asymmetrically presented over time periods 
following UP and DOWN market states, with the premia being significantly more 
pronounced quantitatively during time following UP market state than those found 
during time following DOWN market state. Following the spirit and in the glow of 
empirical evidence of the asymmetry found in other financial markets by Cooper et al. 
(2004) in the U.S. stock markets, Huang (2006) in the international stock market 
context and Du et al. (2009) in the Taiwan stock market, we endeavour to look into 
the importance of market state on influencing the phenomena in the financial 
markets and extend the discussion on the interaction between the momentum 
premium and information uncertainty in Chapter 6 by drawing together and interpret 
the findings from our investigation on the interplay of the momentum premium and 
information uncertainty conditional on two market states—post-UP and post-DOWN 
market states under the aegis of heuristics and biases tradition (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1974) and a set of behavioural finance theories. Coherent with Chapter 
5, we only focus on the Chinese Class A share market, with Class B shares being 
disregarded due to liquidity concern, and the momentum premium of the (R=6, H=6) 
trading strategy for the same reasons detailed in the last few sections. Additionally, 
the market states are defined in the same manner as they were in Chapter 5—a time 
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average monthly return of market portfolio, proxied by a consolidated Chinese Share 
A Index encompassing all the Class A shares listed in the Shanghai Stock Exchange 
and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, is positive (negative). By the same vein of 
thinking of using prior 24-month market average return as additional definition of 
market states discussed in section 5.3 of chapter 5, the same method is also 
implemented in this section to boost the power of the test and foster our findings 
from this section, which is elaborated on at the end of this section. Overall, this 
chapter will be organized in the same sequence of 7 different information uncertainty 
proxy factors as discussed in chapter 6 (Firm size, firm age, analysts’ coverage, 
return volatility, dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecast, trading volume and the 
strength/quality of corporate governance).  
7.2 Firm size  
This section outlines the results from the investigation of using firm size, measured 
by the market capitalizations of stocks ahead of the ranking period, as an IU proxy 
factor in influencing the momentum premium of the (R=6, H=6) momentum trading 
strategy during the time periods following UP and DOWN market states in the 
Chinese share A market. Firm size is deemed as a suitable candidate to proxy the 
information uncertainty levels associated with listed firms for the reason detailed in 
Chapter 6 and the theory chapter. 
Table 7.1 presents the average monthly returns of momentum quintiles and 
momentum portfolio premia of the (R=6, H=6) strategy across 5 different IU levels 
(IU1, IU2, IU3, IU4, IU5), by which order the degree of information uncertainty 
increasingly heightens, during the time periods following UP market state (as shown 
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Class A share market over the whole sample period from January 1996 to December 
2008. At first glance, the momentum premia across different IU levels, shown in “Q5-
Q1” column, are positive and statistically significant for both case scenarios. 
Furthermore, in staggering contrast to the asymmetric pattern between the 
momentum premium of the momentum strategy unconditional on IU factor over 
periods following UP market state and that over time periods following DOWN 
market state, we observe that, by comparing Panel A and B, the average 
momentum-IU (firm size) premia (Q5-Q1) over the periods following UP market state 
(1.148%) trails those found over the periods following DOWN market state (1.522%). 
The above-described asymmetric influence of information uncertainty over the 
momentum premia over time periods over UP and DOWN market states is analyzed 
and explained further in the remaining part of this section.  
Looking into the momentum quintiles, within “loser” portfolios (Q1), there is a positive 
relationship between the average monthly returns of Q1 and information uncertainty 
in both of Panel A and Panel B. Numerically, the returns of “loser” portfolio increase 
monotonically from -0.32% to 0.24% as the degree of IU gets greater from IU1 to IU5 
in Panel A and from 0.65% to 1.5% in Panel B. The same positive relationship is also 
observed within “winner” portfolio for both case scenarios, shown in Panel A and 
Panel B. As IU level goes up from IU1 to IU5, the average monthly returns of “winner” 
portfolio creep up monotonically from 0.71% to 1.52% in Panel A and from 1.86% to 
3.18% in Panel B. The positive association between returns of “winner” and “loser” 
portfolios  and the degree of information uncertainty over the time periods following 
UP and DOWN market states is consistent with the patterns recorded for 
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results described above confirm the empirical finding documented by Hong, Lim and 
Stein (2000) and thereby lend support to their gradual-information diffusion theory, 
contending that the momentum premia is partly attributable to the fact that news 
travels in a sluggish manner among small-cap firms associated with relatively greater 
information uncertainty. More pointedly, regardless of prior market condition, facing 
IU, investors, buoyed by exaggerated influence of optimism bias (Armor and Taylor, 
1998), are more likely to follow the grain (Yeh and Lee, 2000), prompting further 
momentum of changes in share price of “loser” and “winner” stocks on the heels of 
market swings, which is especially obvious among large-cap “loser” and small-cap 
“winner” stocks.  
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Table 7.1 Momentum premia (monthly returns) under IU (proxied by firm size) 
following UP and DOWN market states (12 months) (R=6, H=6) in the Chinese Class 
A share market (Jan. 1996- Dec. 2008) 
Panel A.         Monthly returns of momentum quintiles and momentum premia  
Following UP market state (12 months) 
   Momentum Quintile 
   Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q5  Q5-Q1  t-value 
  
Information uncertainty proxy: Firm size 
(1/MV)    
IU1  -0.32  0.13  0.45  0.68  0.71  1.03  1.79 
t-stats  -0.78  1.55  0.78  1.13  1.54       
IU2  -0.25  0.15  0.41  0.75  0.85  1.1  2.55 
t-stats  -1.05  0.94  1.18  2.01  2.11       
IU3  0.02  0.17  0.39  0.83  1.18  1.16  1.89 
t-stats  0.88  1.83  0.94  1.49  1.89       
IU4  0.18  0.22  0.43  0.97  1.35  1.17  2.11 
t-stats  1.18  1.5  0.58  1.89  2.36       
IU5  0.24  0.31  0.33  0.92  1.52  1.28  2.51 
t-stats  1.06  2.5  1.58  2.57  1.99       
IU5-IU1  0.56  0.18  -0.12  0.24  0.81  0.25    
t-value  1.85  1.99  -1.01  3.11  2.51  2.03    
 
Panel B.      Monthly returns of momentum quintiles and momentum premia  
Following DOWN market state (12 months) 
   Momentum Quintile 
   Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q5   Q5-Q1  t-value 
   Information uncertainty proxy: Firm size (1/MV) 
IU1  0.65  1.24  1.16  1.38  1.86  1.21  5.32 
t-stats  2.19  5.91  3.21  4.19  5.89       
IU2  0.82  1.47  1.28  1.52  2.37  1.55  10.1 
t-stats  3.16  3.71  1.99  5  7.55       
IU3  1.21  1.55  1.34  1.73  2.79  1.58  9.74 
t-stats  4.81  3.5  4.6  6.37  12.03       
IU4  1.43  1.73  1.51  1.96  3.02  1.59  12.5 
t-stats  4.5  4.88  7.29  4.58  9.31       
IU5  1.5  1.88  1.66  2.01  3.18  1.68  15.05 
t-stats  3.99  6.5  8.99  6.5  10.99       
IU5-IU1  0.85  0.64  0.5  0.63  1.32  0.47    
t-value  6.88  4.75  5.16  4.88  8.64  1.55    
This table presents the average monthly returns of momentum quintiles and momentum premia under 
the influence of different levels of IU over time periods following UP and DOWN market states, as 
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period spanning from January 1996 to December 2008. The UP and DOWN market states are 
defined by prior 12-month average market return, with a consolidated Chinese Share A index being 
employed as a proxy for market portfolio. For simplicity and ease of comparison, the (R=6, H=6) 
momentum trading strategy is focused on in the investigation on the influence of information 
uncertainty on the momentum premia over time periods following UP and DOWN market states. The 
portfolios are formed based on independent two-way sorting mechanism, described in rich detail in 
the methodology chapter and in chapter 6. Simply put, all the eligible stocks are ranked based on their 
prior 6-month returns and firm size, measured by the reciprocal of their market capitalization (1/MV) 
prior to the ranking period purely for ease of illustration, independently into 5 quintiles for each factor. 
Taking the intersections of these 10 quintiles gives rise to 25 momentum-IU portfolios in total, with 
every stock being equally weighted within every portfolio. After skipping a month, all the resulted 
portfolios are held for 6 months following the buy-and-hold strategy to curb trading costs from the 
perspective of practicality. The momentum premia (Q5-Q1) is determined by the difference between 
the average monthly return of “winner” portfolio (Q5) and that of “loser” portfolio (Q1), the significance 
of which is indicated by corresponding t statistics. The calculation of the momentum premia under 
influence of IU over the periods following UP and DOWN market states is akin to Cooper et al.(2006), 
Huang(2006) Siagnos and Chelley-Steeley(20060 and Du et al. (2009)’s approach. Mathematically, 
the procedure can be expressed as     ,  =     ,      +     ,          +   		.	 All the numbers 
in the table are in percentage term.  
 
Through running an equality test analogous to Cooper et al. (2004) and Huang 
(2006)’s approach, we are able to quantify how the momentum premia across 5 
different IU levels over the periods following UP market state differ from the those 
corresponding ones over the period following DOWN market state, as shown in 
Table 7.2 and more vividly illustrated in Figure 7.1. In Table 7.2, the differences for 
all IU levels are negative and statistically positive, cementing the asymmetry 
between momentum premia over periods following UP market state and those over 
periods following DOWN market state, with the former lagging the latter, as opposed 
to the reversed version witnessed in section 5.2 of chapter 5 concerning the 
momentum trading strategies unconditional on the information uncertainty. 
Furthermore, the asymmetry of momentum premia between the two case scenarios 
is depicted in Figure 7.1, where the momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) momentum 
trading strategy for the periods following UP market state is represented by red 
columns and those for the periods following DOWN market state by blue columns. Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty                       Chapter 7 Results III 
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The vertical axis measures the momentum premia in percentage term and the 
horizontal axis labels the five different information uncertainty levels examined. 
Rather convincingly, the (R=6, H=6) momentum trading strategy over the periods 
following DOWN market state consistently outperforms the same strategy over time 
periods following UP market state across all the IU levels, empirically supporting our 
conjecture for this section--- the amplifying effect of IU over the momentum premium 
is expected to be more pronounced during the time following DOWN market state as 
the salience of IU is accentuated when investors grow jittery, formed reliant on the 
finds from empirical and theoretical studies by Kelsey et al. (2010) and Hong, Lim 
and Stein (2000) in the field of finance and experimental studies by Gilovich et al. 
(2002) in the domain of psychology.  Visually, the above-noted pattern is strikingly 
distinct from the pattern of the momentum premia of momentum trading strategies 
unconditional on information uncertainty  in the Chinese Class A share market over 
the periods following UP market state and DOWN market state demonstrated in 
Figure 5.3, in which all the 16 momentum trading strategies produce significant 
superior returns over the time periods following UP market state compared with over 
the time periods following DOWN market state, with the momentum premia of 
momentum strategies unconditional on IU following UP market state being positive 
and statistically and economically significant yet those following DOWN market state 
tipping into negative territory. Naturally, the questions is raised about the reason why 
there exists such a staggering dichotomy in the asymmetric patterns of the 
momentum premia following UP and DOWN market states between our analysis of 
the momentum strategies and of the momentum strategies conditional on the IU. 
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research, the disparate results documented here is, to a substantial extent, the 
resultant of the influence of information uncertainty, proxied by firm size in this case. 
In other words, the empirical evidence suggests the amplifying effect of information 
uncertainty over momentum premium is enhanced for the momentum premium found 
over periods following market skid. With firm size being the yardsticks in measuring 
information uncertainty, the asymmetric pattern of the momentum premia over the 
time periods following UP market state and those over the time periods following 
DOWN market state can be most appropriately interpreted by a investors’ 
underconfidence behavioural model proposed by Du (2002) (also cited by Siganos 
and Chelley-Steeley (2006)), whom claim that it is the traders’ hesitation, largely 
driven by underconfidence of part of investors, in the investment decision making 
process, prompting an underreaction to information about stocks in the market that 
contributes to the larger momentum premia under the influence of information 
uncertainty over periods post market slides.  
Taking the interpretation on a deeper level, under the theoretical framework of 
heuristics and biases tradition (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973), following a market 
downside movement, the Chinese retail investors, historically the vast majority of 
Chinese stock market participants (Kang et al., 2002), are inclined to keep on 
embracing the bearish view concerning the outlook of stock returns (Fisher and 
Statman, 2002), reflecting retail investors’ persistent sombre sentiment (Brown and 
Cliff, 2004, Fisher and Statman, 2000). The negative sentiment of Chinese retail 
investors heightens their perception of risk (Schwarz, 1990), exacerbated by greater 
information uncertainty they face, leading to the underreaction toward firm-specific 
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resulting in more profound momentum premia among high IU stocks over time 
periods following DOWN market states. Elsewhere in the literature, one line of 
psychological study shows that people tend to appear underconfident in decision 
making when facing high information uncertainty by misplacing weights on the 
strength of the evidence upon which the decisions are drawn (Griffin and Tversky, 
1992), leading to the underreaction in share price (Du, 2002) and therefore giving 
rise to increasingly large momentum premia under greater information uncertainty. 
The underconfidence of some Chinese retail investors is further reinforced by their 
negative sentiment on the heels of market slide (Schwarz, 1990), consequently 
triggering the asymmetrically larger momentum premia found over time periods 
following market downdraft. Furthermore, from the perspective of the way in which 
investors process information, the larger momentum premia following DOWN market 
state can be explained as follows: subsequent to downside market movement, retail 
investors are pessimistic on the dim outlook of the market, also being preoccupied 
by concern over heightened IU, provoking the evaluative judgment process involving 
frequent practice of intuitive heuristics(Schwarz, 1990) such as affective, availability 
heuristics of System 1(intuitive) of two cognitive systems (Kahneman and Frederick, 
2002), which requires less cognitive resources (Frederick, 2002). As a result, 
investors’ decisions are subject to pervasive influence of different behavioural biases 
such as overconfidence, conservatism, underconfidence, and underreaction, 
resulting in larger momentum premia during post-market slides (Daniel et al., 1998, 
Barberis et al., 1998, Du, 2002, Hong and Stein, 1999). These theories, collectively, 
elucidate the reason why the amplifying effect of IU over momentum premium is 
reinforced over time periods following DOWN market state. Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty                       Chapter 7 Results III 
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On the other hand, the amplifying effect of IU over momentum premium seems to 
falter over the periods following UP market state. The interpretation of the preceding 
observation is established under the framework of confirmation 
bias/representativeness heuristics (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974, Kahneman et al., 
1982). More explicitly, following market run-ups, systematic judgment information 
processing strategy involving the use of different reflective heuristics such as 
statistics and abstract heuristics, induced by investors’ awareness of information 
uncertainty/scarcity (Schwarz, 1990), overwhelms intuitive/evaluative judgment 
information processing strategy of investors’ judgment, driven by investors’ optimistic 
sentiment (Schwarz, 1990), curtailing the influence of a series of behavioural biases 
such as overconfidence (Daniel et al., 1998), conservatism (Barberis et al., 1998), 
underconfidence (Du, 2002) and underreaction on investors’ decision making 
process and in turn undermining the significance of momentum premia. Additionally, 
spurred by the buoyant mood following market upside movement, Chinese retail 
investors with low confidence, subject to self-attribution bias(Daniel et al., 2001) and 
confirmation/representativeness heuristics (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974), are 
predisposed to place more weight on prior evidence confirms their expectation and 
less weight on evidence contradicts their expectation (Kahneman et al., 1982), 
resulting in the overreaction of share price and hence abysmal momentum premia 
over the periods following market run-ups on the premise of Du (2002)’s investors’ 
underreaction behavioural model.   
Collectively, various behavioural finance theories in conjunction with the 
experimental evidence in psychology explain the asymmetric pattern of momentum 
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following different market states observed, echoing our conjecture derived from the 
gradual information-diffusion hypothesis advanced by Hong, Lim and Stein (2000) as 
discussed in detail earlier on.  
Table 7.2 Equality test results of state-dependent momentum-IU (firm size) premia 
(following UP and DOWN market states) in the Chinese Class A share market (R=6, 
H=6) 
Equality test (MOM and IU (1/MV))(12 months)    
   UP-DOWN=0    
   IU1  IU2  IU3  IU4  IU5 
IU5-
IU1 
Q5-Q1 (UP)  1.03  1.1  1.16  1.17  1.28  0.25 
Q5-Q1(DOWN)  1.21  1.55  1.58  1.59  1.68  0.47 
Difference  -0.18  -0.45  -0.42  -0.42  -0.4    
t stats  -1.59  -2.04  -1.37  -1.73  -1.25    
Overall  1.37  1.74  1.79  1.97  2.34  0.97 
This table reports the difference between the momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) momentum trading 
strategy conditional on different level of information uncertainty in the Chinese Class A share market 
for the sample period from Jan. 1996 to Dec. 2008. The difference is estimated by regressing the raw 
momentum-IU premia against an UP dummy variable (   )	 and an intercept (  ), following the same 
methodology for equality test used by Cooper et al. (2004) and Du et al. (2009). Mathematically, it can 
be written as      ,  =   +     ,           +    . The t statistics associated with each difference is 
listed in the row below. 
 
Figure 7.1 Comparison between the momentum-IU (firm size) premia of the (R=6, 
H=6) strategy over the time period following UP and DOWN market states in the 
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Notes: The column-shaped diagram illustrates the difference of momentum-IU premia of the (R=6, 
H=6) momentum trading strategy over time periods following UP and DOWN market states in the 
Chinese Class A share market for the sample time period. The vertical axis measures the momentum-
IU premia in percentage form; the horizontal axis labels the 5 different levels of IU, with IU1 
representing the lowest level and IU5 the highest level. For each IU level, the corresponding 
momentum premium following UP market state is demonstrated by the blue-coloured column, 
whereas that following DOWN market state is indicated by the red-coloured column. 
 
Figure 7.2 and 7.3 demonstrate the fluctuations of the momentum premia of the (R=6, 
H=6) trading strategy, conditional on both IU and market states, as IU level varies 
during the periods following UP and DOWN market states in the Chinese Class A 
share market in comparison with the momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) strategy 
conditional only on market states and the momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) 
strategy conditional only on IU by plotting the momentum premia produced by three 
different types of conditional (R=6, H=6) momentum strategy on two different 
diagrams categorized by different conditions of market state. The blue line 
represents the momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) momentum strategy conditional 
on both IU and market state (over periods following UP market state in Figure 7.2 
and over periods following DOWN market state in Figure 7.3); the red line charts the 
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momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) momentum strategy conditional on market 
state; the green line represents the momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) momentum 
strategy conditional on IU. For the testing periods following UP market state 
(illustrated in Figure 7.2), even though the momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) 
trading strategy conditional on 4 of total five IU levels for overall same period exceed 
the momentum premium of (R=6, H=6) strategy unconditional on IU, the same 
trading strategy conditional on IU and UP market state consistently fares worse than 
the other two case scenarios depicted in the figure across all IU levels. This picture 
portrays the evidence that the information uncertainty does boost the momentum 
premia for the overall sample period, yet the amplifying effect actually languishes 
and reverses its course for the testing periods following UP market state. 
Unequivocally, the question is raised about the reason why post-UP market state 
condition seems to damp the amplifying effect of the IU on the momentum premia 
comprehensively. This observation can be interpreted based on the experimental 
evidence of investors’ optimism documented by Armor and Taylor (2002) in the 
domain of psychology. Being more specific, buoyed by the euphoria from the 
previous market run-up and more optimistic sentiment, investors may well take 
advantage of extra cognitive resources for the time being and practice more 
deliberate heuristics
58 in making investment decision, effectively keeping a lid on 
triggering extended underreaction of share prices and in turn attenuating the 
momentum premia (Kahneman and Frederick, Frederick, 2002) during post-UP 
market state periods, reflected by the languished amplifying effect of IU over the 
momentum premia.  
                                            
58 More deliberate heuristics include neutral, statistics, abstract, sets processing assessment in 
judgment, which all belong to the System 2(Reflective) of the two Cognitive systems proposed by 
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In comparison to what was just described in Figure 7.3, a strikingly different picture is 
observed with regard to the results for the time periods following DOWN market state. 
Specifically, both sets of the momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) trading strategy 
conditional on IU and DOWN market state and those conditional only on IU outstrip 
the momentum yield of the same trading strategy conditional only on DOWN market 
state across all IU levels. In other words, the amplifying effect of IU over the 
momentum premia is maximized for the scenario when the (R=6, H=6) momentum 
strategy is applied conditional only on IU, and also sustains for the scenario when 
the (R=6, H=6) momentum trading strategy is employed conditional on both IU and 
post-DOWN market state. Hinging on the above-noted evidence and in view of the 
depressed momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) strategy unconditional on IU over 
the testing time periods following DOWN market state, we conjecture that the 
amplifying effect of IU over the momentum premium is, to a markedly large extent, 
driven by the impact of IU over the momentum premia over time periods following 
DOWN market state. This theorising is in line with the gradual information-diffusion 
theory developed by Hong, Lim and Stein (2000) and the traders’ underconfidence 
behavioural model developed by Du (2002), receiving further support from 
psychology research by Griffin and Tversky (2002) as described in great detail 
earlier in this section in explaining why the amplifying of IU over momentum premium 
is not only present but also enhanced over the periods following market downside 
movements.  
Figure 7.2 Comparison: momentum-IU (firm size) premia over periods following UP 
market state, momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) strategy conditional on post-UP 
market state, overall momentum-IU(firm size) premia in the Chinese A market (Jan. 
1996-Dec. 2008) Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty                       Chapter 7 Results III 
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Notes: This figure demonstrates the difference among momentum-IU premia over periods following 
UP market state, momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) momentum strategy conditional on post-UP 
market state, overall momentum-IU premia in the Chinese Class A share market. The vertical axis 
measures the returns in percentage form. The blue line represents the fluctuations in the momentum 
premia across different levels of IU over the periods following UP market state; the red line illustrates 
the premium of (R=6, H=6) momentum strategy unconditional on IU and market states; the green line 
represents the changes of momentum premia across different IU levels unconditional on market 
states. 
 
 
Figure 7.3 Comparison: momentum-IU (firm size) premia over periods following 
DOWN market state, momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) strategy conditional on 
post-DOWN market state, overall momentum-IU (firm size) premia in the Chinese 
Class A market (01/96-12/08) 
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Notes: This figure demonstrates the difference among momentum-IU premia over periods following 
DOWN market state, momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) momentum strategy conditional on post-
DOWN market state, overall momentum-IU premia in the Chinese Class A share market. The vertical 
axis measures the returns in percentage form. The blue line represents the fluctuations in the 
momentum premia across different levels of IU over the periods following DOWN market state; the 
red line illustrates the premium of (R=6, H=6) momentum strategy unconditional on IU and market 
states; the green line represents the changes of momentum premia across different IU levels 
unconditional on market states. 
Inspired by the behavioural model portraying the way three types of investors--- 
uncertainty neutral arbitragers, uncertainty averse traders and momentum traders—
behave in contributing to the momentum phenomenon proposed by (Kelsey et al., 
2010), Figure 7.4 depicts the fluctuations of asymmetry of positive momentum
59 
(returns of “winner” portfolios) and negative momentum (returns of “loser” portfolios) 
in contributing to the momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) momentum strategy 
across 5 five different levels of information uncertainty. The vertical axis measures 
the sum of positive momentum and negative momentum in percentage term; the 
horizontal axis labels different levels of information uncertainty. The blue line 
indicates the changes of the sum of positive momentum and negative momentum 
across 5 IU levels for the time periods following UP market state, and the red line 
                                            
59 The way positive and negative momentums are termed is consistent with Kelsey, Kozhan and Pang 
(2010) for ease of comparison and avoiding any confusion. 
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illustrates the changes of the sum of positive and negative momentums at different 
IU levels for the time periods following DOWN market state. From the statistics box 
above the figure, it is noticeable that regardless of market state conditions, the sum 
of positive momentum and negative momentum of the momentum portfolio with the 
highest IU level (IU5) far exceeds that with lowest IU level (IU1). Specifically, the 
difference (IU5-IU1) is more staggering for the testing periods following DOWN 
market state, with the sum of positive and negative momentum of momentum 
portfolio at IU5 outpacing that at IU1 by 2.17%, than that for the testing periods 
following UP market state (1.37%), implying that the effect of positive momentum 
overwhelms the effect of negative momentum in contributing to the momentum 
premia. In addition, we find that momentum portfolios associated with higher IU tend 
to have higher sum of positive and negative momentum, demonstrated by positively-
sloped red and blue lines despite both being non-linear. In sum, it is evident that 
aside from market state conditions, the divide of the effects of positive momentum 
and negative momentum grows wider as information uncertainty level heightens, 
with positive momentum being the driving force. The evidence found here parallels 
the hypothesis and empirical evidence documented by Kelsey et al. (2010) to the 
extent that high IU amplifies the asymmetry of positive and negative momentum 
effects, and in turn boost the momentum premia in the U.S. stock markets yet 
contradicts their find by showing that positive momentum (“winner” portfolio), instead 
of negative momentum (“loser” portfolio) as suggested by Kelsey et al. in the U.S. 
stock market, is the driving force behind the momentum premia in the Chinese share 
A market, and asymmetry between positive and negative momentum and the 
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DOWN market state, illustrated by the red line being higher above the blue line in 
Figure 7.4. Overall, the evidence seen here is in line with the prediction of gradual 
information-diffusion theory by (Hong, Lim and Stein, 2000), underreaction theory 
(Hong and Stein, 1999) and traders’ underconfidence behavioural model (Du, 2002).  
Figure 7.4 Asymmetry of positive momentum (Q5) and negative momentum (Q1) 
over the time periods following UP and DOWN market states in the Chinese Class A 
share market (Jan. 1996- Dec. 2008) (firm size) 
UP market 
   Q1  Q5  Q1+Q5 
IU1  -0.32  0.71  0.39 
IU2  -0.25  0.85  0.6 
IU3  0.02  1.18  1.2 
IU4  0.18  1.35  1.53 
IU5  0.24  1.52  1.76 
IU5-IU1  1.37 
DOWN market 
   Q1  Q5  Q1+Q5 
IU1  0.65  1.86  2.51 
IU2  0.82  2.37  3.19 
IU3  1.21  2.79  4 
IU4  1.43  3.02  4.45 
IU5  1.5  3.18  4.68 
IU5-IU1        2.17 
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Notes: The statistics box above the figure summarizes positive momentum (Q5) and negative 
momentum (Q1) for testing periods following UP and DOWN market states. This figure depicts the 
difference of the asymmetry of positive momentum (Q5) and negative momentum (Q1) over the time 
periods following UP market state, plotted as the blue line, and DOWN market state, graphed as the 
red line in the Chinese Class A share market over Jan. 1996 to Dec. 2008.The vertical axis measures 
the sum of positive momentum (returns of “winner” portfolio) and negative momentum (returns of 
“loser” portfolio) under each level of IU; the horizontal axis labels 5 different level of information 
uncertainty. The upward sloped lines suggest that regardless of market states, the positive 
momentum (Q5) or the returns of “winner” portfolios tend to overwhelm the negative momentum (Q1) 
or the returns of “loser” portfolios in contributing to the momentum premia as IU level increases.  
 
 
7.3 Firm age 
This section summarizes and interprets the results from the investigation on the 
momentum premium of the (R=6, H=6) momentum trading strategy conditional on IU, 
proxied by firm age (measured by the number of days prior to the ranking period 
since eligible stocks first get listed or first appear in the database) in the Chinese 
Class A share market over the time periods following UP and DOWN market state 
over the whole sample period from January 1996 to December 2008. 
Table 7.3 reports the average monthly returns of momentum quintiles and 
momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) trading strategy across 5 different IU levels for 
the time periods following UP market state, shown in Panel A, and for the time 
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periods following DOWN market state as presented in Panel B. By focusing on the 
Q5-Q1 columns of two panels, we observe that the momentum premia across 
different IU levels stay positive and statistically significant under both market state 
conditions, yet coherent with the pattern witnessed in the previous section, the 
momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) trading strategy conditional on IU tend to be 
consistently more pronounced over the time periods following DOWN market state 
than over the time periods following UP market state, contrary to the pattern of the 
momentum premia conditional solely on market state conditions. More specifically, 
the momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) strategy conditional on firm age as IU proxy 
factor over the periods following UP market state average out at 0.76%, only about 
half of the momentum premium of the (R=6, H=6) strategy unconditional on IU under 
the same market state condition (1.55%). On the post-DOWN market state condition 
front, the momentum premia across different levels of IU average out at 1.83%, in 
stark contrast with the negative return (-0.75%) of momentum portfolio realized for 
the (R=6, H=6) trading strategy unconditional on IU. The observed asymmetric 
pattern of momentum premia conditional on both IU and market states supports our 
hypothesis, largely in line with the predictions of gradual-information-diffusion theory 
by Hong et al. (2000) in finance research and evidence of the determinants of 
investor’s confidence by Griffin and Tversky (2002) in psychology as explained in 
detail in the previous section and in summary at the end of this section.  
In view of the performance of different momentum quintiles, within “loser” portfolios 
(Q1), contrary to positive relationship between returns of “loser” portfolios and IU 
observed in the previous section, the returns of “loser” portfolio here lurch lower in a 
monotonic fashion as IU level heightens under both market state scenarios, Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty                       Chapter 7 Results III 
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consistent with the pattern found when the (R=6, H=6) momentum trading strategy 
conditional on IU yet unconditional on market states was implemented. This find 
most certainly doesn’t conform to the risk-return relationship structured by (Sharpe, 
1964) yet is in accord with the empirical evidence documented by Zhang (2006)—the 
momentum premium is propped up by investors’ overconfidence when facing higher 
degree of IU as theorised by Daniel et al. (1998). On the other hand, the returns of 
“winner” portfolio appear to be positively related to the IU levels, paralleling the 
pattern documented for the momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) trading strategy 
solely conditional on IU, which can be interpreted by the gradual-information-
diffusion theory developed by Hong, Lim and Stein (2000) as detailed in previous 
section. 
Table 7.3 Momentum premia (monthly returns) under IU(firm age) during time 
periods following UP and DOWN market states (12 months) (R=6, H=6) in the 
Chinese Class A market (Jan. 1996-Dec. 2008) 
Panel A.          Monthly returns of momentum quintiles and momentum premia 
Following Up market state (12 months) 
   Momentum Quintile 
   Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q5  Q5-Q1  t-value 
   Information uncertainty proxy: Firm age (1/Age) 
IU1  0.47  0.66  0.81  0.95  0.93  0.46  1.04 
t-stats  1.08  0.66  1.05  1.81  1.83       
IU2  0.35  0.59  1.02  0.89  0.89  0.54  1.12 
t-stats  0.57  1.05  0.85  0.68  0.91       
IU3  0.25  0.37  0.75  1.04  0.88  0.63  0.99 
t-stats  0.48  0.31  0.99  1.03  1.02       
IU4  0.16  0.21  0.51  0.89  1.04  0.88  2.01 
t-stats  0.79  0.73  1.01  0.81  0.77       
IU5  -0.11  0.05  0.47  0.81  1.18  1.29  1.85 
t-stats  -1.05  0.36  1.5  1.19  1.15       
IU5-IU1  -0.58  -0.61  -0.34  -0.14  0.25  0.83    
t-value  -2.1  -0.92  -0.72  -0.87  1.57  2.05    
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Panel B.        Monthly returns of momentum quintiles and momentum premia 
Following DOWN market state (12 months) 
   Momentum Quintile 
   Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q5  Q5-Q1  t-value 
   Information uncertainty proxy: Firm age (1/Age) 
IU1  3.08  2.86  1.46  2.47  3.49  0.41  5.83 
t-stats  5.01  3.48  4.9  6.91  10.19       
IU2  1.83  1.79  1.55  2.17  2.87  1.04  9.1 
t-stats  4.85  4.15  5.93  7.44  8.81       
IU3  1.28  1.48  1.61  1.99  2.56  1.28  10.35 
t-stats  3.25  3.19  4.01  5.36  7.91       
IU4  0.96  1.36  1.59  1.8  4.18  3.22  11.1 
t-stats  2.99  4.51  5.88  4.14  6.54       
IU5  0.72  1.25  1.21  1.75  3.92  3.2  13.52 
t-stats  3.12  6.19  6.71  5.81  3.29       
IU5-IU1  -2.36  -1.61  -0.25  -0.72  0.43  2.79    
t-value  -5.28  -3.09  -4.91  -4.33  9.81  2.95    
This table presents the average monthly returns of momentum quintiles and momentum premia under 
the influence of different levels of IU over time periods following UP and DOWN market states, as 
shown in Panel A and Panel B respectively, in the Chinese Class A share market for the sample 
period spanning from January 1996 to December 2008. The UP and DOWN market states are 
defined by prior 12-month average market return, with a consolidated Chinese Share A index being 
employed as a proxy for market portfolio. The methodological approach is described underneath 
Table 7.1. 
Similar to the previous section, the difference between the momentum premia of the 
(R=6, H=6) trading strategy conditional on IU, measured by firm age, over time 
periods following two market states across 5 different information uncertainty levels 
is quantified and reported in Table 7.4 and is further depicted in Figure 7.5. This 
empirical results stay firmly in line with the prediction of our hypothesis—the 
amplifying effect of IU over the momentum premia is further exacerbated over the 
time periods following DOWN market state, which makes perfect sense as in face of 
high IU, investors’ judgment is inevitably fraught with more cognitive distortions and 
illusions such as underreaction (Hong and Stein, 1999) and investors’ 
underconfidence (Du, 2002). Furthermore, the asymmetric amplifying effect of IU on 
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demonstratively more evident in Figure 7.5. Consistent with the observation in 
previous section, over the time periods following DOWN market state, instead of 
being south of break-even for the (R=6, H=6) strategy unconditional on IU as shown 
in Figure 5.3, the momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) strategy conditional on IU 
and post-DOWN market state dwarf those conditional on IU and post-UP market 
state at 4 out of total five IU levels. It is also worth noting that the asymmetry grows 
wider as IU level edges up, providing further empirical support to our prediction 
hinges on the theoretical frameworks by Hong and Stein (1999) and Du (2002) in 
behavioural finance and evidence of human heuristics in psychology (Gilovich et al., 
2002). More importantly, by brushing off any doubts on whether the pattern of 
differential returns documented when using firm size as IU proxy factor is a singled-
out coincidence, the pattern found here lends support to clinch the proposition 
claimed in the previous section that the information uncertainty is the lynch pin in 
resulting in the distinct asymmetric pattern of the differential momentum premia of 
the (R=6, H=6) strategy conditional on the degree of IU over periods following two 
different market states. 
Table 7.4 Equality test results of state-dependent momentum-IU (firm age) premia 
following UP and DOWN market states in the Chinese Class A market (R=6, H=6) 
Equality test (MOM and IU (1/Age))(12 months) 
   UP-DOWN=0    
   IU1  IU2  IU3  IU4  IU5  IU5-IU1 
Q5-Q1 (UP)  0.46  0.54  0.63  0.88  1.29  0.83 
Q5-Q1(DOWN)  0.41  1.04  1.28  3.22  3.2  2.79 
Difference  0.05  -0.5  -0.65  -2.34  -1.91    
t stats  0.26  -1.58  -2.93  -2.55  -3.11    
Overall  0.65  1.03  1.24  1.88  2.3  1.65 
This table reports the difference between the momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) momentum trading 
strategy conditional on different level of information uncertainty in the Chinese Class A share market 
for the sample period from Jan. 1996 to Dec. 2008. The difference is estimated by regressing the raw 
momentum-IU premia against an UP dummy variable (   )	 and an intercept (  ), following the same Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty                       Chapter 7 Results III 
 
- 176 - 
 
methodology for equality test used by Cooper et al. (2004) and Du et al. (2009). Mathematically, it can 
be written as      ,  =   +     ,           +    . The t statistics associated with each difference is 
listed in the row below. 
Figure 7.5 Comparison between the momentum-IU(firm age) premia of the (R=6, 
H=6) strategy over time periods following UP and DOWN states in the Chinese Class 
A market (Jan. 1996- Dec. 2008) 
 
Notes: The column-shaped diagram illustrates the difference of momentum-IU premia of the (R=6, 
H=6) momentum trading strategy over time periods following UP and DOWN market states in the 
Chinese Class A share market for the sample time period. The vertical axis measures the momentum-
IU premia in percentage form; the horizontal axis labels the 5 different levels of IU, with IU1 
representing the lowest level and IU5 the highest level. For each IU level, the corresponding 
momentum premium following UP market state is demonstrated by the blue-coloured column, 
whereas that following DOWN market state is indicated by the red-coloured column. 
 
Figure 7.6 and 7.7 graphically illustrate the comparison of the momentum premia of 
the (R=6, H=6) trading strategy conditional on different factors (IU, market states and 
both IU and market states). For the momentum premia over the time periods 
following UP market state, as shown in Figure 7.6, the amplifying effect of the IU 
unconditional on market states (green line) is rather subdued for the lowest three IU 
levels and become increasingly more pronounced from IU4 to IU5 on a dime. In 
contrast, the momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) strategy conditional on IU and UP 
market state appear to be rather immune to the amplifying effect of the IU, supposed 
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to be effective on theoretical grounds, for all IU levels. The dampened amplifying 
effect of the IU can be elucidated by human heuristics when facing information 
uncertainty in the post-UP market state periods, during which investors are more 
likely to exercise more systematic processing approaches, encompassed in System 
2 (reflective) of the two cognitive systems proposed by Kahneman and Frederick 
(2002). With more statistical heuristics overriding intuitive heuristics, the weakening 
of the momentum premia is inevitable.  
On the other hand, the amplifying effect of the IU appears to be evidently prevalent 
over the momentum premia of both of the (R=6, H=6) strategy conditional on IU and 
that conditional on IU and post-DOWN market state. More impressively, the 
momentum premia of the trading strategy conditional on IU and DOWN market state 
shoot up, far outpacing those of the trading strategy conditional only on IU at the two 
highest IU levels—IU4 and IU5, implying that the amplifying effect of the IU over the 
momentum premium is maximized over the time periods following DOWN market 
state. The claim is theoretically supported by the gradual-information-diffusion model 
by Hong, Lim and Stein (2000) and investors’ underconfidence behavioural model by 
Du (2002).  
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Figure 7.6 Comparison: momentum-IU (firm age) premia over periods following UP 
market state, momentum premium of the (R=6, H=6) strategy conditional on post-UP 
market sate, overall mom-IU (firm age) premia in the Chinese Class A market (Jan. 
96- Dec.08) 
 
Notes: This figure demonstrates the difference among momentum-IU premia over periods following 
UP market state, momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) momentum strategy conditional on post-UP 
market state, overall momentum-IU premia in the Chinese Class A share market. The vertical axis 
measures the returns in percentage form. The blue line represents the fluctuations in the momentum 
premia across different levels of IU over the periods following UP market state; the red line illustrates 
the premium of (R=6, H=6) momentum strategy unconditional on IU and market states; the green line 
represents the changes of momentum premia across different IU levels unconditional on market 
states. 
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Figure 7.7 Comparison: momentum-IU (firm age) premia over periods following 
DOWN market state, momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) strategy conditional on 
post-DOWN market state, overall momentum-IU (firm age) premia in the Chinese 
Class A market (Jan.96- Dec.08) 
 
Notes: This figure demonstrates the difference among momentum-IU premia over periods following 
DOWN market state, momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) momentum strategy conditional on post-
DOWN market state, overall momentum-IU premia in the Chinese Class A share market. The vertical 
axis measures the returns in percentage form. The blue line represents the fluctuations in the 
momentum premia across different levels of IU over the periods following DOWN market state; the 
red line illustrates the premium of (R=6, H=6) momentum strategy unconditional on IU and market 
states; the green line represents the changes of momentum premia across different IU levels 
unconditional on market states. 
 
Following the spirit of Kelsey et al. (2010) who look into the asymmetric effects of 
positive momentum (Q1) and negative momentum (Q5) on the momentum premia 
under uncertainty, Figure 7.8 aims at demonstrating how the impact of positive 
momentum differs from that of negative momentum under uncertainty over the time 
periods following UP and DOWN market states. Looking into the statistics box above 
the figure, under both market state conditions, the differences of the sum of positive 
and negative momentum between IU5 and IU1 (IU5-IU1) are negative, implying that 
negative momentum is the driving force behind the momentum premia, contradicting 
the evidence showing positive momentum is driving momentum premia when firm 
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size is employed to gauge IU levels discussed earlier yet paralleling the evidence 
found in the U.S stock markets by Kelsey et al. (2010). In addition, the dominant role 
negative momentum plays in contributing to the momentum premia is more evident 
over the time periods following DOWN market state than those over the time periods 
following UP market state, demonstrated by smaller magnitude of the sum (-0.33%) 
for post-UP market state condition than (-1.93%) for post-DOWN market state 
condition. Moreover, as shown in the figure, the fact that both lines are downward-
sloped suggests that the asymmetric effects of positive and negative momentums on 
the momentum premium, with negative momentum being the dominant force, 
increase as the degree of IU gets greater, consistent with the evidence documented 
by Kelsey et al. (2010) in the U.S. stock markets. The observation that the red line 
(the sum of positive and negative momentum for periods following DOWN market 
state) is well above the blue line (the sum of positive and negative momentum over 
periods following UP market state) and the blue line is roughly flatter than red line 
supports our hypothesis that the amplifying effect of IU prevails in a more significant 
manner over time periods following DOWN market state, which is in line with the 
prediction of gradual-information-diffusion theory (Hong et al., 2000), underreaction 
theory(Hong and Stein, 1999) and traders’ underconfidence behavioural model (Du, 
2002) as described earlier.  
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Figure 7.8 Asymmetry of positive momentum (Q5) and negative momentum (Q1) 
over periods following UP and DOWN market states in the Chinese Class A share 
market (Jan. 1996- Dec. 2008) (firm age) 
UP market 
   Q1  Q5  Q1+Q5 
IU1  0.47  0.93  1.4 
IU2  0.35  0.89  1.24 
IU3  0.25  0.88  1.13 
IU4  0.16  1.04  1.2 
IU5  -0.11  1.18  1.07 
IU5-IU1  -0.33 
DOWN market 
   Q1  Q5  Q1+Q5 
IU1  3.08  3.49  6.57 
IU2  1.83  2.87  4.7 
IU3  1.28  2.56  3.84 
IU4  0.96  4.18  5.14 
IU5  0.72  3.92  4.64 
IU5-IU1        -1.93 
 
 
Notes: The statistics box above the figure summarizes positive momentum (Q5) and negative 
momentum (Q1) for testing periods following UP and DOWN market states. This figure depicts the 
difference of the asymmetry of positive momentum (Q5) and negative momentum (Q1) over the time 
periods following UP market state, plotted as the blue line, and DOWN market state, graphed as the 
red line in the Chinese Class A share market over Jan. 1996 to Dec. 2008.The vertical axis measures 
the sum of positive momentum (returns of “winner” portfolio) and negative momentum (returns of 
“loser” portfolio) under each level of IU; the horizontal axis labels 5 different level of information 
uncertainty. The upward sloped lines suggest that regardless of market states, the positive 
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momentum (Q5) or the returns of “winner” portfolios tend to overwhelm the negative momentum (Q1) 
or the returns of “loser” portfolios in contributing to the momentum premia as IU level increases. 
 
7.4 Analysts’ coverage 
Table 7.5 reports average monthly returns of momentum quintiles and momentum 
premia of the (R=6, H=6) momentum trading strategy conditional on IU, proxied by 
analysts’ coverage being measured by the residual from regressing the number of 
analysts covering the firm (by reporting earnings forecasts) in the year prior to the 
ranking period against the market capitalization of the corresponding firm (1/COV), 
over time periods following UP market state (Panel A) and DOWN market state 
(Panel B) in the Chinese Class A share market over the sample period from January 
1996 to December 2008. Firstly looking into the Q5-Q1 columns of both panels, the 
momentum premia across different IU levels, regardless of market state condition, 
are found positive and statistically significant. In Panel A, the momentum premia of 
the (R=6, H=6) trading strategy conditional on IU and post-UP market state average 
out at 2.23% across all IU levels, well outstripping the 1.55% yield of the ((R=6, H=6) 
momentum trading strategy conditional solely on post-UP market state. Yet a more 
dramatic picture is witnessed in Panel B, where the average momentum premia of 
the (R=6, H=6) strategy conditional on IU and post-DOWN market state (3.25%) 
triumphs the momentum premium of the same strategy conditional only on post 
DOWN market state (-0.75%). Besides, the average momentum premia of the (R=6, 
H=6) trading strategy conditional on IU and both post-UP and DOWN market states 
exceed the average momentum premia of the same strategy conditional solely on IU 
(1.91%), indicating that the amplifying effect of the IU over the momentum premia is 
evidently present under both market state conditions. i.e. periods following UP Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty                       Chapter 7 Results III 
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market state and those following DOWN market state. Futhermore, coherent with our 
proposition, the amplifying effect of IU is more considerable on the momentum 
premia of the (R=6, H=6) strategy for the periods following DOWN market state. This 
observation is evidenced by the average momentum premia conditional on IU and 
post-DOWN market state (3.25%) bettering those conditional on IU and post-UP 
market state (2.23%), as opposed to the difference of momentum premia of the (R=6, 
H=6) strategy conditional on two market states unconditional on IU, with the strategy 
yielding superior returns over periods following UP market state. In sum, the 
preceding evidence is supported by studies in finance domain such as underreaction 
theory(Hong and Stein, 1999) and the gradual-information-diffusion theory (Hong et 
al., 2000), as well as in the field of psychology such as the determinants of 
confidence (Griffin and Tversky, 2002).  
Within “loser” portfolio return column (Q1) of Panel A, there is not a clear relationship 
observed between average monthly returns of “loser” momentum quintiles and IU 
levels. However, the returns of “loser” portfolios decline monotonically as IU level 
raises in Panel B, consistent with Zhang (2006)’s finding and supported by investors’ 
overreaction theory by Daniel et al. (1998). On the other hand, the returns of “winner” 
momentum quintiles are found to be positively related to the IU levels in both panels, 
concurring with the prediction of gradual-information-diffusion theory(Hong et al., 
2000), coupled with the proposition of investors’ optimism heuristics under 
uncertainty—investors illusion of possessing better prediction ability gets 
exaggerated when being optimistic in face of uncertainty(Dunning et al., 2002). In 
other words, the overreaction prompted by the exaggerated illusion extends the 
upward trend of “winner” stocks/portfolios.  Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty                       Chapter 7 Results III 
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Table 7.5 Momentum premia (monthly returns) under IU (proxied by analysts' 
coverage) during periods following UP and DOWN market states (12 months) ((R=6, 
H=6) momentum trading strategy) in the Chinese Class A market (01/96-12/08) 
Panel A.   Monthly returns of momentum quintiles and momentum premia 
Following UP market state (12 months) 
   Momentum Quintile 
   Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q5  Q5-Q1  t-value 
   Information uncertainty proxy: Analyst coverage (1/COV) 
IU1  -0.25  -0.12  1.65  1.68  1.76  2.01  1.01 
t-stats  -1.08  -1.55  1.47  0.87  2.5       
IU2  -0.43  -0.03  1.29  1.59  1.6  2.03  0.86 
t-stats  -1.46  -2.05  1.69  0.37  1.86       
IU3  -0.33  0.14  1.22  1.48  2.03  2.36  1.21 
t-stats  -0.05  1.45  2.01  1.35  0.98       
IU4  -0.25  0.21  1.17  1.39  2.1  2.35  2.06 
t-stats  -0.85  1.08  0.95  2.1  1.28       
IU5  -0.14  0.33  1.02  1.25  2.24  2.38  3.09 
t-stats  -0.47  1.84  1.27  1.16  2.28       
IU5-IU1  0.11  0.45  -0.63  -0.43  0.48  0.37    
t-value  1.22  1.52  -0.47  -0.96  1.06  1.94    
 
Panel B.    Monthly eturns of momentum quintiles and momentum premia 
Following DOWN market state (12 months) 
   Momentum Quintile 
   Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q5   Q5-Q1  t-value 
   Information uncertainty proxy: Analyst coverage (1/COV) 
IU1  1.57  2.65  1.77  2.1  4.05  2.48  4.91 
t-stats  3.62  2.99  3.28  3.64  5.28       
IU2  1.49  2.31  2.57  3.04  4.16  2.67  5.72 
t-stats  5.88  3.5  2.91  4.77  7.39       
IU3  1.31  3.01  1.65  2.82  5.03  3.72  4.98 
t-stats  4.18  2.85  3.17  5.1  6.15       
IU4  1.15  1.73  1.43  3.01  5.16  4.01  8.54 
t-stats  3.18  3.17  2.57  6.36  8.39       
IU5  1.02  1.65  1.28  3.49  5.15  4.13  18.4 
t-stats  5.09  4.72  3.08  4.81  14       
IU5-IU1  -0.55  -1  -0.49  1.39  1.1  1.65    
t-value  -2.06  -1.02  -0.43  -0.89  3.18  3.06    
This table presents the average monthly returns of momentum quintiles and momentum premia under 
the influence of different levels of IU over time periods following UP and DOWN market states, as 
shown in Panel A and Panel B respectively, in the Chinese Class A share market for the sample 
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defined by prior 12-month average market return, with a consolidated Chinese Share A index being 
employed as a proxy for market portfolio. The methodological approach is described underneath 
Table 7.1. 
 
Table 7.6 Equality test results of state-dependent momentum-IU (analysts' coverage) 
premia (folowing UP and DOWN market states) in the Chinese Class A market (R=6, 
H=6) 
Equality test (MOM and IU (1/COV))(12 months) 
   UP-DOWN=0    
   IU1  IU2  IU3  IU4  IU5  IU5-IU1 
Q5-Q1 (UP)  2.01  2.03  2.36  2.35  2.38  0.37 
Q5-Q1(DOWN)  2.48  2.67  3.72  4.01  4.13  1.65 
Difference  -0.47  -0.64  -1.36  -1.66  -1.75    
t stats  -2.39  -1.95  -3.04  -2.05  -1.74    
Overall  1.91  2.07  2.57  2.86  3.78  1.87 
This table reports the difference between the momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) momentum trading 
strategy conditional on different level of information uncertainty in the Chinese Class A share market 
for the sample period from Jan. 1996 to Dec. 2008. The difference is estimated by regressing the raw 
momentum-IU premia against an UP dummy variable (   )	 and an intercept (  ), following the same 
methodology for equality test used by Cooper et al. (2004) and Du et al. (2009). Mathematically, it can 
be written as      ,  =   +     ,           +    . The t statistics associated with each difference is 
listed in the row below. 
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Figure 7.9 Comparison between the momentum-IU (analysts' coverage) premia of 
the (R=6, H=6) strategy over periods following UP and DOWN market states in the 
Chinese Class A market (Jan. 1996- Dec. 2008) 
 
Notes: The column-shaped diagram illustrates the difference of momentum-IU premia of the (R=6, 
H=6) momentum trading strategy over time periods following UP and DOWN market states in the 
Chinese Class A share market for the sample time period. The vertical axis measures the momentum-
IU premia in percentage form; the horizontal axis labels the 5 different levels of IU, with IU1 
representing the lowest level and IU5 the highest level. For each IU level, the corresponding 
momentum premium following UP market state is demonstrated by the blue-coloured column, 
whereas that following DOWN market state is indicated by the red-coloured column. 
Figure 7.10 and 7.11 portrays the comparison between the momentum premia of the 
(R=6, H=6) trading strategy conditional on IU, market state conditions and IU and 
market state conditions jointly in the Chinese Class A share market for the whole 
sample period. In Figure 7.10, at every IU level, both the blue line and green line are 
well above the red line, suggesting that the amplifying effect of IU over the 
momentum premia is present regardless of market state condition. Nevertheless, 
aside from the lowest IU level (IU1), it appears that the post-UP market condition 
crimps the amplifying effect of IU over the momentum premia, which can be 
interpreted by the two cognitive systems in judgmental process proposed by 
Kahneman and Frederick (2002) as we alluded to in the previous section. 
Specifically, having sufficient cognitive resources on the heel of market run-ups, 
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investors are more likely to deploy more deliberated, sophisticated heuristics in 
honing their investment decision, susceptible to weaken the momentum premia. 
Most noticeably, the amplifying effect of IU over momentum premia strengthens for 
the time periods following DOWN market state as the blue line stays well above the 
green line, which dominates the red line at every IU level. This evidence supports the 
prediction of our hypothesis, theoretically reliant on gradual-information-diffusion 
theory (Hong et al., 2000), investors’ underconfidence behavioural model (Du, 2002) 
and evidence of human heuristics described by Griffin and Tversky (2002), which is 
elaborated in summary at the end of the section. 
Figure 7.10 Comparison: momentum-IU (analysts' coverage) premia over periods 
following UP market state, momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) strategy conditional 
on post-UP market state, overall momentum-IU (analysts' coverage) premia in the 
Chinese Class A market (Jan.1996- Dec. 2008) 
 
Notes: This figure demonstrates the difference among momentum-IU premia over periods following 
UP market state, momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) momentum strategy conditional on post-UP 
market state, overall momentum-IU premia in the Chinese Class A share market. The vertical axis 
measures the returns in percentage form. The blue line represents the fluctuations in the momentum 
premia across different levels of IU over the periods following UP market state; the red line illustrates 
the premium of (R=6, H=6) momentum strategy unconditional on IU and market states; the green line 
represents the changes of momentum premia across different IU levels unconditional on market 
states. 
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Figure 7.11 Comparison: momentum-IU (analysts' coverage) premia over periods 
following DOWN market state, momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) strategy 
conditional DOWN market state, momentum premia o fthe (R=6, H=6) strategy 
conditional on post-DOWN market state, overall momentum-IU premia in the 
Chinese Class A share market (Jan.1996- Dec. 2008) 
 
Notes: This figure demonstrates the difference among momentum-IU premia over periods following 
DOWN market state, momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) momentum strategy conditional on post-
DOWN market state, overall momentum-IU premia in the Chinese Class A share market. The vertical 
axis measures the returns in percentage form. The blue line represents the fluctuations in the 
momentum premia across different levels of IU over the periods following DOWN market state; the 
red line illustrates the premium of (R=6, H=6) momentum strategy unconditional on IU and market 
states; the green line represents the changes of momentum premia across different IU levels 
unconditional on market states. 
 
Figure 7.12 illustrates the interaction of positive momentum and negative momentum 
in contributing to the momentum premia. From the statistics box above the figure, the 
differences of the sum of positive and negative momentum (Q1+Q5) between at IU5 
and at IU1 are both positive, suggesting that the momentum premia are largely 
driven by positive momentum. This finding supports the evidence described when 
firm size is used as yardstick to measure the degree of IU, nonetheless contradicts 
Kelsey et al. (2010)’s finding in the U.S. stock markets and the results arrived at 
when using firm age as IU proxy factor accounted earlier—both suggest that 
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negative momentum is playing a deciding role in contributing to the momentum 
premia. The positivity of IU5-IU1 of the sum of positive and negative momentums is 
further portrayed by two slightly up-ward sloped lines in the figure, with the red line 
being above the blue line, which provides empirical support to the prediction of our 
hypothesis that the information uncertainty boosts the momentum premia especially 
so over the periods following DOWN market state, in accord with Kelsey et al. 
(2010)’s postulate. The growing asymmetry of positive and negative momentums in 
face of higher information uncertainty, more obvious in post-DOWN market state, 
can be arguably attributed to investors’ underreaction to firm-specific news (Hong 
and Stein, 1999) or their hesitation toward investment decision making (Du, 2002).  
Figure 7.12 Asymmetry of positive momentum (Q5) and negative momoentum (Q1) 
over periods following UP and DOWN market states in the Chinese Class A share 
market (Jan. 1996- Dec. 2008) (analysts' coverage) 
UP market state 
   Q1  Q5  Q1+Q5 
IU1  -0.25  1.76  1.51 
IU2  -0.43  1.6  1.17 
IU3  -0.33  2.03  1.7 
IU4  -0.25  2.1  1.85 
IU5  -0.14  2.24  2.1 
IU5-IU1  0.59 
DOWN market state 
   Q1  Q5  Q1+Q5 
IU1  1.57  4.05  5.62 
IU2  1.49  4.16  5.65 
IU3  1.31  5.03  6.34 
IU4  1.15  5.16  6.31 
IU5  1.02  5.15  6.17 
IU5-IU1        0.55 
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Notes: The statistics box above the figure summarizes positive momentum (Q5) and negative 
momentum (Q1) for testing periods following UP and DOWN market states. This figure depicts the 
difference of the asymmetry of positive momentum (Q5) and negative momentum (Q1) over the time 
periods following UP market state, plotted as the blue line, and DOWN market state, graphed as the 
red line in the Chinese Class A share market over Jan. 1996 to Dec. 2008.The vertical axis measures 
the sum of positive momentum (returns of “winner” portfolio) and negative momentum (returns of 
“loser” portfolio) under each level of IU; the horizontal axis labels 5 different level of information 
uncertainty. The upward sloped lines suggest that regardless of market states, the positive 
momentum (Q5) or the returns of “winner” portfolios tend to overwhelm the negative momentum (Q1) 
or the returns of “loser” portfolios in contributing to the momentum premia as IU level increases. 
 
7.5 Return volatility 
Table 7.7 reports the average monthly returns of momentum quintiles and 
momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) trading strategy conditional on IU, proxied by 
return volatility (measured by the standard deviation of monthly returns of eligible 
stocks over 6 months prior to the ranking period), over the time periods following UP 
market state in Panel A and following DOWN market state in Panel B in the Chinese 
Class A share market for the whole sample period from January 1996 to December 
2008. The momentum premia across 5 different IU levels for two market state 
conditions, summarized in Q5-Q1 columns of Panel A and Panel B, are all positive 
and statistically significant. Under post-UP market state condition, the average 
momentum premium (0.76%) of the (R=6, H=6) momentum trading strategy across 
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different degrees of IU trails that of the same trading strategy unconditional on IU 
(1.55%). On the other hand, the momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) trading 
strategy conditional on IU over the time periods following DOWN market state, 
averaging out at 1.97%, overwhelm that of the same strategy unconditional on IU. 
Collectively, the post-UP market state condition appears to curb the amplifying effect 
of IU over the momentum premia in general whereas post-DOWN market state 
condition enhances the amplifying effect of IU, firmly in line with the findings 
observed when firm size, firm age, analysts’ coverage were employed as IU proxy 
factor. This preceding evidence can be interpreted by Du (2002)’s investors’ 
underconfidence behavioural model in conjunction with experimental evidence of 
confirmation bias (Rabin, 1998)/ representativeness heuristics (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1974) from the domain of psychology.  
Within the two extreme momentum quintiles (Q1 and Q5), we find that for both 
market conditions (Panel A and B), the returns of “loser” quintiles are negatively 
related to the IU levels, whereas the returns of “winner” quintiles are positively 
related to the IU levels. This observation is consistent with Jiang et al. (2005) and 
Zhang (2006)’s findings in the U.S. stock market, supported by the theoretical 
framework of investor’s underreaction explanation to the momentum effect proposed 
by Hong and Stein (1999) and the gradual-information-diffusion theory (Hong, Lim 
and Stein, 2000) as alluded to in the previous sections of this chapter.  
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Table 7.7 Momentum premia (monthly returns) under IU (return volatility) over 
periods following UP and DOWN market states (12 months) (R=6, H=6) in the 
Chinese Class A share market (Jan. 1996- Dec. 2008) 
Panel A.   Monthly returns of momentum quintiles and momentum premia 
Following UP market state (12 months) 
   Momentum Quintile 
   Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q5  Q5-Q1  t-value 
   Information uncertainty proxy: Return volatility (VOL) 
IU1  0.89  0.94  0.96  1.02  1.15  0.26  0.83 
t-stats  0.45  0.66  1.48  0.82  1.29       
IU2  0.74  0.81  0.8  0.93  1.21  0.47  1.08 
t-stats  0.09  1.09  1.16  0.99  1.4       
IU3  0.61  0.75  0.79  0.86  1.32  0.71  2.01 
t-stats  0.16  1.37  1.08  1.31  0.94       
IU4  0.34  0.47  0.63  0.73  1.3  0.96  3.48 
t-stats  0.3  0.96  0.34  1.2  1.72       
IU5  -0.06  0.29  0.41  0.61  1.35  1.41  2.39 
t-stats  -0.07  0.27  1.08  2.01  0.86       
IU5-IU1  -0.95  -0.65  -0.55  -0.41  0.2  1.15    
t-value  -1.05  -1.06  -0.75  -0.91  -1.76  1.82    
 
 
Panel B.          Monthly returns of momentum quintiles and momentum premia 
Following DOWN market state (12 months) 
   Momentum Quintile 
   Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q5  Q5-Q1  t-value 
   Information uncertainty proxy: Return volatility (VOL) 
IU1  2.23  2.41  2.05  2.73  3.48  1.25  5.19 
t-stats  4.1  3.18  6.71  5.18  5.16       
IU2  1.84  1.99  1.95  2.68  3.49  1.65  7.38 
t-stats  5.99  4.04  4.52  4.46  6.71       
IU3  1.67  1.73  1.84  2.47  3.55  1.88  6.11 
t-stats  3.28  5.99  8.29  6.77  8.44       
IU4  1.33  1.48  1.55  2.16  3.57  2.24  10.89 
t-stats  5.19  3.18  3.81  5.39  10.09       
IU5  1.2  1.36  1.43  1.84  4.03  2.83  8.15 
t-stats  4.47  4.03  4.38  8.6  14.01       
IU5-IU1  -1.03  -1.05  -0.62  -0.89  0.55  1.58    
t-value  -3.81  -3.91  -4.01  -4.33  4.81  3.05    
This table presents the average monthly returns of momentum quintiles and momentum premia under 
the influence of different levels of IU over time periods following UP and DOWN market states, as 
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period spanning from January 1996 to December 2008. The UP and DOWN market states are 
defined by prior 12-month average market return, with a consolidated Chinese Share A index being 
employed as a proxy for market portfolio.The methodological approach is described underneath Table 
7.1.  
 
Table 7.8 summarizes the differences of the momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) 
trading strategy conditional on IU over time periods following UP and DOWN market 
states for the whole sample period from January 1996 to December 2008, 
subsequently illustrated in Figure 7.13. Echoing the asymmetric pattern observed in 
the previous sections, we find that the differential returns of the momentum premia 
under two types of market conditions are consistently negative and statistically 
significant, implying that with the influence of IU, the (R=6, H=6) momentum trading 
strategy conditional on post-DOWN market state outperforms that conditional on 
post-UP market state. This observation is plausible as investors are more inclined to 
underreact facing information uncertainty over time periods following DOWN market 
state, propelled by abundant psychological evidence (Gilovich et al., 2002) and 
theories in empirical finance (Hong and Stein, 1999, Kelsey et al., 2010). As shown 
in Figure 7.13, the aforementioned asymmetry of the momentum premia under two 
market conditions is steadily growing larger as IU level heightens, highlighting the 
crucial role of IU proxy factor plays as an amplifier in boosting momentum premia 
over the periods following DOWN market state. Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty                       Chapter 7 Results III 
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Table 7.8 Equality test results of state-dependent momentum-IU (return volatility) 
premia following UP and DOWN market states in the Chinese A market (R=6, H=6) 
Equality test (MOM and IU (VOL))(12 months) 
   UP-DOWN=0    
   IU1  IU2  IU3  IU4  IU5  IU5-IU1 
Q5-Q1 (UP)  0.26  0.47  0.71  0.96  1.41  1.15 
Q5-Q1(DOWN)  1.25  1.65  1.88  2.24  2.83  1.58 
Difference  -0.99  -1.18  -1.17  -1.28  -1.42    
t stats  -1.85  -2.48  -3.99  -2.38  -1.93    
Overall  0.54  0.84  1.02  1.79  2.29  1.75 
This table reports the difference between the momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) momentum trading 
strategy conditional on different level of information uncertainty in the Chinese Class A share market 
for the sample period from Jan. 1996 to Dec. 2008. The difference is estimated by regressing the raw 
momentum-IU premia against an UP dummy variable (   )	 and an intercept (  ), following the same 
methodology for equality test used by Cooper et al. (2004) and Du et al. (2009). Mathematically, it can 
be written as      ,  =   +     ,           +    . The t statistics associated with each difference is 
listed in the row below. 
 
Figure 7.13 Comparison between the momentum-IU (return volatility) premia of the 
(R=6, H=6) strategy over periods following UP and DOWN market states in the 
Chinese Class A share market (Jan. 1996- Dec. 2008) 
 
Notes: The column-shaped diagram illustrates the difference of momentum-IU premia of the (R=6, 
H=6) momentum trading strategy over time periods following UP and DOWN market states in the 
Chinese Class A share market for the sample time period. The vertical axis measures the momentum-
IU premia in percentage form; the horizontal axis labels the 5 different levels of IU, with IU1 
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representing the lowest level and IU5 the highest level. For each IU level, the corresponding 
momentum premium following UP market state is demonstrated by the blue-coloured column, 
whereas that following DOWN market state is indicated by the red-coloured column. 
 
Figure 7.14 and 7.15 illustrate the comparison between the performance of three 
different types of conditional (R=6, H=6) momentum trading strategy (IU, market 
states and both IU and market states). As shown in Figure 7.14, the observation that 
an upward sloping green line intercepts the straight red line suggests that the 
amplifying effect of IU over the momentum premia is evident at two highest levels of 
IU. Additionally, similar to the pattern observed in the previous sections, the post-UP 
market condition appears to dampen the amplifying effect of IU over the momentum 
premia (every point on the blue line falls below that on the red line and the green 
line). Conversely, the amplifying effect of IU over the momentum premia has been 
strikingly obvious over time periods following DOWN market state as demonstrated 
in Figure 7.15, cementing the prediction of our hypothesis, supported by Hong and 
Stein (1998)’s underreaction theory and Du (2002)’s traders’ hesitation behavioural 
model. 
 
Figure 7.14 Comparison: momentum-IU (return volatility) premia following UP market 
state, momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) strategy conditional on post-UP market 
state, overall momentum-IU premia in the Chinese Class A share market (01/96-
12/08) Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty                       Chapter 7 Results III 
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Notes: This figure demonstrates the difference among momentum-IU premia over periods following 
UP market state, momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) momentum strategy conditional on post-UP 
market state, overall momentum-IU premia in the Chinese Class A share market. The vertical axis 
measures the returns in percentage form. The blue line represents the fluctuations in the momentum 
premia across different levels of IU over the periods following UP market state; the red line illustrates 
the premium of (R=6, H=6) momentum strategy unconditional on IU and market states; the green line 
represents the changes of momentum premia across different IU levels unconditional on market 
states. 
 
Figure 7.15 Comparison: momentum-IU (return volatilty) premia following DOWN 
market state, momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) strategy conditonal on post-
DOWN market state, overall momentum-IU (return volatility) premia in the Chinese 
Class A share market (Jan. 1996-Dec. 2008) 
 
Notes: This figure demonstrates the difference among momentum-IU premia over periods following 
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DOWN market state, momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) momentum strategy conditional on post-
DOWN market state, overall momentum-IU premia in the Chinese Class A share market. The vertical 
axis measures the returns in percentage form. The blue line represents the fluctuations in the 
momentum premia across different levels of IU over the periods following DOWN market state; the 
red line illustrates the premium of (R=6, H=6) momentum strategy unconditional on IU and market 
states; the green line represents the changes of momentum premia across different IU levels 
unconditional on market states. 
 
The asymmetry of positive momentum (Q5) and negative momentum (Q1) is 
graphically demonstrated in Figure 7.16. According to the statistics box above the 
figure, with difference of Q1+Q5 between highest level IU case scenario (IU5) and 
lowest IU case scenario (IU1) conditional on post-UP market state (-0.75%) edging 
that conditional on post-DOWN market state (-0.48%), IU5-IU1 are negative for both 
case scenarios, suggesting that the negative momentum prevails positive 
momentum in contributing to the momentum premia when return volatility is used to 
gauge the degree of IU. Furthermore, the fact that the red line is well above the blue 
line and both of them are downward sloped in the diagram suggests that the 
asymmetry of the positive and negative momentums widens as IU level goes up, 
with negative momentum being the dominant force and the asymmetry is more 
considerable over periods following DOWN market state than that over periods 
following UP market state, resembling the evidence described earlier when using 
firm age as an IU proxy factor and consistent with the find by Kelsey et al. (2010) in 
the U.S. stock markets comprehensively, yet contradicting the results from using firm 
size and analysts’ coverage as IU proxy factors. All are in line with the prediction of 
underreaction theory (Hong and Stein, 1999) and investors’ hesitation behavioural 
model (Du, 2002). Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty                       Chapter 7 Results III 
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Figure 7.16 Asymmetry of positive momentum (Q5) and negative momentum (Q1) 
following UP and DOWN market states in the Chinese Class A share market (Jan. 
1996- Dec. 2008) (return volatility) 
UP market state 
   Q1  Q5  Q1+Q5 
IU1  0.89  1.15  2.04 
IU2  0.74  1.21  1.95 
IU3  0.61  1.32  1.93 
IU4  0.34  1.3  1.64 
IU5  -0.06  1.35  1.29 
IU5-IU1  -0.75 
DOWN market state 
   Q1  Q5  Q1+Q5 
IU1  2.23  3.48  5.71 
IU2  1.84  3.49  5.33 
IU3  1.67  3.55  5.22 
IU4  1.33  3.57  4.9 
IU5  1.2  4.03  5.23 
IU5-IU1        -0.48 
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Notes: The statistics box above the figure summarizes positive momentum (Q5) and negative 
momentum (Q1) for testing periods following UP and DOWN market states. This figure depicts the 
difference of the asymmetry of positive momentum (Q5) and negative momentum (Q1) over the time 
periods following UP market state, plotted as the blue line, and DOWN market state, graphed as the 
red line in the Chinese Class A share market over Jan. 1996 to Dec. 2008.The vertical axis measures 
the sum of positive momentum (returns of “winner” portfolio) and negative momentum (returns of 
“loser” portfolio) under each level of IU; the horizontal axis labels 5 different level of information 
uncertainty. The upward sloped lines suggest that regardless of market states, the positive 
momentum (Q5) or the returns of “winner” portfolios tend to overwhelm the negative momentum (Q1) 
or the returns of “loser” portfolios in contributing to the momentum premia as IU level increases. 
 
7.6 Dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecast (DISP) 
Table 7.9 reports the average monthly returns of momentum quintiles and 
momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) trading strategy conditional on IU, proxied by 
the dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecast (DISP) (measured by standard deviation 
of analysts’ earnings forecasts for each month scaled by prior year-end stock price 
prior to the ranking period), over time periods following UP market state (Panel A) 
and DOWN market state (Panel B) in the Chinese Class A share market over the 
whole sample period (Jan. 1996- Dec. 2008).  
Focusing on the Q5-Q1 columns, summarizing the momentum premia at different IU 
levels, the momentum premia across different levels of IU in both Panel A and Panel 
B are positive and highly statistically significant. As what one would expect based on 
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the prediction of our hypothesis, the momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) trading 
strategy under the influence of different levels of information uncertainty during 
periods following DOWN market state average out at 1.72%, outstripping the 
average momentum premium during periods following UP market state (1.53%). 
More important, the average momentum premium of the (R=6, H=6) trading strategy 
conditional solely on IU (DISP) betters both average momentum premium of the 
momentum trading strategy conditional on IU (DISP) over time periods following UP 
and DOWN market states. Taken together, the preceding observations suggest that 
the amplifying effect of IU over the momentum premia could be, to a substantial 
extent, attributable to its impact over the momentum premia over periods following 
DOWN market state, supported by investors’ underconfidence theory by Du (2002) 
and judgmental heuristics evidence from the field of psychology (Gilovich et al., 
2002), described in more detail in summary at the end of the section. 
Consistent with what’s observed in the previous sections, the average monthly 
returns of “loser” momentum quintiles are negatively related to IU levels, while the 
average monthly returns of “winner” momentum quintiles are positively related to IU 
levels, both in a monotonic manner, strengthening the overall robustness of the 
results of our study by brushing off the potential critics that the patterns of the 
amplifying effect of IU over momentum quintiles are IU proxy factor-specific. 
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Table 7.9 Momentum premia (monthly returns) under IU (dispersion in analysts' 
earnings forecast (DISP) following UP and DOWN market states (12 months) (R=6, 
H=6) in the Chinese Class A share market (Jan. 1996-Dec. 2008) 
Panel A.   Monthly returns of momentum quintiles and momentum premia 
Following UP market state (12 months) 
   Momentum Quintile 
   Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q5  Q5-Q1  t-value 
  
Information uncertainty proxy: Analysts' forecast dispersion 
(DISP) 
IU1  1.76  2.26  2.29  2.51  2.82  1.06  6.18 
t-stats  4.01  5.07  5.83  7.18  14       
IU2  1.55  2.05  1.94  2.43  2.88  1.33  8.43 
t-stats  5  6.19  7.15  9.05  10.62       
IU3  1.39  1.85  1.83  2.31  2.9  1.51  10.95 
t-stats  3.99  3.57  8.93  8.51  9.84       
IU4  1.15  1.59  1.67  2.04  2.92  1.77  6.18 
t-stats  9.15  8.22  5.47  9.37  10.01       
IU5  1.04  1.66  1.52  2.35  3.01  1.97  13.27 
t-stats  7.02  5.61  8.09  7.48  13.29       
IU5-IU1  -0.72  -0.6  -0.77  -0.16  0.19  0.91    
t-value  -4.01  -2.96  -4.29  -4.08  -5.81  1.68    
 
Panel B.    Monthly eturns of momentum quintiles and momentum premia 
Following DOWN market state (12 months) 
   Momentum Quintile 
   Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q5   Q5-Q1  t-value 
  
Information uncertainty proxy: Analysts' forecast dispersion 
(DISP) 
IU1  0.23  0.47  1.1  1.13  1.38  1.15  1.37 
t-stats  0.75  1.03  1.4  2.16  3.09       
IU2  0.14  0.58  0.85  1.25  1.69  1.55  2.06 
t-stats  0.35  1.15  2.13  1.4  2.19       
IU3  0.06  0.39  0.73  1.16  1.85  1.79  3.99 
t-stats  1.06  2.61  1.62  1.05  3.1       
IU4  0.02  0.5  0.82  0.94  1.99  1.97  1.78 
t-stats  0.99  1.54  2.1  1.51  2.99       
IU5  0.03  0.38  0.79  0.98  2.15  2.12  3.43 
t-stats  1.58  1.05  1.96  2.01  5.41       
IU5-IU1  -0.2  -0.09  -0.31  -0.15  0.77  0.97    
t-value  -0.81  -0.61  -2.03  -1.57  3.09  2.39    
This table presents the average monthly returns of momentum quintiles and momentum premia under 
the influence of different levels of IU over time periods following UP and DOWN market states, as Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty                       Chapter 7 Results III 
 
- 202 - 
 
shown in Panel A and Panel B respectively, in the Chinese Class A share market for the sample 
period spanning from January 1996 to December 2008. The UP and DOWN market states are 
defined by prior 12-month average market return, with a consolidated Chinese Share A index being 
employed as a proxy for market portfolio. The methodological approach is described in detail 
underneath Table 7.1. 
The differential average monthly returns of the (R=6, H=6) momentum trading 
strategy conditional on IU (DISP) under two different market conditions (post-UP and 
DOWN market states) are presented in Table 7.10 and are graphically illustrated in 
Figure 7.17. We observe a quite familiar picture, with the trading strategy over the 
periods following DOWN market state consistently outperforming that under the 
reversed market condition across all 5 IU levels. Apart from being congruent with the 
results from other sections that the general trend of the relationship between the 
asymmetry of the performance of the (R=6, H=6) momentum trading strategy under 
post-UP and DOWN market states conditions and IU levels is positive, what’s worth 
nothing is that the asymmetry across different IU levels, in general, appears less 
significant when DISP is employed as IU proxy, illustrated in Figure 7.17. The only 
probable explanation to this observation is that the IU proxy factor use here, DISP, 
stems from best estimates of investing professionals, who are more likely to practice 
deliberate statistics heuristics of System 2 (reflective) of the two cognitive systems 
(Kahneman and Frederick, 2002) in face of IU amid market swings thanks to the 
more sophisticated and systematic statistics training they received compared with 
domestic retail investors, pointed out in an experimental psychology study by Nisbett, 
Krantz, Jepson and Kunda (1983). Succinctly, it is the influence of increasingly more 
rational behaviours of investing professionals embedded in one of the sorting factors 
or the IU proxy factor that narrows the asymmetry of the momentum premia of the 
(R=6, H=6) momentum trading strategy conditional on IU over time periods following 
UP and DOWN market states.  Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty                       Chapter 7 Results III 
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Table 7.10 Equality test results of state-dependent momentum-IU (DISP) premia 
(following UP and DOWN market states) in the Chinese Class A share market (R=6, 
H=6) 
Equality test (MOM and IU (DISP))(12 months) 
   UP-DOWN=0    
   IU1  IU2  IU3  IU4  IU5  IU5-IU1 
Q5-Q1 (UP)  1.06  1.33  1.51  1.77  1.97  0.91 
Q5-Q1(DOWN)  1.15  1.55  1.79  1.97  2.12  0.97 
Difference  -0.09  -0.22  -0.28  -0.2  -0.15    
t stats  -1.48  -2.03  -1.59  -1.33  -1.84    
Overall  1.28  1.51  1.67  1.97  2.21  0.93 
This table reports the difference between the momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) momentum trading 
strategy conditional on different level of information uncertainty in the Chinese Class A share market 
for the sample period from Jan. 1996 to Dec. 2008. The difference is estimated by regressing the raw 
momentum-IU premia against an UP dummy variable (   )	 and an intercept (  ), following the same 
methodology for equality test used by Cooper et al. (2004) and Du et al. (2009). Mathematically, it can 
be written as      ,  =   +     ,           +    . The t statistics associated with each difference is 
listed in the row below. 
Figure 7.17 Comparison between the momentum-IU (DISP) premia of the (R=6, H=6) 
strategy over periods following UP and DOWN market states in the Chinese Class A 
market (Jan. 1996- Dec. 2008) 
 
Notes: The column-shaped diagram illustrates the difference of momentum-IU premia of the (R=6, 
H=6) momentum trading strategy over time periods following UP and DOWN market states in the 
Chinese Class A share market for the sample time period. The vertical axis measures the momentum-
IU premia in percentage form; the horizontal axis labels the 5 different levels of IU, with IU1 
representing the lowest level and IU5 the highest level. For each IU level, the corresponding 
momentum premium following UP market state is demonstrated by the blue-coloured column, 
whereas that following DOWN market state is indicated by the red-coloured column. 
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Figure 7.18 and 7.19 depict the comparison of the momentum premia of three 
conditional (R=6, H=6) momentum trading strategies categorized on conditioning 
factors IU, market states, and both IU and market states over the whole sample 
period from January 1996 to December 2008. In Figure 7.18, both of the momentum 
premia of the strategy conditional on IU and those of the strategy conditional on IU 
and post-UP market state exceed the momentum premia of the strategy conditional 
only on post-UP market state at two highest IU levels (IU4 and IU5), yet the 
performance of the (R=6, H=6) trading strategy conditional on both IU and post-UP 
market state trails that of the strategy conditional only on IU, echoing our findings in 
previous sections. It is not surprising, according to the prediction of our hypothesis, 
that both of the (R=6, H=6) strategy conditional on IU and post-DOWN market state 
and that conditional on IU fare much better than the strategy conditional only on 
post-DOWN market state, with the performance of the former two strategies neck-
and-neck. The afore-described observations, in combination, imply and reinforce that 
the amplifying effect of IU over momentum premia is more pronounced over time 
periods following DOWN market state, paralleling the prediction of underreaction 
theory (Hong and Stein,1999) and investors’ underconfidence behavioural model (Du, 
2002). 
Figure 7.18 Comparison: momentum-IU(DISP) premia over periods following UP 
market state, momentum premi of the (R=6, H=6) strategy conditional on post-UP 
market state, overall mom-IU (DISP) premia in Chinese Class A share market 
(01/1996-12/2008) Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty                       Chapter 7 Results III 
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Notes: This figure demonstrates the difference among momentum-IU premia over periods following 
UP market state, momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) momentum strategy conditional on post-UP 
market state, overall momentum-IU premia in the Chinese Class A share market. The vertical axis 
measures the returns in percentage form. The blue line represents the fluctuations in the momentum 
premia across different levels of IU over the periods following UP market state; the red line illustrates 
the premium of (R=6, H=6) momentum strategy unconditional on IU and market states; the green line 
represents the changes of momentum premia across different IU levels unconditional on market 
states. 
Figure 7.19 Comparison: momentum-IU(DISP) premia over periods following DOWN 
market state, momentum premia of the 9R=6, H=6) strategy conditonal on post-
DOWN market state, overall momentum-IU (DISP) premia in the Chinese Class A 
share market (01/1996-12/2008) 
 
Notes: This figure demonstrates the difference among momentum-IU premia over periods following 
DOWN market state, momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) momentum strategy conditional on post-
DOWN market state, overall momentum-IU premia in the Chinese Class A share market. The vertical 
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axis measures the returns in percentage form. The blue line represents the fluctuations in the 
momentum premia across different levels of IU over the periods following DOWN market state; the 
red line illustrates the premium of (R=6, H=6) momentum strategy unconditional on IU and market 
states; the green line represents the changes of momentum premia across different IU levels 
unconditional on market states. 
 
The asymmetry of positive momentum (Q5) and negative momentum (Q1) over time 
periods following UP and DOWN market states is graphed in Figure 7.20. As shown 
in the statistics box above the figure, it’s intriguing to find that negative momentum is 
the dominant force in contributing to the momentum premia over post-UP market 
condition (IU5-IU1 of Q1+Q5 is negative) while positive momentum dominates 
negative momentum over post-DOWN market condition, differentiating from the 
findings in other sections. This observation could be argued as the resultant of 
employing DISP, being one of the sorting factors in deriving the momentum-IU 
quintiles, as yardstick in measuring IU due to the judgmental heuristics investing 
professionals apply in their assessment of investing opportunities as described 
earlier (Nisbett et al., 1983). With the blue line well above the red line, the downward 
sloping blue line and upward sloping red line jointly confirms the prediction of our 
hypothesis that the amplifying effect of IU tends to be more pervasive under the 
influence of greater degree of IU and over time periods following DOWN market 
state, supported by underreaction theory (Hong and Stein, 1998) and investors’ 
underconfidence behavioural model (Du, 2002). Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty                       Chapter 7 Results III 
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Figure 7.20 Asymmetry of positive momentum (Q5) and negative momentum (Q1) 
over peirods following UP and DOWN market states in the Chinese Class A share 
market (01/1996-12/2008) 
UP market state 
   Q1  Q5  Q1+Q5 
IU1  1.76  2.82  4.58 
IU2  1.55  2.88  4.43 
IU3  1.39  2.9  4.29 
IU4  1.15  2.92  4.07 
IU5  1.04  3.01  4.05 
IU5-IU1  -0.53 
DOWN market state 
   Q1  Q5  Q1+Q5 
IU1  0.23  1.38  1.61 
IU2  0.14  1.69  1.83 
IU3  0.06  1.85  1.91 
IU4  0.02  1.99  2.01 
IU5  0.03  2.15  2.18 
IU5-IU1        0.57 
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Notes: The statistics box above the figure summarizes positive momentum (Q5) and negative 
momentum (Q1) for testing periods following UP and DOWN market states. This figure depicts the 
difference of the asymmetry of positive momentum (Q5) and negative momentum (Q1) over the time 
periods following UP market state, plotted as the blue line, and DOWN market state, graphed as the 
red line in the Chinese Class A share market over Jan. 1996 to Dec. 2008.The vertical axis measures 
the sum of positive momentum (returns of “winner” portfolio) and negative momentum (returns of 
“loser” portfolio) under each level of IU; the horizontal axis labels 5 different level of information 
uncertainty. The upward sloped lines suggest that regardless of market states, the positive 
momentum (Q5) or the returns of “winner” portfolios tend to overwhelm the negative momentum (Q1) 
or the returns of “loser” portfolios in contributing to the momentum premia as IU level increases. 
 
7.7 Trading volume 
Table 7.11 presents the average monthly returns of momentum quintiles and the 
premia of the conditional (R=6, H=6) momentum trading strategy on IU and post-UP 
and DOWN market states, in which trading volume (measured by monthly turnover 
ratios of the eligible stock prior to the ranking period) is used as an IU proxy, in the 
Chinese Class A share market for the entire sample period (Jan. 1996- Dec. 2008). 
The momentum premia are reported in the Q5-Q1 column of Panel A for post-UP 
market condition and that of Panel B for post-DOWN market condition. The average 
momentum premia of the trading strategy over periods following UP market state 
(0.87%) lag that over period following DOWN market state (1.99%), reiterating the 
observations documented in the previous sections—the amplifying effect of IU on the 
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momentum is especially pronounced over periods following DOWN market state, 
supported by investors’ overconfidence theory (Daniel et al., 1998). 
Within “loser” and “winner” quintiles, consistent with the observations of the 
momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) trading strategy conditional only on IU and the 
empirical findings by Zhu et al. (2004) and Jiang et al. (2005) in the Chinese stock 
market and the U.S. stock market respectively, there is a negative relationship 
between the returns of “loser” momentum quintiles (Q1) and IU levels and a positive 
relationship between the returns of “winner” momentum quintiles (Q5) and IU levels, 
paralleling the empirical evidence found by Lee and Swaminathan (2000) in the U.S. 
stock markets. The preceding observation is in line with the prediction of the gradual-
information-diffusion theory (Hong, Lim and Stein, 2000). 
Table 7.11 Momentum premia (monthly returns) under IU (trading volume) over 
periods following UP and DOWN market states (12 months) (R=6, H=6) in the 
Chinese Class A share market (Jan. 1996- Dec. 2008) 
Panel A.        Monthly returns of momentum quintiles and momentum premia 
Following UP market state (12 months) 
   Momentum Quintile 
   Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q5  Q5-Q1  t-value 
   Information uncertainty proxy: Volume(1/Turnover ratio) 
IU1  0.49  0.63  0.77  0.91  0.97  0.48  1.84 
t-stats  0.81  1.41  0.95  0.37  1.83       
IU2  0.38  0.58  0.63  0.75  1.02  0.64  2.01 
t-stats  0.45  0.84  1.15  1.07  2.82       
IU3  0.21  0.44  0.56  0.69  1.1  0.89  1.03 
t-stats  1.01  0.73  0.74  2.17  1.64       
IU4  0.09  0.28  0.42  0.53  1.17  1.08  2.41 
t-stats  0.83  0.93  1.08  1.5  3.21       
IU5  -0.05  0.19  0.35  0.43  1.23  1.28  3.15 
t-stats  -0.83  1.01  0.63  2.12  2.12       
IU5-IU1  -0.54  -0.44  -0.42  -0.48  0.26  0.8    
t-value  -0.85  -1.01  -0.73  -0.89  2.51  2.03    
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Panel B.         Monthly returns of momentum quintiles and momentum premia 
Following DOWN market state (12 months) 
   Momentum Quintile 
   Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q5  Q5-Q1  t-value 
   Information uncertainty proxy: Volume(1/Turnover ratio) 
IU1  1.56  1.96  1.88  2.64  3.05  1.49  12.1 
t-stats  6.09  7.05  6.71  13.41  9.51       
IU2  1.4  1.73  1.75  2.35  3.08  1.68  8.61 
t-stats  8.18  5.19  8.36  8.15  10.77       
IU3  1.23  1.58  1.6  2.17  3.14  1.91  9.25 
t-stats  10.85  10.08  10.2  6.68  8.26       
IU4  1.07  1.42  1.49  2.09  3.2  2.13  7.35 
t-stats  8.17  7.1  6.36  8.72  9.61       
IU5  0.62  1.18  1.31  1.89  3.36  2.74  15.07 
t-stats  3.79  5.42  7.01  10.52  15.1       
IU5-IU1  -0.94  -0.78  -0.57  -0.75  0.31  1.25    
t-value  -3.06  -4.02  -2.64  -5.05  6.41  3.01    
This table presents the average monthly returns of momentum quintiles and momentum premia under 
the influence of different levels of IU over time periods following UP and DOWN market states, as 
shown in Panel A and Panel B respectively, in the Chinese Class A share market for the sample 
period spanning from January 1996 to December 2008. The UP and DOWN market states are 
defined by prior 12-month average market return, with a consolidated Chinese Share A index being 
employed as a proxy for market portfolio. The methodological approach is described in detail 
underneath Table 7.1. 
 
The differences between the performance of the (R=6, H=6) trading strategy over 
time periods following UP market state and DOWN market state under the influence 
of different levels of IU are quantified in Table 7.12 and graphically illustrated in 
Figure 7.21. Almost like a general feature of results among different IU proxy factors, 
across all 5 information uncertainty levels, the (R=6, H=6) momentum trading 
strategy conditional on post-DOWN market state evidently outperforms that 
conditional on post-UP market state, manifested by the observation that all the 
differences (UP-DOWN) are negative and highly statistically significant. The 
preceding evidence is more vividly depicted in Figure 7.21, where the momentum 
premia of the trading strategy over periods following DOWN market state (red Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty                       Chapter 7 Results III 
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columns) dwarf those over periods following UP market state (blue columns), 
implying that the amplifying effect of IU on the momentum premia is asymmetric, with 
the (R=6, H=6) momentum trading strategy conditional on IU (trading volume) over 
time periods following DOWN market state yielding significantly superior premia 
across different IU levels. This claim can be interpreted under the theoretical 
framework of underreaction theory (Hong and Stein, 1998) and investors’ 
underconfidence behavioural model (Du, 2002).  
Table 7.12 Equality test results of state-depdendent momentum-IU (trading volume) 
premia (following UP and DOWN market states) in the Chinese Class A share 
market (R=6, H=6) 
Equality test (MOM and IU (Volume))(12 months) 
   UP-DOWN=0    
   IU1  IU2  IU3  IU4  IU5  IU5-IU1 
Q5-Q1 (UP)  0.48  0.64  0.89  1.08  1.28  0.8 
Q5-Q1(DOWN)  1.49  1.68  1.91  2.13  2.74  1.25 
Difference  -1.01  -1.04  -1.02  -1.05  -1.46    
t stats  -3.01  -2.99  -1.83  -2.06  -2.55    
Overall  0.91  0.99  1.68  2.12  2.27  1.36 
This table reports the difference between the momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) momentum trading 
strategy conditional on different level of information uncertainty in the Chinese Class A share market 
for the sample period from Jan. 1996 to Dec. 2008. The difference is estimated by regressing the raw 
momentum-IU premia against an UP dummy variable (   )	 and an intercept (  ), following the same 
methodology for equality test used by Cooper et al. (2004) and Du et al. (2009). Mathematically, it can 
be written as      ,  =   +     ,           +    . The t statistics associated with each difference is 
listed in the row below. 
Figure 7.21 Comparison between the momentum-IU(trading volume) premia of the 
(R=6, H=6) strategy over periods following UP and DOWN market states in the 
Chinese Class A share market (Jan. 1996- Dec. 2008) Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty                       Chapter 7 Results III 
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Notes: The column-shaped diagram illustrates the difference of momentum-IU premia of the (R=6, 
H=6) momentum trading strategy over time periods following UP and DOWN market states in the 
Chinese Class A share market for the sample time period. The vertical axis measures the momentum-
IU premia in percentage form; the horizontal axis labels the 5 different levels of IU, with IU1 
representing the lowest level and IU5 the highest level. For each IU level, the corresponding 
momentum premium following UP market state is demonstrated by the blue-coloured column, 
whereas that following DOWN market state is indicated by the red-coloured column. 
 
As shown in Figure 7.22 and 7.23, illustrating the fluctuations of the momentum 
premia of the (R=6, H=6) trading strategy conditional on both IU and market states 
as IU level varies in comparison with that of the trading strategy conditional solely on 
IU, along with that of the trading strategy conditional on market states, the amplifying 
effect of the IU is only evident at the highest three IU levels for the trading strategy 
conditional solely on IU yet is quite subdued for the trading strategy conditional on 
both IU and post-UP market condition. On the other hand, also quite consistent with 
findings described in previous sections, the amplifying effect of IU over the 
momentum premia is enhanced over time periods following DOWN market state. 
Collectively, both patterns strike remarkable uniformity with the observations in prior 
5 sections when other variables are used as IU proxy, which all can be interpreted by 
the investors’ underreaction theory (Hong and Stein, 2002) and traders’ hesitation 
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behavioural model (Du, 2002), coupled with some compelling experimental evidence 
from the field of psychology (Griffin and Tversky, 2002).  
Figure 7.22 Comparison: momentum-IU (trading volume) premia over periods 
following UP market state, momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) strategy conditional 
on post-UP market state, overall momentum-IU (trading volume) premia in the 
Chinese Class A share market (01/96-12/08) 
 
Notes: This figure demonstrates the difference among momentum-IU premia over periods following 
UP market state, momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) momentum strategy conditional on post-UP 
market state, overall momentum-IU premia in the Chinese Class A share market. The vertical axis 
measures the returns in percentage form. The blue line represents the fluctuations in the momentum 
premia across different levels of IU over the periods following UP market state; the red line illustrates 
the premium of (R=6, H=6) momentum strategy unconditional on IU and market states; the green line 
represents the changes of momentum premia across different IU levels unconditional on market 
states. 
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Figure 7.23 Comparison: momentum-IU (trading volume) premia over periods 
following DOWN market state, momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) strategy 
conditional on post-DOWN market state, overall mom-IU premia in the Chinese A 
share market (01/1996-12/2008) 
 
Notes: This figure demonstrates the difference among momentum-IU premia over periods following 
DOWN market state, momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) momentum strategy conditional on post-
DOWN market state, overall momentum-IU premia in the Chinese Class A share market. The vertical 
axis measures the returns in percentage form. The blue line represents the fluctuations in the 
momentum premia across different levels of IU over the periods following DOWN market state; the 
red line illustrates the premium of (R=6, H=6) momentum strategy unconditional on IU and market 
states; the green line represents the changes of momentum premia across different IU levels 
unconditional on market states. 
Figure 7.24 presents the empirical evidence of the asymmetry of positive and 
negative momentums in contributing to the momentum premia under the influence of 
IU (trading volume) and post-UP and DOWN market states. In the statistics box 
above the figure, both of the differences (IU5-IU1) of the sum of positive and 
negative momentum are negative, suggesting that negative momentum is the largely 
driving the momentum premia. According to the figure, the red line is above the blue 
line and both of them are downward sloping, implying that the asymmetry is more 
significant at higher IU levels over periods following DOWN market state, which is 
consistent with the finding by Kelsey et al. (2010) in the U.S. stock market and can 
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be interpreted based on the underreaction theory (Hong and Stein, 1998) and 
traders’ hesitation behavioural model (Du, 2002). 
Figure 7.24 Asymmetry of positive momentum (Q5) and negative momoentum (Q1) 
over periods following UP and DOWN market states in the Chinese Class A share 
market (Jan. 1996- Dec. 2008) (trading volume) 
UP market state 
   Q1  Q5  Q1+Q5 
IU1  0.49  0.97  1.46 
IU2  0.38  1.02  1.4 
IU3  0.21  1.1  1.31 
IU4  0.09  1.17  1.26 
IU5  -0.05  1.23  1.18 
IU5-IU1  -0.28 
DOWN market state 
   Q1  Q5  Q1+Q5 
IU1  1.56  3.05  4.61 
IU2  1.4  3.08  4.48 
IU3  1.23  3.14  4.37 
IU4  1.07  3.2  4.27 
IU5  0.62  3.36  3.98 
IU5-IU1        -0.63 
 
 
Notes: The statistics box above the figure summarizes positive momentum (Q5) and negative 
momentum (Q1) for testing periods following UP and DOWN market states. This figure depicts the 
difference of the asymmetry of positive momentum (Q5) and negative momentum (Q1) over the time 
periods following UP market state, plotted as the blue line, and DOWN market state, graphed as the 
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red line in the Chinese Class A share market over Jan. 1996 to Dec. 2008.The vertical axis measures 
the sum of positive momentum (returns of “winner” portfolio) and negative momentum (returns of 
“loser” portfolio) under each level of IU; the horizontal axis labels 5 different level of information 
uncertainty. The upward sloped lines suggest that regardless of market states, the positive 
momentum (Q5) or the returns of “winner” portfolios tend to overwhelm the negative momentum (Q1) 
or the returns of “loser” portfolios in contributing to the momentum premia as IU level increases. 
 
 
7.8 Corporate governance 
Table 7.13 reports the average monthly returns of momentum quintiles and 
momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) momentum trading strategy conditional on IU, 
proxied by the quality of corporate governance (measured by free float ratios of 
eligible stocks prior to the ranking period), over time periods following UP (Panel A) 
and DOWN (Panel B) market states in the Chinese Class A share market over the 
entire sample period from January 1996 to December 2008. Across all five IU levels, 
all the momentum premia, summarized in Q5-Q1 columns of Panel A and Panel B, 
are positive and highly statistically significant. Both the average momentum premium 
over post-UP market state (2.69%) and that over post-DOWN market state (3.56%) 
exceed the average momentum premium of the momentum strategy conditional 
solely on IU (2.61%), suggesting that the amplifying effect of the IU over the 
momentum premia is present under both market state conditions and the influence of 
IU. Firmly in line with the observations described in previous six sections, the 
amplifying effect of the IU appears to be considerably more significant over the 
momentum premia found during time periods following DOWN market state. As 
noted earlier, the observation can be interpreted based on underreaction theory 
(Hong and Stein) and evidence of human heuristics from studies in the domain of 
psychology (Gilovich et al., 2002). 
Unsurprisingly, within Q1 and Q5 columns of both panels, we witness that there is a Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty                       Chapter 7 Results III 
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negative relationship between the average monthly returns of “loser” momentum 
quintiles and IU levels and a positive relationship between the returns of “winner” 
momentum quintiles and IU levels, consistent with the findings in previous sections. 
Table 7.13 Momentum premia (monthly returns) under IU(corporate governance) 
during periods following UP and DOWN market states (12 months) (R=6, H=6) in the 
Chinese Class A share market (Jan. 1996- Dec. 2008) 
Panel A.            Monthly returns of momentum quintiles and momentum premia 
Following UP market state (12 months) 
   Momentum Quintile 
   Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q5  Q5-Q1  t-value 
  
Information uncertainty proxy: Corporate governance (proxied by 1/free 
float ratio) 
IU1  1.05  1.16  1.83  2.21  3.03  1.98  3.05 
t-stats  2.53  2.88  3.99  2.81  3.01       
IU2  0.94  1.02  1.58  2.49  3.08  2.14  5.15 
t-stats  1.85  1.83  2.51  3.15  4.62       
IU3  0.82  0.82  1.73  1.93  3.41  2.59  7.36 
t-stats  3.01  3.55  1.99  2.75  5.99       
IU4  0.61  0.74  1.59  1.78  3.6  2.99  6.5 
t-stats  2.83  2.84  2.83  3.02  6.31       
IU5  0.51  0.7  1.43  1.59  4.25  3.74  8.77 
t-stats  3.14  1.95  3.49  3.25  10.5       
IU5-IU1  -0.54  -0.46  -0.4  -0.62  1.22  1.76    
t-value  -1.99  -2.04  -1.52  -1.57  5.88  3.47    
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Panel B.           Monthly returns of momentum quintiles and momentum premia 
Following DOWN market state (12 months) 
   Momentum Quintile 
   Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q5  Q5-Q1  t-value 
  
Information uncertainty proxy: Corporate governance (proxied by 1/free 
float ratio) 
IU1  1.02  1.35  1.78  2.25  3.48  2.46  4.1 
t-stats  2.81  2.85  4.16  3.17  5.18       
IU2  0.93  1.3  1.59  2.14  3.8  2.87  6.19 
t-stats  3.36  3.51  3.55  3.25  7.66       
IU3  0.88  1.18  1.48  2.08  4.15  3.27  8.93 
t-stats  2.17  3.91  2.07  4.5  9.12       
IU4  0.79  1.16  1.48  1.72  4.96  4.17  7.61 
t-stats  1.64  3.05  3.05  2.16  7.51       
IU5  0.68  1.09  1.36  1.75  5.69  5.01  9.37 
t-stats  3.99  2.99  2.81  5.55  10.38       
IU5-IU1  -0.34  -0.26  -0.42  -0.5  2.21  2.55    
t-value  -1.25  -1.84  -1.37  -1.93  6.27  5.02    
This table presents the average monthly returns of momentum quintiles and momentum premia under 
the influence of different levels of IU over time periods following UP and DOWN market states, as 
shown in Panel A and Panel B respectively, in the Chinese Class A share market for the sample 
period spanning from January 1996 to December 2008. The UP and DOWN market states are 
defined by prior 12-month average market return, with a consolidated Chinese Share A index being 
employed as a proxy for market portfolio. The methodological approach is described in detail 
underneath Table 7.1. 
Table 7.14 reports quantitatively how the performance of the (R=6, H=6) trading 
strategy conditional on IU over time periods following DOWN market state differs 
from that over time periods following UP market state. Across all the IU levels, the 
differences (UP-DOWN) are consistently negative and highly statistically significant, 
providing empirical evidence in supporting the prediction of our hypothesis—the 
amplifying effect of IU over momentum premia is exacerbated during time periods 
following DOWN market state. Further, the preceding evidence is more visually 
illustrated in Figure 7.25, in which the differential returns of the (R=6, H=6) 
momentum trading strategy under post-UP and DOWN market states steadily get 
larger as the degree of IU heightens, consistent with our proposition and also with Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty                       Chapter 7 Results III 
 
- 219 - 
 
what one would expect on theoretical grounds based on underreaction theory (Hong 
and Stein, 1998) and investors’ underconfidence behavioural model (Du, 2002).  
Table 7.14 Equality test results of state-dependent momentum-IU (corporate 
governance) premia (following UP and DOWN market states) in the Chinese Class A 
share market (R=6, H=6) 
Equality test (MOM and IU (corporate governance))(12 months) 
   UP-DOWN=0    
   IU1  IU2  IU3  IU4  IU5  IU5-IU1 
Q5-Q1 (UP)  1.98  2.14  2.59  2.99  3.74  1.76 
Q5-Q1(DOWN)  2.46  2.87  3.27  4.17  5.01  2.55 
Difference  -0.48  -0.73  -0.68  -1.18  -1.27    
t stats  -1.94  -2.68  -1.59  -2.07  -3.15    
Overall  1.84  2.2  2.52  2.51  3.99  2.15 
This table reports the difference between the momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) momentum trading 
strategy conditional on different level of information uncertainty in the Chinese Class A share market 
for the sample period from Jan. 1996 to Dec. 2008. The difference is estimated by regressing the raw 
momentum-IU premia against an UP dummy variable (   )	 and an intercept (  ), following the same 
methodology for equality test used by Cooper et al. (2004) and Du et al. (2009). Mathematically, it can 
be written as      ,  =   +     ,           +    . The t statistics associated with each difference is 
listed in the row below. 
Figure 7.25 Comparison between the momentum-IU (corporate governance) premia 
of the (R=6, H=6) strategy over the time periods following UP and DOWN market 
states in the Chinese Class A share market (Jan. 1996- Dec. 2000) 
 
Notes: The column-shaped diagram illustrates the difference of momentum-IU premia of the (R=6, 
H=6) momentum trading strategy over time periods following UP and DOWN market states in the 
Chinese Class A share market for the sample time period. The vertical axis measures the momentum-
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IU premia in percentage form; the horizontal axis labels the 5 different levels of IU, with IU1 
representing the lowest level and IU5 the highest level. For each IU level, the corresponding 
momentum premium following UP market state is demonstrated by the blue-coloured column, 
whereas that following DOWN market state is indicated by the red-coloured column. 
 
Figure 7.26 and 7.27 depict the comparison between the momentum premia of the 
(R=6, H=6) trading strategies conditional on different factors (IU (quality of corporate 
governance), market states, and both IU (quality of corporate governance) and 
market states) over the entire sample period (Jan. 1996- Dec. 2008). Differing from 
previous 6 sections, the amplifying effect of IU over the momentum premia is not 
only evident during time periods following DOWN market state, but also present over 
the periods following UP market state as the post-UP market state condition does 
not seem to crimp the amplifying effect of IU to a degree as substantial as the 
scenarios when other variables are employed as IU proxy. From the perspective of 
practicality, this piece of empirical evidence is of prime importance as it highlights the 
role of quality of corporate governance plays as an IU proxy factor and more 
importantly the lynch pin in boosting momentum premia regardless of market state 
conditions in the Chinese Class A share market context. In other words, investors 
can promptly consider using the strength of corporate governance to gauge existing 
information uncertainty and accordingly adjust their investing decision to best protect 
their investment against adversity elicited by swingeing market movements in the 
setting of the Chinese stock market. 
Figure 7.26 Comparison: momentum-IU (corporate governance) premia over periods 
following UP market state, momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) strategy conditional 
on post-UP market state, overall momentum-IU (corporate governance) premia in 
the Chinese Class A share market (Jan.1996- Dec. 2008) 
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Notes: This figure demonstrates the difference among momentum-IU premia over periods following 
UP market state, momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) momentum strategy conditional on post-UP 
market state, overall momentum-IU premia in the Chinese Class A share market. The vertical axis 
measures the returns in percentage form. The blue line represents the fluctuations in the momentum 
premia across different levels of IU over the periods following UP market state; the red line illustrates 
the premium of (R=6, H=6) momentum strategy unconditional on IU and market states; the green line 
represents the changes of momentum premia across different IU levels unconditional on market 
states. 
 
Figure 7.27 Comparison: momentum-IU(corporate governance) premia over periods 
following DOWN market state, momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) strategy 
conditional on post-DOWN market state, overall momentum-IU premia in the 
Chinese Class A share market (01/96-12/08) 
 
Notes: This figure demonstrates the difference among momentum-IU premia over periods following 
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DOWN market state, momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) momentum strategy conditional on post-
DOWN market state, overall momentum-IU premia in the Chinese Class A share market. The vertical 
axis measures the returns in percentage form. The blue line represents the fluctuations in the 
momentum premia across different levels of IU over the periods following DOWN market state; the 
red line illustrates the premium of (R=6, H=6) momentum strategy unconditional on IU and market 
states; the green line represents the changes of momentum premia across different IU levels 
unconditional on market states. 
 
Figure 7.28 describes the asymmetry of positive momentum and negative 
momentum over time periods following UP and DOWN market states. Different from 
previous sections, both differences (IU5-IU1) of the sum of positive and negative 
momentums are positive, suggesting that when the strength of corporate governance 
is used as IU proxy, the positive momentum is the driving force behind the 
momentum premia, consistent with our finding when using firm size as IU proxy in 
the very first section. Furthermore, the asymmetry between positive and negative 
momentum is still more significant over the post-DOWN market condition and under 
the influence of greater degree of IU, as indicated by the observation that the red line 
is above the blue line and both are upward sloping. This finding is line with the 
prediction of our hypothesis, supported by the underreaction theory by Hong and 
Stein (1998) and investors’ underconfidence behavioural model (Du, 2002).  Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty                       Chapter 7 Results III 
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Figure 7.28 Asymmetry of positive momentum (Q5) and negative momentum (Q1) 
over periods following UP and DOWn market states in the Chinese Class A share 
market (Jan. 1996- Dec. 2008) (Corporate governance) 
UP market state 
   Q1  Q5  Q1+Q5 
IU1  1.05  3.03  4.08 
IU2  0.94  3.08  4.02 
IU3  0.82  3.41  4.23 
IU4  0.61  3.6  4.21 
IU5  0.51  4.25  4.76 
IU5-IU1  0.68 
DOWN market state 
   Q1  Q5  Q1+Q5 
IU1  1.02  3.48  4.5 
IU2  0.93  3.8  4.73 
IU3  0.88  4.15  5.03 
IU4  0.79  4.96  5.75 
IU5  0.68  5.69  6.37 
IU5-IU1        1.87 
 
 
Notes: The statistics box above the figure summarizes positive momentum (Q5) and negative 
momentum (Q1) for testing periods following UP and DOWN market states. This figure depicts the 
difference of the asymmetry of positive momentum (Q5) and negative momentum (Q1) over the time 
periods following UP market state, plotted as the blue line, and DOWN market state, graphed as the 
red line in the Chinese Class A share market over Jan. 1996 to Dec. 2008.The vertical axis measures 
the sum of positive momentum (returns of “winner” portfolio) and negative momentum (returns of 
“loser” portfolio) under each level of IU; the horizontal axis labels 5 different level of information 
uncertainty. The upward sloped lines suggest that regardless of market states, the positive 
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momentum (Q5) or the returns of “winner” portfolios tend to overwhelm the negative momentum (Q1) 
or the returns of “loser” portfolios in contributing to the momentum premia as IU level increases. 
 
7.9 Prior 24-month market average return as market state definition  
Analogous to the approach employed in section 5.3 of chapter 5, to boost the power 
of our test and underscore the robustness of the findings in this study, we also run 
the tests to investigate the dynamics of the momentum premia under influence of IU 
over time periods following two different market states—UP and DOWN, with the 
market states defined by prior 24-month market average return, differing from prior 
12-month market average return used to defined market states in the previous 7 
sections. Overall, the results from the above-mentioned test strikingly resemble the 
patterns of the results found when prior 12-month is used as market state definition, 
corroborating the finding that the amplifying of IU over momentum premia is 
particularly pronounced over time periods following DOWN market state yet 
dampened over time periods following UP market state across all IU proxy factors 
but the quality of corporate governance (please see Appendix 8 for details). 
 
7.10 Summary 
Subsequent to chapter 6, where information uncertainty is reported to have an 
amplifying effect over momentum premia, the core finding lies at the heart of this 
section is the asymmetric presence of the amplifying effect of information uncertainty 
over momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) momentum trading strategy during time 
periods following UP and DOWN market states. Specifically, across 7 different IU 
proxy factors, we find evidence unanimously showing that the (R=6, H=6) 
momentum trading strategy conditional on IU and post-DOWN market state Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty                       Chapter 7 Results III 
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significantly outperform that conditional on IU and post-UP market state and that 
conditional solely on IU, indicating that the amplifying effect of IU over the 
momentum premium is exacerbated during time periods following DOWN market 
state. On the premise of some behavioural explanations—such as Du (2002)’s 
investors’ underconfidence behavioural model and Hong, Lim and Stein (2000)’s 
gradual information diffusion theory—to the momentum premium, the observation 
can be interpreted from different angles under the aegis of various human cognitive 
heuristics as explained in rich detail in section 7.2-7.8 of this chapter.Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty                       Chapter 7 Results III 
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Chapter 8 Robustness tests 
 
8.1 Introduction 
To further boost the power of the tests employed, we run two analyses—1) sub-
period analysis; 2) risk-adjustment procedure—to check the robustness of the 
empirical findings reported in chapter 5, chapter 6, and chapter 7. Section 8.2 
describes the results from the sub-period analysis and section 8.3 documents the 
results from risk-adjugment procedure. 
8.2 Results from sub-period analysis (robustness test 1) 
As described in rich detail in section 4.2.7 of data and methodology chapter, 
considering the relatively short full operational history of the Chinese stock market 
(only started running full operations in 1991) compared with other developed 
financial markets, we do not have the luxury to run the tests on a sample dataset 
spanning over the length of time period comparable to the length of the main entire 
sample period (Jan. 1996- Dec. 2008) as back-testing strategy, used by Jegadeesh 
and Titman (1993) in their seminal work of the field
60. Alternatively, a sub-period 
analysis, adopted by a spate of studies in the literature (Conrad and Kaul, 1998, 
Schiereck et al., 1999, Zhang, 2006, Lin and Swanson, 2008, Kelsey et al., 2010), is 
employed as the bedrock of the back-testing strategy in the study through turning our 
sights on two of the salient financial reforming events
61--1) the implementation of the 
new P.R.C. security law on July 1
st, 1999; 2) the opening of the Chinese Class A 
                                            
60 Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) employed stock returns for the period over 1965 to 1989 as the main 
entire sample dataset and stock returns for the period over 1927 to 1964 as the time period of their 
back-testing strategy. 
61 The four major financial market reforming events took place over the entire sample are detailed in 
section 4.1.2.1 of Data and methodology chapter.  Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty  Chapter 8 Robustness test results 
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share market to qualified foreign institutional investors (QFII) on July 9
th, 2003, to the 
extent that they evidently ameliorated the operational efficiency of the Chinese stock 
market as documented by Lin and Swanson (2008). Specifically, as described in 
data and methodology chapter, the time periods revolving the aforementioned two 
salient financial market regulatory reforms are split into pre-event periods and post-
event periods—the implementation of the new P.R.C. securities law (July 1
st, 1999): 
pre-event period (Jan. 1998- June 1999) and post-event period (Aug. 1999- Jan. 
2001); the opening of Chinese Class A share market to qualified foreign institutional 
investors (QFII) (July 9
th, 2003): pre-event period (Jan. 2002- June 2003) and post-
event period (Aug. 2003- January 2005).  
In view of theoretical lead from Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and practical lead from 
Conrad and Kaul (1998), Schiereck et al. (1999), Zhang (2006), Lin and Swanson 
(2008) and Kelsey et al. (2010), the underlying motivation of the design of the back-
testing strategy is twofold: first, the results of the back-testing strategy reassure that 
the results of the study are not time period-specific. Second, given the intricate 
relationship between trading volume, stock returns, and investors’ sentiment 
(heuristics and biases tradition) (Fisher and Statman, 2000, Brown and Cliff, 2004, 
Statman et al., 2006) as evidenced in chapter 5-7, the resilience and pattern of 
results yielded over time periods revolving two financial market reforming events, 
when information uncertainty mounts (Schwarz, 1990), could directly vindicate the 
plausibility of our interpretation of the asymmetric pattern of momentum premia over 
time periods following UP and DOWN market states under the theoretical framework 
of heuristics and biases tradition. Theoretically, our surmise, from the perspective of 
the linkage among stock returns, investors’ sentiment and momentum premium, is Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty  Chapter 8 Robustness test results 
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that overall positive stock market returns, reflecting favourable response of investors 
towards the occurrence of the event, are indicative of investors’ optimistic sentiment 
in the near future (De Bondt, 1993, Fisher and Statman, 2000, Brown and Cliff, 
2004), sapping the investors’ underconfidence and freeing up their cognitive 
resources. Both of the underconfidence among a group of investors (Du, 2002) and 
insufficient cognitive resources (Frederick, 2002) are nominated as main culprits 
provoking the momentum premia through triggering underconfident investors’ 
delayed update of priors in view of more confident investors’ behaviours (Du, 2002), 
fuelled by representativeness heuristics (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) from the 
view of behavioural theorists  and via prompting the frequent practice of intuitive 
heuristics such as affective and representative heuristics of System 1(intuitive) of two 
cognitive systems (Kahneman and Frederick, 2002) from the vantage point of 
experimental evidence from psychology respectively. As a result, the presence of 
momentum premia is expected to be less evident over pre-event period of an event 
whose inception received cheerful response from the stock market. On the contrary, 
the momentum premia are expected to be relatively more pronounced over post-
event period of an event whose inception receiving lukewarm or even unfavourable 
response from the stock market.  
Table 8.1, shown below, reports the momentum premia of momentum trading 
strategies with different combinations of ranking period (R= 3, 6, 9, 12) and holding 
period (H=3, 6, 9, 12) over time periods revolving the inception of two salient events 
–pre-event and post-event periods—in comparison with the momentum premia of 
corresponding momentum trading strategies over the entire sample period spanning 
from Jan. 1996 to Dec. 2008. At first glance, all the momentum premia stay positive Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty  Chapter 8 Robustness test results 
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and statistically significant over pre- and post-event periods of both events. 
Additionally, there are a couple of fairly striking observations worth noting: 1) for both 
event 1 and 2, the momentum premia of 16 different momentum trading strategies 
evidenced over pre-event periods unanimously eclipse those of corresponding 
momentum trading strategies realized during post-event periods; 2) on average, the 
momentum premia of 16 different momentum trading strategies yielded over pre-
event period of event 2 are slightly larger than those of matching momentum trading 
strategies found during pre-event period of event 1 and this pattern remains evident 
for the momentum premia of corresponding momentum trading strategies resulted 
over the post-event periods of two events, with the momentum premia found over 
post-event period of event 2 trumping those yielded over post-event period of event 
1. 
A unified interpretation of the observation of the asymmetry in terms of the 
momentum premia over pre- and post-event periods for both events can be spelled 
out as: in face of uncertainty prior to the implementation of new P.R.C security law, 
stoked by anxiety, investors’ perception of risk heightens (Schwarz, 1990), 
exacerbating the underconfident investors’ confident investors’-behaviour-chasing 
behaviour through delaying update on their prior beliefs. As a result, the momentum 
premia found over pre-event periods of both events overwhelm those yielded over 
post-event periods. This asymmetric pattern can further be elucidated from the 
perspective of the impact of the inception of event 1(the implementation of new 
P.R.C. security law) and event 2 (the openings of Chinese Class A share market to 
qualified foreign institutional investors (QFII) over the operational efficiency of the 
Chinese stock market. Specifically, the deteriorated momentum premia over post-Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty  Chapter 8 Robustness test results 
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event periods imply the improvement in the operational efficiency of the Chinese 
stock market (Gilson and Kraakman, 1984, Pena, 1995), which seems plausible 
considering that the common grounds between the two events is the aim of 
ameliorating the operational efficiency of the Chinese stock market (Lin and 
Swanson, 2008). 
The second observation is that on average, the momentum premia of 16 different 
momentum trading strategies over pre- and post-event 2 periods outstrip those of 
matching strategies over corresponding time periods of event 1. Simply put, the 
momentum premia found over more recent time periods (revolving the inception of 
event 2) comprehensively beat those realized over time periods of more distant past 
(revolving the inception of event 1), in corroboration of empirical evidence from a 
barrage of major studies in the literature such as Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), 
Conrad and Kaul (1998), Schiereck et al. (1999) and Zhang (2006) all showing that 
momentum premium tends to creep up over time. Intriguingly, under the theoretical 
framework of heuristics and biases tradition, one would expect that as Chinese stock 
market participants hone their statistics skills over time and in turn become more 
capable of processing information with systematic heuristics such as statistics 
reasoning heuristic (Nisbett et al., 1983), prompting a deterioration of momentum 
premia, casting doubt on the plausibility of this finding. However, one cannot be 
oblivious of the fact that increasingly more novice Chinese retail investors, plagued 
with scarce access to different forms of investment products despite holding 
considerable amount of capital as saving (Kang et al., 2002), have started 
participating in the Chinese Class A share market over years. These novice Chinese 
retail investors are subject to intuitive information processing strategy (Nisbett et al., Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty  Chapter 8 Robustness test results 
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1983) and the influence of different intuitive heuristics such as affective and 
representative heuristics of System 1(intuitive) of two cognitive systems (Kahneman 
and Frederick, 2002), prone to provoke momentum premia (Daniel et al., 1998; 
Barberis et al., 1998; Du, 2002; Hong and Stein, 1999), vindicating the plausibility of 
the empirical evidence found in this study.  The implementation of new P.R.C. 
security law and the opening of Chinese Class A share market to qualified foreign 
institutional investors (QFII) received contrasting receptions, with the former 
receiving favourable market response and the latter negative market response. The 
more pervasive momentum premia of different momentum trading strategies are 
observed over periods revolving event 2, which is in line with the empirical evidence 
documented by Kelsey et al.(2010) manifesting that the unfavourable market 
response reflects investors’ worry over bleak or uncertain outlook of the stock market, 
consequently leading to more pronounced momentum premia through their 
hesitation, prompted by underconfidence, toward investment decision making 
process (Du, 2002). The above-noted evidence adds leg of support to our conjecture 
and corroborates our finding in chapter 7—the amplifying effect of information 
uncertainty over the momentum premia is intensified over time periods following 
DOWN market state—and its interpretation in the sense that the information 
uncertainty, embedded in the coming implementation of stock market regulatory 
reforms, kindles investors’ anxiety over the outlook of stock market and heightens 
their perception of risk (Schwarz, 1990). With this logic in mind, It is plausible that 
market participants get more jittery when the implementation of stock market 
regulatory reform receives unfavourable response, underpinning the impact of 
underconfidence over investors’ judgmental process and therefore giving a boost to Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty  Chapter 8 Robustness test results 
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the momentum premia over pre- and post-event periods of the event receiving 
negative stock market response (Du, 2002).   
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Table 8.1 Monthly momentum premia over different sub-periods in the Chinese Class A share market 
Monthly momentum premia for Class A 
shares                                         
   (R, H) where R is the length of the ranking period and H is the length of the holding period 
   Trading strategies     
Time periods  (3,3)  (3,6)  (3,9)  (3,12)  (6,3)  (6,6)  (6,9)  (6,12)  (9,3)  (9,6)  (9,9)  (9,12)  (12,3)  (12,6)  (12,9)  (12,12) 
Whole sample period  1.85  2.18  2.25  2.31  1.31  1.64  2.17  2.09  1.57  1.8  1.99  2.1  1.49  1.8  1.94  2.08 
(Jan. 1996- Dec. 2008)  *  **  **  *  **  **  *  **  **  **  **  **  *  **  **  ** 
Event 1  The implementation of the P.R.C. security law                         
Pre-event  2.33  2.57  2.35  2.68  1.96  2.14  2.63  2.73  2.42  2.35  2.62  2.58  3.06  2.37  2.26  2.34 
(Jan. 1998- July 1999)  *  **  **  *  **  **  **  **  **  **  **  *  **  **  *  * 
Post-event  1.52  1.83  1.79  1.85  1.28  1.05  1.38  1.46  1.04  0.86  1.62  1.74  1.15  1.36  1.62  1.73 
(Aug. 1999- Jan. 2001)  *  *  **  *  **  *  **  **  *  **  **  **  *  *  **  * 
Event 2  Openings to Qualified foreign institutional investors (QFII)                       
Pre-event  2.52  2.94  2.71  3.15  2.19  2.35  2.81  2.74  2.18  2.37  2.56  2.93  2.05  2.51  2.47  2.85 
(Jan. 2002- July 2003)  **  *  **  **  *  **  **  **  **  **  **  **  *  **  **  ** 
Post-event  1.68  2.12  2.2  2.19  1.3  1.57  1.89  1.95  1.44  1.63  1.92  1.96  1.38  1.75  1.86  1.94 
(Aug. 2003- Jan. 2005)  *  *  *  **  *  *  **  **  **  *  **  *  *  **  *  * 
Notes: this table presents the momentum premia (Q5-Q1) of six different momentum trading strategies in the Chinese Class A share market (all the eligible 
Class A shares listed in the SHSE and SZSE) over the entire sample period from Jan. 1996 to Dec. 2008 and the time periods (pre-event and post-event 
periods) around the point when two salient financial market policy reforms---the implementation of the P.R.C. security law in July, 1999 and the openings of 
share A market to qualified foreign institutional investors (QFII) in July, 2003--- took place. The momentum portfolio formation procedure is akin to the 
approach first used by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). Over each specific time period, at the end of each month, all the eligible share A stocks are ranked in 
ascending order based on their past R-month (the value R denotes the number of months used as ranking period for a specific momentum trading strategy. 
R=3, 6, 9, 12) performance. The 20% highest ranked stocks, being equally weighted, form the “winner” portfolio (Q5) and 20% lowest ranked stocks form the  
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“loser” portfolio (Q1). One month is skipped to avoid microstructure issues. The portfolios are then held for H months (H= 3, 6, 9, 12) following a buy-and-old 
approach to avoid excessive trading costs (Galariotis et al., 2007). The momentum premium for each trading strategy is calculated by taking the difference of 
the average monthly return of “winner” portfolio and that of corresponding “loser” portfolio. The significance is each momentum premium is labelled by “*” or 
“**”: “*” symbolizes statistical significance at 10% level. “**” symbolizes statistical significance at 5% level. All the numbers are in percentage term.  
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The sub-period analysis is also run on the momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) 
momentum trading strategy under the influence of information uncertainty in the 
Chinese Class A share market. Overall, the momentum premia are positive and 
statistically significant at 5% significance level over pre- and post-event periods of 
both events across different level of information uncertainty. As the pattern of results 
of the impact of IU over momentum premia, with seven different factors (firm size, 
firm age, analysts’ coverage, return volatility, dispersion in analysts’ earnings 
forecasts, trading volume and the strength of corporate governance) used in gauging 
the level of information uncertainty, is very consistent, we only spell out the 
explanation to the results when firm size (1/MV) is employed as information 
uncertainty proxy for brevity (the rest of results (other 6 factors as IU proxy) can be 
referred to Appendix 9). Table 8.2 reports the momentum premia under the influence 
of information uncertainty during time periods revolving two salient events—the 
implementation of new P.R.C. security law and the opening of Chinese Class A 
share market to qualified foreign institutional investors (QFII). Compared with the 
momentum premia under the influence of information uncertainty for the entire 
sample period from January 1996 to December 2008, the amplifying effect of 
information uncertainty, documented in chapter 6 and 7, is evidently present, with the 
amplifying effect being more noticeable over pre-event periods of both events and 
less pronounced over post-event periods. Specifically, over different sub-periods, the 
momentum premium increases monotonically as the level of information uncertainty 
heightens, consistent with the pattern reported in chapter 6 and 7. Akin to our 
explanation in earlier on regarding the results of sub-period analysis for basic  
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momentum trading strategies, the deteriorated impact of information uncertainty over 
momentum premium during post-event periods is attributable to the improvement in 
operational efficiency elicited by the inception of the two financial market policy 
reforms (Gilson and Kraakman, 1984, Pena, 1995) or a drop in return volatility 
induced by the implementation of the financial market reforms (Chen et al., 2006). 
Further, the fall in return volatility is also indicative of a lowered level of ambiguity in 
the intrinsic values of listed firms in the stock market (Magnan and Xu, 2008), 
underpinning investors’ confidence level and consequently depressing the 
momentum premia during time periods subsequent to the inception of stock market 
policy reforms (Du, 2002).  
Collectively, the above-described sub-period results reinforce the robustness of the 
results described from chapter 5 to chapter 7, underscoring that our findings are not 
time period specific. 
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Table 8.2 Momentum premia (monthly returns) under the influence of IU (firm size) 
over different sub-periods revolving two salient financial market regulatory reforms in 
the Chinese Class A share market 
Monthly momentum returns for portfolios with different levels of information 
uncertainty 
Information uncertainty is proxied by the firm size (1/market capitalization) 
(6,6) as the typical momentum strategy    
     
  
Different information uncertainty (IU) 
levels    
Time period  IU1   IU2  IU3  IU4  IU5 
Whole sample period  1.37  1.74  1.79  1.97  2.34 
Jan. 1996- Dec. 2008  **  **  **  **  ** 
Event 1 
The implementation of the P.R.C. 
security law    
Pre-event  1.56  1.85  1.93  2.18  2.53 
Jan. 1998- July 1999  **  **  **  **  ** 
Post-event  1.14  1.35  1.4  1.52  1.75 
Aug. 1999- Jan. 2001  **  **  **  **  ** 
Event 2 
Openings to qualified foreign institutional 
investors (QFII)  
Pre-event  1.48  1.82  1.93  2.05  2.61 
Jan. 2002- July 2003  **  **  **  **  ** 
Post-event  1.32  1.69  1.75  1.89  2.31 
Aug. 2003- Jan. 2005  **  **  **  **  ** 
This table reports the momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) momentum trading strategy (the 
difference between the average monthly returns of “winner” portfolios and those of “loser” portfolios) 
under the influence of five different levels of information uncertainty over sub-periods (pre-event, post-
event periods) revolving two salient events --- the implementations of two financial market reforms: 1) 
the launch of the P.R.C. security law in July, 1999; 2) the openings of Class A shares to qualified 
foreign institutional investors (QFII) in the Chinese Class A share market in comparison with the 
momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) trading strategy conditional on information uncertainty over the 
whole sample period (Jan. 1996- Dec. 2008) in the same market segment. Consistent with the 
definition of Chinese Class A share market noted from chapter 5-7, the Chinese Class A share market 
here refers to a consolidated Class A share market consisting of all the eligible Class A stocks listed 
in the Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange. For ease of comparison and the 
main focus of this research—the investigation on the influence of information uncertainty, the (R=6, 
H=6) momentum trading strategy is employed as a representative of 16 momentum trading strategies 
with different combinations of ranking and holding periods (R=3, 6, 9, 12; H=3, 6, 9, 12), analogous to 
the approach adopted for chapter 6--- investigation on the interplay of information uncertainty and 
momentum premia and chapter 7--- investigation on the interplay of information uncertainty and 
momentum premia over periods following UP and DOWN market states. The methodological 
approach is described in detail underneath Table 5.6 and 5.13. The significance of the momentum 
premia is indicated by asterisk(s), shown below each momentum premium, for the difference between 
the returns of “winner” portfolio and those of “loser” portfolio—one asterisk symbols the significance of  
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the momentum premium at 10% significance level; two asterisks symbol the significance of the 
momentum premium at 5% significance level. All the numbers are in percentage term. 
8.3 Risk adjustment for momentum premia (robustness test 2) 
Given the landmark status of the Fama & French three factor (FF3F) model in the 
stage of financial market efficiency debate of modern finance domain and the 
inability of traditional CAPM or conditional CAPM models in justifying most of 
anomalous effects in the financial markets, one would be hard-pressed to relinquish 
the opportunity to test the resilience of the momentum premia of various momentum 
trading strategies with different combinations of ranking (R=3, 6, 9, 12) and holding 
periods (H=3, 6, 9, 12) or armed with different conditions such as post-UP or DOWN 
market state on the premise of the explanatory power of three risk factors—market 
risk factor (  ,  −   , ), firm size effect factor (    ) and value effect factor
62 
(    ), embedded in the FF3F model. To further expand the understanding of 
explanatory power of corporate governance over stock returns documented by Wang 
and Xu (2004) in the unique setting of the Chinese stock market, we extend the 
reach of their version of the FF3F model by adjusting the raw momentum premia of 
different momentum trading strategies according to Wang & Xu(2004)’s version of 
the FF3F model, augmented by three risk factors—market risk factor (  ,  −   , ), 
firm size effect factor (    ) and the residual free float ratio
63 (the strength of 
corporate governance factor) (   _    ). In other word, the third risk factor—value 
                                            
62 The question of whether firm size effect factor and value effect factor should be categorized as risk 
factors remains debatable (Ferson and Harvey, 1999) yet an in-depth discussion would sidetrack 
the main direction of the  research as discussed in data and methodology chapter and is beyond 
the scope of this study. 
63 Consistent with Wang and Xu(2004)’s approach, the residual free float ratios are estimated by 
regressing free float ratios against logarithm market capitalization of corresponding firms at the 
end of June every year.  
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effect factor—of the traditional FF3F model is supplanted by the residual free float 
ratio factor, aimed to reflect the quality of firm-level corporate governance, in the 
Wang & Xu(2004)’s version of the FF3F model. 
That said, the importance of the risk adjustment procedure is certainly not limited to 
check the resilience of the momentum premia of different momentum trading 
strategies against rational risk factors per se, but also to address the doubt cast on 
the explanatory power of the Wang and Xu(2004)’s version of FF3F model by Wang 
and Di lorio (2007) whom evidenced the significant explanatory power of the value 
effect factor over cross-sectional stock returns in the Chinese stock market, 
consequently fostering the role of the quality of corporate governance plays in asset 
pricing in the setting of the Chinese stock market. In light of Wang and Xu (2004)’s 
empirical finding (described in detail in the literature review chapter), we conjecture 
that the supplantation of the value effect factor of the traditional FF3F model with the 
residual free float ratio as the proxy variable for the quality of corporate governance 
factor enhances the explanatory power of the asset pricing model (FF3F) over 
momentum premia of various momentum trading strategies. 
Table 8.3 reports the momentum premia of momentum trading strategies with 
different combinations of ranking and holding periods (R= 3, 6, 9, 12; H=3, 6, 9, 12) 
adjusted for risk based on the traditional FF3F model in the Chinese Class A share 
market for the entire sample period from January 1996 through December 2008. By 
and large, the majority of the momentum premia becomes relatively smaller in terms 
of magnitude yet still manage to stay statistically significant after being justified 
against the market risk factor (  ,  −   , ), the firm size effect factor (    ), and the  
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value effect factor (    ), entailed in the traditional FF3F model. Table 8.4 presents 
the momentum premia of momentum trading strategies with different combinations of 
ranking and holding periods (R=3, 6, 9, 12; H=3, 6, 9, 12) after being adjusted for 
three risk factors entailed in Wang and Xu (2004)’s version of the FF3F model, which 
replaces the value effect factor (    ) of the traditional FF3F model with the 
residual free float ratio factor (   _    ), an proxy for the quality of firm-level 
corporate governance) in the Chinese Class A share market for the whole sample 
period spanning from January 1996 to December 2008. Compared with the raw 
momentum premia of different momentum strategies in the Chinese Class A share 
market presented in Table 5.1 and the risk-adjusted momentum premia of 
momentum trading strategies based on the traditional FF3F model, reported in Table 
8.3, the risk-adjusted momentum premia of corresponding momentum trading 
strategies hinged on Wang and Xu(2004)’s version of the FF3F model are 
universally drastically smaller in magnitude and mostly muted in terms of significance, 
indicating that Wang and Xu (2004)’s version of the FF3F model, with the value 
effect factor (    )	replaced with the residual free float ratio factor (   _    ) (the 
strength of corporate governance), is apparently superior to the traditional version of 
the FF3F model in justifying the risks embedded in the momentum portfolios in the 
setting of the Chinese stock market. Futhermore, the preceding finding is clinched by 
the values of the adjusted R^2 resulted from two risk adjustment procedures based 
on traditional FF3F and on Wang and Xu (2004)’s version of the FF3F respectively, 
with average adjusted R^2 for the latter scenario (0.56) overwhelming that for the 
former scenario (0.26), suggesting Wang and Xu(2004)’s version of the FF3F model  
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is more capable of capturing and justifying the momentum premia in the Chinese 
Class A share market. In spite of the finding of evidently superior explanatory power 
of Wang and Xu (2004)’s version of the FF3F model over the momentum premia in 
the Chinese Class A share market, the momentum premia of different momentum 
trading strategies are still yet to be fully justified by two different forms of the FF3F 
model, tempted to the setting of the Chinese stock market, with a vision for 
rationalizing financial market anomalous effects. The preceding observation 
underpins the resilience of our finding described in chapter 5. 
The estimated coefficients (factor loadings) for the two risk adjustment procedures 
are presented in Table 8.5 and 8.6. First turning our glance to the estimated 
coefficient of market risk factor ( ) , the estimated coefficients of market risk factor—
resulted from the risk adjustment approach based on Wang and Xu(2004)’s version 
of the FF3F model as reported in Table 8.6—of different momentum trading 
strategies in the Chinese Class A share market are uniformly positive and highly 
statistically significant, contrary to the observation that the estimated coefficients of 
market risk factors of corresponding momentum trading strategies from the risk 
adjustment procedure hinged on traditional FF3F model being much smaller in terms 
of magnitude (sometimes even turning negative) coupled with subdued statistical 
significance. In sum, the preceding observation with respect to the estimated 
coefficient of market risk factor( )  suggests that the inclusion of the residual free 
float ratio strengthens the explanatory power of the market risk factor over the 
momentum premia of different momentum trading strategies in the Chinese Class A 
share market. Comparing the estimated coefficients of firm size effect factor ( ) from  
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the risk adjustment processes based on two versions of FF3F model, we find that 
overall the estimated coefficients of firm size effect factor from the risk adjustment 
procedure based on Wang and Xu (2004)’s version of the FF3F model are slightly 
larger in magnitude and considerably more significant compared with those from the 
procedure based on traditional FF3F model, reflecting that the replacement of the 
value effect factor with the residual free float ratio in Wang and Xu’s version of the 
FF3F model enhances the ability of firm size effect factor (    ) in justifying the 
momentum premia of different momentum trading strategies in the Chinese Class A 
share market. The preceding evidence shed light on Wang and Xu (2004)’s finding, 
manifesting that the supplantation of the traditional value effect factor with the 
residual free float ratio factor (   _    ) –an proxy for the quality of firm-level 
corporate governance in the Chinese stock market setting— “helps reduces the 
noise in the SMB variable” (page 75). Finally, the estimated coefficients of the value 
effect factor (ℎ) from the risk adjustment process based on traditional FF3F model 
average out at 0.0304, strikingly trailing behind those from the risk adjustment 
procedure hinged on Wang and Xu(2004)’s version of the FF3F model (0.7288) at 
high statistical significance level, providing compelling empirical evidence in 
supporting our conjecture that the inclusion of the residual free float ratio 
(   _    ) is the driving force behind the enhanced explanatory power of Wang 
and Xu(2004)’s version of the FF3F model over the momentum premia of different 
momentum trading strategies in the Chinese Class A share market. Collectively, the 
results found here lend added leg of support to Wang and Xu (2004)’s finding that in 
the setting of the Chinese Class A share market, the explanatory power of the  
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traditional FF3F model over cross-sectional stock returns/momentum premia is 
boosted through supplanting the value effect factor with the residual free float ratio 
(proxy for the quality/strength of firm-level corporate governance). From the 
perspective of estimated coefficients of different risk factors, namely market risk 
factor ( ), firm size effect factor ( ), and the residual free float ratio factor (strength 
of corporate governance) ( ), the empirical finding that the estimated coefficients of 
three risk factors are all positive, markedly statistically significant and generally 
larger than the corresponding estimated coefficients of the three risk factors entailed 
in the traditional FF3F model in magnitude implies that the superior explanatory 
power of risk factors entailed in Wang & Xu (2004)’s version of the FF3F model over 
the momentum premia yielded in the Chinese Class A share market. The proceding 
finding is also corroborated by a swingeing drop in both magnitude and significance 
of the risk-adjusted momentum premia when Wang & Xu (2004)’s version of the 
FF3F model is employed to rationalize the momentum premia found in the Chinese 
Class A share market. 
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Table 8.3 Risk-adjusted momentum premia (monthly returns) in the Chinese Class A 
share market based on the FF3F model (Jan. 1996- Dec. 2008) 
Risk-adjusted momentum premia (monthly returns) in the Chinese Class A share 
market 
Entire sample period Jan. 1996- Dec. 2008 
Risk adjusted based on FF3F model    
   Q5-Q1    
   H=3     H=6     H=9     H=12    
R=3  1.24  1.51  *  1.55  **  1.75  ** 
Adjusted R^2  0.15     0.19     0.24     0.23    
R=6  0.83  *  1.07  *  1.63  *  1.42  ** 
Adjusted R^2  0.18     0.23     0.27     0.31    
R=9  0.92  *  1.03  **  1.26  *  1.68  * 
Adjusted R^2  0.22     0.2     0.31     0.32    
R=12  1.01  *  1.35  *  1.4  *  1.85    
Adjusted R^2  0.27     0.26     0.33     0.37    
This table reports the risk-adjusted momentum premia of 16 different momentum trading strategies 
with different combination of ranking periods (R=3, 6, 9, 12) and holding periods (H=3, 6, 9, 12) in the 
Chinese Class A share market (all eligible Class A shares listed in the SHSE and SZSE) for the entire 
sample period from Jan. 1996 to Dec. 2008. In light of the structure of FF3F model, the risk-adjusted 
momentum premia are calculated by regressing corresponding raw momentum of different 
momentum trading strategies, reported in Table 1, against three risk factors, namely market risk factor 
(  ,  −   , ), firm size effect factor(    ), and value effect factor (    ). Mathematically, it can be 
expressed as  (   ),  −   ,  =   +     ,  −   ,   +  (    ) + ℎ(    ) +   .  (   ),  is the 
momentum premia calculated by taking the difference between the average monthly returns of 
“winner” portfolios and those of “loser” portfolios;   ,  is the risk-free rate, proxied by monthly yield of 
the China on-year time deposit rate;   ,  denotes the average monthly return of the market portfolio, 
estimated by the average monthly return of a consolidated value-weighted Chinese Class A share 
index, entailing all the eligible Class A shares listed in the SHSE and SZSE;      is the difference 
between the average monthly returns of portfolios consisting of 20% of all the eligible Class A shares 
with the smallest capitalization and those of portfolios comprising 20% of all eligible Class A shares 
with the largest capitalization ranked in June of each year, also known as the size effect (firm size) 
factor;      represents the difference between the average monthly returns of portfolios consisting of 
20% of all eligible Class A shares with the highest book-to-market ratios and those of portfolios with 
20% of all eligible Class A shares with the lowest book-to-market ratios, dubbed as the value effect 
factor.   represents the portion of the raw momentum premium that cannot be justified by the three 
aforementioned risk factors encompassed in the FF3F model.  , ,ℎ are the factor loadings 
(coefficients) from regressing estimation procedure on the market risk factor	   ,  −   ,   , size effect 
factor(    ), and value effect factor (    ) respectively, specifying the explanatory power of each 
risk factor over the raw momentum premia.    is an error factor, which is independently and identically 
distributed.  The adjusted R^2 is specified for the risk-adjusted momentum premium of each 
momentum trading strategy, indicating the percentage of variation in raw momentum premia can be 
jointly explained by the three risk factors, taking into account the number of regressors (risk factors).  
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The number of asterisk(s) indicates the statistical significance of the risk-adjusted momentum premia, 
with one asterisk showing that the relevant risk-adjusted momentum premium is statistically significant 
at 10% level while two showing the relevant risk-adjusted momentum premium is statistically 
significant at 5% level. All the risk-adjusted momentum premia are present in percentage term.  
 
 
Table 8.4 Risk-adjusted momentum premia (monthly returns) in the Chinese Class A 
share market based on Wang & Xu(2004)'s version of the FF3F model (Jan. 1996- 
Dec. 2008) 
Risk-adjusted momentum premia (monthly returns) in the Chinese Class A share market 
Entire sample period from Jan. 1996 to Dec. 2008 
Risk adjusted based on Wang & Xu (2004)'s FF3F 
   Q5-Q1    
   H=3     H=6     H=9     H=12    
R=3  0.24  0.42  0.46  0.58    
Adjusted R^2  0.42     0.46     0.53     0.6    
R=6  0.15  0.28  0.39  *  0.51    
Adjusted R^2  0.43     0.51     0.55     0.59    
R=9  0.09  0.13  *  0.25  0.46    
Adjusted R^2  0.47     0.59     0.62     0.74    
R=12  -0.06  0.12  0.2  0.63  * 
Adjusted R^2  0.56     0.58     0.65     0.72    
This table reports the risk-adjusted momentum premia of 16 different momentum trading strategies 
with different combination of ranking periods (R=3, 6, 9, 12) and holding periods (H=3, 6, 9, 12) in the 
Chinese Class A share market (all eligible Class A shares listed in the SHSE and SZSE) for the entire 
sample period from Jan. 1996 to Dec. 2008. In light of the structure of Wang & Xu (2004)’s version of 
the FF3F model, the risk-adjusted momentum premia are calculated by regressing corresponding raw 
momentum of different momentum trading strategies, reported in Table 1, against three risk factors, 
namely market risk factor (  ,  −   , ), firm size effect factor(    ), and residual free float ratio factor 
(   _    ) . Mathematically, it can be expressed as  (   ),  −   ,  =   +     ,  −   ,   +  (    ) +
 (   _    ) +    .  (   ),  is the momentum premia calculated by taking the difference between the 
average monthly returns of “winner” portfolios and those of “loser” portfolios;   ,  is the risk-free rate, 
proxied by monthly yield of the China one-year time deposit rate;   ,  denotes the average monthly 
return of the market portfolio, estimated by the average monthly return of a consolidated value-
weighted Chinese Class A share index, entailing all the eligible Class A shares listed in the SHSE and 
SZSE;      is the difference between the average monthly returns of portfolios consisting of 20% of 
all the eligible Class A shares with the smallest capitalization and those of portfolios comprising 20% 
of all eligible Class A shares with the largest capitalization ranked in June of each year, also known as 
the size effect (firm size) factor;    _     represents the difference between the average monthly 
returns of portfolios consisting of 20% of all eligible Class A shares with the highest residual free float  
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ratios—resulted from regressing free float ratios against log market capitalizations of corresponding 
firms—and those of portfolios with 20% of all eligible Class A shares with the lowest free float ratios, 
known as the strength of corporate governance factor at different time points.   represents the portion 
of the raw momentum premium that cannot be justified by the three aforementioned risk factors 
entailed in the Wang & Xu (2004)’s version of the FF3F model.  , ,  are the factor loadings 
(coefficients) from regressing estimation procedure on the market risk factor	   ,  −   ,   , size effect 
factor(    ), and the strength of corporate governance (   _    ) respectively, specifying the 
explanatory power of each risk factor over the raw momentum premia.    is an error factor, which is 
independently and identically distributed.  The adjusted R^2 is specified for the risk-adjusted 
momentum premium of each momentum trading strategy, indicating the percentage of variation in raw 
momentum premia can be jointly explained by the three risk factors, taking into account the number of 
regressors (risk factors). The number of asterisk(s) indicates the statistical significance of the risk-
adjusted momentum premia, with one asterisk showing that the relevant risk-adjusted momentum 
premium is statistically significant at 10% level while two showing the relevant risk-adjusted 
momentum premium is statistically significant at 5% level. All the risk-adjusted momentum premia are 
present in percentage term.  
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Table 8.5 Factor loadings from the risk adjustment for 16 momentum trading strategies in the Chinese Class A share market based 
on the FF3F model (Jan. 1996- Dec. 2008) 
                                                                                             Factor loadings based on the FF3F model 
   Momentum trading strategies (R, H)    
   (3,3)  (3,6)  (3,9)  (3,12)  (6,3)  (6,6)  (6,9)  (6,12)  (9,3)  (9,6)  (9,9)  (9,12)  (12,3)  (12,6)  (12,9)  (12,12) 
β  -0.003  0.015  0.008  -0.012  0.023  0.01  0.031  0.029  0.025  -0.015  0.042  0.037  0.044  0.028  0.019  0.02 
t(β)  -1.54  2.63  1.05  3.06  1.99  1.82  0.79  1.27  2.05  -0.04  1.37  1.91  2.58  2.11  1.25  2.04 
s  0.18  0.24  0.28  0.31  0.3  0.53  0.37  0.41  0.27  0.16  0.38  0.47  0.51  0.55  0.48  0.39 
t(s)  1.06  2.15  2.09  1.99  2.02  1.52  1.73  2.38  2.17  1.83  2.06  3.11  2.58  1.99  2.04  2.51 
h  0.029  0.015  -0.005  0.029  0.036  0.041  0.037  0.052  0.041  0.029  0.036  0.022  0.035  0.016  0.04  0.034 
t(h)  1.03  1.5  -0.28  1.37  1.93  2.04  1.84  1.27  1.55  1.92  1.73  1.52  1.07  2.02  1.73  1.88 
This table presents the factor loadings results from the risk adjustment process of the raw momentum premia of 16 different momentum trading strategies in 
the Chinese Class A share market based on the FF3F model. The risk adjustment process can be mathematically expressed as:  (   ),  −   ,  =   +
    ,  −   ,   +  (    ) + ℎ(    ) +   .  (   ),  is the momentum premia calculated by taking the difference between the average monthly returns of 
“winner” portfolios and those of “loser” portfolios;   ,  is the risk-free rate, proxied by monthly yield of the China one-year time deposit rate;   ,  denotes the 
average monthly return of the market portfolio, estimated by the average monthly return of a consolidated value-weighted Chinese Class A share index, 
entailing all the eligible Class A shares listed in the SHSE and SZSE;      is the difference between the average monthly returns of portfolios consisting of 
20% of all the eligible Class A shares with the smallest capitalization and those of portfolios comprising 20% of all eligible Class A shares with the largest 
capitalization ranked in June of each year, also known as the size effect (firm size) factor;      represents the difference between the average monthly 
returns of portfolios consisting of 20% of all eligible Class A shares with the highest book-to-market ratios and those of portfolios with 20% of all eligible Class 
A shares with the lowest book-to-market ratios, dubbed as the value effect factor.   represents the portion of the raw momentum premium that cannot be 
justified by the three aforementioned risk factors entailed in the FF3F model.  , ,ℎ are the factor loadings (coefficients) from regressing estimation procedure 
on the market risk factor	   ,  −   ,   , size effect factor(    ), and value effect factor (    ) respectively, specifying the explanatory power of each risk 
factor over the raw momentum premia.    is an error factor, which is independently and identically distributed. The t statistics of corresponding estimated 
coefficients (loading factors) are listed in the row below.  
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Table 8.6 Factor loadings from the risk adjustment for 16 momentum trading strategies in the Chinese Class A share market based 
on Wang & Xu(2004)'s version of the FF3f model ( Jan. 1996- Dec. 2008) 
Factor loadings based on Wang Xu(2004)'s version of the FF3F model 
   Momentum trading strategies (R, H)    
   (3,3)  (3,6)  (3,9)  (3,12)  (6,3)  (6,6)  (6,9)  (6,12)  (9,3)  (9,6)  (9,9)  (9,12)  (12,3)  (12,6)  (12,9)  (12,12) 
β  0.036  0.038  0.027  0.041  0.055  0.049  0.035  0.028  0.047  0.052  0.044  0.039  0.03  0.048  0.052  0.053 
t(β)  2.99  3.04  3.18  2.58  2.05  3.16  3.37  3.05  3.28  3.37  2.19  3.06  4.15  2.85  3.06  2.19 
s  0.31  0.44  0.39  0.27  0.51  0.47  0.34  0.29  0.51  0.58  0.43  0.37  0.42  0.5  0.51  0.59 
t(s)  2.99  3.51  3.28  4.05  5.07  3.79  4.06  3.82  4.16  3.07  4.11  3.07  4.16  5.25  4.13  3.94 
f  0.72  0.67  0.59  0.81  0.74  0.61  0.73  0.8  0.77  0.69  0.84  0.87  0.72  0.63  0.59  0.88 
t(f)  3.45  4.99  6.03  4.39  5.07  6.15  3.92  4.02  5.15  6.33  5.29  4.31  5.01  3.49  5.28  6.01 
This table presents the factor loadings results from the risk adjustment process of the raw momentum premia of 16 different momentum trading strategies in 
the Chinese Class A share market based on Wang & Xu(2004)’s version of the FF3F model. The risk adjustment process can be mathematically expressed 
as:  (   ),  −   ,  =   +     ,  −   ,   +  (    ) +  (   _    ) +    .    _     represents the difference between the average monthly returns of 
portfolios consisting of 20% of all eligible Class A shares with the highest residual free float ratios—resulted from regressing free float ratios against log 
market capitalizations of corresponding firms—and those of portfolios with 20% of all eligible Class A shares with the lowest free float ratios, known as the 
strength of corporate governance factor at different time points.   represents the portion of the raw momentum premium that cannot be justified by the three 
aforementioned risk factors embedded in the Wang & Xu (2004)’s version of the FF3F model.  , ,  are the factor loadings (coefficients) from regressing 
estimation procedure on the market risk factor	   ,  −   ,   , size effect factor(    ), and the strength of corporate governance (   _    ) respectively, 
specifying the explanatory power of each risk factor over the raw momentum premia.    is an error factor, which is independently and identically distributed. 
The t statistics of corresponding estimated coefficients (loading factors) are listed in the row below. 
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Additionally, we also adjusted the raw momentum premia of different momentum 
trading strategies over time periods following UP market state (defined by positive 
prior 12-month average market return), presented in Panel A of Table 5.2, in the 
Chinese Class A share market for different risk factors entailed in either traditional 
FF3F model or Wang & Xu (2004)’s version of the FF3F model. Conversely, it’s 
worth noting that the risk adjustment analysis is not performed for the raw 
momentum premia of different momentum strategies conditional on post-DOWN 
market state, reported in Panel B of Table 5.2, in that the momentum returns yielded 
over time periods following DOWN market state appear to be negative across most 
of the momentum trading strategies, revealing subdued momentum premia of the 
momentum strategies with post-DOWN market state condition without having been 
adjusted for risk factors. Naturally, the raw momentum premia of different trading 
strategies found in the Chinese Class A share market over periods following UP 
market state are zeroed in on. The risk-adjusted momentum premia of 16 
momentum trading strategies with different combinations of ranking and holding 
periods (R=3, 6, 9, 12; H=3, 6, 9, 12) over time periods following UP market state in 
the Chinese Class A share market based on traditional FF3F model and Wang & Xu 
(2004)’s version of FF3F model are reported in Table 8.7 and 8.8 respectively. 
Apparently, the pattern of the results is somewhat similar to what was described 
earlier on with respect to the risk-adjusted momentum premia of momentum trading 
strategies unconditional on market states—Wang & Xu(2004)’s version of the FF3F 
model exhibits superior ability in rationalizing the momentum premia of different 
momentum strategies over time periods following UP market state.   
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Table 8.7 Risk-adjusted momentum premia (monthly returns) in the Chinese Class A 
share market over time periods following UP market state based on the FF3F model 
(Jan. 1996- Dec. 2008) 
Risk-adjusted momentum premia (monthly returns) Class A share market following UP 
market state (12 months) 
Entire sample period Jan. 1996- Dec. 2008 
Risk adjusted based on FF3F model 
   Q5-Q1    
   H=3     H=6     H=9     H=12    
R=3  1.03  *  1.53  *  1.47  *  1.89  * 
Adjusted R^2  0.21     0.25     0.33     0.3    
R=6  0.87  *  1.02  1.68  **  1.54  * 
Adjusted R^2  0.24     0.28     0.35     0.29    
R=9  1.15  1.25  **  1.05  *  1.47  * 
Adjusted R^2  0.27     0.3     0.38     0.35    
R=12  0.61  1.16  *  1.23  *  1.65    
Adjusted R^2  0.31     0.37     0.43     0.45    
This table reports the risk-adjusted momentum premia of 16 different momentum trading strategies 
with different combination of ranking periods (R=3, 6, 9, 12) and holding periods (H=3, 6, 9, 12) in the 
Chinese Class A share market (all eligible Class A shares listed in the SHSE and SZSE) over the time 
periods following UP market state (defined by positive prior 12 month average market return) for the 
entire sample period from Jan. 1996 to Dec. 2008. In light of the structure of FF3F model, the risk-
adjusted momentum premia are calculated by regressing corresponding raw momentum of different 
momentum trading strategies, reported in the Panel A of Table 5, against three risk factors, namely 
market risk factor (  ,  −   , ), firm size effect factor(    ), and value effect factor (    ). 
Mathematically, it can be expressed as  (   ),  −   ,  =   +     ,  −   ,   +  (    ) + ℎ(    ) +   . 
The adjusted R^2 is specified for the risk-adjusted momentum premium of each momentum trading 
strategy, indicating the percentage of variation in raw momentum premia can be jointly explained by 
the three risk factors, taking into account the number of regressors (risk factors). The number of 
asterisk(s) indicates the statistical significance of the risk-adjusted momentum premia, with one 
asterisk showing that the relevant risk-adjusted momentum premium is statistically significant at 10% 
level while two showing the relevant risk-adjusted momentum premium is statistically significant at 5% 
level. All the risk-adjusted momentum premia are present in percentage term.  Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty   Chapter 8 Robustnes test results 
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Table 8.8 Risk-adjusted momentum premia (monthly returns) in the Chinese Class A 
share market over the time periods following UP market state based on Wang & Xu 
(2004)'s version of the FF3F model (Jan. 1996- Dec. 2008) 
Risk-adjusted momentum premia (monthly returns) Chinese Class A share market 
following UP market state (12 months) 
Entire sample period from Jan. 1996 to Dec. 2008 
Risk adjusted based on Wang & Xu (2004)'s version of the FF3F model 
   Q5-Q1    
   H=3     H=6     H=9     H=12    
R=3  0.88  1.01  0.95  *  1.12    
Adjusted R^2  0.41     0.44     0.4     0.53    
R=6  0.45  0.83  1.26  **  0.96    
Adjusted R^2  0.46     0.52     0.57     0.62    
R=9  0.49  0.77  *  0.81  *  1.08  * 
Adjusted R^2  0.49     0.55     0.56     0.62    
R=12  0.35  0.94  1.07  *  1.24    
Adjusted R^2  0.53     0.55     0.51     0.6    
This table reports the risk-adjusted momentum premia of 16 different momentum trading strategies 
with different combination of ranking periods (R=3, 6, 9, 12) and holding periods (H=3, 6, 9, 12) in the 
Chinese Class A share market (all eligible Class A shares listed in the SHSE and SZSE) for the entire 
sample period from Jan. 1996 to Dec. 2008 over the time periods following UP market state (defined 
by positive prior 12-month market average return). In light of the structure of Wang & Xu (2004)’s 
version of the FF3F model, the risk-adjusted momentum premia are calculated by regressing 
corresponding raw momentum of different momentum trading strategies, reported in the Panel A of 
Table 5, against three risk factors, namely market risk factor (  ,  −   , ), firm size effect factor(    ), 
and residual free float ratio factor (   _    ) . Mathematically, it can be expressed as  (   ),  −
  ,  =   +     ,  −   ,   +  (    ) +  (   _    ) +    . The adjusted R^2 is specified for the risk-
adjusted momentum premium of each momentum trading strategy, indicating the percentage of 
variation in raw momentum premia can be jointly explained by the three risk factors, taking into 
account the number of regressors (risk factors). The number of asterisk(s) indicates the statistical 
significance of the risk-adjusted momentum premia, with one asterisk showing that the relevant risk-
adjusted momentum premium is statistically significant at 10% level while two showing the relevant 
risk-adjusted momentum premium is statistically significant at 5% level. All the risk-adjusted 
momentum premia are present in percentage term. 
 
Table 8.9 summarizes the risk-adjusted momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) 
momentum trading strategy conditional on 7 different IU proxy factors (firm size, firm 
age, analysts’ coverage, return volatility, dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecast, 
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market over the entire sample period from January 1996 to December 2008. The 
amplifying effect of information uncertainty over the momentum premia is still evident. 
Nevertheless, compared with the results of raw momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) 
momentum trading strategy at different levels of information uncertainty, proxied by 
the aforementioned 7 factors, reported in chapter 6, the pattern of the risk-adjusted 
momentum premia based on traditional FF3F model and Wang & Xu (2004)’s 
version of the FF3F model is commensurate with the one observed earlier on in the 
section. Specifically, the Wang & Xu (2004)’s version of the FF3F model is more 
capable of justifying the momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) momentum trading 
strategy conditional on IU across different IU proxy factors, reinforcing the validity of 
our conjecture that Wang & Xu (2004)’s approach of including the strength of 
corporate governance enhances the explanatory power of the FF3F model over the 
momentum premia.  
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Table 8.9 Risk-adjusted momentum premia (monthly returns) of the (R=6, H=6) 
momentum trading strategy under the influence of information uncertainty (firm size, 
firm age, analysts' coverage, return volatility, dispersion in analysts' earnings 
forecast, trading volume and the strength of corporate governance(free float ratio)) in 
the Chinese Class A share market over the entire sample period from Jan. 1996 to 
Dec. 2008 based on the traditional FF3F model and Wang & Xu (2004)’s version of 
the FF3F model 
Risk-adjusted momentum premia (monthly returns) of the (R=6, H=6) momentum 
strategy conditional on IU proxies 
Chinese Class A share market 
   Q5-Q1    
   IU1  IU2  IU3  IU4  IU5 
Firm size  FF3F  1.18  0.85  0.99  0.83  0.98 
   t value  3.51  4.82  3.07  4.99  5.5 
   WXFF3F  0.75  0.49  0.42  0.5  0.65 
   t value  2.01  1.59  1.3  2.18  2.55 
Firm age   FF3F  0.68  0.39  0.46  0.35  0.96 
   t value  3.99  5.16  3.01  6.13  4.04 
   WXFF3F  0.31  0.18  0.2  0.13  0.46 
   t value  1.09  0.62  2.11  1.37  2.08 
Coverage  FF3F  1.89  2.01  2.47  1.86  2.05 
   t value  2.55  1.84  3.08  4.55  7.91 
   WXFF3F  1.17  1.64  1.81  1.39  1.66 
   t value  1.99  2.04  2.14  1.05  2.28 
VOL  FF3F  0.29  0.25  0.22  0.31  0.69 
   t value  2.15  3.01  3.85  6.17  5.18 
   WXFF3F  0.05  0.18  0.14  0.2  0.37 
   t value  0.24  1.03  2.18  2.51  1.99 
DISP  FF3F  1.05  1.13  1.2  1.18  1.29 
   t value  8.91  10.5  15.05  7.22  10.51 
   WXFF3F  0.23  0.46  0.5  0.49  0.61 
   t value  1.09  0.83  3.01  2.95  4.05 
Volume  FF3F  0.65  0.52  0.49  0.55  0.69 
   t value  3.91  4.03  5.99  5.68  5.09 
   WXFF3F  0.31  0.27  0.19  0.44  0.5 
   t value  0.11  1.55  1.08  2.31  1.85 
Governance  FF3F  1.68  1.75  2.37  2.6  3.81 
   t value  4.01  6.85  9.42  8.84  15.5 
   WXFF3F  0.57  1.05  1.29  1.88  2.09 
   t value  1.05  2.86  3.59  2.68  3.92 
This table reports the risk-adjusted momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) momentum trading strategy 
conditional on 7 different IU proxy factors (firm size, firm age, analysts’ coverage, return volatility, 
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the Chinese Class A share market for the entire sample period from Jan. 1996 to Dec. 2008 based on 
two versions of the FF3F models—the traditional FF3F model:  (   ),  −   ,  =   +     ,  −   ,   +
 (    ) + ℎ(    ) +    and Wang & Xu(2004)’s version of the FF3F model:  (   ),  −   ,  =   +
    ,  −   ,   +  (    ) +  (   _    ) +   . The specifications of both models are described in rich 
detail in Data and methodology chapter and earlier on in this section. Succinctly, in the Wang & 
Xu(2004)’s version of the FF3F model, the residual free float ratio, resulted from regressing free float 
ratio against logarithm market capitalization of corresponding firm, is included as the third risk factor 
instead of the value effect factor of the traditional FF3F model. The risk-adjusted momentum premia 
are present in percentage term.  
 
Taken together, by implementing risk adjustment analysis, we find that overall Wang 
& Xu (2004)’s version of the FF3F model is superior in justifying the momentum 
premia of different momentum trading strategies, the momentum strategies 
conditional on market states as well as the (R=6, H=6) trading strategy conditional 
on 7 different IU proxy factors. Notwithstanding, the risk factors—market risk factor, 
firm size effect factor, value effect factor, and the residual free float ratio (strength of 
corporate governance)—included in two versions of the FF3F model are still yet to 
fully explain the momentum premia of momentum trading strategies examined in this 
study. 
8.4 Summary 
This chapter reports the results from two robustness tests. In section 8.2, through 
running a sub-period analysis, we show that the momentum premia of momentum 
trading strategies examined remain positive and exhibit strong statistical significance 
over the time periods revolving two financial market regulatory reforms— 1) July 1
st, 
1999: the implementation of the new P.R.C security law; 2) July 9
th, 2003: the 
opening of Chinese Class A share market to qualified foreign institutional investors 
(QFII) in the Chinese stock market, indicating that the empirical findings of pervasive 
momentum premium in this study is not sample period-specific. In section 8.3, we Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty   Chapter 8 Robustnes test results 
 
- 256 - 
 
adjust the raw momentum premia of different momentum strategies for the risk 
factors—market risk factor, firm size effect factor, value effect factor, residual free 
float ratio (strength of corporate governance) entailed in traditional FF3F model and 
Wang & Xu (2004)’s version of the FF3F model and show that consistent with our 
conjecture, Wang & Xu’s version of the FF3F model, replacing the value effect factor 
with the residual free float ratio factor (the quality/strength of corporate governance), 
is superior in justifying the momentum premia than the traditional FF3F model yet 
both asset pricing models fail to fully rationalize the anomalous effect in the setting of 
the Chinese Class A share market. 
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Chapter 9 Conclusion 
9.1 Concluding remarks 
The underlying motivation of the research is not limited to the investigation on the 
existence of the momentum premia of different momentum trading strategies with 
ranking and holding periods (both range between short-to-intermediate time horizon) 
in the Chinese Class A share market per se but also to scrutinise the dynamics of 
the momentum premia of momentum trading strategies under post-UP and DOWN 
market states conditions in the Chinese Class A share market. Further, we expand 
the understanding of the momentum phenomenon in the setting of the Chinese stock 
market by studying the impact of the information uncertainty over the momentum 
premia of different momentum trading strategies as well as the impact of the 
information uncertainty over the momentum premia during time periods following UP 
and DOWN market states. More explicitly, we test our conjectures through 
comparing the empirical findings we arrived at in this research against a set of 
hypotheses theorized to succinctly reflect the essence of our conjectures as 
described in section 2.6 Summary/testing hypotheses of chapter 2 theoretical 
framework. 
Responding to the four testing hypotheses, we find that the momentum premia are 
universally positive and statistically significant across 16 different momentum trading 
strategies with different combinations of ranking and holding periods (R= 3, 6, 9, 12; 
J=3, 6, 9, 12) in the Chinese Class A share market. The result differs from other 
previous studies on the topic for the reasons such as different frequency of the 
dataset (Wu, 2004), sample time horizons (Kang et al., 2002), market 
segments(Naughton et al., 2008) chosen to focus on. The observation that the Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty                     Chapter 9 Conclusion 
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momentum premia found here in the Chinese Class A share market are more 
pervasive than those found in more developed financial markets such as the U.S. 
(Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993) and the U.K. (Hon and Tonks, 2003) markets, which 
can be attributed to the evidence showing that Asian/Chinese investors are 
predisposed to practice evaluative information processing, overly reliant on intuitive 
heuristics such as affective and representativeness heuristics of System 1(intuitive) 
of two cognitive systems (Kahneman and Frederick, 2002) and excessive 
overconfidence (Yates et al., 1998), consequently leading to the more pronounced 
momentum premia across different momentum strategies in the Chinese Class A 
share market (Daniel et al., 2001, Barberis et al., 1998, Du, 2002, Hong and Stein, 
1999). Among different momentum investing strategies, the momentum premia 
gradually increase as the holding period lengthens from 3 months to 12 months, yet 
deteriorate as the ranking period extends from 3 months to 12 months, plausible 
based on the investors’ overconfidence theory by Daniel et al. (1998) and investors’ 
underconfidence theory by Du (2002) respectively. Specifically, subdued momentum 
premia for trading strategies with longer ranking and shorter holding periods are 
driven by investors’ sour mood as the time to release their prediction outcomes 
draws nearer, triggering the detailed-oriented, systematic information processing 
strategy involving frequent practice of reflective heuristics of System 2 (reflective) of 
two cognitive systems (Kahneman and Frederick, 2002) (Schwarz, 1990) and the 
sanguine confidence level of investors as longer ranking periods renders them 
access to more information, prompting more decisive and timely decision making of 
even underconfidence investors, jointly depressing the momentum premia.  
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prior-12 or 24-month average Chinese Class A share market returns, we show that 
the momentum premia of different momentum strategies over time periods following 
UP market state outstrip those over time periods following DOWN market state in the 
Chinese Class A share market for the entire sample period from January 1996 to 
December 2008. Investors’ optimism/overconfidence on the heels of market run-ups 
is deemed as the driving force behind the observation. Specifically, investors 
misplace weights on the strength of the information (Griffin and Tversky, 1992) and 
rely heavily on intuitive heuristics such as affective heuristics of System 1(intuitive) of 
two cognitive systems (Kahneman and Frederick, 2002), elicited by their optimism 
and overconfidence, subsequently giving a boost to the momentum premia. In 
addition, the surge in herding activities among Chinese investors post-market upside 
movements could also substantiate the momentum premia over time periods 
following DOWN market state. 
By employing 7 factors—firm size, firm age, analysts’ coverage, return volatility, 
dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecast, trading volume, the quality/strength of 
corporate governance (free float ratio)—to proxy for the degree of firm-specific 
information uncertainty, we find that the average monthly returns of “loser” 
momentum quintiles tend to be negatively related to IU levels, yet the average 
monthly returns of “winner” momentum quintiles are positively associated with IU 
levels, in accord with the prediction of our hypothese and corroborated by the 
underreaction theory and gradual information diffusion theory (Hong and Stein, 1999, 
Hong et al., 2000). More importantly, we find that momentum premia of the (R=6, 
H=6) momentum trading strategy are universally positively related to information 
uncertainty when 7 different variables are used to proxy for the degree of IU, Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty                     Chapter 9 Conclusion 
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suggesting that information uncertainty evidently amplifies the momentum premia 
across different IU levels. The preceding evidence can be interpreted as: in face of 
greater information uncertainty, investors are inclined to introduce more optimistic 
biases into their judgmental processes (Armor and Taylor, 1998), a prompt for 
extensive practice of intuitive heuristics such as affective, representativeness 
heuristics of System 1(intuitive) of two cognitive system (Kahneman and Frederick, 
2002), coupled with insufficient amount of statistics knowledge among Chinese retail 
investors (Kang et al., 2002), resulting in soaring momentum premia under the 
influence of information uncertainty. The evidence can also be interpreted as the 
resultant of more intensive herding behaviours among Chinese investors in face of 
information uncertainty (Yeh and Lee, 2000, Grinblatt et al., 1995, Nofsinger and 
Sias, 1999) and is consistent with the prediction of the underreaciton theory (Hong 
and Stein, 1999) and gradual information diffusion theory (Hong et al., 2000).  
Taking the investigation on the impact of information uncertainty over momentum 
premia a step further, we split the whole sample period into time periods following 
UP and DOWN market states and find that the amplifying effect of information 
uncertainty over the momentum premia is further exacerbated over time periods 
following DOWN market state, yet is blunted over time periods following UP market 
state. The exacerbated amplifying effect of information uncertainty over momentum 
premia could be the resultant of two different processes. First, the bearish sentiment 
in the time periods following market downside movements (Brown and Cliff, 2004) 
and heightened level of information uncertainty sap the confidence of underconfident 
investors, resulting in the enhanced amplifying effect of information uncertainty over 
the momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) momentum trading strategy over the Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty                     Chapter 9 Conclusion 
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periods following DOWN market state in the Chinese Class A share market  
according to Du (2002)’s investors’ underconfidence behavioural model. Secondly, 
on the heels of market downdraft, investors have scarce cognitive resources, eliciting 
the evaluative (intuitive) information processing strategy (Frederick, 2002) involving 
frequent practice of intuitive heuristics such as affective and representativeness of 
System 1(intuitive) of two cognitive systems (Kahneman and Frederick, 2002), 
boosting the momentum premia (Daniel et al., 1998, Barberis et al., 1998, Du, 2002, 
Hong and Stein, 1999). Akin to the finding mentioned earlier, a dichotomy on which 
(positive or negative) momentum is driving asymmetry between positive and 
negative momentum and in turn momentum premium is still evidently present, 
corroborating the postulate that the impetus behind the asymmetry between positive 
and negative momentums and main driving force behind the momentum premia are 
IU proxy factor-specific. On this front, the quality/strength of corporate governance 
as IU proxy in amplifying the momentum premia stands out as the amplifying effect 
does not diminish even over time periods following UP market state, countering the 
evidence that the amplifying effect of information uncertainty, proxied by the rest of 
IU proxy factors, turn dismal over time periods following UP market state. 
Through applying sub-period analysis revolving the inception of two financial market 
regulatory reforms— 1) July 1
st, 1999: the implementation of the new P.R.C. security 
law; 2) July 9
th, 2003: the opening of Chinese Class A share market to qualified 
foreign institutional investors (QFII), we find that overall the momentum premia of 
different momentum strategies in the Chinese Class A share market are resilient and 
not sample period-specific. The considerably larger momentum premia found over 
pre-event periods compared with those found over post-event periods is the resultant Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty                     Chapter 9 Conclusion 
 
- 262 - 
 
of heightened perception of risk, elicited by greater information uncertainty ahead of 
regulatory reforms (Schwarz, 1990), exacerbating the underconfidence of investors, 
amplifying the momentum premia (Du, 2002). Conversely, the dampened momentum 
premia over post-event periods reflect the amelioration in terms of operational 
efficiency of the Chinese stock market, kindled by the inception of financial market 
regulatory reforms. Moreover, the momentum premia of 16 different momentum 
trading strategies over pre- and post- event 2 periods eclipse those of matching 
strategies over corresponding time periods of event 1, indicating the influx of novice 
Chinese retail investors, who are lacking of sufficient amount of statistics knowledge, 
invoking more intuitive information processing strategy with the practice of intuitive 
heuristics of System 1(intuitive) of two cognitive systems (Kahneman and Frederick, 
2002, Nisbett et al., 1983), inflating the momentum premia (Daniel et al., 1998, 
Barberis et al., 1998, Du, 2002, Hong and Stein, 1999).  
By supplanting the value effect factor (    ) with the residual free float ratio (proxy 
of the quality/strength of corporate governance) (   _    ) as a risk factor, we 
show that the explanatory power of the traditional FF3F over momentum premia in 
the Chinese Class A share market is improved, corroborating Wang & Xu (2004)’s 
postulate that the inclusion of the quality/strength of corporate governance (the 
residual free float ratio) as a risk factor in asset pricing improves the explanatory 
power of the FF3F model over cross-sectional stock returns in the setting of the 
Chinese stock market. Nevertheless, neither the traditional FF3F model nor Wang & 
Xu (2004)’s version of the FF3F model can fully rationalize the momentum premia of 
different momentum trading strategies in the Chinese Class A share market.  
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9.2 Contributions to the literature and practical implications 
The findings of this study, summarized in previous section, contribute to the literature 
in various ways and bear significant practical implications in view of the current 
volatile financial market around the globe. 
All told, the theoretical contributions of this study to the literature are five-fold: 
First, we examine the existence of the momentum premia of 16 different momentum 
trading strategies with different combinations of ranking and holding periods (R=3, 6, 
9, 12; H=3, 6, 9, 12) in the Chinese Class A share market over the sample period 
spanning from January 1996 to December 2008. The investigation per se is not 
ground-breaking yet the results from the investigation complement those found in 
previous studies with respect to the existence of momentum premium in the Chinese 
stock market, where the frequency of data, sample time horizon, or the time horizon 
of the momentum trading strategies (e.g. intermediate-to-long horizon: 12-24 months) 
chosen differ from the specifications of the data and momentum investing strategies 
selection of this study, and therefore offer a unique view of the existence of 
momentum premium in the setting of the Chinese stock market. 
Secondly, this research investigates the dynamics of the momentum premia of 
different momentum investing strategies (short-to-intermediate time horizon) amidst 
market swings in the Chinese Class A stock market, expanding the empirical 
evidence from previous studies by Cooper et al. (2004), Siganos and Chelley-
Steeley (2006), Huang (2006) and Du et al. (2009) concerning the U.S. stock market, 
U.K. stock market, an international context (excluding the Chinese stock market) and 
Taiwan stock market respectively, and consequently filling the gap in the extant 
literature. Moreover, given that most of studies in the domain such as Asem and Tian 
(2009) and Du et al. (2009) zeroing in on the behaviour of the momentum premium Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty                     Chapter 9 Conclusion 
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of the (R=6, H=6) momentum investing strategy in the U.S. and Taiwan stock 
markets respectively, this research also offer a comprehensive view of the behaviour 
of the momentum premia of all 16 momentum investing strategies in the Chinese 
Class A share market. 
Then, in view that study concerning the influence of information uncertainty has 
become increasingly entrenched in the research domain of social sciences and 
finance, inspired by the seminal research on this front by Jiang et al. (2005) and 
Zhang (2006) both with focus on the U.S. stock market, we study the influence of 
information uncertainty over the momentum premium of the (R=6, H=6) momentum 
trading strategy (as a representative of all 16 momentum investing strategies) in the 
Chinese Class A share market. Although many IU proxy factors employed in this 
study such as firm size and firm age have been espoused as IU proxy in Jiang et al. 
(2005) and Zhang (2006)’s methodological approach, we not only implement the 
methodology in the unique setting of the Chinese stock market, which has yet to be 
done in the extant literature per se, but also include the quality/strength of corporate 
governance as an IU proxy, tempted to the unique characteristic of the Chinese 
stock market—a split between tradable and non-tradable shares, which makes the 
gauge of the strength of corporate governance possible through free float ratio—in 
the light of intricate relationship between information uncertainty and corporate 
governance documented in the literature (Magnan and Xu, 2008). Collectively, the 
findings from this research expand the understanding of the measurement of firm-
level information uncertainty given that there is not a consensus view on the matter 
in the extant literature. 
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premium of momentum investing strategy further, we explore the behaviour of the 
momentum premium of the (R=6, H=6) momentum trading strategy amid market 
swings in the Chinese Class A share market. To our knowledge, this has never been 
done by anyone in any financial markets in the existing literature, let alone in the 
setting of the Chinese stock market. 
Last but certainly not the least, following the spirit of Wang & Xu (2004) whom 
postulate that the quality/strength of corporate governance possesses explanatory 
power over cross-sectional stock return in the Chinese stock market, the 
quality/strength of corporate governance is also espoused as a risk factor, 
supplanting the value effect factor of the traditional FF3F model, to justify the 
evidence of momentum premia of different momentum trading strategies found in 
this research, stressing the importance of the quality/strength of corporate 
governance in asset pricing literature in the context of the Chinese stock market and 
filling the gap in the existing literature. 
On the practical implication front, previous empirical evidences demonstrate the 
practicality of technical trading strategies in emerging stock markets (Bessembinder 
and Chan, 1998) and that the Chinese stock market is still lacking of interrelation 
with other developed markets even after the implementation of many financial 
market regulatory reforms, aimed at strengthening its tie with other developed 
financial markets around the globe (Lin and Swanson, 2008). Both of these two 
aforementioned characteristics of the Chinese stock market imply that the Chinese 
stock market is still a prime sourcing location for international investors’ portfolio 
strategy formation and diversification (Phylaktis and Ravazzolo, 2005). Therefore, 
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market swings and under the influence of information uncertainty is essential for 
global investors to promptly adjust their investment strategies and portfolio positions 
amid volatile market condition.  
As the dual role of corporate governance is explored in gauging the degree of firm-
level information uncertainty and in rationalizing the momentum premium in this 
research, analysts and fund managers might be able to make better use of the 
relevant information in assessing the plausibility of investing in the Chinese stock 
market or including Chinese stocks as part of their portfolio strategies. Also, 
considering the intricate relationship between stock returns and the quality/strength 
of corporate governance of corresponding list firms, the findings of this research 
might be of interest to Chinese policy makers in regulating the proportion of non-
tradable shares within listed firms in the Chinese financial market. 
 
9.3 Limitations and future research avenues 
The findings of this research should be viewed with a couple of caveats:  
1) the transaction costs associated with momentum investing is not addressed in this 
research. With transactions costs for Class A shares and Class B shares currently 
standing at 0.119% and 0.058% respectively, a large chunk of the momentum 
premia will surely be eaten away, blunting the practicality of the implementation of 
the momentum trading strategy on its own in the setting of the Chinese stock market. 
However, as transaction costs have been increasingly cut down by the authorities to 
underpin the healthy liquidity level of the stock market over recent years, the 
implementation of the momentum trading strategy as part of a mix of portfolio 
strategies appears rather promising.  Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty                     Chapter 9 Conclusion 
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2) short-selling activities are currently not legalized in the Chinese stock market. The 
constraint of short selling makes shorting losers, essential part of the momentum 
trading, practically impossible. Nevertheless, given that the Chinese stock market 
has been increasingly embracing practice aligned with international standard and a 
market openness policy in the recent decade, the relaxation of the constraint of short 
selling is just a matter of time. 
Seeing that the disposition effect can have considerable impact over investors’ 
behaviours from neroeconomics point of view, it would be intriguing to look into how 
the disposition effect plays out in affecting the amplifying effect of information 
uncertainty over the momentum premium. Furthermore, an investigation on why 
different information proxy factor is capable of shifting the power of positive and 
negative momentum in determining the momentum premium under the conditions of 
post-UP and post-DOWN market states could be another promising future research 
avenue. Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty                     Chapter 9 Conclusion 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1. The current constituents of the Shanghai Composite Index 
 
For detailed list of the constituents, please refer to 
http://www.sse.com.cn/sseportal/index/en/singleIndex/000001/const/index_const_list
_en_1.shtml?code=000001&type=2 
 
Appendix 2. The current constituents of the Shenzhen Composite Index 
For detailed list of the constituents, please refer to 
http://www.szse.cn/main/en/marketdata/Indiceslist/# 
 
Appendix 3. The current constituents of the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) 
A Share Index 
For detailed list of the constituents, please refer to 
http://www.sse.com.cn/sseportal/index/en/singleIndex/000002/const/index_const_list
_en_1.shtml?code=000002&type=2 
Appendix 4. The current constituents of the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) 
B Share Index 
For detailed list of the constituents, please refer to 
http://www.sse.com.cn/sseportal/index/en/singleIndex/000003/const/index_const_list
_en_1.shtml?code=000003&type=2 
Appendix 5. The current constituents of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) 
A Share Index 
For detailed list of the constituents, please refer to 
http://www.szse.cn/main/en/marketdata/Indiceslist/# 
Appendix 6. The current constituents of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) 
B Share Index 
For detailed list of the constituents, please refer to 
http://www.szse.cn/main/en/marketdata/Indiceslist/# 
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Appendix 7. Huang (2006)’s results of asymmetric momentum premia 
following UP and DOWN market states 
 
(3,3)  (3,6)  (3,9)  (3,12)  (6,3)  (6,6)  (6,9)  (6,12) 
UP   0.67  1.04  1.41  1.135  0.81  1.195  1.265  0.82 
DOWN  -0.53  -0.34  0.14  -0.46  -0.045  0.13  -0.05  -0.575 
Difference  1.2  1.38  1.27  1.595  0.855  1.065  1.315  1.395 
                 
 
(9,3)  (9,6)  (9,9)  (9,12)  (12,3)  (12,6)  (12,9)  (12,12) 
UP   0.91  1.01  0.885  0.585  0.655  0.56  0.57  0.41 
DOWN  0.4  0.055  -0.275  -0.62  -0.19  -0.36  -0.605  -0.96 
Difference  0.51  0.955  1.16  1.205  0.845  0.92  1.175  1.37 
Source: Huang (2006): page 442 
 
 
Appendix 8. Results of analysis on the behaviours of momentum premia 
under the influence of information uncertainty over time periods following 
UP and DOWN market states (defined by prior 24-month average market 
return) 
Firm size as IU proxy 
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Table 1. Momentum premia (monthly returns) under the influence of IU (proxied by 
firm size) during the time periods following UP and DOWN market states (24 months) 
(the (R=6, H=6) momentum trading strategy) in the Chinese Class A share market 
(Jan. 1996- Dec. 2008) 
 Panel A  Monthly returns of momentum quintiles and momentum premia 
   Following UP market state (24 months) 
   Momentum Quintile 
   Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q5  Q5-Q1  t-value 
  
Information uncertainty proxy: Firm size 
(1/MV)       
IU1  -0.26  0.15  0.6  0.77  0.72  0.98  2.95 
t-stats  -0.51  1.09  1.82  2.99  1.41       
IU2  -0.15  0.14  0.39  0.82  1.05  1.2  3.09 
t-stats  -0.62  1.47  1.85  2.24  2.56       
IU3  0.03  0.24  0.43  0.73  1.28  1.25  4.06 
t-stats  0.31  2.03  1.46  1.03  2.72       
IU4  0.12  0.36  0.54  0.93  1.41  1.29  3.09 
t-stats  0.78  1.08  1.27  2.32  3.1       
IU5  0.22  0.37  0.48  1.25  1.58  1.36  5.01 
t-stats  0.72  1.93  1.28  3.4  4.08       
IU5-IU1  0.48  0.22  -0.12  0.48  0.86  0.38    
t-value  0.61  0.94  -0.16  1.85  3.04  2.05    
 
Panel B.          Monthly returns of momentum quintiles and momentum premia  
Following DOWN market state 
   Momentum Quintile 
   Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q5  Q5-Q1  t-value 
   Information uncertainty proxy: Firm size (1/MV) 
IU1  0.69  1.21  1.04  1.12  1.95  1.26  4.15 
t-stats  1.27  5.05  3.94  3.1  1.99       
IU2  0.74  1.38  1.17  1.47  2.55  1.81  8.58 
t-stats  2.75  5.14  3.81  2.09  5.17       
IU3  0.92  1.42  1.19  1.53  2.78  1.86  10.5 
t-stats  3.91  2.05  2.14  3.35  6.77       
IU4  1.12  1.13  1.26  1.73  3.21  2.09  10.69 
t-stats  1.69  3.04  5.28  3.99  7.49       
IU5  1.24  1.65  1.39  1.84  3.57  2.33  10.62 
t-stats  2.14  3.62  4.37  2.81  7.73       
IU5-IU1  0.55  0.44  0.35  0.72  1.62  1.07    
t-value  2.06  1.85  2.03  1.58  4.17  2.51    
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the influence of different levels of IU over time periods following UP and DOWN market states, as 
shown in Panel A and Panel B respectively, in the Chinese Class A share market for the sample 
period spanning from January 1996 to December 2008. The UP and DOWN market states are 
defined by prior 24-month average market return, with a consolidated Chinese Share A index being 
employed as a proxy for market portfolio. For simplicity and ease of comparison, the (R=6, H=6) 
momentum trading strategy is focused on in the investigation on the influence of information 
uncertainty on the momentum premia over time periods following UP and DOWN market states. The 
portfolios are formed based on independent two-way sorting mechanism, described in rich detail in 
the methodology chapter and in chapter 6. Simply put, all the eligible stocks are ranked based on their 
prior 6-month returns and firm size, measured by the reciprocal of their market capitalization (1/MV) 
prior to the ranking period purely for ease of illustration, independently into 5 quintiles for each factor. 
Taking the intersections of these 10 quintiles gives rise to 25 momentum-IU portfolios in total, with 
every stock being equally weighted within every portfolio. After skipping a month, all the resulted 
portfolios are held for 6 months following the buy-and-hold strategy to curb trading costs from the 
perspective of practicality. The momentum premia (Q5-Q1) is determined by the difference between 
the average monthly return of “winner” portfolio (Q5) and that of “loser” portfolio (Q1), the significance 
of which is indicated by corresponding t statistics. The calculation of the momentum premia under 
influence of IU over the periods following UP and DOWN market states is akin to Cooper et al.(2006), 
Huang(2006) Siagnos and Chelley-Steeley(20060 and Du et al. (2009)’s approach. Mathematically, 
the procedure can be expressed as     ,  =     ,      +     ,          +   		.	 All the numbers 
in the table are in percentage term.  
 
Table 2. Equality test results of state-dependent momentum-IU (firm size) premia 
(following UP and DOWN market states) in the Chinese Class A share market (the 
(R=6, H=6) momentum trading strategy) 
Equality test (MOM and IU (1/MV))(24 months)    
   UP-DOWN=0       
   IU1  IU2  IU3  IU4  IU5  IU5-IU1 
Q5-Q1 (UP)  0.98  1.2  1.25  1.29  1.36  0.38 
Q5-Q1(DOWN)  1.26  1.81  1.86  2.09  2.33  1.07 
Difference  -0.28  -0.61  -0.61  -0.8  -0.97    
t stats  -2.03  -1.84  -2.38  -1.98  -2.01    
Overall  1.34  1.77  1.66  1.78  2.4  1.06 
This table reports the difference between the momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) momentum trading 
strategy conditional on different level of information uncertainty in the Chinese Class A share market 
for the sample period from Jan. 1996 to Dec. 2008. The difference is estimated by regressing the raw 
momentum-IU premia against an UP dummy variable (   )	 and an intercept (  ), following the same 
methodology for equality test used by Cooper et al. (2004) and Du et al. (2009). Mathematically, it can 
be written as      ,  =   +     ,           +    . The t statistics associated with each difference is 
listed in the row below. 
Figure 1. Comparison between the momentum-IU (firm size) premia of the (R=6, 
H=6) strategy over the time periods following UP and DOWN market states in the 
Chinese Class A share market (Jan. 1996- Dec. 2008) (prior 24-month average 
market return as market state definition) Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty                                     Appendices 
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Notes: The column-shaped diagram illustrates the difference of momentum-IU premia of the (R=6, 
H=6) momentum trading strategy over time periods following UP and DOWN market states in the 
Chinese Class A share market for the sample time period. The vertical axis measures the momentum-
IU premia in percentage form; the horizontal axis labels the 5 different levels of IU, with IU1 
representing the lowest level and IU5 the highest level. For each IU level, the corresponding 
momentum premium following UP market state is demonstrated by the blue-coloured column, 
whereas that following DOWN market state is indicated by the red-coloured column. 
Figure 2. Comparison: momentum-IU (firm size) premia over periods following UP 
market state, momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) strategy conditional on post-UP 
market state, overall momentum-IU (firm size) premia in the Chinese Class A share 
market (Jan.1996- Dec. 2008) (24 months) 
 
Notes: This figure demonstrates the difference among momentum-IU premia over periods following 
UP market state, momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) momentum strategy conditional on post-UP 
market state, overall momentum-IU premia in the Chinese Class A share market. The vertical axis 
measures the returns in percentage form. The blue line represents the fluctuations in the momentum 
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premia across different levels of IU over the periods following UP market state; the red line illustrates 
the premium of (R=6, H=6) momentum strategy unconditional on IU and market states; the green line 
represents the changes of momentum premia across different IU levels unconditional on market 
states. 
Figure 3. Comparison: momentum-IU (firm size) premia over periods following 
DOWN market state, momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) strategy conditional on 
post-DOWN market state, overall momentum-IU (firm size) premia in the Chinese 
Class A share market (Jan.1996- Dec. 2008) 
 
Notes: This figure demonstrates the difference among momentum-IU premia over periods following 
DOWN market state, momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) momentum strategy conditional on post-
DOWN market state, overall momentum-IU premia in the Chinese Class A share market. The vertical 
axis measures the returns in percentage form. The blue line represents the fluctuations in the 
momentum premia across different levels of IU over the periods following DOWN market state; the 
red line illustrates the premium of (R=6, H=6) momentum strategy unconditional on IU and market 
states; the green line represents the changes of momentum premia across different IU levels 
unconditional on market states. 
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Figure 4. Asymmetry of positive momentum (Q5) and negative momentum (Q1) over 
the time periods following UP and DOWN market states in the Chinese Class A 
share market (Jan. 1996 – Dec. 2008) (firm size) (24 months) 
   UP market 
   Q1  Q5  Q1+Q5 
IU1  -0.26  0.72  0.46 
IU2  -0.15  1.05  0.9 
IU3  0.03  1.28  1.31 
IU4  0.12  1.41  1.53 
IU5  0.22  1.58  1.8 
IU5-IU1 
   
1.34 
   DOWN market 
   Q1  Q5  Q1+Q5 
IU1  0.69  1.95  2.64 
IU2  0.74  2.55  3.29 
IU3  0.92  2.78  3.7 
IU4  1.12  3.21  4.33 
IU5  1.24  3.57  4.81 
IU5-IU1        2.17 
 
 
Notes: The statistics box above the figure summarizes positive momentum (Q5) and negative 
momentum (Q1) for testing periods following UP and DOWN market states. This figure depicts the 
difference of the asymmetry of positive momentum (Q5) and negative momentum (Q1) over the time 
periods following UP market state, plotted as the blue line, and DOWN market state, graphed as the 
red line in the Chinese Class A share market over Jan. 1996 to Dec. 2008.The vertical axis measures 
the sum of positive momentum (returns of “winner” portfolio) and negative momentum (returns of 
“loser” portfolio) under each level of IU; the horizontal axis labels 5 different level of information 
uncertainty. The upward sloped lines suggest that regardless of market states, the positive 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
IU1 IU2 IU3 IU4 IU5
Q1+Q5 (UP)
Q1+Q5 (DOWN)Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty                                     Appendices 
 
- 276 - 
 
momentum (Q5) or the returns of “winner” portfolios tend to overwhelm the negative momentum (Q1) 
or the returns of “loser” portfolios in contributing to the momentum premia as IU level increases.  
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Table 3. Momentum premia (monthly returns) under IU (proxied by firm age) during 
the time periods following UP and DOWN market states (24 months) (the (R=6, H=6) 
momentum trading strategy) in the Chinese Class A share market (Jan. 1996- Dec. 
2008)  
Panel A.        Monthly returns of momentum quintiles and momentum premia 
Following UP market state (24 months) 
   Momentum Quintile 
   Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q5  Q5-Q1  t-value 
   Information uncertainty proxy: Firm age (1/Age) 
IU1  0.64  0.81  1.05  1.37  1.25  0.61  2.16 
t-stats  1.48  1.39  2.05  1.99  2.51       
IU2  0.43  0.62  1.25  1.2  1.07  0.64  0.99 
t-stats  0.64  0.93  1.04  1.72  0.63       
IU3  0.51  0.64  0.97  1.26  1.21  0.7  1.55 
t-stats  0.74  0.59  1.28  1.89  2.06       
IU4  0.31  0.45  0.5  0.75  1.27  0.96  1.83 
t-stats  0.88  1.04  0.85  1.05  0.94       
IU5  0.12  0.24  0.45  0.92  1.32  1.2  2.05 
t-stats  0.47  0.83  1.28  0.95  1.26       
IU5-IU1  -0.52  -0.57  -0.6  -0.45  0.07  0.59    
t-value  -0.64  -1.49  -0.58  -0.22  1.04  3.03    
 
Panel B.         Monthly returns of momentum quintiles and momentum premia 
Following DOWN market state (24 months) 
   Momentum Quintile 
   Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q5  Q5-Q1  t-value 
  
Information uncertainty proxy: Firm age 
(1/Age) 
 
  
IU1  1.93  2.58  1.65  2.5  2.31  0.38  7.1 
t-stats  4.06  2.95  6.01  3.95  5.51       
IU2  1.62  1.82  1.64  2.03  2.62  1  12.58 
t-stats  5.4  3.28  5.46  8.93  10.27       
IU3  1.17  1.34  1.6  2  2.53  1.36  15.5 
t-stats  4.02  2.94  5.39  7.16  8.09       
IU4  0.78  1.25  1.47  1.66  4.05  3.27  8.96 
t-stats  3.01  6.62  3.27  5.99  10.3       
IU5  0.49  1.17  1.06  1.69  4.29  3.8  10.66 
t-stats  2.16  3.61  9.45  6.7  5.51       
IU5-IU1  -1.44  -1.41  -0.59  -0.81  1.98  3.42    
t-value  -1.98  -0.41  -1.37  -0.72  4.55  2.88    
This table presents the average monthly returns of momentum quintiles and momentum premia under 
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shown in Panel A and Panel B respectively, in the Chinese Class A share market for the sample 
period spanning from January 1996 to December 2008. The UP and DOWN market states are 
defined by prior 24-month average market return, with a consolidated Chinese Share A index being 
employed as a proxy for market portfolio. The methodological approach is described in detail 
underneath Table 1. 
 
Table 4. Equality test results of state-dependent momentum-IU (firm age) premia 
(following UP and DOWN market states) in the Chinese Class A share market (the 
(R=6, H=6) momentum trading strategy) (24 months) 
Equality test (MOM and IU (1/Age))(24 months)    
   UP-DOWN=0       
   IU1  IU2  IU3  IU4  IU5  IU5-IU1 
Q5-Q1 (UP)  0.61  0.64  0.7  0.96  1.2  0.59 
Q5-Q1(DOWN)  0.38  1  1.36  3.27  3.8  3.42 
Difference  0.23  -0.36  -0.66  -2.31  -2.6    
t stats  1.03  -2.58  -1.48  -3.05  -4.22    
Overall  0.59  1.04  1.24  1.94  2.42  1.83 
This table reports the difference between the momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) momentum trading 
strategy conditional on different level of information uncertainty in the Chinese Class A share market 
for the sample period from Jan. 1996 to Dec. 2008. The difference is estimated by regressing the raw 
momentum-IU premia against an UP dummy variable (   )	 and an intercept (  ), following the same 
methodology for equality test used by Cooper et al. (2004) and Du et al. (2009). Mathematically, it can 
be written as      ,  =   +     ,           +    . The t statistics associated with each difference is 
listed in the row below. 
Figure 5. Comparison between the momentum-IU (firm age) premia of the (R=6, H=6) 
strategy over the time periods following UP and DOWN market states in the Chinese 
Class A share market (Jan. 1996- Dec. 2008) (24 months) Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty                                     Appendices 
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Notes: The column-shaped diagram illustrates the difference of momentum-IU premia of the (R=6, 
H=6) momentum trading strategy over time periods following UP and DOWN market states in the 
Chinese Class A share market for the sample time period. The vertical axis measures the momentum-
IU premia in percentage form; the horizontal axis labels the 5 different levels of IU, with IU1 
representing the lowest level and IU5 the highest level. For each IU level, the corresponding 
momentum premium following UP market state is demonstrated by the blue-coloured column, 
whereas that following DOWN market state is indicated by the red-coloured column. 
 
Figure 6. Comparison: momentum-IU (firm age) premia over periods following UP 
market state, momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) strategy conditional on post-UP 
market state, overall momentum-IU (firm age) premia in the Chinese Class A share 
market (Jan.1996- Dec. 2008) 
 
Notes: This figure demonstrates the difference among momentum-IU premia over periods following 
UP market state, momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) momentum strategy conditional on post-UP 
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market state, overall momentum-IU premia in the Chinese Class A share market. The vertical axis 
measures the returns in percentage form. The blue line represents the fluctuations in the momentum 
premia across different levels of IU over the periods following UP market state; the red line illustrates 
the premium of (R=6, H=6) momentum strategy unconditional on IU and market states; the green line 
represents the changes of momentum premia across different IU levels unconditional on market 
states. 
Figure 7. Comparison: momentum-IU (firm age) premia over periods following 
DOWN market state, momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) strategy conditional on 
post-DOWN market state, overall momentum-IU (firm age) premia in the Chinese 
Class A share market (Jan.1996- Dec. 2008) (24 months) 
 
Notes: This figure demonstrates the difference among momentum-IU premia over periods following 
DOWN market state, momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) momentum strategy conditional on post-
DOWN market state, overall momentum-IU premia in the Chinese Class A share market. The vertical 
axis measures the returns in percentage form. The blue line represents the fluctuations in the 
momentum premia across different levels of IU over the periods following DOWN market state; the 
red line illustrates the premium of (R=6, H=6) momentum strategy unconditional on IU and market 
states; the green line represents the changes of momentum premia across different IU levels 
unconditional on market states. 
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Figure 8. Asymmetry of positive momentum (Q5) and negative momentum (Q1) over 
the time periods following UP and DOWN market states in the Chinese Class A 
share market (Jan. 1996 – Dec. 2008) (firm age) 
   UP market 
   Q1  Q5  Q1+Q5 
IU1  0.64  1.25  1.89 
IU2  0.43  1.07  1.5 
IU3  0.51  1.21  1.72 
IU4  0.31  1.27  1.58 
IU5  0.12  1.32  1.44 
IU5-IU1 
   
-0.45 
   DOWN market 
   Q1  Q5  Q1+Q5 
IU1  1.93  2.31  4.24 
IU2  1.62  2.62  4.24 
IU3  1.17  2.53  3.7 
IU4  0.78  4.05  4.83 
IU5  0.49  4.29  4.78 
IU5-IU1        0.54 
 
 
Notes: The statistics box above the figure summarizes positive momentum (Q5) and negative 
momentum (Q1) for testing periods following UP and DOWN market states. This figure depicts the 
difference of the asymmetry of positive momentum (Q5) and negative momentum (Q1) over the time 
periods following UP market state, plotted as the blue line, and DOWN market state, graphed as the 
red line in the Chinese Class A share market over Jan. 1996 to Dec. 2008.The vertical axis measures 
the sum of positive momentum (returns of “winner” portfolio) and negative momentum (returns of 
“loser” portfolio) under each level of IU; the horizontal axis labels 5 different level of information 
uncertainty. The upward sloped lines suggest that regardless of market states, the positive 
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momentum (Q5) or the returns of “winner” portfolios tend to overwhelm the negative momentum (Q1) 
or the returns of “loser” portfolios in contributing to the momentum premia as IU level increases. 
Analysts’ coverage as IU proxy 
Table 5. Momentum premia (monthly returns) under IU (proxied by analysts’ 
coverage (1/COV)) during the time periods following UP and DOWN market states 
(24 months) (the (R=6, H=6) momentum trading strategy) in the Chinese Class A 
share market (Jan. 1996- Dec. 2008)  
Panel A.         Monthly returns of momentum quintiles and momentum premia 
Following UP market state (24 months) 
   Momentum Quintile 
   Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q5  Q5-Q1  t-value 
   Information uncertainty proxy: Analyst coverage (1/COV) 
IU1  -0.19  -0.1  1.88  1.95  2.03  2.22  3.84 
t-stats  -1.84  -1.5  2.17  1.95  4.2       
IU2  -0.24  0.42  1.57  1.8  1.95  2.19  2.5 
t-stats  -1.13  1.99  2.71  2.35  4.57       
IU3  -0.16  1.27  1.45  1.84  2.14  2.3  5.06 
t-stats  -0.83  2.17  1.52  2.04  3.44       
IU4  -0.12  0.47  1.07  1.55  2.23  2.35  3.41 
t-stats  -0.62  1.84  2.09  3.55  2.96       
IU5  -0.07  0.53  1.48  1.72  2.29  2.36  7.1 
t-stats  -0.31  1.52  2.81  3.16  4.05       
IU5-IU1  0.12  0.63  -0.4  -0.23  0.26  0.14    
t-value  1.44  0.97  -0.49  -0.28  1.53  2.18    
Panel B.         Monthly returns of momentum quintiles and momentum premia 
Following DOWN market state (24 months) 
   Momentum Quintile 
   Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q5  Q5-Q1  t-value 
   Information uncertainty proxy: Analyst coverage (1/COV) 
IU1  1.43  2.38  1.61  1.97  3.2  1.77  6.51 
t-stats  2.51  3.04  2.13  3.59  4.99       
IU2  1.37  2.15  1.55  2.45  3.39  2.02  8.68 
t-stats  8.16  4.53  3.29  5.04  6.97       
IU3  1.19  2.86  1.83  2.65  3.84  2.65  8.04 
t-stats  2.17  1.83  2.96  4.18  5.95       
IU4  1.06  1.69  1.24  2.85  3.87  2.81  5.3 
t-stats  2.16  3.74  1.84  3.28  2.95       
IU5  1.08  1.47  1.39  3.02  4.53  3.45  10.76 
t-stats  4.16  5.47  2.04  3.27  10.3       
IU5-IU1  -0.35  -0.91  -0.22  1.05  1.33  1.68    
t-value  -0.99  -1.57  -1.36  2.05  5.9  3.55    Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty                                     Appendices 
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This table presents the average monthly returns of momentum quintiles and momentum premia under 
the influence of different levels of IU over time periods following UP and DOWN market states, as 
shown in Panel A and Panel B respectively, in the Chinese Class A share market for the sample 
period spanning from January 1996 to December 2008. The UP and DOWN market states are 
defined by prior 24-month average market return, with a consolidated Chinese Share A index being 
employed as a proxy for market portfolio. The methodological approach is described in detail 
underneath Table 1. 
 
Table 6. Equality test results of state-dependent momentum-IU (analysts’ coverage) 
premia (following UP and DOWN market states) in the Chinese Class A share 
market (the (R=6, H=6) momentum trading strategy) (24 months) 
Equality test (MOM and IU (1/COV))(24 months)    
   UP-DOWN=0       
   IU1  IU2  IU3  IU4  IU5  IU5-IU1 
Q5-Q1 (UP)  2.22  2.19  2.3  2.35  2.36  0.14 
Q5-Q1(DOWN)  1.77  2.02  2.65  2.81  3.45  1.68 
Difference  0.45  0.17  -0.35  -0.46  -1.09    
t stats  0.06  1.03  -2.07  -3.55  -2.94    
Overall  1.87  2.15  2.66  2.94  3.95  2.08 
This table reports the difference between the momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) momentum trading 
strategy conditional on different level of information uncertainty in the Chinese Class A share market 
for the sample period from Jan. 1996 to Dec. 2008. The difference is estimated by regressing the raw 
momentum-IU premia against an UP dummy variable (   )	 and an intercept (  ), following the same 
methodology for equality test used by Cooper et al. (2004) and Du et al. (2009). Mathematically, it can 
be written as      ,  =   +     ,           +    . The t statistics associated with each difference is 
listed in the row below. 
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Figure 9. Comparison between the momentum-IU (analysts’ coverage) premia of the 
(R=6, H=6) strategy over the time periods following UP and DOWN market states in 
the Chinese Class A share market (Jan. 1996- Dec. 2008) (24 months) 
 
Notes: The column-shaped diagram illustrates the difference of momentum-IU premia of the (R=6, 
H=6) momentum trading strategy over time periods following UP and DOWN market states in the 
Chinese Class A share market for the sample time period. The vertical axis measures the momentum-
IU premia in percentage form; the horizontal axis labels the 5 different levels of IU, with IU1 
representing the lowest level and IU5 the highest level. For each IU level, the corresponding 
momentum premium following UP market state is demonstrated by the blue-coloured column, 
whereas that following DOWN market state is indicated by the red-coloured column. 
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Figure 10. Comparison: momentum-IU (analysts’ coverage) premia over periods 
following UP market state, momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) strategy conditional 
on post-UP market state, overall momentum-IU (analysts’ coverage) premia in the 
Chinese Class A share market (Jan.1996- Dec. 2008) 
 
Notes: This figure demonstrates the difference among momentum-IU premia over periods following 
UP market state, momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) momentum strategy conditional on post-UP 
market state, overall momentum-IU premia in the Chinese Class A share market. The vertical axis 
measures the returns in percentage form. The blue line represents the fluctuations in the momentum 
premia across different levels of IU over the periods following UP market state; the red line illustrates 
the premium of (R=6, H=6) momentum strategy unconditional on IU and market states; the green line 
represents the changes of momentum premia across different IU levels unconditional on market 
states. 
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Figure 11. Comparison: momentum-IU (analysts’ coverage) premia over periods 
following DOWN market state, momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) strategy 
conditional on post-DOWN market state, overall momentum-IU (analysts’ coverage) 
premia in the Chinese Class A share market (Jan.1996- Dec. 2008) (24 months) 
 
Notes: This figure demonstrates the difference among momentum-IU premia over periods following 
DOWN market state, momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) momentum strategy conditional on post-
DOWN market state, overall momentum-IU premia in the Chinese Class A share market. The vertical 
axis measures the returns in percentage form. The blue line represents the fluctuations in the 
momentum premia across different levels of IU over the periods following DOWN market state; the 
red line illustrates the premium of (R=6, H=6) momentum strategy unconditional on IU and market 
states; the green line represents the changes of momentum premia across different IU levels 
unconditional on market states. 
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Figure 12. Asymmetry of positive momentum (Q5) and negative momentum (Q1) 
over the time periods following UP and DOWN market states in the Chinese Class A 
share market (Jan. 1996 – Dec. 2008) (analysts’ coverage) 
   UP market  
   Q1  Q5  Q1+Q5 
IU1  -0.19  2.03  1.84 
IU2  -0.24  1.95  1.71 
IU3  -0.16  2.14  1.98 
IU4  -0.12  2.23  2.11 
IU5  -0.07  2.29  2.22 
IU5-IU1 
   
0.38 
   DOWN market 
   Q1  Q5  Q1+Q5 
IU1  1.43  3.2  4.63 
IU2  1.37  3.39  4.76 
IU3  1.19  3.84  5.03 
IU4  1.06  3.87  4.93 
IU5  1.08  4.53  5.61 
IU5-IU1 
   
0.98 
 
 
Notes: The statistics box above the figure summarizes positive momentum (Q5) and negative 
momentum (Q1) for testing periods following UP and DOWN market states. This figure depicts the 
difference of the asymmetry of positive momentum (Q5) and negative momentum (Q1) over the time 
periods following UP market state, plotted as the blue line, and DOWN market state, graphed as the 
red line in the Chinese Class A share market over Jan. 1996 to Dec. 2008.The vertical axis measures 
the sum of positive momentum (returns of “winner” portfolio) and negative momentum (returns of 
“loser” portfolio) under each level of IU; the horizontal axis labels 5 different level of information 
uncertainty. The upward sloped lines suggest that regardless of market states, the positive 
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momentum (Q5) or the returns of “winner” portfolios tend to overwhelm the negative momentum (Q1) 
or the returns of “loser” portfolios in contributing to the momentum premia as IU level increases. 
Return volatility as IU proxy 
Table 7. Momentum premia (monthly returns) under IU (proxied by return volatility 
(VOL)) during the time periods following UP and DOWN market states (24 months) 
(the (R=6, H=6) momentum trading strategy) in the Chinese Class A share market 
(Jan. 1996- Dec. 2008)  
Panel A.        Monthly returns of momentum quintiles and momentum premia 
Following UP market state (24 months) 
   Momentum Quintile 
   Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q5  Q5-Q1  t-value 
   Information uncertainty proxy: Return volatility (VOL) 
IU1  0.91  1  1.05  1.08  1.18  0.27  1.53 
t-stats  0.62  0.79  1.52  0.94  2.29       
IU2  0.79  0.85  0.93  1.05  1.24  0.45  2.18 
t-stats  0.68  2.07  3.05  2.07  3.05       
IU3  0.59  0.8  0.92  0.96  1.28  0.69  2.01 
t-stats  0.38  1.86  1.54  1.48  1.13       
IU4  0.41  0.53  0.7  0.62  1.32  0.91  5.38 
t-stats  0.64  1.99  3.4  2.18  3.07       
IU5  0.08  0.38  0.44  0.72  1.35  1.27  2.74 
t-stats  1.48  0.97  2.99  1.58  1.36       
IU5-IU1  -0.83  -0.62  -0.61  -0.36  0.17  1    
t-value  -0.22  -0.41  -0.15  -0.94  1.27  2.93    
Panel B.        Monthly returns of momentum quintiles and momentum premia 
Following DOWN market state (24 months) 
   Momentum Quintile 
   Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q5   Q5-Q1  t-value 
   Information uncertainty proxy: Return volatility (VOL) 
IU1  2.09  2.32  1.95  2.56  3.54  1.45  8.93 
t-stats  5.99  4.81  2.58  3.91  4.82       
IU2  1.86  1.89  1.9  2.55  3.48  1.62  9.05 
t-stats  6.05  4.37  8.13  5.45  7.18       
IU3  1.59  1.78  1.95  2.38  3.62  2.03  8.04 
t-stats  2.05  10.49  6.81  3.29  4.27       
IU4  1.25  1.48  1.5  2.07  3.7  2.45  12.15 
t-stats  4.18  5.36  5.16  3.3  8.93       
IU5  1.05  1.4  1.49  1.75  3.75  2.7  8.22 
t-stats  5.04  3.03  5.18  6.83  10.75       
IU5-IU1  -1.04  -0.92  -0.46  -0.81  0.21  1.25    
t-value  -0.52  -4.99  -0.96  -2.86  0.59  2.36    Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty                                     Appendices 
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This table presents the average monthly returns of momentum quintiles and momentum premia under 
the influence of different levels of IU over time periods following UP and DOWN market states, as 
shown in Panel A and Panel B respectively, in the Chinese Class A share market for the sample 
period spanning from January 1996 to December 2008. The UP and DOWN market states are 
defined by prior 24-month average market return, with a consolidated Chinese Share A index being 
employed as a proxy for market portfolio. The methodological approach is described in detail 
underneath Table 1. 
 
Table 8. Equality test results of state-dependent momentum-IU (return volatility) 
premia (following UP and DOWN market states) in the Chinese Class A share 
market (the (R=6, H=6) momentum trading strategy) (24 months) 
Equality test (MOM and IU (VOL))(24 months)    
   UP-DOWN=0       
   IU1  IU2  IU3  IU4  IU5  IU5-IU1 
Q5-Q1 (UP)  0.27  0.45  0.69  0.91  1.27  1 
Q5-Q1(DOWN)  1.45  1.62  2.03  2.45  2.7  1.25 
Difference  -1.18  -1.17  -1.34  -1.54  -1.43    
t stats  -3.02  -2.58  -4.25  -2.82  -3.26    
Overall  0.56  0.85  1.01  1.84  2.26  1.7 
This table reports the difference between the momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) momentum trading 
strategy conditional on different level of information uncertainty in the Chinese Class A share market 
for the sample period from Jan. 1996 to Dec. 2008. The difference is estimated by regressing the raw 
momentum-IU premia against an UP dummy variable (   )	 and an intercept (  ), following the same 
methodology for equality test used by Cooper et al. (2004) and Du et al. (2009). Mathematically, it can 
be written as      ,  =   +     ,           +    . The t statistics associated with each difference is 
listed in the row below. 
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Figure 13. Comparison between the momentum-IU (return volatility) premia of the 
(R=6, H=6) strategy over the time periods following UP and DOWN market states in 
the Chinese Class A share market (Jan. 1996- Dec. 2008) (24 months) 
 
Notes: The column-shaped diagram illustrates the difference of momentum-IU premia of the (R=6, 
H=6) momentum trading strategy over time periods following UP and DOWN market states in the 
Chinese Class A share market for the sample time period. The vertical axis measures the momentum-
IU premia in percentage form; the horizontal axis labels the 5 different levels of IU, with IU1 
representing the lowest level and IU5 the highest level. For each IU level, the corresponding 
momentum premium following UP market state is demonstrated by the blue-coloured column, 
whereas that following DOWN market state is indicated by the red-coloured column. 
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Figure 14. Comparison: momentum-IU (return volatility) premia over periods 
following UP market state, momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) strategy conditional 
on post-UP market state, overall momentum-IU (return volatility) premia in the 
Chinese Class A share market (Jan.1996- Dec. 2008) 
 
Notes: This figure demonstrates the difference among momentum-IU premia over periods following 
UP market state, momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) momentum strategy conditional on post-UP 
market state, overall momentum-IU premia in the Chinese Class A share market. The vertical axis 
measures the returns in percentage form. The blue line represents the fluctuations in the momentum 
premia across different levels of IU over the periods following UP market state; the red line illustrates 
the premium of (R=6, H=6) momentum strategy unconditional on IU and market states; the green line 
represents the changes of momentum premia across different IU levels unconditional on market 
states. 
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Figure 15. Comparison: momentum-IU (return volatility) premia over periods 
following DOWN market state, momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) strategy 
conditional on post-DOWN market state, overall momentum-IU (return volatility) 
premia in the Chinese Class A share market (Jan.1996- Dec. 2008) (24 months) 
 
Notes: This figure demonstrates the difference among momentum-IU premia over periods following 
DOWN market state, momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) momentum strategy conditional on post-
DOWN market state, overall momentum-IU premia in the Chinese Class A share market. The vertical 
axis measures the returns in percentage form. The blue line represents the fluctuations in the 
momentum premia across different levels of IU over the periods following DOWN market state; the 
red line illustrates the premium of (R=6, H=6) momentum strategy unconditional on IU and market 
states; the green line represents the changes of momentum premia across different IU levels 
unconditional on market states. 
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Figure 16. Asymmetry of positive momentum (Q5) and negative momentum (Q1) 
over the time periods following UP and DOWN market states in the Chinese Class A 
share market (Jan. 1996 – Dec. 2008) (return volatility) 
   UP market  
   Q1  Q5  Q1+Q5 
IU1  0.91  1.18  2.09 
IU2  0.79  1.24  2.03 
IU3  0.59  1.28  1.87 
IU4  0.41  1.32  1.73 
IU5  0.08  1.35  1.43 
IU5-IU1 
   
-0.66 
   DOWN market 
   Q1  Q5  Q1+Q5 
IU1  2.09  3.54  5.63 
IU2  1.86  3.48  5.34 
IU3  1.59  3.62  5.21 
IU4  1.25  3.7  4.95 
IU5  1.05  3.75  4.8 
IU5-IU1        -0.83 
 
 
Notes: The statistics box above the figure summarizes positive momentum (Q5) and negative 
momentum (Q1) for testing periods following UP and DOWN market states. This figure depicts the 
difference of the asymmetry of positive momentum (Q5) and negative momentum (Q1) over the time 
periods following UP market state, plotted as the blue line, and DOWN market state, graphed as the 
red line in the Chinese Class A share market over Jan. 1996 to Dec. 2008.The vertical axis measures 
the sum of positive momentum (returns of “winner” portfolio) and negative momentum (returns of 
“loser” portfolio) under each level of IU; the horizontal axis labels 5 different level of information 
uncertainty. The upward sloped lines suggest that regardless of market states, the positive 
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momentum (Q5) or the returns of “winner” portfolios tend to overwhelm the negative momentum (Q1) 
or the returns of “loser” portfolios in contributing to the momentum premia as IU level increases. 
Dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecast (DISP) as IU proxy 
Table 9. Momentum premia (monthly returns) under IU (proxied by dispersion in 
analysts’ earnings forecast (DISP)) during the time periods following UP and DOWN 
market states (24 months) (the (R=6, H=6) momentum trading strategy) in the 
Chinese Class A share market (Jan. 1996- Dec. 2008) 
Panel A.        Monthly returns of momentum quintiles and momentum premia 
Following UP market state (24 months) 
   Momentum Quintile 
   Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q5  Q5-Q1  t-value 
   Information uncertainty proxy: Analysts' forecast dispersion (DISP) 
IU1  0.16  0.34  0.87  1.12  1.42  1.26  3.04 
t-stats  1.99  2.08  2.16  4.81  2.58       
IU2  0.04  0.38  0.92  1.14  1.4  1.36  5.41 
t-stats  1.06  1.99  3.5  2.64  4.08       
IU3  -0.05  0.44  0.85  1.06  1.7  1.75  6.97 
t-stats  2.05  4.33  2.95  3.18  4.88       
IU4  -0.26  0.69  1.04  1.21  1.75  2.01  5.06 
t-stats  1.85  2.94  3.48  2.97  3.04       
IU5  -0.24  0.18  0.58  0.94  1.85  2.09  10.5 
t-stats  2.05  4.18  1.04  6.72  5.15       
IU5-IU1  -0.4  -0.16  -0.29  -0.18  0.43  0.83    
t-value  -1.37  -0.89  -1.45  -0.83  1.27  1.99    
Panel B.       Monthly returns of momentum quintiles and momentum premia 
Following DOWN market state (24 months) 
   Momentum Quintile 
   Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q5  Q5-Q1  t-value 
   Information uncertainty proxy: Analysts' forecast dispersion (DISP) 
IU1  1.65  2.15  2.55  2.6  3.06  1.41  3.18 
t-stats  3.08  6.17  3.84  9.01  10.54       
IU2  1.6  2.12  2.01  2.52  3.04  1.44  9.5 
t-stats  3.19  4.05  8.01  10.55  8.44       
IU3  1.32  1.9  1.81  2.4  3.1  1.78  15.77 
t-stats  5.05  4.1  10.9  6.71  10.5       
IU4  1.06  1.8  1.75  2.06  3.13  2.07  7.46 
t-stats  6.18  4.91  9.88  10.35  6.82       
IU5  0.87  1.85  1.64  1.88  3.19  2.32  9.59 
t-stats  2.85  6.49  5.82  9.15  10.77       
IU5-IU1  -0.78  -0.3  -0.91  -0.72  0.13  0.91    
t-value  -0.68  -0.88  -2.98  -2.58  3.16  1.85    Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty                                     Appendices 
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This table presents the average monthly returns of momentum quintiles and momentum premia under 
the influence of different levels of IU over time periods following UP and DOWN market states, as 
shown in Panel A and Panel B respectively, in the Chinese Class A share market for the sample 
period spanning from January 1996 to December 2008. The UP and DOWN market states are 
defined by prior 24-month average market return, with a consolidated Chinese Share A index being 
employed as a proxy for market portfolio. The methodological approach is described in detail 
underneath Table 1. 
 
Table 10. Equality test results of state-dependent momentum-IU (DISP) premia 
(following UP and DOWN market states) in the Chinese Class A share market (the 
(R=6, H=6) momentum trading strategy) (24 months) 
Equality test (MOM and IU (DISP))(24 months)    
   UP-DOWN=0       
   IU1  IU2  IU3  IU4  IU5  IU5-IU1 
Q5-Q1 (UP)  1.26  1.36  1.75  2.01  2.09  0.83 
Q5-Q1(DOWN)  1.41  1.44  1.78  2.07  2.32  0.91 
Difference  -0.15  -0.08  -0.03  -0.06  -0.23    
t stats  -1.83  -2.05  -1.72  -2.05  -2.27    
Overall  1.28  1.51  1.69  1.95  2.21  0.93 
This table reports the difference between the momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) momentum trading 
strategy conditional on different level of information uncertainty in the Chinese Class A share market 
for the sample period from Jan. 1996 to Dec. 2008. The difference is estimated by regressing the raw 
momentum-IU premia against an UP dummy variable (   )	 and an intercept (  ), following the same 
methodology for equality test used by Cooper et al. (2004) and Du et al. (2009). Mathematically, it can 
be written as      ,  =   +     ,           +    . The t statistics associated with each difference is 
listed in the row below. 
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Figure 17. Comparison between the momentum-IU (DISP) premia of the (R=6, H=6) 
strategy over the time periods following UP and DOWN market states in the Chinese 
Class A share market (Jan. 1996- Dec. 2008) (24 months) 
 
Notes: The column-shaped diagram illustrates the difference of momentum-IU premia of the (R=6, 
H=6) momentum trading strategy over time periods following UP and DOWN market states in the 
Chinese Class A share market for the sample time period. The vertical axis measures the momentum-
IU premia in percentage form; the horizontal axis labels the 5 different levels of IU, with IU1 
representing the lowest level and IU5 the highest level. For each IU level, the corresponding 
momentum premium following UP market state is demonstrated by the blue-coloured column, 
whereas that following DOWN market state is indicated by the red-coloured column. 
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Figure 18. Comparison: momentum-IU (DISP) premia over periods following UP 
market state, momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) strategy conditional on post-UP 
market state, overall momentum-IU (DISP) premia in the Chinese Class A share 
market (Jan.1996- Dec. 2008) (24 months) 
 
Notes: This figure demonstrates the difference among momentum-IU premia over periods following 
UP market state, momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) momentum strategy conditional on post-UP 
market state, overall momentum-IU premia in the Chinese Class A share market. The vertical axis 
measures the returns in percentage form. The blue line represents the fluctuations in the momentum 
premia across different levels of IU over the periods following UP market state; the red line illustrates 
the premium of (R=6, H=6) momentum strategy unconditional on IU and market states; the green line 
represents the changes of momentum premia across different IU levels unconditional on market 
states. 
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Figure 19. Comparison: momentum-IU (DISP) premia over periods following DOWN 
market state, momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) strategy conditional on post-
DOWN market state, overall momentum-IU (DISP) premia in the Chinese Class A 
share market (Jan.1996- Dec. 2008) (24 months) 
 
Notes: This figure demonstrates the difference among momentum-IU premia over periods following 
DOWN market state, momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) momentum strategy conditional on post-
DOWN market state, overall momentum-IU premia in the Chinese Class A share market. The vertical 
axis measures the returns in percentage form. The blue line represents the fluctuations in the 
momentum premia across different levels of IU over the periods following DOWN market state; the 
red line illustrates the premium of (R=6, H=6) momentum strategy unconditional on IU and market 
states; the green line represents the changes of momentum premia across different IU levels 
unconditional on market states. 
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Figure 20. Asymmetry of positive momentum (Q5) and negative momentum (Q1) 
over the time periods following UP and DOWN market states in the Chinese Class A 
share market (Jan. 1996 – Dec. 2008) (DISP) (24 months) 
   UP market 
   Q1  Q5  Q1+Q5 
IU1  0.16  1.42  1.58 
IU2  0.04  1.4  1.44 
IU3  -0.05  1.7  1.65 
IU4  -0.26  1.75  1.49 
IU5  -0.24  1.85  1.61 
IU5-IU1 
   
0.03 
   DOWN market 
   Q1  Q5  Q1+Q5 
IU1  1.65  3.06  4.71 
IU2  1.6  3.04  4.64 
IU3  1.32  3.1  4.42 
IU4  1.06  3.13  4.19 
IU5  0.87  3.19  4.06 
IU5-IU1        -0.65 
 
 
Notes: The statistics box above the figure summarizes positive momentum (Q5) and negative 
momentum (Q1) for testing periods following UP and DOWN market states. This figure depicts the 
difference of the asymmetry of positive momentum (Q5) and negative momentum (Q1) over the time 
periods following UP market state, plotted as the blue line, and DOWN market state, graphed as the 
red line in the Chinese Class A share market over Jan. 1996 to Dec. 2008.The vertical axis measures 
the sum of positive momentum (returns of “winner” portfolio) and negative momentum (returns of 
“loser” portfolio) under each level of IU; the horizontal axis labels 5 different level of information 
uncertainty. The upward sloped lines suggest that regardless of market states, the positive 
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momentum (Q5) or the returns of “winner” portfolios tend to overwhelm the negative momentum (Q1) 
or the returns of “loser” portfolios in contributing to the momentum premia as IU level increases. 
Trading volume as IU proxy 
Table 11. Momentum premia (monthly returns) under IU (proxied by trading volume 
(1/turnover ratio)) during the time periods following UP and DOWN market states (24 
months) (the (R=6, H=6) momentum trading strategy) in the Chinese Class A share 
market (Jan. 1996- Dec. 2008) 
Panel A.        Monthly returns of momentum quintiles and momentum premia 
Following UP market state (24 months) 
   Momentum Quintile 
   Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q5  Q5-Q1  t-value 
   Information uncertainty proxy: Volume(1/Turnover ratio) 
IU1  0.48  0.7  0.79  1.01  1.03  0.55  3.07 
t-stats  1.03  2.44  1.08  2.19  3.18       
IU2  0.32  0.62  0.7  0.83  1.05  0.73  4.05 
t-stats  0.87  1.03  1.45  1.63  2.61       
IU3  0.18  0.46  0.59  0.73  1.12  0.94  3.64 
t-stats  2.08  1.48  2.07  1.69  2.38       
IU4  0.07  0.36  0.45  0.49  1.18  1.11  6.09 
t-stats  1.04  0.84  1.29  1.55  4.39       
IU5  -0.09  0.21  0.4  0.47  1.25  1.34  5.84 
t-stats  -0.28  0.91  1.72  5  3.25       
IU5-IU1  -0.57  -0.49  -0.39  -0.54  0.22  0.79    
t-value  -0.44  -1.07  -0.69  -1.04  1.52  2.05    
Panel B.        Monthly return of momentum quintiles and momentum premia 
Following DOWN market state (24 months) 
   Momentum Quintile 
   Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q5  Q5-Q1  t-value 
   Information uncertainty proxy: Volume(1/Turnover ratio) 
IU1  1.54  1.9  1.85  2.57  3.02  1.48  10.2 
t-stats  3.08  4.25  5.15  6.19  5.07       
IU2  1.42  1.71  1.82  2.28  3.01  1.59  10.4 
t-stats  8.18  6.2  10.19  6.52  8.17       
IU3  1.3  1.64  1.69  2.13  3.1  1.8  12.54 
t-stats  5.03  7.13  5.25  7.07  10.9       
IU4  1.29  1.5  1.43  2.04  3.14  1.85  10.15 
t-stats  3.99  4.5  2.81  6.19  5.47       
IU5  0.94  1.05  1.28  1.79  3.19  2.25  10.2 
t-stats  5.16  8.13  4.18  5.61  7.82       
IU5-IU1  -0.6  -0.85  -0.57  -0.78  0.17  0.77    
t-value  -0.49  -1.27  -1.93  -0.93  2.84  1.59    Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty                                     Appendices 
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This table presents the average monthly returns of momentum quintiles and momentum premia under 
the influence of different levels of IU over time periods following UP and DOWN market states, as 
shown in Panel A and Panel B respectively, in the Chinese Class A share market for the sample 
period spanning from January 1996 to December 2008. The UP and DOWN market states are 
defined by prior 24-month average market return, with a consolidated Chinese Share A index being 
employed as a proxy for market portfolio. The methodological approach is described in detail 
underneath Table 1. 
 
Table 12. Equality test results of state-dependent momentum-IU (trading volume) 
premia (following UP and DOWN market states) in the Chinese Class A share 
market (the (R=6, H=6) momentum trading strategy) (24 months) 
Equality test (MOM and IU (trading volume))(24 months)    
   UP-DOWN=0       
   IU1  IU2  IU3  IU4  IU5  IU5-IU1 
Q5-Q1 (UP)  0.55  0.73  0.94  1.11  1.34  0.79 
Q5-Q1(DOWN)  1.48  1.59  1.8  1.85  2.25  0.77 
Difference  -0.93  -0.86  -0.86  -0.74  -0.91    
t stats  -2.96  -1.99  -3.04  -2.72  -2.81    
Overall  0.9  1.02  1.59  2.12  2.19  1.29 
This table reports the difference between the momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) momentum trading 
strategy conditional on different level of information uncertainty in the Chinese Class A share market 
for the sample period from Jan. 1996 to Dec. 2008. The difference is estimated by regressing the raw 
momentum-IU premia against an UP dummy variable (   )	 and an intercept (  ), following the same 
methodology for equality test used by Cooper et al. (2004) and Du et al. (2009). Mathematically, it can 
be written as      ,  =   +     ,           +    . The t statistics associated with each difference is 
listed in the row below. 
 
Figure 21. Comparison between the momentum-IU (trading volume) premia of the 
(R=6, H=6) strategy over the time periods following UP and DOWN market states in 
the Chinese Class A share market (Jan. 1996- Dec. 2008) (24 months) Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty                                     Appendices 
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Notes: The column-shaped diagram illustrates the difference of momentum-IU premia of the (R=6, 
H=6) momentum trading strategy over time periods following UP and DOWN market states in the 
Chinese Class A share market for the sample time period. The vertical axis measures the momentum-
IU premia in percentage form; the horizontal axis labels the 5 different levels of IU, with IU1 
representing the lowest level and IU5 the highest level. For each IU level, the corresponding 
momentum premium following UP market state is demonstrated by the blue-coloured column, 
whereas that following DOWN market state is indicated by the red-coloured column. 
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Figure 22. Comparison: momentum-IU (trading volume) premia over periods 
following UP market state, momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) strategy conditional 
on post-UP market state, overall momentum-IU (trading volume) premia in the 
Chinese Class A share market (Jan.1996- Dec. 2008) (24 months) 
 
Notes: This figure demonstrates the difference among momentum-IU premia over periods following 
UP market state, momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) momentum strategy conditional on post-UP 
market state, overall momentum-IU premia in the Chinese Class A share market. The vertical axis 
measures the returns in percentage form. The blue line represents the fluctuations in the momentum 
premia across different levels of IU over the periods following UP market state; the red line illustrates 
the premium of (R=6, H=6) momentum strategy unconditional on IU and market states; the green line 
represents the changes of momentum premia across different IU levels unconditional on market 
states. 
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Figure 23. Comparison: momentum-IU (trading volume) premia over periods 
following DOWN market state, momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) strategy 
conditional on post-DOWN market state, overall momentum-IU (trading volume) 
premia in the Chinese Class A share market (Jan.1996- Dec. 2008) (24 months) 
 
Notes: This figure demonstrates the difference among momentum-IU premia over periods following 
DOWN market state, momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) momentum strategy conditional on post-
DOWN market state, overall momentum-IU premia in the Chinese Class A share market. The vertical 
axis measures the returns in percentage form. The blue line represents the fluctuations in the 
momentum premia across different levels of IU over the periods following DOWN market state; the 
red line illustrates the premium of (R=6, H=6) momentum strategy unconditional on IU and market 
states; the green line represents the changes of momentum premia across different IU levels 
unconditional on market states. 
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Figure 24. Asymmetry of positive momentum (Q5) and negative momentum (Q1) 
over the time periods following UP and DOWN market states in the Chinese Class A 
share market (Jan. 1996 – Dec. 2008) (trading volume) (24 months) 
   UP market 
   Q1  Q5  Q1+Q5 
IU1  0.48  1.03  1.51 
IU2  0.32  1.05  1.37 
IU3  0.18  1.12  1.3 
IU4  0.07  1.18  1.25 
IU5  -0.09  1.25  1.16 
IU5-IU1 
   
-0.35 
   DOWN market 
   Q1  Q5  Q1+Q5 
IU1  1.54  3.02  4.56 
IU2  1.42  3.01  4.43 
IU3  1.3  3.1  4.4 
IU4  1.29  3.14  4.43 
IU5  0.94  3.19  4.13 
IU5-IU1        -0.43 
 
 
Notes: The statistics box above the figure summarizes positive momentum (Q5) and negative 
momentum (Q1) for testing periods following UP and DOWN market states. This figure depicts the 
difference of the asymmetry of positive momentum (Q5) and negative momentum (Q1) over the time 
periods following UP market state, plotted as the blue line, and DOWN market state, graphed as the 
red line in the Chinese Class A share market over Jan. 1996 to Dec. 2008.The vertical axis measures 
the sum of positive momentum (returns of “winner” portfolio) and negative momentum (returns of 
“loser” portfolio) under each level of IU; the horizontal axis labels 5 different level of information 
uncertainty. The upward sloped lines suggest that regardless of market states, the positive 
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momentum (Q5) or the returns of “winner” portfolios tend to overwhelm the negative momentum (Q1) 
or the returns of “loser” portfolios in contributing to the momentum premia as IU level increases. 
 
The strength of corporate governance as IU proxy 
Table 13. Momentum premia (monthly returns) under IU (proxied by the strength of 
corporate governance) during the time periods following UP and DOWN market 
states (24 months) (the (R=6, H=6) momentum trading strategy) in the Chinese 
Class A share market (Jan. 1996- Dec. 2008) 
Panel A.             Monthly returns of momentum quintiles and momentum premia 
Following UP market state (24 months) 
   Momentum Quintile 
   Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q5  Q5-Q1  t-value 
  
Information uncertainty proxy: Corporate governance (proxied by 1/free float 
ratio) 
IU1  0.85  1.21  2.11  2.26  3.06  2.21  7.19 
t-stats  3.05  2.17  5.15  3.99  8.03       
IU2  0.73  1.25  1.65  2.62  3.15  2.42  7.1 
t-stats  2.38  3.56  4.19  2.99  5.05       
IU3  0.83  0.95  1.85  2.06  3.47  2.64  6.55 
t-stats  3.46  3.95  2.79  3.03  4.16       
IU4  0.76  0.79  1.67  1.83  3.55  2.79  8.91 
t-stats  1.94  3.09  3.81  4.1  7.14       
IU5  0.51  0.82  1.53  1.68  4.21  3.7  12.44 
t-stats  4.15  2.96  3.17  3.84  8.19       
IU5-IU1  -0.34  -0.39  -0.58  -0.58  1.15  1.49    
t-value  -0.99  -1.07  -2.84  -3.61  4.18  3.1    
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Panel B.              Monthly returns of momentum quintiles and momentum premia 
Following DOWN market state (24 months) 
   Momentum Quintile 
   Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q5  Q5-Q1  t-value 
  
Information uncertainty proxy: Corporate governance (proxied by 1/free float 
ratio) 
IU1  0.99  1.32  1.6  2.17  3.5  2.51  4.17 
t-stats  3.71  4.58  5.99  3.28  6.09       
IU2  1.02  1.41  1.65  2.07  3.85  2.83  8.91 
t-stats  3.16  5.62  4.93  5.31  8.53       
IU3  0.91  1.25  1.5  2.14  4.23  3.32  12.9 
t-stats  3.74  5.18  4.09  7.71  6.1       
IU4  0.79  1.18  1.42  1.69  5.05  4.26  10.31 
t-stats  1.42  2.08  4.61  1.94  4.18       
IU5  0.72  1.15  1.58  1.83  5.75  5.03  8.42 
t-stats  2.38  3.05  5.19  4.7  8.89       
IU5-IU1  -0.27  -0.17  -0.02  -0.34  2.25  2.52    
t-value  -1.17  -0.78  -2.18  -0.19  3.89  3.88    
This table presents the average monthly returns of momentum quintiles and momentum premia under 
the influence of different levels of IU over time periods following UP and DOWN market states, as 
shown in Panel A and Panel B respectively, in the Chinese Class A share market for the sample 
period spanning from January 1996 to December 2008. The UP and DOWN market states are 
defined by prior 24-month average market return, with a consolidated Chinese Share A index being 
employed as a proxy for market portfolio. The methological approach is described in detail 
underneath Table 1. 
 
   Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty                                     Appendices 
 
- 308 - 
 
Table 14. Equality test results of state-dependent momentum-IU (corporate 
governance) premia (following UP and DOWN market states) in the Chinese Class A 
share market (the (R=6, H=6) momentum trading strategy) (24 months) 
Equality test (MOM and IU (corporate governance))(24 months)    
   UP-DOWN=0       
   IU1  IU2  IU3  IU4  IU5  IU5-IU1 
Q5-Q1 (UP)  2.21  2.42  2.64  2.79  3.7  1.49 
Q5-Q1(DOWN)  2.51  2.83  3.32  4.26  5.03  2.52 
Difference  -0.3  -0.41  -0.68  -1.47  -1.33    
t stats  -2.05  -2.88  -1.96  -2.63  -3.05    
Overall  1.79  2.09  2.42  2.65  4.04  2.25 
This table reports the difference between the momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) momentum trading 
strategy conditional on different level of information uncertainty in the Chinese Class A share market 
for the sample period from Jan. 1996 to Dec. 2008. The difference is estimated by regressing the raw 
momentum-IU premia against an UP dummy variable (   )	 and an intercept (  ), following the same 
methodology for equality test used by Cooper et al. (2004) and Du et al. (2009). Mathematically, it can 
be written as      ,  =   +     ,           +    . The t statistics associated with each difference is 
listed in the row below. 
Figure 25. Comparison between the momentum-IU (corporate governance) premia 
of the (R=6, H=6) strategy over the time periods following UP and DOWN market 
states in the Chinese Class A share market (Jan. 1996- Dec. 2008) (24 months) 
 
Notes: The column-shaped diagram illustrates the difference of momentum-IU premia of the (R=6, 
H=6) momentum trading strategy over time periods following UP and DOWN market states in the 
Chinese Class A share market for the sample time period. The vertical axis measures the momentum-
IU premia in percentage form; the horizontal axis labels the 5 different levels of IU, with IU1 
representing the lowest level and IU5 the highest level. For each IU level, the corresponding 
momentum premium following UP market state is demonstrated by the blue-coloured column, 
whereas that following DOWN market state is indicated by the red-coloured column. 
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Figure 26. Comparison: momentum-IU (corporate governance) premia over periods 
following UP market state, momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) strategy conditional 
on post-UP market state, overall momentum-IU (corporate governance) premia in 
the Chinese Class A share market (Jan.1996- Dec. 2008) (24 months) 
 
Notes: This figure demonstrates the difference among momentum-IU premia over periods following 
UP market state, momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) momentum strategy conditional on post-UP 
market state, overall momentum-IU premia in the Chinese Class A share market. The vertical axis 
measures the returns in percentage form. The blue line represents the fluctuations in the momentum 
premia across different levels of IU over the periods following UP market state; the red line illustrates 
the premium of (R=6, H=6) momentum strategy unconditional on IU and market states; the green line 
represents the changes of momentum premia across different IU levels unconditional on market 
states. 
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Figure 27. Comparison: momentum-IU (corporate governance) premia over periods 
following DOWN market state, momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) strategy 
conditional on post-DOWN market state, overall momentum-IU (corporate 
governance) premia in the Chinese Class A share market (Jan.1996- Dec. 2008) (24 
months) 
 
Notes: This figure demonstrates the difference among momentum-IU premia over periods following 
DOWN market state, momentum premia of the (R=6, H=6) momentum strategy conditional on post-
DOWN market state, overall momentum-IU premia in the Chinese Class A share market. The vertical 
axis measures the returns in percentage form. The blue line represents the fluctuations in the 
momentum premia across different levels of IU over the periods following DOWN market state; the 
red line illustrates the premium of (R=6, H=6) momentum strategy unconditional on IU and market 
states; the green line represents the changes of momentum premia across different IU levels 
unconditional on market states. 
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Figure 28. Asymmetry of positive momentum (Q5) and negative momentum (Q1) 
over the time periods following UP and DOWN market states in the Chinese Class A 
share market (Jan. 1996 – Dec. 2008) (corporate governance) (24 months) 
   UP market 
   Q1  Q5  Q1+Q5 
IU1  0.85  3.06  3.91 
IU2  0.73  3.15  3.88 
IU3  0.83  3.47  4.3 
IU4  0.76  3.55  4.31 
IU5  0.51  4.21  4.72 
IU5-IU1 
 
1.15  1.15 
   DOWN market 
   Q1  Q5  Q1+Q5 
IU1  0.99  3.5  4.49 
IU2  1.02  3.85  4.87 
IU3  0.91  4.23  5.14 
IU4  0.79  5.05  5.84 
IU5  0.72  5.75  6.47 
IU5-IU1        1.98 
 
 
Notes: The statistics box above the figure summarizes positive momentum (Q5) and negative 
momentum (Q1) for testing periods following UP and DOWN market states. This figure depicts the 
difference of the asymmetry of positive momentum (Q5) and negative momentum (Q1) over the time 
periods following UP market state, plotted as the blue line, and DOWN market state, graphed as the 
red line in the Chinese Class A share market over Jan. 1996 to Dec. 2008.The vertical axis measures 
the sum of positive momentum (returns of “winner” portfolio) and negative momentum (returns of 
“loser” portfolio) under each level of IU; the horizontal axis labels 5 different level of information 
uncertainty. The upward sloped lines suggest that regardless of market states, the positive 
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momentum (Q5) or the returns of “winner” portfolios tend to overwhelm the negative momentum (Q1) 
or the returns of “loser” portfolios in contributing to the momentum premia as IU level increases. 
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Appendix 9. the definitions of the JVSF and JVFMF and the discussion on the 
development of the two avenues 
 
JVSFs: a foreign party may own up to 33% of the stock capital of a JVSF. 
These companies may, without hiring Chinese intermediaries, underwrite A-
shares, and underwrite and trade B-shares, H-shares and government and 
corporate bonds. They cannot, however, broker or deal in A-shares on a 
proprietary basis. No timetable has been agreed for increasing the 33% 
ownership limit. JVSF will need RMB 500 million yuan in registered capital, a 
relatively large sum, and at least 50 qualified employees, to receive a license. 
 
JVFMF: the foreign party may, again initially own 33% of the company, a 
percentage which will be allowed to rise to 49% after 2004, subject to the 
approval of both shareholders and the CSRC. Such firms may manage funds 
raised in China, and must raise RMB 200 million yuan within three months of 
launch. The foreign party will need paid-up capital of RMB 300 million yuan, 
though the rules are silent on whether JVFMFs can be set up by multiple 
foreign parties. Management fees are set at 2.5% or below; quite a generous 
rate compared with Western markets (CSRC
64; Green, 2003: page 200). 
Notwithstanding, the development of the JVSFs and JVFMFs has been a mixed bag. 
Firstly, the introduction of the JVSF idea has received lukewarm welcome from both 
Chinese securities firms and foreign securities firms for three main reasons in 
particular. First, the picture of the profitability of the JVSFs looks rather dim 
considering the fact that the size of the Chinese stock market, measured by total 
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market capitalization, is relatively small compared to that of the U.S. stock market. 
Yet, the former has never been short of domestic securities firms, which forges a 
very crowded and competitive market situation. In other words, the profits can be 
easily competed away. Second, the large, well-established international investment 
banks can provide investment banking services to corporations in the mainland 
China directly through their Hong Kong offices. Thirdly and above all, the operation 
of the joint venture can be fragile due to the potential conflicts between the domestic 
shareholder and foreign shareholders provoked by cultural and workstyle-related 
differences (Paul, 2003).  
On the other hand, the JVFMFs had some success prior to the year 2000, “China’s 
fund sector is undeveloped” (Green, 2003: page 203). i.e. fund management as a 
form of financial service has great growth potential.  Also, the Chinese government 
was in need of professional help from fund management companies to manage its 
equity holding positions and pension funds. After the honey moon period till 2002, 
foreign firms became less keen on partnering with domestic fund management firms, 
mainly for the concern over the amount of risks flagged.  
Appendix 10. Three different versions of the EMH—the weak-form EMH, 
semi-strong-form EMH and strong-form EMH 
The weak-form EMH says that current security prices instantaneously and fully 
reflect all information contained in the past history of security prices. In other words, 
past prices provide no information about future prices that would allow an investor to 
earn excess returns (over a passive buy-and-hold strategy) from using active trading 
rules based on historical prices. Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty                                     Appendices 
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The semi-strong-form EMH says that current security prices instantaneously and 
fully reflected all publicly available information about securities markets. If the 
hypothesis is true, then when any new information (i.e news) becomes public, it is 
very rapidly incorporated in security prices. Good new will lead to a rise in prices and 
bad news will lead to a fall in prices, but once this has happened no further 
predictable price changes can be expected to occur. In short, this version of the 
EMH implies that there are no learning lags in the dissemination of publicly available 
information that can give rise to profitable trading rules. Similarly, if news does not 
lead to any change in security prices, then if the Semi-strong-form EMH is true, we 
can infer that the news contained no relevant information.  
The strong-form EMH says that current security prices instantaneously and fully 
reflect all known information about securities markets including privately available 
inside information. This implies that the markets respond so quickly that not even 
someone with the most valuable piece of inside information can trade profitably on 
the basis of it. (Blake, 2000: page 392-93)  
 
Appendix 11. The Chinese Class A share market revisited with market 
states being defined by prior 24-month average market return 
Table 15 Monthly momentum premia over periods following UP and DOWN market 
states in the Chinese Class A share market over sample period (Jan. 1996- Dec. 
2008) (24 months) 
 
Panel A.        Overall momentum premia Share A following UP market (24 months) 
Jan. 1996- Dec. 2008 
Ranking periods 
Holding 
periods 
   H=3     H=6     H=9     H=12    
R=3  Q1  -0.61  -0.74  -0.85  -0.84 Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty                                     Appendices 
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   Q5  1.32  1.51  1.31  1.41 
   Q5-Q1  1.93  *  2.25  **  2.16  *  2.25  * 
R=6  Q1  -0.73  -0.86  -0.91  -0.87 
   Q5  0.62  0.7  1.25  1.31 
   Q5-Q1  1.35  *  1.56  *  2.16  **  2.18  * 
R=9  Q1  -0.71  -0.69  -0.62  -0.83 
   Q5  1.11  1.2  1.23  1.33 
   Q5-Q1  1.82  *  1.89  **  1.85  *  2.16  ** 
R=12  Q1  -0.57  -0.69  -0.71  -0.88 
   Q5  1  1.15  1.08  1.25 
   Q5-Q1  1.57  *  1.84  **  1.79  *  2.13  * 
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Panel B.              Monthly momentum premia Share A following DOWN market (24 months) 
Jan. 1996- Dec. 
2008 
Ranking periods 
Holding 
periods 
   H=3     H=6     H=9     H=12    
R=3  Q1  0.94  0.93  0.74  0.91 
   Q5  0.46  0.26  0.28  0.4 
   Q5-Q1  -0.48     -0.67  *  -0.46     -0.51    
R=6  Q1  0.89  0.98  0.92  0.71 
   Q5  0.51  0.39  0.19  0.42 
   Q5-Q1  -0.38     -0.59  *  -0.73  *  -0.29    
R=9  Q1  0.67  0.92  1.31  0.65 
   Q5  0.35  0.45  0.69  0.46 
   Q5-Q1  -0.32     -0.47  *  -0.62  *  -0.19  * 
R=12  Q1  0.49  0.85  0.72  0.9 
   Q5  0.34  0.42  0.36  0.48 
   Q5-Q1  -0.15  *  -0.43  **  -0.36  *  -0.42    
This table presents the momentum premia (the difference between average monthly returns of 
“winner” portfolios and those of “loser” portfolios) following UP market state and DOWN market state, 
where UP and DOWN market state are defined as positive and negative prior 24-month average 
market returns respectively. The methodological approach used in calculating monthly momentum 
returns and quantifying the momentum returns under different market states is described in detail 
underneath results table 5.2. 
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Table 16 Equality test results of state-depedent monthly momentum premia 
(following UP and DOWN market states) in the Chinese Class A share market (24 
months) 
Class A share market (24 months) 
Equality test for UP-
DOWN=0 
MOM  (3,3)  (3,6)  (3,9)  (3,12)  (6,3)  (6,6)  (6,9)  (6,12) 
UP  1.93  2.25  2.16  2.25  1.35  1.56  2.16  2.18 
DOWN  -0.48  -0.67  -0.46  -0.51  -0.38  -0.59  -0.73  -0.29 
Difference  2.41  2.92  2.62  2.76  1.73  2.15  2.89  2.47 
t stats  3.81  2.75  3.05  4.15  2.55  3.26  2.99  3.74 
MOM  (9,3)  (9,6)  (9,9)  (9,12)  (12,3)  (12,6)  (12,9)  (12,12) 
UP  1.82  1.89  1.85  2.16  1.57  1.84  1.79  2.13 
DOWN  -0.32  -0.47  -0.62  -0.19  -0.15  -0.43  -0.36  -0.42 
Difference  2.14  2.36  2.47  2.35  1.72  2.27  2.15  2.55 
t stats  4.03  3.87  2.94  3.26  2.94  3.15  1.93  2.08 
This table reports the difference between the momentum premia following UP and DOWN market 
states in the Class A share market for 16 different momentum trading strategies. The difference is 
estimated by regressing the raw momentum premia against an UP dummy variable (    ) and an 
intercept (  ) , following the same methodology for equality test used by Cooper et al. (2004) and Du 
et al. (2009). Mathematically, it can be written as     ,  =   +     ,           +    . The t statistics 
associated with each difference is listed in the following row. 
 
Appendix 12. Summary of listing and trading costs for Class A shares and 
Class B shares on the SHSE and the SZSE 
The SHSE 
It costs a mainland firm 0.03% of total par value listed (no more than RMB
65 30,000 
yuan) to get its Class A share issuance listed on the SHSE, and thereafter the firm is 
obliged to pay an annual listing fee at the amount of 0.012% of total par value listed 
                                            
65 RMB stands for Renminbi. Being the official currency of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the 
RMB’s primary unit is the yuan. Before July 21, 2005, the RMB had been pegged to the U.S. dollar 
at relatively fixed exchange rates (1.50 yuan/USD in the 1980s; 8.62 yuan/USD in the early 1990). 
Between the time period from July, 2005 to July, 2008, the Chinese government briefly loosened its 
grip on the yuan pegging until the global financial crisis triggered the comeback of pegging in late 
2008. Since then, the Chinese government has maintained a “managed floating exchange rate” 
policy. i.e. the value of RMB is determined by market condition (the amount of supply and demand) 
“with reference to a basket of foreign currencies”. ( March 9, 2011. “Managed Float” < 
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(no more than RMB 6,000 yuan). On the SHSE, the listing of B shares is subject to 
an initial listing fee at the amount of 0.1% of total issued share capital (no more than 
equivalent of US$ 5,000) and an annual listing fee at the amount of 600 U.S. dollars 
per year
66.  
For a Class A share transaction, the incurred trading costs can be mainly partitioned 
into 3 categories: 0.011% of trading value for both buy and sell sides as handling fee 
paid to the SSE; 0.004% of trading value on both buy and sell sides as securities 
management fee paid to the CSRC (collected by the SHSE); stamp duty, 0.1% of 
trading value on buy or sell side, shall be paid to tax authorities (collected by the 
SHSE). On the other hand, the trading costs revolving a Class B share transaction 
can be divided into two parts: handling fee, which is 0.026% of trading value on both 
buy and sell sides paid to the SHSE and securities management fee, 0.004% of 
trading value on both sell and buy sides paid to the CSRC (collected by the SHSE)
67.  
The SZSE 
On the SZSE, the initial listing fee for Class A and Class B shares is at the amount of 
RMB 30,000 yuan. Thereafter, the companies are subject to pay a monthly fee--- 
500 yuan for par value below 50 million yuan and it increases by 100 yuan as the par 
value goes up by every 10 million yuan (no more than 2500 yuan per month)
68.  
Despite having similar listing fee scheme on the SZSE, the transaction of Class A 
and Class B shares are subject to different amount of trading costs. The costs to 
trade Class A shares include: a commission fee, which is no more than 0.3% of the 
                                            
66 The SHSE. “Stocks Listing Fees” March 9, 2011. < 
http://www.sse.com.cn/sseportal/en/c02/c01/c05/p1020/c15020105_p1020.shtml > 
67 The SHSE. “Fees and Taxes Charged or Collected by S[H]SE” March 9, 2011. < 
http://www.sse.com.cn/sseportal/en/c04/c01/c04/c04/p1296/c1504010404_p1296.shtml > 
68 The SZSE. “Fees of Shenzhen Stock Exchange” The SZSE Fact Book 2006 (Page 332-4). Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty                                     Appendices 
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trading value yet no less than the administration fees incurred during the transaction, 
starting from 5 yuan paid to the brokerage firms; a stamp duty at the amount of 0.1% 
of trading value on one side paid to the tax authorities (collected by SZSE); a 
handling fee at the amount of 0.01475% of trading value on both buy and sell sides 
paid to SZSE (collected by brokerage firms); a securities management fee at the 
amount of 0.004% of trading value on both buy and sell sides paid to 
CSRC(collected by brokerage firms). Similar to the transaction costs for Class A 
shares on the SZSE, the grand trading costs for Class B share on the SZSE also 
comprise four components, namely, commission fee, stamp duty, handing fee and 
securities management fee. However, most of these components are quantified 
based on different criteria: the commission fee incurred for trading a Class B share 
cannot be more than 0.3% of the trading value or less than total administration costs 
associated with the transaction, starting from 5 Hong Kong dollars to be paid by 
investors to their brokerage firm; 0.1% of trading value as the stamp duty to be 
collected by the national tax authorities via the SZSE; 0.0301% of trading value on 
both buy and sell sides is to be paid to the SZSE through brokerage firms; 0.004% of 
the trading value is to be paid, on both buy and sell sides, as securities management 
fee to the CSRC via brokerage firms
69.  
 
Appendix 13. A detailed description portraying domestic individual 
investors, domestic foreign investors, and foreign (institutional) investors 
Domestic individual investors 
Overall, with the Chinese stock market generally portrayed as young and emergent, 
the Chinese investors in general can be deemed as very inexperienced in terms of 
                                            
69 The SZSE. “Fees of Shenzhen Stock Exchange” The SZSE Fact Book 2006 (Page 332-333). Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty                                     Appendices 
 
- 321 - 
 
investing(Chen et al., 2004). Simply put, the majority of the Chinese investors’ 
investing decisions are still made based, to a considerable extent, on speculations. 
The speculation –driven investing behaviours are found to be the main impetus 
behind “share price bubble” formation by a few academic studies in the field such as 
Yao and Luo’s research(2009), where they find that three economic psychological 
factors—namely, “ ‘greed’, ‘envy’ and ‘speculation’ ” (page 668)—are responsible for 
the formation of the Chinese stock market bubble (2005-2007). Nonetheless, three 
other investment psychological factors—“‘fear’, ‘lack of confidence’ and 
‘disappointment’ ” (page 669)—are blamed for contributing to the burst of the 
Chinese stock market bubble in 2008. The above-listed investment psychological 
factors are most prevalent among the Chinese individual (retail) investors who are 
prone to steep losses in the long term (Yao and Luo, 2009), as opposed to other 
domestic institutional investors and foreign investors (mostly at institutional level), 
whose behavioural characteristics will be described later in this section. Specifically, 
‘greed’ factor reflects Chinese individual investors’ naïve desire of ‘becoming rich 
overnight’ triggered by their witness of small portion of individuals thriving financially 
precipitously since the launch of the Chinese open-market economic policy. The 
investing attitude among Chinese investors, consequently, leads to the prevalence of 
‘Envy’ factor. The ‘Envy’-factor-driven individual investors flocked into stock trading 
en masse, portrayed by a steep surge in the number of trading accounts (Class A 
shares) registered with the SHSE and the SZSE over the sample period 1996- 2008 
(from 10 million in 1996 to 80 million by the end of 2008 and from 10 million in 1996 
to 74 million by the end of 2008 respectively).  
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With the perception that the overwhelmingly high proportion of the Chinese retail 
investors, provoking market inefficiency, exaggerated by the press and semi-
professionals, the impact of domestic institutional investors on the Chinese stock 
market microstructure, understandably, has been grossly overlooked. The domestic 
institutional investors can be generally put into four major categories: “the securities 
companies, investment funds, insurance companies and the informal privately-raised 
funds (simu jijin)” (Green, 2003:71). At the first glance, it appears to be rather 
obvious that the economic importance of the individual investors overwhelms that of 
the institutional investors. Yet, like most emerging financial markets, the 
development of the securities law is still at its baby stage, allowing some institutional 
investors abuse their right in the financial market. The manipulations of stock market 
trading by institutional investors directly distorted the picture of the composition of 
market participants in the Chinese stock market observed due to two main reasons: 
first, a large number of formal and informal institutional investors execute trading 
using “fraudulently-opened individual accounts” (Green, 2003: page 70), believed to 
account for 50% of market capitalization.  Secondly, camouflaged with individual 
trading accounts, the domestic institutional investors abuse their right through 
accessing large amount of capital and insider information, and consequently 
possessing influential power over the stock trading operation (Green, 2003).  
Foreign investors 
In response to calling for financial market globalisation and to attract foreign capital, 
the Chinese authority gradually opens up the stock market to foreign investors 
(mainly foreign institutional investors), signified by the decreasing level of restrictions 
on the proportion of foreign stake in companies listed in the Chinese stock market. Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty                                     Appendices 
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This can be vividly illustrated by change in the limit in percentage term for a single 
qualified foreign institutional investors’ (QFII) investment in a listed company over 
years. Prior to 1997, the limit is 10%, which was raised to 15% in 1997, and then to 
30% in 1998. By the end of 2000, the barrier was virtually lifted. In terms of the 
amount of capital that foreign investors are allowed to inject into listed Chinese 
corporation, in 2001, most of QFIIs are subject to the limit of $ 3 billion, which was 
soon completed relaxed(Green, 2003). Foreign institutional investors normally qualify 
to penetrate the Chinese stock market through two avenues: (1) forming joint-
venture securities firms (JVSFs); (2) becoming part of a joint-venture fund 
management firm (JVFMF). Based on CSRC regulations published in June 2002, the 
definitions of the JVSF and JVFMF and the discussion on the development of the 
two avenues can found in Appendix 9.Momentum premium under the influence of information uncertainty                                     Appendices 
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